PAPERS  OF 

THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 
OF  MASSACHUSETTS 

THE   WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

MAY-JUNE  1864 
VOLUME  IV 


NOTE.  —  Citations  of  the  War  Records,  published 
after  the  papers  in  this  Volume  and  Volume  III 
were  read  before  the  Society,  have  been  added 
by  the  authors  or  editors  for  the  publications 


THE 

WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

MAY-JUNE  1864 


PAPERS  OF 
THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

V  \. 

OF  MASSACHUSETTS 
VOL.  IV 


THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

OF  MASSACHUSETTS 

CADET  ARMORY  FERDINAND  STREET 

BOSTON 

1905 


1  <* 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

I.  OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

By  CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.  PORTER,  39th  Mass.  Infantry,  U.  S.V.        1 

II.  LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  THE  WILDERNESS, 

1864 
By  HENRY  ALEXANDER  WHITE,  ^t.A.,  Ph.D.,  D.D.          .     .  .      25 

'  III.  ON  THE  USELESSNESS  OF  THE  MAPS  FURNISHED  TO 
THE    STAFF   OF    THE   ARMY   OF   THE    POTOMAC 
PREVIOUS  TO  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MAY,  1864 
By  COLONEL  THEODORE  LYMAN,  A.  D.  C.  TO  MAJOR-GENERAL 
GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  U.  S.  A 77 

IV.  NOTES  AND    RECOLLECTIONS    OF  THE  OPENING  OF 

THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

By  FIRST  LIEUTENANT  McHENRY  HOWARD,  late  A.  D.  C.  and 
A.  I.  G.,  C.  S.A 81 

V.  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

By  BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  W.  SWAN,  U.  S.  A.     117 

VI.  ADDENDA  TO  THE  PAPER  BY  BREVET  LIEUTENANT- 
COLONEL  SWAN  ON  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WIL 
DERNESS 
By  COLONEL  THEODORE  LYMAN 165 

VII.  THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE  WILDERNESS 

By  BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  HAZARD  STEVENS,  U.  S.  V.    175 

VHI.  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MAY  7-11,  1864 

By  BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  CHARLES  LAWRENCE  PEIR- 
SON,U.  S.  V 205 

IX.  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT,  MAY  12,  1864 

By  MAJOR-GENERAL  FRANCIS  CHANNING  BARLOW,  U.  S.  V.   .    243 

X.  REVIEW    OF    GENERAL    BARLOW'S    PAPER    ON    THE 

CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT 
By  BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  LEWIS  A.  GRANT,  U.  S.  V.        .    263 

XI.  THE    CAPTURE    OF    THE    SALIENT    AT    SPOTTSYL- 

VANIA,  MAY   12,  1864 
By  BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  R.  DRIVER,  U.  S.V.    273 


vi  CONTENTS 

"  XII.  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

MAY  13-JUNE  2,  1864 
By  BREVET  MAJOR  WILLIAM  P.  SHREVE,  U.  S.  V.         .        .    287 

XIII.  THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

By  CAPTAIN  CHARLES  H.  PORTER,  39th  Mass.  Infantry,  U.  S.V.     319 

XIV.  THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq 341 

XV.  GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864 

By  JOHN  C.  ROPES,  Esq 363 

XVI.   GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE 

By  COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE 407 

INDEX  461 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

FROM  THE  RAPIDAN  TO  THE  JAMES 
THE  WILDERNESS 
SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HODSE 
THE  NORTH  ANNA 
THE  TOTOPOTOMOY 
COLD  HARBOR 


ABBREVIATIONS  USEET  IN  REFERENCES  IN 
THIS  VOLUME 

M.  &  S.     Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  Rebellion. 

BADEAU.     Badeau's  Military  History  of  General  Grant. 

SWINTON.     Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.    Revision  and  Reissue  by 

William  Swinton. 

GRANT'S  MEMOIRS.     Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant. 

VA.  CAMP.    The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '64  and  '65.    By  Andrew  A.  Humphreys. 
N.  &  L.     Numbers  and  Losses  in  the  Civil  War  in  America  1861-1865.     By 

Thomas  L.  Livermore. 
WALKER.     History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

By  Francis  A.  Walker. 
W.  R.    The   War  of  the   Rebellion.    Official   Records.     Cited    by  "Serial 

numbers." 

C.  W.     Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War.     Part  1. 
S.  H.  S.     Papers  Southern  Historical  Society. 


I 

OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 
CAPTAIN  CHARLES   H.  PORTER 

39iH  MASSACHDSETTS  INFANTRY,  U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  April  4,  1899 


ERRATA 

PAPERS  OF  THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY  OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 

Vol.  1,  Ed.  of  1895,  p.  41.  In  18th  line,  for  "  before  "  read  "after,"  and 
in  19th  line,  for  "  letter"  read  "  latter,"  thus  making  the 
passage  run  :  "  Patterson,  in  his  testimony  and  '  Narra 
tive,'  places  this  despatch  after  Scott's  of  the  18th  above 
quoted,  but  if  the  text  of  the  latter  "  etc. 

Vol.  3,  p.  469.  The  paragraph  beginning,  "  A  French  writer  of  distinc 
tion,"  and  ending  at  the  bottom  of  the  page,  should  be 
omitted,  as  it  is  out  of  place  here  through  an  error  in 
copying  manuscript.  It  appears  in  its  proper  connection 
on  pages  70  and  71. 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

UPON  the  return  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  December, 
1863,  from  the  Mine  Run  campaign,  all  active  operations 
ceased.  The  troops  took  up  encampments  on  the  neck  of  land 
between  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan  rivers.  Many  of 
the  troops  occupied  the  identical  camps  vacated  by  them  at 
the  opening  of  this  campaign. 

Under  instructions  from  Washington,  Meade  was  author 
ized  to  put  the  army  into  winter  quarters,  and  he  could  remain 
in  his  present  quarters,  or,  for  convenience  in  supplying  it,  he 
could  occupy  ground  north  of  the  Rappahannock. 

Meade  decided  to  occupy  the  ground  already  held  by  us, 
and  with  slight  changes  the  troops  were  put  into  winter  quar 
ters.  The  1st  corps,  in  advance,  and  nearest  the  Rapidan 
River,  connected  on  the  right  and  left  with  the  6th  and  3d 
corps,  with  headquarters  at  Culpeper  Court  House ;  the  6th 
swung  around  to  the  right,  with  headquarters  at  Welford 
House ;  the  3d  was  on  the  left,  with  headquarters  near  Cul 
peper  ;  the  2d  was  still  further  to  the  left,  with  headquarters 
at  Stevensburg ;  the  5th  was  in  the  rear,  and  had  guards 
along  the  railroad  from  Rappahannock  Station  to  Bull  Run, 
with  corps  headquarters  at  Rappahannock  Station.  Camp 
guards  were  established ;  also  extensive  picket  lines,  heavily 
supported  by  reserves.  Outside  of  these  infantry  lines  was  a 
long  cordon  of  cavalry  vedettes,  unbroken  except  at  one  place, 
where  an  infantry  picket  was  maintained  on  the  line  of  the 
cavalry  outposts.  This  was  at  Mitchell's  Station.  For  a  short 
time  there  were  two  brigades  of  infantry,  but  one  was  with 
drawn  early  in  the  winter.  The  brigade  occupying  the  line 
with  cavalry  vedettes  was  1st  brigade,  2d  division,  1st  corps. 


4  THE    WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

General  Merritt's  cavalry  division  was  on  the  right,  Gen 
eral  Kilpatrick's  on  the  left,  and  General  Gregg's  in  the  rear, 
with  headquarters  at  Warrenton  Junction. 

There  was  little  to  vary  the  monotony  of  drill  and  picket. 
The  troops  were  comfortably  housed  in  good  huts,  abundantly 
supplied  with  the  regular  service  ration,  and  were  as  free 
from  scares  and  alarms  as  you  could  possibly  imagine. 

In  January,  1864,  Burnside  was  authorized  to  recruit  the 
9th  corps  to  50,000  men,  and  be  ready  in  the  spring  to  exe 
cute  any  movement  that  should  be  ordered.  Hancock  was 
summoned  to  Washington,  and  as  a  result  he  was  authorized 
to  recruit  his  corps  (the  2d),  to  50,000  men. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  a  letter  was  sent  early  in  1864 
to  various  generals  asking  them  for  opinions  as  to  the  best 
methods  for  making  successful  campaigns  in  the  East.  To 
this  circular  General  Grant,  at  that  time  in  command  of  the 
Mississippi  Department,  replied  advising  a  descent  upon  the 
enemy  in  North  Carolina,  looking  to  the  capture  of  Wilming 
ton,  the  cutting  of  the  railroad  communication  in  that  state, 
the  capture  of  Raleigh,  and  thus  compelling  the  evacuation  of 
Richmond. 

The  quiet  of  the  army  was  not  disturbed  until  February, 
1864.  General  Butler,  then  in  command  at  Fort  Monroe,  con 
ceived  that  a  rapid  movement  could  be  made  against  Rich 
mond,  in  order  to  liberate  the  prisoners  at  Libby  and  Belle 
Isle  and  cause  great  consternation  in  that  city.  To  secure 
success  he  requested  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  should 
make  a  demonstration  against  Lee  to  prevent  his  sending 
troops  to  the  defense  of  that  city.  General  Sedgwick  was 
temporarily  in  command  of  the  army,  General  Meade  being 
sick  in  Philadelphia.  Sedgwick  at  once  replied  that  he  would 
do  so,  although  a  move  at  this  time  and  in  this  way  might 
preclude  a  success  should  later  an  attempt  be  made  in  earnest. 
Accordingly  on  the  5th  of  February,  the  2d  corps  moved  in 
obedience  to  orders  to  Morton's  Ford  on  the  Rapidan  River. 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  5 

The  corps  for  this  movement  was  temporarily  under  the 
command  of  General  Caldwell,  General  Warren  being  unable 
by  reason  of  illness  to  go  out  with  the  troops.  Instead  of  a 
demonstration,  the  movement  was  converted  into  a  real  attack. 
The  troops  under  Hayes  forded  the  river,  rushed  up  the  hill, 
and  actually  drove  the  Confederates  from  their  intrench- 
ments.  It  was  a  real  surprise,  and  could  by  any  means  our 
army  have  been  brought  up  promptly  in  force,  we  could  have 
taken  the  camps  and  met  and  beaten  the  enemy  in  detail. 
Meanwhile  the  1st  corps  had  been  pushed  down  to  Raccoon 
Ford.  Merritt's  cavalry  division  had  deployed  at  Barnet's 
Ford  and  Kilpatrick's  at  Germanna  and  the  lower  fords. 
General  Warren  reached  the  ground  about  4  p.  M.,  and  by 
this  time  the  enemy  had  been  somewhat  reinforced,  and  Webb 
was  put  across  the  river  to  assist  Hayes.  The  demonstration 
having  been  made  and  our  men  being  in  a  rather  precarious 
situation,  General  Warren,  under  cover  of  the  night,  withdrew 
both  Hayes's  and  Webb's  divisions  to  the  north  side  of  the 
river.  Our  losses  were  210  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 
After  remaining  at  the  fords  for  two  days,  the  troops  were 
withdrawn  to  their  camps.  The  enemy,  profiting  by  this  sur 
prise,  immediately  began  fortifying  the  ground  on  the  south 
bank,  and  in  a  very  short  time  had  made  it  secure  against 
another  attack.  Thus  you  see  that  the  movement  prevented 
our  crossing  at  this  point  again,  and  the  demonstration  brought 
about  the  condition  suggested  by  Sedgwick.  Quiet  came  to 
us  until  the  28th  of  February,  when  Kilpatrick  started  on  his 
raid  upon  Richmond.  The  6th  corps  was  pushed  out  on  the 
north  to  distract  attention,  and  the  cavalry,  crossing  at  Ely's 
Ford,  hurried  through  the  woods  of  Chancellorsville  on  their 
way  to  Richmond.  The  death  of  Colonel  Dahlgren  was  the 
most  conspicuous  result  of  the  raid,  and  the  finding  of  certain 
papers  on  his  body  led  to  a  correspondence  between  Gen 
erals  Lee  and  Meade  as  to  whether  or  not  the  papers  were 
a  part  of  the  official  instructions  to  that  commander. 


6  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Early  in  the  winter,  General  Meade  had  requested  author 
ity  to  reorganize  the  army,  by  reducing  the  number  of  the 
corps  to  three.  This  authority  was  granted  to  the  general 
after  a  good  deal  of  correspondence,  and  in  March,  1864,  the 
1st  corps  was  consolidated  with  the  5th ;  two  divisions  of  the 
3d  were  assigned  to  the  2d,  and  one  division  of  the  3d  went 
to  the  6th  corps.  Three  corps  commanders  were  removed,  — 
General  Newton  of  the  1st,  General  French  of  the  3d,  and 
General  Sykes  of  the  5th,  —  the  first  two  by  reason  of  consoli 
dation  ;  the  last  to  give  place  to  General  Warren,  who  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  enlarged  corps.  General 
Hancock  retained  command  of  the  2d,  and  General  Sedgwick 
of  the  6th.  The  2d  and  5th  corps  had  each  four  divisions, 
the  6th  three.  The  result  of  this  consolidation  was  to  give 
three  corps  with  the  average  strength  of  about  25,000  men 
each.  In  the  light  of  the  experience  gained  in  the  campaign, 
I  think  there  is  no  doubt  that  these  corps  were  too  large  to 
be  successfully  handled.  I  am  quite  sure  that  in  the  Wilder 
ness  battle,  smaller  commands  well  handled  would  have  been 
better  than  the  larger  ones. 

Again  it  produced  a  certain  amount  of  dissatisfaction  among 
the  men.  We  were  proud  of  our  records.  The  1st  corps 
had  been  almost  wiped  out  on  the  first  day  at  Gettysburg,  yet 
its  heroic  bravery  had  saved  the  day,  and  caused  hesitation  in 
Lee's  mind  and  made  possible  the  assembling  of  our  army 
on  Cemetery  Ridge.  The  3d  corps,  among  the  first  organ 
ized,  with  a  record  unsurpassed,  and  whose  gallantry  on  every 
field  was  conspicuous,  did  not  relish  being  merged  into  another 
corps.  It  is  true  we  could  wear  our  old  distinctive  badges,  but 
our  corps  name  was  blotted  out  from  the  page  of  history.  I 
think  the  men  fought  quite  as  well  as  ever,  but  while  doing 
so  there  was  always  the  feeling  of  regret  that  this  or  that 
success  did  not  redound  to  the  credit  of  our  old  corps. 

Whatever  may  have  been  in  the  minds  of  the  authorities  at 
Washington,  the  reviving  of  the  rank  of  lieutenant-general, 


OPENING   OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  1 

and  the  assignment  of  General  Grant  to  that  rank,  put  the 
military  affairs  of  the  nation  upon  the  right  basis.  Hereafter 
there  was  to  be  one  supreme  control  of  military  affairs,  and 
all  operations  were  to  be  directed  from  one  headquarters. 

General  Grant  visited  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  a 
short  stay  removed  all  doubts,  if  any  ever  existed  in  his  mind, 
as  to  the  movements  to  be  taken.  He  ordered  Burnside  to 
assemble  his  command  at  Annapolis,  ordered  a  division  of  the 
9th  corps  from  East  Tennessee,  and  thus  gave  the  name  to 
the  troops  assembling  at  that  point.  On  his  return  from  the 
West,  he  took  up  his  headquarters  at  Culpeper  Court  House, 
and  prepared  for  the  opening  of  the  great  campaign. 

At  the  close  of  the  Mine  Run  campaign,  the  Confederate 
army  resumed  its  old  position  south  of  the  Rapidan.  It  was 
composed  of  two  corps,  those  of  Hill  and  Ewell.  General 
Lee's  headquarters  were  at  Orange  Court  House.  His  force 
was  disposed  in  camps  covering  as  much  ground  as  was  neces 
sary  to  give  ample  room  for  camps  and  drill-grounds,  and 
also  to  afford  healthy  quarters  for  the  men.  Ewell  was  on  the 
right,  Hill  on  the  left.  A  large  portion  of  his  cavalry  under 
Rosser  was  detached  to  operate  in  the  Valley  of  the  Shenan- 
doah,  and  against  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  Early 
was  also  in  the  Valley  in  command  of  the  whole  force.  Long- 
street,  after  his  unsuccessful  assault  on  Knoxville,  had  re 
treated  into  the  hills  to  the  northeast  of  that  city,  and  while 
he  was  absolutely  quiet,  his  position  was  one  which  most  seri 
ously  threatened  our  occupation  of  East  Tennessee.  Had  it 
been  decided  by  the  Confederate  authorities  to  advance  against 
our  lines  of  communication,  as  Longstreet  most  earnestly 
advised,  the  whole  military  situation  would  have  been  greatly 
changed.  The  difficulty  of  procuring  supplies  and  transporta 
tion  prevented  this  scheme  from  being  seriously  considered. 
The  activity  in  the  East  and  West,  after  Grant's  promotion, 
shaped  the  military  situation.  Lee  perceived  that  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  being  reinforced.  He  soon  learned  of  the 


8  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

massing  of  the  new  force  under  Burnside  at  Annapolis,  and 
in  turn  he  ordered  Longstreet  to  join  him  in  his  present  posi 
tion,  concentrating  that  corps  at  Gordons ville,  a  most  advan 
tageous  position  to  be  used  in  the  event  of  either  flank  being 
assailed. 

Lee  was  seriously  hampered  for  supplies.  He  never  was 
able  to  have  over  three  days'  rations  on  hand,  and  more  often 
only  one  day's  supply.  He  detached  Hampton  to  Hamilton's 
Crossing,  where  there  was  better  grazing  for  his  horses,  and 
where  also  the  lower  fords  of  the  Rappahannock  could  be 
observed.  The  whole  winter  was  devoted  on  both  sides  to 
serious  and  earnest  preparation  for  the  coming  spring.  It 
was  evident  that  from  this  time  on  it  was  to  be  a  battle  to  the 
death.  On  the  9th  of  April  Grant  issued  to  Meade  his  first 
general  instructions.  I  quote  : l 

"For  information  and  as  instructions  to  govern  your  pre 
parations  for  the  coming  campaign  the  following  is  communi 
cated  confidentially,  for  your  own  perusal  alone  : 

"  So  far  as  practicable,  all  the  armies  are  to  move  together 
and  toward  one  common  centre.  .  .  .  Sherman  will  move  at 
the  same  time  you  do,  or  two  or  three  days  in  advance,  Joe 
Johnston's  army  being  his  objective  point.  .  .  . 

44  Lee's  army  will  be  your  objective  point.  Wherever  Lee 
goes,  there  you  will  go  also.  The  only  point  upon  which  I  am 
now  in  doubt  is  whether  it  will  be  better  to  cross  the  Rapidan 
above  or  below  him.  Each  plan  presents  great  advantages 
over  the  other,  with  corresponding  objections.  By  crossing 
above,  Lee  is  cut  off  from  all  chance  of  ignoring  Richmond 
and  going  north  on  a  raid  ;  but  if  we  take  this  route,  all  we 
do  must  be  done  while  the  rations  we  start  with  hold  out ;  we 
separate  from  Butler  so  that  he  cannot  be  directed  how  to  co 
operate.  By  the  other  route,  Brandy  Station  can  be  used  as  a 
base  of  supplies  until  another  is  secured  on  the  York  or  James 
1  60  W.  R.  827. 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  9 

River.    These  advantages  and  objections  I  will  talk  over  with 
you  more  fully  than  I  can  write  them. 

"  Burnside,  with  a  force  of  probably  25,000  men,  will  re 
inforce  you.  .  .  . 

"  There  will  be  naval  cooperations  on  the  James  River,  and 
transports  and  ferries  will  be  provided,  so  that  should  Lee 
fall  back  into  his  intrenchments  at  Richmond,  Butler's  force 
and  yours  will  be  a  unit,  or  at  least  can  be  made  to  act  as 
such.  .  .  . 

"  Should  Lee's  right  flank  be  our  route,  you  will  want  to 
make  arrangements  for  having  supplies  of  all  sorts  promptly 
forwarded  to  White  House,  on  the  Pamunkey.  Your  esti 
mates  for  this  contingency  should  be  made  at  once.  If  not 
wanted  there,  there  is  every  probability  they  will  be  wanted 
on  the  James  River  or  elsewhere. 

"  If  Lee's  left  is  turned,  large  provision  will  have  to  be 
made  for  ordnance  stores.  I  would  say  not  much  short  of  500 
rounds  of  infantry  ammunition  would  do.  By  the  other,  half 
the  amount  would  be  sufficient. 

"  U.  S.  GRANT, 

"  Lieutenant-General." 

It  will  be  noted  that  while  in  January  Grant  suggested 
operations  in  North  Carolina,  in  the  circular  he  completely 
abandons  the  idea.  He  says  in  regard  to  this,  that  it  was 
never  really  considered,  and  that  but  one  plan  was  really  con 
sidered,  namely,  that  of  this  overland  campaign.  The  organ 
ization  was  now  practically  complete,  the  only  changes  being 
those  made  in  the  cavalry  corps.  General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 
having  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  cavalry  corps, 
assumed  command  on  April  5.  At  his  request  there  were 
some  changes  in  division  commanders.  General  A.  T.  A.  Tor- 
bert,  who  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  6th  corps,  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  1st  division ;  General  D.  McM.  Gregg 
kept  the  2d,  and  General  James  H.  Wilson  was  assigned  to 


10  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  command  of  the  3d.  General  Wesley  Merritt  held  com 
mand  of  a  brigade  under  Torbert. 

It  can  be  well  understood  that  from  this  time  on  there  were 
many  consultations  at  headquarters  as  to  which  flank  of  Lee's 
army  should  be  turned.  The  country  on  our  right  was  fairly 
open,  in  which  the  troops  could  be  easily  handled.  The  real 
objection  to  this  line  of  operations  lay  in  the  fact  that  the 
Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  must  of  necessity  be  our 
line  of  supply.  To  protect  this  a  large  detail  of  men  from  the 
fighting  line  would  be  required,  thus  reducing  our  effective 
force.  Again  there  would  of  necessity  be  large  numbers  of 
wounded  to  be  cared  for,  and  this  line  was  the  only  one  by 
which  they  could  be  transported  to  the  general  hospitals  at 
Washington,  relieving  the  field  hospitals.  The  limit  of  sup 
plies  that  could  possibly  be  carried  in  our  immense  train  of 
rather  more  than  4000  wagons  was  fifteen  days,  and  when 
these  were  exhausted  our  line  of  supply  must  be  called  upon 
and  utilized.  Our  movements  could  be  easily  seen  by  the 
enemy,  and  he  could  thus  meet  our  dispositions  with  perfect 
ease.  Longstreet's  corps  of  two  divisions  was  admirably 
placed  to  meet  our  advance  should  it  be  by  our  right.  It 
seems  to  me  that  the  only  possible  advantage  by  the  right 
flank  march  consisted  of  the  more  open  country  in  which  to 
operate.  From  every  other  standpoint  a  movement  by  the 
left  was  the  most  promising.  Once  through  the  Wilderness  the 
country  was  fairly  open,  and  troops  could  be  easily  handled. 
Our  lines  of  supply  were  clearly  marked  out.  Depots  or  bases 
could  be  made  at  deep-water  points  all  along  the  march,  and 
no  calls  would  be  made  from  the  fighting  line  for  guards  to 
our  train.  These  depots  were  guarded  by  our  left  flank  at  all 
times. 

Grant  hoped  that  he  could  get  through  the  Wilderness 
without  a  fight,  and  would  first  meet  the  enemy  on  his  lines 
at  Mine  Run,  and  that  a  development  to  the  left,  a  movement 
which  was  the  universal  rule  after  the  campaign  opened,  would 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  11 

bring  our  lines  into  fairly  open  country.  With  his  preponder 
ating  force  he  hoped  to  have  a  decisive  battle  in  which  he 
would  be  the  victor,  and  reach  Richmond  much  earlier  than 
he  did.  The  Mine  Run  campaign  also  played  a  great  part  in 
the  decision  which  was  finally  made.  Both  generals,  Meade 
and  Humphreys,  were  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  we  could 
get  through  this  tangle  of  trees,  swamp,  and  underbrush  by  a 
long,  steady  march,  and  that  Lee  would  content  himself  by 
holding  the  Mine  Run  lines  and  awaiting  developments.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  on  the  Mine  Run  campaign  two  corps, 
the  6th  and  the  3d,  crossed  at  Jacobs  Mill  Ford,  just  below 
the  mouth  of  Mine  Run,  the  2d  at  Germanna  Ford,  and  the 
5th  and  1st  at  Culpeper  Mine  Ford,  swinging  up  to  the  Ger 
manna  Road  after  it  was  clear  of  the  2d.  It  will  be  observed 
that  our  forces  were  able  to  effect  their  crossing  and  take  up 
their  line  of  march  on  the  second  day  across  the  river,  and 
reach  the  position  assigned  them  without  serious  resistance 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  except  on  the  front  of  the  3d  corps, 
and  then  in  such  a  small  way  as  to  prove  of  no  importance  as 
affecting  the  general  movement.  For  some  unexplainable  rea 
son,  French,  at  that  time  in  command  of  the  3d  corps,  did  not 
reach  the  position  assigned  him,  and  when  he  did  move  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  second  day,  he  met  the  enemy  in  a  good  deal 
of  force.  The  success  in  reaching  these  positions  made  Meade 
and  Humphreys  view  the  line  of  advance  by  the  left  flank  as 
the  one  to  be  followed. 

On  April  25,  Burnside,  with  his  column  of  troops,  began 
to  relieve  the  5th  corps  from  Bull  Run  to  Rappahannock 
Station,  and  these  divisions  were  assembled  between  Brandy 
and  Rappahannock  stations,  preparatory  to  the  final  move. 
The  decision  was  made  to  move  by  our  left  flank,  and  General 
Humphreys,  chief  of  staff,  was  directed  by  Meade  to  prepare 
the  proper  orders. 

Before  considering  the  order  which  was  issued,  it  will  be  well 
to  give  the  numbers  of  each  army  as  nearly  as  can  be  stated. 


12  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

So  far  as  our  own  army  is  concerned,  these  can  be  given  very 
accurately,  although  it  must  be  remembered  that  from  the 
number  reported  as  "  present  equipped  "  there  can  safely  be 
deducted  at  least  ten  per  cent,  for  the  real  strength  of  the 
fighting  line.1  By  the  return  of  April  30,  1864,  there  were 
"present  for  duty  equipped  "  of  all  arms  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  99,438  officers  and  men,  divided  as  follows : 

Second  Corps 26,681  officers  and  men 

Fifth                24,125 

Sixth                22,584 

Cavalry            12,424 

Artillery           4,801                                      with  150  guns 

Artillery  of  Cavalry  Corps  863                                                 32  guns 

Total 91,478  182  guns 

Detailed  : 

Provost  Guard     .     .     .     e  1,118  officers  and  men 

Engineers 2,276 

Reserve  Artillery     .     .     .  2,116 
Infantry    Guard    for    Re 
serve  Artillery     .     .     .  2,450  7,960          92  guns 

Total 7,960  99,438       274  guns 

In  addition: 

Ninth  Corps 19,331          42  guns 


Total 118,769       316  guns 

Of  this  force  of  118,769  officers  and  men,  there  were  de 
tailed,  as  appears  above,  7960  officers  and  men.  If  now  we 
deduct  from  the  118,769,  the  engineers,  provost  guard,  in 
fantry  guard  to  trains,  and  the  colored  division,  we  have  a 
force  of  about  100,000  officers  and  men. 

Of  this  force  assembled  many  were  new  men,  and  particu 
larly  in  the  9th  corps,  as  there  were  in  it  but  6000  seasoned 
troops.  In  my  judgment  it  is  perfectly  safe  to  say  that  there 

1  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  1864-65,  by  Major-General  A.  A.  Humphreys, 
U.  S.  A.,  p.  14,  and  Appendix,  p.  408. 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  13 

were  not  over  75,000  seasoned  troops  with  the  colors  in  the 
army,  and  it  will  be  noted  that  one  division  of  the  9th  corps 
was  assigned  as  guard  to  the  train  and  never  was  in  the  fight 
ing  line  until  after  crossing  the  James  River. 

Our  supply  train  consisted  of  rather  more  than  4000 
wagons,  and  in  addition  there  was  a  light  train  which  was 
always  up  with  the  troops. 

In  giving  the  numbers  of  the  Confederate  army  it  is  ex 
ceedingly  difficult  to  determine  how  many  men  were  in  their 
army.1  General  Humphreys,  a  most  careful  and  painstaking 
officer,  estimates  that  there  were  present  equipped  not  less 
than  61,953  officers  and  men  of  all  branches  of  the  service, 
every  one  of  which  could  be  put  on  the  fighting  line,  divided 
as  follows : 

Infantry 48,700  officers  and  men. 

Artillery 4,854      "         "       " 

Cavalry 8,399  with  probably  224  guns. 

Total 61,953 

I  am  inclined  to  think  that  there  were  not  less  than  65,000 
men,  and  I  reach  this  conclusion  from  the  fact  that  in  the 
roster  of  troops  as  given  there  are  omitted  not  less  than  two 
or  three  brigades  which  must  have  been  present.  Moreover, 
these  men  were  veterans  and  had  fought  on  many  a  field. 
There  were  but  few  recruits,  and  the  increase  in  numbers 
during  the  winter  resulted  from  the  return  of  convalescents 
and  wounded  men. 

Having  decided  to  move  by  the  left  flank,  on  May  2,  1864, 
the  following  order  was  issued.  This  order  is  most  carefully 
drawn  and  is  complete  in  its  every  detail,  and  the  movements 
most  thoroughly  thought  out : 

1  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  1864-65,  by  Major-General  A.  A.  Humphreys, 
U.  S.  A.,  p.  15. 


14  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

May  2,  1864.1 
(Orders.) 

1.  The  army  will  move  on  Wednesday,  the  4th  of  May, 
1864. 

2.  On  the  day  previous,  Tuesday,  the  3d  of  May,  Major- 
General    Sheridan,    commanding   cavalry   corps,    will   move 
Gregg's  cavalry  division  to  the  vicinity  of  Richardsville.    It 
will  be  accompanied  by  one  half  of  the  canvas  pontoon  train, 
the  engineer  troops  with  which  will  repair  the   road  to  Ely's 
Ford  as  far  as  practicable  without  exposing  their  work  to  the 
observation  of  the  enemy.    Guards  will  be  placed  in  all  the 
occupied  houses  on  or  in  the  vicinity  of  the  route  of  the 
cavalry  and  in  advance  of  the  Rapidan,  so  as  to  prevent  any 
communication  with  the  enemy  by  the  inhabitants.  The  same 
precaution  will  be  taken  at  the  same  time  in  front  of  the  1st 
and  3d  cavalry  divisions,  and  wherever  it  may  be  considered 
necessary.    At  2  A.  M.  of  the  4th  May,  Gregg's  division  will 
move  to  Ely's  Eord,  cross   the  Rapidan  as  soon  as  the  canvas 
pontoon  bridge  is   laid,  if  the  river  is  not  fortlable,  and,  as 
soon  as  the  infantry  of  the  2d  corps  is  up,  will  move  to  the 
vicinity  of  Piney  Branch  Church,  or  in  that  section,  throwing 
reconnoissances  well  out  on  the  Pamunkey  Road  toward  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House,  Hamilton's  Crossing,  and  Fredericks- 
burg.    The  roads  past  Piney  Branch  Church,  Todd's  Tavern, 
etc.,  will  be  kept  clear  for  the  passage  of  the  infantry  the  fol 
lowing  day.    The  cavalry  divisions  will  remain  in  this  position 
to  cover  the  passage  of  the  army  trains,  and  will  move  with 
them  and  cover  their  left  flank.    At  midnight  of  the  3d  of 
May,  the  3d  cavalry  division,  with  one  half  the  canvas  pontoon 
bridge  train,  which  will  join  it  after  dark,  will  move  to  Ger- 
manna  Ford,  taking  the  plank  road,  and  cross  the  Rapidan 
as  soon  as   the   bridge  is  laid,  if  the  river  is  not  fordable, 
and  hold  the  crossing  until  the  infantry  of  the  5th  corps  is 

1  W.  R.  vol.  Ixviii.  pp.  331-334. 


OPENING   OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  15 

up.  It  will  then  move  to  Parker's  Store,  on  the  Orange  Court 
House  Plank  Koad,  or  that  vicinity,  sending  out  strong  recon- 
noissances  on  the  Orange  pike  and  plank  roads  and  the 
Catharpin  and  Pamunkey  roads,  until  they  feel  the  enemy, 
and  at  least  as  far  as  Robertson's  Tavern,  the  New  Hope 
Church,  and  Ormond's  or  Robertson's.  All  intelligence  con 
cerning  the  enemy  will  be  communicated  with  promptitude  to 
headquarters  and  to  the  corps  and  division  commanders  of  the 
nearest  infantry  troops. 

3.  Major- General   Warren,  commanding   5th   corps,   will 
send  two  divisions  at  midnight  of  the  3d  instant,  by  way  of 
Stevensburg  and  the  plank  road,  to  the  crossing  at  Germanna 
Ford.    So  much  of  the  bridge  train  of  the  5th  corps  as  may 
be  necessary  to  bridge  the  Rapidan  at  Germanna  Ford,  with 
such  artillery  as  may  be  required,  will  accompany  these  divi 
sions,  which  will  be  followed  by  the  remainder  of  the  corps  at 
such  hour  that  the  column  will  cross  the  Rapidan  without 
delay.    Such  disposition  of  the  troops  and  artillery  as  may  be 
found  necessary  to  cover  the  bridge  will  be  made  by  the  corps 
commander,  who,  after  crossing,  will  move  to  the  vicinity  of 
the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  on  the  Orange  Court  House  Pike. 
The    corps   will    move  the  following   day  past  the  head  of 
Catharpin  Run,  crossing  the  Orange  Court  House  Plank  Road 
at  Parker's  Store. 

4.  Major-General   Sedgwick,  commanding  6th  corps,  will 
move  at  4  A.  M.  of  the  4th  instant,  by  way  of  Stevensburg  and 
the  Germanna  Plank  Road  to  Germanna  Ford,  following  the 
5th  corps,  and,  after  crossing  the  Rapidan,  will  bivouac  on 
the  heights  beyond.    The  canvas  pontoon  train  will  be  taken 
up  as  soon  as  the  troops  of  the  6th  corps  have  crossed,  and 
will  follow  immediately  in  rear  of  the  troops  of  that  corps.   So 
much  of  the  bridge  train  of  the  6th  corps  as  may  be  neces 
sary  to  bridge  the  Rapidan  at  Culpeper  Mine  Ford  will  pro 
ceed  to  Richardsville  in  rear  of    the  reserve   artillery,   and 
as  soon   as   it   is   ascertained  that  the  reserve  artillery  are 


16  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

crossing,  it  will  move  to  Culpeper  Mine  Ford,  where  the 
bridge  will  be  established.  The  engineers  of  this  bridge  train 
will  at  once  open  a  road  from  Culpeper  Mine  Ford  direct  to 
Richardsville. 

5.  Major-General   Hancock,   commanding   2d   corps,  will 
send  two  divisions,  with  so  much  of  the  bridge  train  as  may 
be  necessary  to  bridge  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  Ford,  and  such 
artillery  as  may  be  required,  at  midnight  of  the  3d  instant, 
to  Ely's  Ford.    The  remainder  of  the  corps  will  follow  at  such 
hour  that  the  column  will  cross  the  Rapidan  without  delay. 
The  canvas  pontoon  bridge  at  this  ford  will  be  taken  up  as 
soon  as  the  troops  of  this  corps  have  passed,  and  will  move 
with  it  at  the  head  of  the  trains  that  accompany  the  troops. 
The  wooden  pontoon  bridge  will  remain.    The  2d  corps  will 
enter  the  Stevensburg  and  Richardsville  Road  at  Madden's 
in  order  that  the  route  from  Stevensburg  to  the  plank  road 
may  be  free  for  the  5th  and  6th  corps.   After  crossing  the 
Rapidan,  the  2d  corps  will  move  to  the  vicinity  of  Chandler's 
or  Chancellorsville. 

6.  It  is  expected  that  the  advanced  divisions  of  the  5th 
and  2d  corps,  with  the  wooden  pontoon  trains,  will  be  at  the 
designated  points  of  crossing  not  later  than  6  A.  M.  of  the 
4th  instant. 

7.  The  reserve  artillery  will  move  at   3  A.  M.  of  the  4th 
instant,  and  follow  the  2d  corps,  passing  Mountain  Run  at 
Ross's  Mill  or  Hamilton's,  cross  at  Ely's  Ford,  take  the  road 
to  Chancellorsville,  and  halt  for  the  night  at  Hunting  Creek. 

8.  Great  care  will  be  taken  by  the  corps  commanders  that 
the  roads  are  promptly  repaired  by  the  pioneers  wherever 
needed,  not  only  for  the  temporary  wants  of  the  division  or 
corps  to  which  the  pioneers  belong,  but  for  the  passage  of  the 
troops  and  trains  that  follow  on  the  same  route. 

9.  During  the  movement  of  the  4th  and  following  days  the 
commanders  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps  will  occupy  the  roads 
on  the  right  flank,  to  cover  the  passage  of  their  corps,  and 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  17 

will  keep  their  flankers  well  out  in  that  direction.  The  com 
manders  of  the  2d  corps  and  reserve  artillery  will  in  a 
similar  manner  look  out  for  the  left  flank.  Whenever  prac 
ticable,  double  columns  will  be  used  to  shorten  the  col 
umns.  Corps  commanders  will  keep  in  communication  and 
connect  with  each  other,  and  cooperate  whenever  necessary. 
Their  picket  lines  will  be  connected.  They  will  keep  the  com 
manding  general  constantly  advised  of  their  progress  and  of 
everything  important  that  occurs,  and  will  send  staff  officers 
to  acquaint  him  with  the  location  of  their  headquarters.  Dur 
ing  the  movement  of  the  4th  instant,  headquarters  will  be  on 
the  route  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps.  It  will  be  established  at 
night  between  these  corps  on  the  Germanna  Plank  Road. 

10.  The  infantry  troops  will  take  with  them  fifty  rounds  of 
ammunition  upon  the  person,  three  days'  full  rations  in  the 
haversacks,  three  days'  bread  and  small  rations  in  the  knap 
sacks,  and  three  days'  beef  on  the  hoof.   Each  corps  will  take 
with  it  one  half  its  infantry  ammunition,  one  half  the  intrench 
ing  tools,  one  hospital  wagon  and  one  medicine  wagon  for  each 
brigade,  one  half  the  ambulance  trains,  and  the  light  spring 
wagons  and  pack  animals  allowed  at  the  various  headquarters. 
No  other  train  or  means  of  transportation  than  those  just 
specified  will  accompany  the  corps,  except  such  wagons  as 
may  be  necessary  for  the  forage  for  immediate  use  (five  days). 
The  artillery  will  have  with  them  the  ammunition  of  the  cais 
sons  only. 

11.  The  subsistence  and  other  trains,  loaded  with  the  amount 
of  rations,  forage,  infantry,  and  artillery  ammunition,  etc.,  here 
tofore  ordered,  the  surplus  wooden  pontoons  of  the  different 
corps,  etc.,  will  be  assembled  under  the  direction  of  the  chief 
quartermaster  of  the  army  in  the  vicinity  of  Richardsville, 
with  a  view  to  crossing  the  Rapidan  by  bridges  at  Ely's  Ford 
and  Culpeper  Mine  Ford. 

12.  A  detail  of  1000  or  1200  men  will  be  made  from  each 
corps  as  guard  for  its  subsistence  and   other  trains.    This 


18  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

detail  will  be  composed  of  entire  regiments  as  far  as  prac 
ticable.  No  other  guards  whatever  for  regimental,  brigade, 
division,  or  corps  wagons  will  be  allowed.  Each  detail  will 
be  under  the  command  of  an  officer  selected  for  that  purpose, 
and  the  whole  will  be  commanded  by  the  senior  officer  of  the 
three.  This  guard  will  be  so  disposed  as  to  protect  the  trains 
on  the  march  and  in  park.  The  trains  are  likewise  protected 
by  cavalry  on  the  flanks  and  rear. 

13.  Major-General   Sheridan,  commanding  cavalry  corps, 
will  direct  the  1st  cavalry  division  to  call  in  its  pickets  and 
patrols  on  the  right  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  instant,  and 
hold  itself  ready  to  move  and  cover  the  trains  of  the  army. 
It  will  picket   and  watch   the  fords  of   the   Rapidan  from 
Rapidan  Station  to  Germanna  Ford.    On  the  morning  of  the 
5th  the  1st  cavalry  division  will  cross  the  Rapidan  at  Ger 
manna  Ford  and  cover  the   right  flank  of  the  trains   while 
crossing  the  Rapidan  and  during  their  movements  in  rear  of 
the  army.    The  signal  stations  on  Cedar,  Pony,  and  Stony 
mountains  will  be  maintained  as  long  as  practicable. 

14.  The  wooden  pontoon  bridges  at  Germanna  Ford  and 
Ely's  Ford  will  remain  for  the  passage  of  General  Burnside's 
army.    That  at  Culpeper  Mine  Ford  will  be  taken  up,  under 
the  direction  of  the  chief  engineer,  as  soon  as  the  trains  have 
crossed,  and  will  move  with  the  train  of  its  corps. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Meade : 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

Promptly  at  the  hours  designated  in  the  orders,  the  move 
ment  began,  and  proceeded  without  the  slightest  interruption. 
Everything  moved  with  the  utmost  ease  and  regularity.  There 
was  no  friction.  There  were  no  hitches.  The  enemy,  aside  from 
a  few  outposts  at  the  fords,  were  not  to  be  seen.  There  was 
absolutely  no  resistance  to  our  march.  The  day  was  bright, 
clear,  and  not  too  warm  —  a  day  on  which  the  troops  could  do 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  19 

their  best.  The  head  of  column  reached  the  fords  on  time. 
Gregg  cleared  the  way  for  the  2d  corps,  and  its  head  of  col 
umn  reached  Chancellorsville  between  nine  and  ten  A.  M.  The 
head  of  column  of  the  5th  corps  was  at  Wilderness  Tavern 
between  twelve  and  one  P.  M.  The  6th  corps  was  well  across 
the  river  by  the  afternoon  of  May  4,  two  divisions  being 
pushed  some  three  miles  up  the  road  to  encamp  for  the  night 
in  rear  of  and  close  in  support  of  the  5th.  Wilson's  division 
of  cavalry  had  cleared  the  way  from  Germanna,  and  was  well 
by  Wilderness  Tavern.  He  pushed  out  observation  columns 
on  the  pike,  well  out  to  Locust  Grove,  and  also  occupied  the 
plank  road,  looking  to  Parker's  Store.  Torbert  had  not  moved 
but  covered  our  right  flank,  on  the  north  side  of  the  Rapidan. 
One  division  of  the  6th  corps  was  retained  to  guard  the  wagon 
train,  which,  as  well  may  be  imagined,  was  a  source  of  great 
anxiety  to  Grant  and  Meade.  The  movement  was  successful 
in  every  respect.  The  units  of  the  army  were  exceedingly  well 
handled,  and  in  all  my  observation  there  were  no  movements 
ever  made  where  everything  was  accomplished  with  so  much 
ease  as  this  opening  march.  The  troops  were  in  the  best  of 
spirits.  They  believed  that  the  supreme  effort  to  bring  the 
rebellion  to  a  close  was  being  made.  There  was  enthusiasm 
and  determination  in  the  minds  of  every  one.  The  troops 
halted  at  an  early  hour,  going  into  bivouac  long  before  sunset. 
There  is  no  doubt  but  that  Warren  could  easily  have  made 
Parker's  Store  on  the  4th,  even  using  Griffin  on  the  pike  as  a 
pivot  around  which  to  swing  his  other  divisions.  The  6th 
could  easily  have  got  no  less  than  two  divisions  up  to  the  Wil 
derness  Tavern.  One  division  could  have  moved  out  on  the 
pike  to  support  Griffin,  a.nd  one  could  have  been  used  to  sup 
port  the  left  of  the  5th  corps,  as  was  actually  done  on  the 
5th  of  May.  The  great  wagon  train  was  the  cause  of  the  early 
camping  this  evening,  the  safety  of  which,  together  with  the 
belief  that  Lee  would  halt  at  Mine  Run,  caused  the  early 
bivouac. 


20  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Meanwhile  the  enemy  had  not  been  idle.  Daylight  of  the 
4th  revealed  the  situation,  and  Lee  ordered  Ewell  to  move 
down  the  pike  to  Mine  Run,  and  Hill  down  the  plank  road  to 
Parker's  Store,  and  Longstreet  was  directed  to  move  from 
Gordonsville  to  reinforce  Hill  on  the  plank  road.  Lee  had 
received  the  news  of  the  advance  of  Burnside  down  the  Orange 
and  Alexandria  Railroad.  He  had  been  told  of  the  changes  in 
position  of  troops,  all  of  which  betokened  an  early  move.  He 
had  been  told  of  the  move  of  Gregg  on  the  3d,  but  daylight 
of  the  4th  told  him  that  Grant  was  turning  his  right  flank 
and  that  the  campaign  had  begun.  He  met  the  advance  of 
Grant  and  determined  to  put  himself  in  position  where  he 
could  strike  the  flank  of  our  army  in  its  march  through  the 
Wilderness.  His  first  idea  was  to  stop  at  Mine  Run  until  his 
army  was  united,  but  activity  on  the  part  of  Ewell  and  Hill 
in  pushing  out  beyond  these  lines  brought  on  the  fight  at  the 
Wilderness  on  May  5,  directly  against  the  orders  of  Lee, 
who  continually  advised  both  of  these  generals  not  to  bring 
on  a  fight.  Indeed,  if  I  read  the  dispatches  correctly,  he  had 
no  idea  or  wish  to  fight  on  this  day  at  all. 

The  enemy  had  been  closely  observed.  The  signal  stations 
at  Cedar,  Pony,  and  Stony  mountains,  quickly  discovered  the 
movements  of  the  Confederates  in  abandoning  their  camps. 
Huge  clouds  of  dust  were  observed,  and  it  was  reported  very 
promptly  to  headquarters.  Our  signal  corps  read  a  message 
from  Lee  which  directed  Hill  and  Ewell  to  occupy  the  Mine 
Run  intrenchments.  This  dispatch  was  early  in  the  hands  of 
Grant,  and  I  have  little  doubt  but  that  it  served  to  convince 
the  commanding  general  that  he  could  get  into  the  positions 
assigned  in  the  general  order  to  be  sent  out  .directing  move 
ments  to  be  made  on  the  following  day. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  when  Grant  found  the  enemy 
were  in  force  in  advance  of  the  Mine  Run  line,  he  should  have 
taken  up  the  best  position  available  and  carefully  intrenched 
his  entire  front.  Believing  as  he  did  that  we  could  make  the 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  21 

movements  directed  in  the  order  which  I  will  soon  read,  it 
seems  to  me  that  he  did  intend  to  intrench,  but  on  the  line 
which  was  to  be  occupied  by  the  troops  on  the  forenoon  of 
the  5th  of  May.  The  marches  were  very  short,  and  had  there 
been  no  opposition,  it  is  quite  certain  that  by  noon  of  this 
day  our  army  would  have  been  in  a  fine  position,  and  one 
easily  defended. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  there  was  issued  from  general 
headquarters  the  following  order,  dated  6  p.  M. : 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

May  4,  1864,  6  P.  M.I 
(Orders.) 

The  following  movements  are  ordered  for  the  5th  of  May, 
1864: 

1.  Major-General  Sheridan,  commanding  cavalry  corps,  will 
move  with  Gregg's  and  Torbert's  divisions  against  the  enemy's 
cavalry  in  the  direction  of  Hamilton's   Crossing.    General 
Wilson,  with  the  3d  cavalry  division,  will  move  at  5  A.  M. 
to  Craig's  Meeting  House,  on  the  Catharpin  Road.    He  will 
keep  out  parties  on  the  Orange  Court  House  pike  and  plank 
roads,  the  Catharpin  Road,  Pamunkey  Road  (road  to  Orange 
Springs),  and  in  the  direction  of  Twyman's  Store  and  An 
drew's  Tavern  or  Good  Hope  Church. 

2.  Major-General    Hancock,   commanding    2d  corps,  will 
move  at  5  A.  M.  to  Shady  Grove  Church  and  extend  his  right 
toward  the  5th  corps  at  Parker's  Store. 

3.  Major-General  Warren,    commanding   5th  corps,   will 
move  at  5  A.  M.  to  Parker's  Store,  on  the  Orange  Court  House 
Plank  Road,  and  extend  his  right  toward  the  6th  corps  at  Old 
Wilderness  Tavern. 

4.  Major-General  Sedgwick,  commanding  6th  corps,  will 
move  to  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  on  the  Orange  Court  House 
Pike,  as  soon  as  the  road  is  clear.    He  will  leave  a  division  to 

1  W.  R.  vol.  Ixviii.  p.  371. 


22  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

cover  the  bridge  at  Germanna  Ford  until  informed  from  these 
headquarters  of  the  arrival  of  General  Burnside's  troops  there. 

5.  The  reserve  artillery  will  move  to  Corbin's  Bridge  as 
soon  as  the  road  is  clear. 

6.  The  trains   will  be  parked   in  the  vicinity  of  Todd's 
Tavern. 

7.  Headquarters  will  be  on  the  Orange  Court  House  Plank 
Koad  near  the  5th  corps. 

8.  After  reaching  the  points  designated,  the  army  will  be 
held  ready  to  move  forward. 

9.  The  commanders  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps  will  keep  out 
detachments  on  the  roads  on  their  right  flank.  The  commander 
of  the  2d  corps  will  do  the  same  on  the  roads  on  his  front. 
These  flankers  and  pickets  will  be  thrown  well  out  and  their 
troops  be  held  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  at  any  moment. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Meade  : 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

The  night  of  the  4th  was  quiet.  On  the  early  morning  of 
the  5th  the  pickets  in  front  of  Griffin  fired  some  few  shots, 
and  the  presence  of  the  enemy  was  detected.  These  were 
advanced  parties  supported  by  no  force.  In  obedience  to  the 
instructions  given  in  orders  issued  at  6  P.  M.,  May  4,  Warren, 
on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  moved  Crawford's  division  from 
his  camp  of  the  night  before  across  the  fields  to  the  Chewning 
farm  on  his  way  to  Parker's  Store.  Wilson,  who  had  been  out 
to  Parker's  Store,  was  early  engaged  with  the  enemy  and 
forced  from  that  place.  The  head  of  Crawford's  column  had 
nearly  reached  the  plank  road  when  his  advance  was  met  by 
the  advance  of  Hill's  corps,  and  was  soon  driven  back  by  a  force 
much  larger  than  his  own.  Following  Crawford  were  Wads- 
worth  and  Robinson's  divisions.  Griffin  on  the  pike  had  by 
this  time  become  vigorously  engaged,  and  it  was  found  that 
no  movements  could  be  made,  but  a  line  of  battle  formed  and 


OPENING  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864  23 

attempts  made  to  crush  the  enemy.  It  is  apparent  from  the 
reading  of  the  afternoon  order  of  May  4  that  the  enemy  was 
carefully  observed  and  an  engagement  might  be  expected  at 
any  time,  especially  after  the  troops  had  reached  the  positions 
assigned  them.  The  one  that  actually  took  place  placed 
our  army  at  a  disadvantage,  and  while  it  resulted  in  a  drawn 
battle,  success  just  failing  to  stay  in  our  grasp,  which  would 
surely  have  been  with  us  if  the  country  had  been  more  open,  I 
cannot  but  feel,  however,  that  it  was  quite  unfortunate  for  us 
that  our  march  had  not  been  at  least  continued  for  a  couple  of 
hours  on  May  4.  Grant,  having  found  that  Lee  was  pushing 
to  meet  him,  ordered  Burnside  to  make  a  forced  march,  and 
reach  the  army  as  soon  as  possible.  Torbert  was  withdrawn, 
and  everything  after  May  6  was  south  of  the  Rapidan.  Burn- 
side  pushed  his  corps,  some  of  his  troops  making  about  forty 
miles,  but  it  was  a  terrible  blow  to  this  corps.  As  quite  two 
thirds  of  its  men  were  recruits,  it  proved  too  severe  on  them, 
and  as  a  result  it  reduced  the  effective  strength  not  less  than 
twenty-five  per  cent.,  and  one  of  its  divisions,  the  4th,  remained 
with  the  train  from  this  time  until  in  front  of  Petersburg. 
That  Grant  hoped  to  get  through  the  Wilderness  without 
a  battle,  is  evident.  That  it  was  believed  at  headquarters  by 
Meade  and  Humphreys  to  be  possible,  is  also  true.  Their 
judgment  and  belief  were  based  upon  the  experience  gained 
in  the  Mine  Run  campaign. 

The  aggressiveness  of  Lee  changed  the  situation  and  caused 
an  entirely  different  course  to  be  pursued. 

The  campaign  was  opened  on  the  plan  laid  out  by  that 
master  spirit  of  military  science,  General  Humphreys,  and  he 
believed  that  the  lines  laid  down  were  the  best  suited  to  get 
through  the  first  part  of  our  difficulties. 

Would  a  prolongation  of  the  march  of  May  4  have  so  far 
uncovered  our  rear  and  exposed  the  trains  to  harm,  is  the 
question.  With  Torbert  north  of  the  river,  Rickett's  division 
at  the  river,  it  seems  to  me  that  our  communications  were 


24  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

safe,  especially  as  Burnside  was  within  supporting  distance, 
and  I  am  sure  we  could  have  kept  Hill  and  Ewell  busy  on  the 
5th,  as  we  did,  with  our  troops  in  better  position  than  that 
we  were  forced  into.  The  fact  is,  the  enemy  were  about  half 
a  day's  march  ahead  of  expectations,  and  the  early  halt  of 
the  first  day  caused  delays  which  brought  conditions  not 
expected  at  headquarters. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  crossed  the  Rapidan,  how 
ever,  for  the  last  time.  Its  march  was  ever  onward.  Blows 
were  given  and  received,  and  success  was  finally  achieved 
after  many  weary  days,  nearly  a  year  later,  at  Appomattox 
Court  House. 


II 

LEE'S  WRESTLE   WITH   GRANT  IN   THE 
WILDERNESS  1864 

BY 

HENRY  ALEXANDER  WHITE 
M.  A.,  PH.  D.,  D.  D. 


Read  before  the  Society  March  2, 1897 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH    GRANT   IN  THE 
WILDERNESS  1864 

THE  spring  of  1864  found  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
intrenched  upon  the  bluffs  that  skirt  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Rapidan  River.  Behind  the  army  to  the  southward  were 
outspread  the  tangled  forests  of  the  Piedmont  and  Tidewater 
sections  of  central  Virginia.  The  flight  of  the  bee  toward 
the  rear  from  the  position  of  the  Confederate  guns  would 
pass  across  the  network  of  streams  that  feed  the  York  and 
the  James,  and  at  the  distance  of  sixty-five  miles  would  find 
Richmond,  the  capital  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  Twenty 
miles  in  length  was  the  Confederate  line  of  defense,  behind 
the  Rapidan.  The  left  flank  was  guarded  by  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad,  and  the  right  was  made  strong  by  the 
intrenchments  that  followed  the  windings  of  the  forest  stream 
of  Mine  Run.  From  this  fortress  established  in  the  midst  of 
a  land  of  rolling  hills  and  level  plains  the  Confederate  cannon 
frowned  upon  every  avenue  of  approach  from  the  direction 
of  Culpeper  Court  House.  The  latter  was  the  adopted  home 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  ten  miles  due  northward  from 
the  central  point  in  the  works  occupied  by  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. 

The  second  day  of  May,  1864,  brought  General  Lee  to  the 
signal  station  on  the  summit  of  Clark's  Mountain,  just  behind 
the  advanced  guns  of  his  own  right  wing.  A  simple  suit  of 
plain  gray  cloth  formed  the  outward  apparel  of  the  grave, 
courtly  Virginian.  Upon  his  person  were  displayed  none  of 
the  insignia  of  military  rank.  The  gray  slouch  hat  was  in 
keeping  with  the  unassuming  dignity  of  the  man.  The  frosts 
of  three  winters  spent  in  camp  had  silvered  the  hair  and 
made  deeper  the  lines  in  the  brow,  but  likewise  had  they  set 


28  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

a  more  intense  glow  in  the  eye,  whose  flashings  often  spoke  of 
the  fire  that  slumbered  within.  Unabated  was  Lee's  natural 
vigor  as  he  stood  in  the  beauty  of  perfect  manhood  and  with 
field-glass  swept  the  plains  of  Culpeper  to  discern  the  future 
movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Along  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  Railroad  from  the 
Rapidan  far  northward  toward  the  Rappahannock,  Lee  could 
look  upon  a  great  city  of  tents,  and  above  the  city  he  saw  ban 
ners  unfurled  in  multitude  to  declare  the  presence  of  a  vast 
host  of  Federal  soldiery.  Long  time  did  Lee  scan  the  warlike 
horizon.  Carefully  did  he  note  the  location  and  arrangement 
of  the  Federal  encampment,  to  see  if  Grant's  intent  was  favor 
able  to  early  battle.  Early  battle  the  Federal  commander 
seemed  to  desire.  There  was  much  riding  to  and  fro ;  there 
was  great  commotion  in  Culpeper  that  May  day,  and  it  was 
evident  to  Lee  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  soon 
strike  tent  and  advance  southward. 

Again  Lee  scans  the  horizon  of  the  field  of  war.  What 
route  will  the  new  commander  choose  ?  Recent  cavalry  move 
ments  along  the  borders  of  the  upper  Rapidan  beyond  the 
left  flank  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  indicate  a  possi 
ble  advance  of  the  Federal  army  in  that  direction.  But  east 
ward  from  the  Confederate  position  lies  the  region  of  pre 
vious  Federal  assaults.  In  the  distance  to  Lee's  right  is 
Fredericksburg,  the  field  of  Burnside  ;  halfway  between  Lee's 
mount  of  observation  and  the  Marye  Heights  lies  Hooker's 
battle-ground  at  Chancellors ville.  Immediately  on  his  right 
Lee's  glass  may  discern  the  course  of  Mine  Run,  from  whose 
intrenched  banks  General  Meade  withdrew  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  the  previous  November.  Only  two  months  old  in 
May  is  the  memory  of  the  cavalry  raid  led  by  Kilpatrick  and 
Dahlgren  across  Ely's  Ford,  through  Spottsylvania,  upon 
Richmond. 

While  Lee  thus  seeks  to  discern  the  future  through  his 
glass  and  weighs  the  chances  of  approaching  battle,  his  corps 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     29 

and  division  commanders  likewise  scan  the  field  and  await 
their  commander's  expression  of  opinion.  The  chief  of  Lee's 
1st  army  corps  is  Longstreet ;  from  the  beginning  he  has 
commanded  one  wing  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  — 
slow  and  deliberate  on  the  march,  impetuous  and  fierce  in 
the  hour  of  battle.  Kershaw  and  Field  stand  near  him,  lead 
ers  of  the  two  divisions  now  constituting  the  1st  corps.  Ker 
shaw  won  his  spurs  behind  the  stone  wall  at  Fredericksburg 
and  now  commands  McLaw's  old  division  ;  Field  has  shown 
gallantry  on  many  battle-grounds,  and  now  directs  the  divi 
sion  that  once  followed  Hood.  Pickett  holds  the  3d  division 
of  the  corps  on  guard  near  the  coast  of  North  Carolina. 

The  2d  corps  is  led  by  Ewell  and  the  3d  by  A.  P.  Hill. 
Both  officers  were  one  time  division  commanders  under  Stone 
wall  Jackson.  Ewell  is  full  of  eccentricities,  a  lover  of  horse 
flesh,  and  of  the  wild  uproar  of  battle.1  Swell's  division 
leaders  are  Early,  Edward  Johnson,  and  Rodes.  Early  is 
familiarly  known  as  "Old  Jubal,"  about  whom  clings  the 
memory  of  desperate  struggles  at  Second  Manassas  and 
Sharpsburg ;  Edward  Johnson  is  the  fierce  and  sturdy  son 
of  Erin  who  carries  a  long  hickory  staff  instead  of  a  sword ; 
the  name  of  Rodes  will  be  repeated  so  long  as  men  shall 
speak  of  Jackson's  flank  attack  upon  Hooker  in  the  Wilder 
ness. 

A.  P.  Hill  possesses  impetuosity  that  is  often  difficult  to 
restrain  ;  courage  flashes  in  every  glance  of  his  eye.  Since 
the  fierce  struggle  on  the  banks  of  the  Antietam,  Lee  has 
set  high  estimate  upon  the  man  who  rushed  in  to  save  the  im 
periled  Confederate  right  wing.  Hill's  divisions  are  directed 
by  R.  H.  Anderson,  Heth,  and  Wilcox.  It  was  Wilcox's  bri 
gade  that  added  renown  to  Longstreet's  corps  in  the  sum 
mer  of  1862  ;  Heth  opened  the  midsummer  battle  of  1863  by 
his  advance  upon  Gettysburg,  and  R.  H.  Anderson  marched 

1  "  You  might  have  killed  the  finest  mare  in  this  army,"  he  said  to  his  own 
men,  who  had  fired  over  the  head  of  their  approaching1  commander. 


30  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

with  McLaw's  to  the  Confederate  left  in  time  to  hold  McClel- 
lan  in  check  at  Sharpsburg. 

The  bravest  of  the  brave  are  all  these  officers  gathered  in 
a  group  about  General  Lee.  Beyond  mere  courage,  however, 
nearly  all  possess  that  skill  which  is  able  to  give  wise  direc 
tion  to  battalions  moving  along  the  "perilous  edge  of  battle." 

To  this  company  of  counselors  and  assistants  General  Lee 
turns  himself  after  long-continued  searching  of  the  Rapidan 
valley  slopes.  With  quiet  dignity  he  points  downstream  to 
ward  Chancellorsville,  and  gives  his  opinion  that  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  will  advance  across  the  Rapidan  at  Germanna 
or  Ely's  Ford.  He  bids  his  officers  hold  the  Confederate  divi 
sions  in  readiness  to  take  up  the  line  of  march  at  the  waving 
of  the  signal  flag. 

On  that  same  second  day  of  May,  perhaps  at  the  very  hour 
when  Lee's  field-glass  caught  glimpses  of  the  city  of  tents, 
General  Meade  was  writing  an  important  military  order.  Lee 
possibly  could  not  discern  the  Solferino  color  of  Meade's  head 
quarters  flag,  nor  could  he  see  the  golden  eagle  in  a  silver 
wreath  wrought  into  the  banner's  folds,  but  already  had  Lee 
divined  the  intent  of  the  commands  now  issued  by  the  Federal 
commander,  for  Meade  was  directing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  set  itself  in  motion  across  the  Germanna  and  the  Ely  fords 
at  the  midnight  hour  which  should  usher  in  the  4th  day  of 
May. 

This  order  of  General  Meade  was  written  in  obedience  to 
the  instructions  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant,  then  command 
ing  all  the  Federal  forces  in  the  field.  This  spring  of  1864 
saw  only  two  Confederate  armies  yet  abiding  in  strength. 
Both  of  these  bands  were  facing  northward,  under  J.  E.  John 
ston  in  northern  Georgia  and  R.  E.  Lee  in  northern  Virginia. 
Against  these  armies  General  Grant  ordered  an  advance  "  all 
along  the  line."  Sherman  was  directed  to  press  forward  from 
Chattanooga  against  Johnston.  Crook  had  orders  to  move 
southeastward  from  the  mountains  of  western  Virginia.  Sigel 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     31 

was  sent  up  the  valley  of  Virginia  to  threaten  the  Central 
Railroad ;  Butler  was  placed  in  charge  of  an  armament  in 
tended  to  plough  the  waters  of  the  James  and  usher  its  com 
mander  within  the  portals  of  Richmond.  At  the  same  time 
Grant  came  eastward  wearing  the  laurels  of  Vicksburg  and 
Chattanooga,  and  pitched  his  tent  with  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  Across  the  Rapidan  he  proposed  to  send  Meade,  with 
the  duty  laid  upon  him  of  destroying  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  Grant's  instructions  to  Meade  were  these : l  "  Lee's 
army  will  be  your  objective  point.  Wherever  Lee  goes,  there 
you  will  go  also."  The  purpose  of  Grant  was  set  forth  in 
other  terms  as  the  intention  "  to  fight  Lee  between  the  Rapidan 
and  Richmond,  if  he  will  stand." 

The  4th  day  of  May  was  the  date  assigned  for  the  simul 
taneous  advance  of  all  the  Federal  hosts  against  Johnston, 
Lee,  and  Richmond.  Under  his  own  immediate  direction 
Grant  could  count  about  119,000  men.  Into  three  great  corps- 
d'armee  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  divided.  The  2d  corps 
of  27,000  men  followed  the  gallant,  brave,  and  skillful  Federal 
hero  of  Gettysburg,  Winfield  S.  Hancock.  The  5th  corps  of 
24,000  was  led  by  that  officer  of  courtesy  and  courage,  G.  K. 
Warren.  The  6th  of  23,000  was  under  the  command  of  the 
gallant  officer  and  noble  man  who  combined  soldierly  courage 
with  personal  tenderness.  General  John  Sedgwick,  familiarly 
called  "  Uncle  John,"  was  a  beloved  friend  to  his  associates 
in  the  Federal  army  and  to  his  former  companions  now  in  the 
Confederate  service.  The  9th  corps  of  more  than  19,000  was 
led  by  the  former  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
General  Burnside.  General  Sheridan  controlled  nearly  13,000 
cavalry,  and  a  park  of  274  heavy  guns  accompanied  the  army. 
"  The  best  clothed  and  the  best  fed  army  "  that  ever  took  the 
field  was  Grant's  Army  of  the  Potomac,  according  to  the  judg 
ment  of  a  member  of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of 
Massachusetts.  For  the  furnishing  and  comfort  of  this  host 
1  60  W.  K.  828. 


32  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

of  armed  men,  Grant  possessed  a  wagon  train  that  would  have 
extended  in  a  continuous  line  from  the  Kapidan  to  Richmond. 
This  tremendous  engine  of  war  was  about  to  hurl  itself  across 
Lee's  right  flank  in  the  effort  to  accomplish  the  destruction 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

The  worst  clothed  and  the  worst  fed  army  that  was  ever 
mustered  into  service  was  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  as 
General  Lee  found  it  on  the  second  day  of  May,  1864,  when 
he  turned  his  face  from  Clark's  Mountain  toward  his  head 
quarters  near  Orange  Court  House.  Not  through  a  city  of 
tents  did  he  ride  that  day,  but  along  avenues  lined  by  rude 
huts  of  pine  and  oaken  logs.  The  crevices  in  these  structures 
were  fortified  against  the  winter's  wind  by  the  purest  quality 
of  Virginia  mud;  they  were  furnished  inside  with  beds  of 
straw.  In  this  Confederate  Valley  Forge,  Lee's  soldiers  were 
greeting  with  laughter  the  coming  of  the  spring-tide,  as  old 
Sol  brought  warmth  into  the  Rapidan  valley,  where  they  had 
shivered  and  starved  together.  The  men  of  Virginia  and 
Maryland  were  there,  whose  fathers  had  shivered  and  starved 
with  Washington  at  the  first  Valley  Forge.  In  that  camp 
were  the  sons  of  the  Virginia  riflemen  who  had  made  a  "  bee- 
line  for  Boston  "  under  Daniel  Morgan  in  the  brave  old  days 
of  1775,  had  crossed  the  Delaware  with  Washington  to  give 
battle  at  Trenton  and  Princeton,  had  broken  the  strength  of 
Burgoyne  by  their  unerring  aim  at  Saratoga,  had  assisted  in 
driving  Cornwallis  from  the  Carolinas,  and  forced  his  surren 
der  at  Yorktown.  Under  Lee's  command  were  gathered  the 
sons  of  North  Carolina  whose  fathers  had  trailed  muskets 
after  Wayne  at  Stony  Point  and  had  followed  both  Washing 
ton  and  Greene  upon  the  march  and  in  the  battle.  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia  had  sent  the  sons  and  grandsons  of 
Revolutionary  veterans.  In  Lee's  camp  were  men  who  never 
wearied  of  telling  how  their  sires  won  the  day  at  King's 
Mountain  and  Cowpens.  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  sent  repre 
sentatives  of  that  line  which  charged  to  victory  at  the  battle 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     33 

of  the  Thames  in  the  northwest,  and  also  of  the  mountain 
riflemen  who  stood  behind  the  breastworks  at  New  Orleans 
to  teach  Pakenham's  veterans  their  first  lesson  in  defeat.  In 
Lee's  army  were  gathered  likewise  some  of  the  selfsame  men 
(from  the  South  Atlantic  and  Mississippi  Valley  States)  who 
had  felt  the  fury  of  the  fight  at  Buena  Vista  and  climbed 
upward  with  the  foremost  in  the  storming  of  Chapul tepee. 

The  gaudium  certamims  which  burned  at  fever  heat  in  the 
soul  of  each  individual  soldier  in  this  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  was  a  direct  heritage  from  his  fathers.  Nearly  every 
man  was  proud  to  detail  family  traditions  concerning  military 
service  in  one  or  both  of  the  wars  with  England,  in  border 
warfare  against  Indian  tribes,  or  in  the  battles  beyond  the 
Rio  Grande  in  Mexico.  Moreover,  most  of  these  Southern 
soldiers  were  descended  from  warlike  races  beyond  the  sea. 
From  the  Alleghany  summits  and  foothills  came  the  men  of 
Ulster,  offspring  of  those  men  of  the  moss-hags  of  Scotland 
who  suffered  persecution  in  the  days  of  Charles  II,  fought  at 
Bothwell  Bridge,  passed  over  to  Ulster  in  Ireland,  to  stand 
with  William  of  Orange  at  the  Boyne  and  endure  the  pangs 
of  hunger  in  Londonderry ;  and  thence  they  came  to  fill  up 
the  western  parts  of  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  both  Carolinas 
and  Georgia,  and  to  plant  the  entire  states  of  Kentucky, 
Tennessee,  Alabama,  Mississippi.  From  the  old  French  and 
Indian  War  down  to  the  war  between  the  States  these  Calvin- 
ists  have  occupied  the  front  line  in  battle,  and  the  days  of' 
peace  they  have  filled  up  as  well  as  they  could  with  disputa 
tions  in  theology.  The  "  Stonewall  Brigade  "  in  Ewell's  corps 
was  the  banner  organization  of  these  belligerent  moss-troop 
ers  and  mountain  riflemen. 

From  the  Tidewater  section  of  Virginia  and  South  Caro 
lina  came  the  English  cavaliers,  whose  ancestors  had  followed 
Marlborough  and  Prince  Rupert ;  whose  love  of  good  cheer 
and  whose  courtly  manners  made  them  the  centre  of  jovial 
comradeship  in  the  starving-time  in  camp ;  whose  unquench- 


34  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

able  courage  sent  them  to  the  very  cannon's  mouth  in  the 
hour  of  battle. 

From  the  eastern  part  of  Virginia  and  of  South  Carolina 
came  the  Huguenots,  whose  patient  endurance  under  sufferings 
in  France,  whose  gallantry  in  the  days  of  partisan  warfare 
under  Francis  Marion  in  the  Carolina  swamps,  had  ripened 
into  that  brave  steadiness  that  wins  the  fight  or  dies  upon  the 
field. 

Nearly  all  these  sons  of  fighting  sires  were  brought  up  in 
the  quietude  of  plantation  life  ;  nearly  all  had  used  the  rifle ; 
nearly  all  from  childhood  upward  had  spent  hours  on  horse 
back  in  the  mountains  and  the  fields ;  nearly  all  had  strength 
and  skill  to  make  the  woodland  ring  with  the  hunter's  wild, 
echoing  shout.  When  all  these  regiments  of  country-bred 
soldiers  advanced  in  line  of  battle  until  they  caught  sight  of 
the  men  in  blue  uniform,  it  was  only  the  old  view-halloo 
upon  the  hunting-field  that  had  become  the  battle-slogan  and 
greeted  the  ears  of  the  Federal  soldiers  as  the  familiar  "  rebel 
yell."  The  yell  and  the  chase  were  linked  by  long  association. 
Scarcely  a  day  passed  during  the  sojourn  of  the  Confederate 
army  in  camp  that  did  not  see  a  full  regiment  of  Confed 
erates  in  hot  chase  across  the  fields  after  the  swift-footed  rab 
bit,  and  at  every  step  were  heard  wild  shouts  and  yells. 
Often  was  it  said  when  this  far-resounding  enthusiasm  came 
rolling  across  the  hills,  "  There  goes  Marse  Robert  or  an  old 
hare." 

By  day,  in  camp,  the  men  moved  about  in  rags ;  their 
clothing  was  made  up  of  patches  and  fluttering  strings.  Very 
few  possessed  shoes  that  fitted.  Thousands  were  absolutely 
without  covering  for  head  or  foot.  The  only  complete  outfits 
were  the  products  of  hand-looms,  wrought  out  by  wives, 
mothers,  daughters,  who  kept  brave  watch  and  prosecuted 
unmurmuring  labors  in  the  old  plantation  home.  At  night 
the  soldiers  slept  on  straw  and  made  covering  with  a  blanket 
that  probably  bore  the  stamp  "  U.  S."  Their  rags  could  be 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     35 

forgotten,  but  hunger  never.  That  insatiate  craving  for  food 
that  half -starved  men  must  bear  was  the  constant  enemy  of 
the  Confederates  in  this  winter  home.  One  quarter  of  a  pound 
of  fat  pork  with  a  little  meal  or  a  little  flour  was  the  portion 
assigned  daily  to  each  man  —  most  of  the  time  not  both 
of  these,  but  either  the  pork  or  the  meal  was  allotted.  Or 
perhaps  only  a  bundle  of  crackers  was  served  from  day  to 
day.  The  officers  fared  as  the  privates.1 

Nor  did  General  Lee  permit  his  rank  to  exempt  him  from 
the  sufferings  that  had  come  upon  all,  men  and  women  alike, 
throughout  the  entire  region  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
General  Lee  allowed  himself  a  small  ration  of  meat  only 
twice  a  week.  He  lived  on  corn-bread  or  crackers  or  a  bit  of 
cabbage,  as  each  or  all  came  conveniently.  His  heart  was  full 
of  concern  for  the  comfort  and  health  of  his  men.  We  are 
told  that  on  one  occasion  Lee  received  through  the  mail  from 
an  anonymous  private  soldier  a  very  small  slice  of  salt  pork 
carefully  packed  between  two  oaken  chips,  with  the  state 
ment  in  a  letter  that  this  was  the  daily  ration  of  meat ;  the 
writer  claimed  to  be  unable  to  live  on  this  allowance,  and 
although  a  gentleman,  had  been  compelled  to  steal.  But  the 
commander  himself  fared  no  more  sumptuously.  It  is  stated 
that  some  official  friends  came  to  dine  in  General  Lee's  tent. 
The  fare  set  before  them  was  only  a  plate  of  boiled  cabbage ; 
in  the  centre  of  the  dish  rested  a  diminutive  slice  of  bacon. 
With  knife  well  poised  above  this  morsel  General  Lee  in 
vited  each  guest  in  turn  to  receive  a  portion,  but  the  small 
size  of  the  bacon  led  them  all  to  decline.  The  meat  remained 

1  This  winter  of  1863  saw  the  climax  of  high  prices  due  to  the  inflated 
paper  currency  of  the  Confederacy.  Bacon,  $8  per  pound ;  beans,  $60  per 
bushel;  sugar,  $20  per  pound  ;  corn-meal,  $50  per  bushel  —  Famine!  Officer 
bartering  for  boots  ;  price,  $200.  Officer  handed  to  the  merchant  a  $500  bill  ; 
merchant  had  no  change.  "  Never  mind,  I  '11  take  the  boots  ;  keep  the  change  ; 
I  never  allow  a  matter  of  $300  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  trade."  Richmond 
paper,  autumn,  1864,  chuckled  over  the  fact  that  "  Tar  is  selling  in  New  York 
for  $2  a  pound.  It  used  to  cost  eighty  cents  a  barrel !  " 


36  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

on  the  plate  untouched,  and  hunger  was  appeased  with  cab 
bage.  The  following  day  General  Lee  called  again  for  the 
bit  of  swine's  flesh,  but  his  servant,  with  much  bowing  and 
grinning,  gave  the  information  that  the  bacon  had  been  bor 
rowed  to  grace  the  hospitable  board  of  the  day  before  and 
already  had  been  returned  to  the  owner.  Lee's  wife  and  daugh 
ters  and  many  female  friends  spent  their  time  at  home  knitting 
socks  for  the  soldiers,  and  these  were  distributed  by  the 
general  himself.  After  a  visit  to  Richmond  he  wrote  to  his 
wife  expressing  gratification  that  there  were  67  pairs  of  socks 
in  the  bag  instead  of  64,  as  she  had  supposed.  He  rejoiced  that 
out  of  the  108  pairs  committed  to  his  personal  charge  for  the 
Stonewall  Brigade,  12  pairs  had  double  heels,  and  suggested 
that  his  daughter  Mildred  learn  the  stitch.  Later  he  reported 
progress :  he  had  sent  263  pairs  of  socks  to  the  Stonewall 
Brigade.  He  wrote :  "  There  are  about  140  without  socks. 
.  .  .  Tell  the  young  women  to  work  hard  for  the  brave  Stone- 
wallers."  He  also  made  mention  of  61  pairs  from  the  ladies 
in  Fauquier. 

Lee's  winter  home  was  a  small  tent  pitched  on  a  steep  hill 
side.  Around  it  stood  two  or  three  other  tents  for  the  con 
venience  of  his  staff.  No  guard  was  on  duty,  not  a  sentinel 
kept  watch.  Naught  was  there  to  indicate  the  presence  of  an 
officer  of  rank.  Everything  was  ordered  with  neatness,  but 
with  the  utmost  simplicity.  Only  the  man  was  there  to  indi 
cate  the  presence  of  one  in  authority.  The  heart  was  full  of 
solicitude  for  the  welfare  of  his  men,  for  the  upbuilding  of 
the  strength  of  his  army ;  but  the  strong  temper  of  a  Wash 
ington  was  held  under  bit  and  curb.  In  hours  when  the 
patience  was  tried,  the  veins  in  the  temple  would  swell  and  a 
deep  flush  would  crimson  the  forehead,  to  show  that  the  will 
to  control  was  stronger  than  the  hidden  passion. 

Unto  the  very  utmost  was  this  man  and  this  army  now  to 
be  tested  in  deadly  combat  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Only  from  a  knowledge  of  the  men  who  followed  his  banner 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     37 

can  we  understand  the  deeds  of  Lee  in  the  Wilderness  cam 
paign.  The  total  effective  number  of  soldiers  in  the  army 
that  was  to  withstand  Grant's  119,000  was  a  little  short  of 
62,000.1  In  the  3d  corps  at  Orange  Court  House,  A.  P. 
Hill  commanding,  there  were  about  22,000  men  and  officers 
ready  for  duty.  The  2d  corps  on  the  Rapidan  under  Ewell 
was  reckoned  at  a  little  more  than  17,000.  From  Knoxville, 
Tenn.,  in  the  month  of  April  had  Lee  called  Longstreet  with 
two  divisions  of  the  1st  corps.  These  lay  in  camp  at  Gordons- 
ville  to  the  rear  of  Lee's  left  wing.  Ten  thousand  men  was  the 
total  effective  force  in  this  corps.  Four  batteries  of  four  guns 
were  assigned  to  each  of  Lee's  eight  infantry  divisions  ;  72 
guns  were  in  reserve,  and  the  24  cannon  constituted  the  flying 
artillery  that  moved  with  the  cavalry.  Four  thousand  eight 
hundred  men  served  this  park  of  224  guns ;  8300  sabres  fol 
lowed  the  black  plume  of  "  Jeb  "  Stuart.  Almost  continu 
ously  throughout  the  winter  had  this  knightly  trooper  lived 
in  the  saddle.  The  right  flank  and  the  left  flank  of  the  Con 
federate  army  knew  his  continual  presence.  Through  the 
forest  glades  and  across  the  hills  resounded  the  trumpet-notes 
of  the  joyous-tempered  cavalier  as  he  galloped  along  the 
picket  posts  and  sang  the  merry  Confederate  camp-songs  to 
the  accompaniment  of  Sweeney's  banjo,  or  dashed  at  full 
speed  through  the  bivouac  of  the  infantry  and  shouted  the 
wild  refrain,  "  If  you  want  to  have  a  good  time,  jine  the 
cavalry.  Yours  to  count  on,  J.  E.  B.  Stuart."  Such  was 
the  signature  of  this  bold  Virginia  knight  who  was  the  eye 
and  the  ear  of  Lee's  army. 

In  two  divisions  of  three  brigades  each  was  Stuart's  corps 
of  horsemen  organized.  The  gallant  Carolinian,  Wade  Hamp 
ton,  rode  at  the  head  of  the  1st  division,  and  Fitzhugh  Lee, 
nephew  of  the  commanding  general,  led  the  2d.  In  Hampton's 
division  the  brigade  of  Gordon  came,  altogether  from  the 
mountains  of  North  Carolina.  The  brigade  of  Young  was 
1  Compare  footnote,  p.  120.  —  EDITOR. 


38  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

made  up  of  South  Carolinians  and  Georgians,  and  Rosser's 
brigade  was  gathered  from  Virginia.  From  Virginia  also  was 
mustered  the  entire  division  of  Fitz  Lee ;  his  2d  and  3d  bri 
gades  followed  the  banner  of  Lomax  and  Wickham,  and 
the  first  was  commanded  by  that  worthy  son  of  a  noble  sire, 
W.  H.  F.  Lee.1 

In  the  opening  days  of  May,  Stuart  held  most  of  these 
swordsmen  on  the  lower  Rapidan  and  Rappahannock,  guard 
ing  the  Confederate  right  along  the  northern  edge  of  that 
wilderness  through  whose  dense  thickets,  like  another  Henry 
of  Navarre,  just  twelve  months  before  he  had  led  the  Con 
federate  left  wing  to  the  charge  and  cheered  Jackson's  corps 
forward  to  the  Chancellor  House  by  singing  with  all  the 
might  of  his  tuneful  mouth,  "  Old  Joe  Hooker,  come  out  of 
the  Wilderness."  As  Grant  now  made  ready  to  advance, 
Stuart's  couriers  bore  swift  messages  to  Lee  that  multitudes 
of  the  Federal  cavalry  were  swarming  on  the  northern  bank 
of  the  lower  Rapidan.  Lee  knew  that  the  hour  of  battle  was 
at  hand ;  he  stood  ready  to  spring  upon  the  flank  of  his 
adversary  as  soon  as  the  latter  should  entangle  himself  in  the 
toils  of  the  Wilderness.  The  3d  day  of  May,  1864,  saw 
much  burnishing  of  muskets  in  the  Confederate  camp.  Let 
ters  were  written  and  final  farewells  sent  to  the  circles  where 
love  and  tenderness  kept  watch  at  home.  No  advance  rations 
were  measured  out  in  that  encampment;  no  busy  cookery 
scattered  its  noisy  din  among  the  houses  of  the  soldiers.  But 
the  hungry  began  to  talk  of  Federal  provision  trains  as  the 

1  Only  in  March,  1864,  had  "  Rooney "  [W.  H.  F.  Lee]  been  exchanged. 
While  a  prisoner  in  Fort  Monroe,  under  sentence  of  death  on  account  of  some 
retaliatory  measure,  his  wife  and  two  children  were  at  the  point  of  death.  The 
husband  and  father  asked  permission  to  make  the  short  journey  to  his  Virginia 
plantation  and  speak  a  last  farewell  to  his  loved  ones.  This  request  was  denied. 
His  brother  Custis,  eldest  son  of  General  R.  E.  Lee,  serving-  on  the  staff  of 
President  Davis,  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  the  Federal  authorities,  asking  to  take 
his  brother's  place  and  die  for  him.  But  this  also  was  refused.  The  spirit  of 
the  father  glowed  in  the  hearts  of  his  sons.  "  Greater  love  hath  no  man  than 
this." 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     39 

possible  spoil  of  battle,  and  comrade  bade  good-by  to  comrade 
and  looked  upon  faces  in  other  brigades  which  he  might  not 
see  again. 

General  Lee  began  the  duties  of  May  4  by  issuing  general 
order  No.  38,  repeating  his  previous  commands  to  "  prevent 
injury  to  fencing,  crops,  and  other  private  property  "  during 
the  approaching  campaign.  The  war-horse  was  already  snuff 
ing  the  battle  from  afar.  At  9  A.  M.  the  signal  flag  on  Clark's 
Mountain  was  waving  the  news  to  JLee's  headquarters  that 
Grant's  tents  were  folded  and  his  column  in  motion  around 
the  Confederate  right  flank  across  the  Rapidan.  At  once  was 
given  the  order  to  advance.  On  parallel  roads  leading  a  little 
east  of  a  due  southward  course  from  the  Rapidan  was  Grant 
moving  his  army  in  two  columns.  He  was  thrusting  himself 
into  the  thickets  of  the  Wilderness  at  a  right  angle  to  Lee's 
front  line.  Lee  whirled  instantly  toward  his  own  right  flank, 
and  turned  his  face  eastward  along  two  parallel  roads  that 
led  him  with  the  course  of  the  Rapidan  in  perpendicular  line 
against  the  right  flank  of  Grant's  long  columns.  At  noontide 
on  the  4th  Ewell  moved  from  the  Palmyra  Ford  by  the  right 
flank  eastward  along  the  Orange  Turnpike.  At  the  same  hour 
moved  two  of  Hill's  divisions  from  Orange  Court  House 
eastward  toward  Chancellors ville  along  the  plank  road  two 
or  three  miles  southward  from  Hill's  advance  on  the  turn 
pike. 

As  early  as  11  A.  M.  Longstreet  was  ordering  Field  and 
Kershaw  to  follow  a  cross-country  road  that  runs  eastward 
from  Gordons  ville.  But  it  was  4  p.  M.  when  the  two  divisions 
fell  into  the  line  of  march. 

Lee  had  left  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps  to  guard 
his  rear,  and  with  28,000  muskets  under  Hill  and  Ewell  was 
making  all  speed  to  strike  a  blow  at  Grant's  side  as  the  latter 
sought  to  move  across  the  Confederate  right.  The  Confed 
erate  artillery  moved  to  the  front  with  the  infantry  column ; 
Stuart  was  already  making  obstinate  battle  far  in  advance. 


40  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

The  Confederate  commander  rode  with  Hill's  column  on  the 
plank  roadway,  and  sent  urgent  messages  to  Longstreet  to 
speed  forward  and  support  the  Confederate  right  wing. 

As  the  three  columns  of  bronzed  veterans  press  onward  to 
deliver  battle,  we  mark  their  eagerness  for  the  coming  strife. 
Confidence  in  their  leader  and  in  themselves  reigns  supreme. 
Two  characteristics  are  stamped  upon  this  army  that  follows 
Lee,  —  the  deep  religious  faith  of  many  and  the  buoyant 
good  temper  of  all.  In  the  ranks  march  ministers  of  the 
Gospel  and  laymen,  who  from  youth  have  been  devotees  of 
the  religious  teachings  handed  down  through  pious  ancestors 
from  Knox,  Cranmer,  Wesley,  and  Bunyan.  The  labors  of 
the  chaplains  during  the  winter  on  the  Rapidan  have  been 
followed  by  a  heightened  religious  devotion  throughout  the 
army.  The  piety  of  General  Lee  himself  has  reached  as  full 
a  measure  of  religious  devotion  as  was  ever  shown  by  Oliver 
Cromwell  or  Stonewall  Jackson.  Often  is  the  commander 
found  engaged  in  earnest  prayer ;  constantly  he  asks  for  the 
prayers  of  his  friends,  and  always  does  he  ascribe  his  army's 
success  to  Providence.  A  veritable  parallel  to  Cromwell's 
Ironsides  is  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  this  Wilder 
ness  campaign  when  it  wards  off  weariness  by  keeping  step  to 
the  vocal  music  of  psalms  and  hymns. 

The  unfailing  good  humor  of  the  men  upon  the  march  is 
their  only  panacea  for  thirst,  hunger,  and  weariness.  "  The 
Lord  bless  your  dirty,  ragged  souls,"  was  the  greeting  extended 
the  army  of  scarecrows  that  followed  Lee  and  Jackson  into 
Maryland  eighteen  months  before.  Some  of  the  same  gray 
jackets  still  hang  in  shreds  upon  the  Confederate  infantry  as 
they  enter  the  Wilderness.  But  rags  and  hunger  only  furnish 
material  for  the  spirit  of  jesting  and  of  mirth.  A  lively  fellow 
whistles  an  air,  another  chirps  the  fragment  of  a  song,  and  all 
join  in  the  chorus  ;  then  a  slip  in  the  mud,  a  peculiar  cry  or 
quaint  jest  sets  an  entire  regiment  into  a  roar  of  laughter. 
Then  follows  the  hum  and  the  buzz  of  a  bewildering  medley 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     41 

of  joking  laughter  and  song  that  makes  light  the  burden  of 
the  journey.1 

This  lightness  of  spirit  bears  little  fruit  for  preservation  as 
wit  and  humor,  but  it  is  the  most  significant  fact  connected 
with  Lee's  army  in  the  Wilderness.  It  indicates  the  superb 
morale  of  the  Confederate  troops.  It  is  the  sign  of  that 
cheerful  endurance  that  carries  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  through  the  marching  and  starving  and  fighting  of 
the  fiercest  campaign  of  the  entire  war.  It  follows  them  into 
battle.  It  marks  them  as  they  fight  in  the  trenches.  The  men 
scarcely  ever  cease  to  laugh  and  jest  and  yell  as  they  load  and 
fire  their  muskets.  We  see  this  merriment  and  well-attem 
pered  buoyancy  changed  into  the  enthusiasm  of  a  devoted  sol 
diery  when  Lee  gallops  forward  along  Hill's  column  on  the 
afternoon  of  May  4.  Affection  for  their  great  leader  breaks 
out  in  the  tumult  of  wild  cheers  and  the  rolling  of  the  battle- 
yell  as  they  catch  sight  of  their  hero  in  the  slouch  hat  and 
the  suit  of  gray. 

The  evening  of  the  4th  of  May  falls  upon  100,000  soldiers 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  south  of  the  Rapidan.  Han 
cock's  corps  (the  2d)  has  crossed  at  Ely's  Ford  and  pitched 
camp  for  the  night  amid  the  wreckage  of  the  field  of  Chan- 
cellorsville.  He  is  three  miles  eastward  from  the  Brock  Road, 
and  has  thrown  out  Gregg's  cavalry  in  advance.  Warren's 

1  A  young  officer  dashes  along  the  roadside,  partially  adorned  with  a  new 
outfit.  "  Come  out  of  that  hat !  "  is  the  familiar  greeting  of  a  thousand  throats, 
one  after  another  in  quick  succession.  "  Don't  hide  in  that  hat !  come  out !  "  is 
the  refrain  that  greets  him  as  he  passes  the  next  brigade.  To  another  horseman 
a  man  in  the  ranks  calls  out,  "  Halloa,  John,  how  's  your  grandma  ?  "  "  Halloa, 
Bill,  here  's  your  brother,"  and  thousands  join  in  the  cheerful  salutation  as  the 
officer  rides  the  gauntlet  of  the  long  column.  A  straggling  foot-soldier  makes 
inquiry  after  the  regiment  he  has  lost ;  a  voice  pipes  out  in  reply,  "  Does  your 
mother  know  you  are  out  ?  "  The  long  line  breaks  forth  into  a  shout  and  a 
roar,  and  the  lost  soldier  continues  his  search.  Again,  the  infantry  column 
pass  a  piece  of  artillery  fast  in  the  mud  ;  the  humor  of  the  foot-soldiers  breaks 
forth  in  mock  heroics  and  good-natured  wit  at  the  expense  of  the  cannoneers 
who  are  almost  buried  in  the  soft  earth  as  they  tug  at  the  wheels. 


42  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

corps,  the  5th,  has  made  passage  at  Germanna,  and  has 
moved  on  the  Germanna  Road  to  the  Wilderness  Tavern  ; 
Sedgwick  has  led  the  6th  corps  behind  the  5th,  and  his  camp- 
fires  are  burning  along  the  Germanna  highway  just  south  of 
the  Rapidan.  Cavalry  vedettes  keep  watch  at  every  path  that 
looks  westward  toward  Lee's  position.  Burnside's  corps,  the 
9th,  remains  as  yet  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  river.  Like 
a  huge  serpent  is  Grant's  army  outstretched  in  the  Wilder 
ness  in  a  southeasterly  course  from  the  Rapidan  to  Jackson's 
last  battle-ground.  In  the  very  heart  of  the  dense  forest-land 
between  Orange  Court  House  and  Fredericksburg  has  Grant 
wedged  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Part  of  the  Wilderness  is 
a  deserted  mining  region,  the  home  of  the  whip-poor-will  and 
the  bat  and  the  owl.  Between  the  numerous  creeks  and  rivu 
lets  are  oak-covered  ridges  and  knolls.  The  sweet-gum,  the 
cedar,  and  the  low  pine  lift  their  tops  just  above  the  dense 
undergrowth.  Ravines  bar  the  way,  and  the  tangled  thickets 
can  be  traversed  only  along  the  winding  cow-paths.  A  few 
cleared  fields  offer  space  for  the  deployment  of  a  regiment  or 
a  brigade.  As  night  approaches,  Grant  calls  the  passage  of  the 
river  "  a  great  success,"  and  declares  that  his  apprehensions 
all  have  vanished.  He  telegraphs  to  Halleck :  "  Forty-eight 
hours  will  now  demonstrate  whether  the  enemy  intends  giving 
battle  this  side  of  Richmond."  At  the  very  same  hour  Ewell 
is  in  bivouac  within  one  hour's  march  of  Grant's  right  flank, 
ready  to  leap  to  battle  in  the  jungle. 

Through  this  district  of  matted  shrubbery  two  roads  nearly 
parallel  to  each  other  seek  passage  from  Orange  Court  House 
eastward  to  Fredericksburg.  The  Orange  Turnpike  runs  par 
allel  to  the  Rapidan,  and  the  Orange  Plank  Road  lies  a 
brief  space  further  away  from  that  stream.  Along  these  same 
highways  that  Jackson  used  in  his  flank  assault  on  Hooker 
and  in  the  same  direction  with  Stonewall's  march  is  Lee  now 
hurrying  to  deliver  a  flank  attack  against  Grant.  Lee  also 
declares  that  his  apprehensions  have  taken  wings,  and  that  he 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     43 

has  the  Federal  army  in  the  position  which  he  himself  would 
select. 

Lee  is  advancing  with  three  columns  en  echelon  against 
Grant's  central  and  advanced  corps.  Ewell  is  foremost  on 
the  turnpike  as  he  rushes  across  the  intrenchments  at  Mine 
Run  and  pitches  camp  at  Locust  Grove  and  Eobertson's 
Tavern  ;  his  advanced  pickets  stand  on  guard  only  three  miles 
from  the  bivouac  of  Warren's  5th  corps.  Lee  sets  up  his 
tent  with  Hill  near  Verdiersville  in  a  roadside  grove ;  he 
abides  thus  with  his  central  column  on  the  plank  road.  Far 
ther  to  Hill's  right  and  rear  approaches  Longstreet.  Twelve 
miles  has  he  marched  from  Gordonsville,  and  darkness  finds 
him  at  Brock's  Bridge  on  the  Catharpin  Road.  Lee's  troops 
are  well  in  hand  for  the  tiger  spring  of  the  morrow.  At  eight 
in  the  evening  he  sends  courier  to  Ewell  with  orders  to  move 
forward  at  the  dawning  of  the  5th  of  May,  and  expresses  the 
strong  desire  "  to  bring  him  [enemy]  to  battle  now  as  soon  as 
possible." 

A  great  chorus  of  forest  birds  greets  the  coming  of  the  dawn 
of  the  5th  day  of  May  as  Lee  sits  to  eat  the  scanty  morning 
meal.  His  face  beams  with  cheerfulness.  He  is  communicative 
beyond  his  wonted  habit.  He  passes  pleasant  jests  at  the 
expense  of  the  staff.  He  openly  gives  expression  to  surprise 
that  Grant  has  pushed  himself  into  the  same  position  occupied 
by  Hooker  just  a  year  before,  and  he  breathes  the  hope  that 
the  result  may  prove  more  disastrous  to  Grant.  In  such  an 
issue  to  the  combat  he  declares  his  perfect  confidence.  He 
then  mounts  horse  and  gallops  to  the  head  of  Hill's  column 
on  the  plank  road.  .  Just  behind  his  own  advanced  pickets 
he  rides  when  the  skirmish  opens  with  Grant's  cavalry  at 
Parker's  Store.  Far  to  the  right  front  he  can  hear  the  car 
bines  of  his  own  cavalry  column,  and  across  the  woods  from 
the  left  come  the  brisk  rattle  of  Swell's  sharpshooters.  An 
occasional  heavy  gun  sends  its  deep  echo  rolling  backward 
from  the  line  of  Confederate  advance.  Lee  is  ready  to  strike 


44  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

with  his  centre  and  left,  but  his  own  right  wing  is  yet  far 
afield. 

Ewell  leads  the  advance  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  along 
the  turnpike.  But  Longstreet  has  not  yet  reported  presence 
on  the  right,  and  at  8  A.  M.  Lee  instructs  Ewell  (left  wing)  to 
regulate  his  march  by  Hill  (centre),  whose  progress  along 
the  plank  road  may  be  marked  by  the  firing  at  the  head  of 
Hill's  column.  At  the  same  time  Lee  prefers  not  "  to  bring 
on  a  general  engagement "  before  the  arrival  of  Longstreet. 
A  general  battle  he  means  to  have,  but  his  plan  now  contem 
plates  brisk  skirmishing  to  hold  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
its  present  position  until  he  can  swing  his  centre  and  right 
wing  against  Grant's  advanced  corps. 

Ewell  advances  slowly  in  readiness  for  action.  Johnson's 
division  leads  the  column,  and  J.  M.  Jones's  brigade  marches 
to  the  front.  The  Federal  pickets  and  skirmishers  fall  back 
before  the  vigor  of  Jones  until  the  latter  at  11  A.  M.  catches 
sight  of  Warren's  column  crossing  the  turnpike  and  pressing 
southward  on  the  Germanna  Road.  Jones  is  greatly  in 
advance  of  Hill,  and  his  attack  has  brought  him  face  to  face 
with  Grant's  regular  line  of  battle.  At  the  same  hour  to 
Ewell  comes  Lee's  repetition  of  the  order,  "  No  general 
engagement  "  until  Longstreet  shall  reach  the  field.  From  his 
central  position  with  Hill,  Lee  holds  his  two  columns  in  check 
waiting  for  the  1st  corps.  The  Confederate  soldiers  are  like 
war-dogs  straining  at  the  leash,  eager  for  battle  with  their 
old  antagonists. 

In  advance  of  the  main  column  on  the  plank  road,  Lee, 
Hill,  and  Stuart  ride  forward  beyond  Parker's  Store  and 
pause  under  the  trees  in  the  edge  of  an  old  field.  Grant's 
skirmishers  break  like  a  blue  cloud  from  the  grove  of  pines 
to  the  eastward,  but  the  line  of  gray  jackets  leaps  forward  to 
the  charge.  In  the  very  forefront,  along  the  plank  road, 
Poague  pushes  his  guns.  The  yells  of  the  Confederates  and 
the  roll  of  their  musketry  tell  Lee  that  a  stronger  line  must 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     45 

press  forward,  and  now  he  sends  Heth's  division  to  hold  the 
crest  of  the  ridge  in  the  edge  of  the  forest.  Just  as  Heth 
moves  to  the  front,  the  music  of  regular  battle  comes  from  the 
left.  The  crash  of  rifle  volleys,  the  deep  roar  of  a  few  scat 
tered  batteries,  the  occasional  report  of  a  Parrott  gun,  and  the 
stirring  cadence  of  the  Confederate  yell  warn  Lee  that  Ewell 
has  found  Grant's  full  line  of  battle.  The  sun  is  already 
sloping  his  course  toward  the  west  —  and  still  Longstreet 
tarries. 

If  we  recall  the  hour  of  noon  on  Swell's  front,  we  find  him 
ordering  the  adventurous  Jones  to  "  fall  back  slowly  if 
pressed."  This  is  Ewell's  obedience  to  Lee's  injunctions 
against  general  battle.  Therefore  Jones  withdraws  the  heavy 
guns  which  stand  in  front  with  his  skirmishers.  This  retire 
ment  of  artillery  in  the  turnpike  invites  Griffin's  division  of 
Warren's  corps  into  strong  attack  upon  the  Confederate  bri 
gade.  The  line  of  Jones  is  broken  and  driven  back  over  the 
dead  body  of  the  brave  brigadier.  But  Ewell  will  no  farther 
retire.  He  gives  the  word,  and  forward  rush  the  brigades  of 
Daniel  and  Gordon  to  pour  a  musketry  fire  into  Griffin's 
front  and  flanks.  Griffin's  column  is  crushed.  Still  onward 
press  the  Confederates  through  the  undergrowth  until  they 
catch  the  flank  of  the  two  Federal  divisions  of  Crawford  and 
Wadsworth.  These  have  become  entangled  in  the  forest  glade 
and  speedily  go  down  before  the  Southern  woodsmen.  Four 
Federal  guns  and  several  hundred  Federal  prisoners  become 
Ewell's  spoil.  At  close  range  now  each  line  of  battle  begins 
to  make  its  position  strong  with  breastworks  of  logs  and 
earth.  Sedgwick  has  brought  his  6th  corps  into  touch  with 
Warren's  right.  Ewell  stands  blocking  the  advance  of  both 
the  5th  and  6th  Federal  corps.  The  entire  Confederate  left 
wing  is  deployed  in  line  across  the  turnpike  facing  Warren 
and  Sedgwick,  who  hold  the  Germanna  Road.  In  Ewell's 
centre  stands  Johnson ;  Ewell's  left  is  held  by  Early,  while 
the  right  division  under  Rodes  extends  itself  southward 


46  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

through  the  tangled  forest  to  touch  elbows  with  the  left  of 
Hill's  corps. 

From  the  plank  road,  where  Lee's  eye  keeps  watch,  arises 
the  roar  of  desperate  battle  about  the  hour  when  Ewell  is 
counting  his  prisoners  and  making  stronger  his  line  on  the 
left.  In  the  opening  strife  at  this  point  Heth  has  led  the 
attack  from  Lee's  centre ;  he  has  struck  Warren's  head  of 
column  under  Crawford  and  has  driven  it  back.  As  Crawford 
recoils  toward  the  turnpike,  his  line  is  caught  in  flank  by 
Ewell's  charge ;  but  Getty  of  Sedgwick's  corps  reaches  the 
junction  of  the  Plank  and  Brock  roads,  and  against  Getty 
rushes  Heth's  line  of  battle. 

It  would  seem  that  Grant  has  not  expected  battle  in  the 
Wilderness.  His  order  of  march  for  the  morning  of  the  5th 
of  May  has  bidden  Hancock  advance  the  2d  corps  to  Shady 
Grove  Church,  has  ordered  Warren  to  bring  the  5th  corps  as 
far  as  Parker's  Store,  and  Sedgwick  to  lead  the  6th  to  Wilder 
ness  Tavern.  The  huge  serpent  seeks  to  crawl  forward  and 
thrust  its  head  outside  the  Wilderness  to  the  southward.  At 
11  A.  M.  Hancock  finds  himself  at  Todd's  Tavern  southward 
from  the  plank  road ;  a  gap  of  ten  miles  has  he  left  between 
the  2d  corps  and  the  5th  and  6th,  which  are  now  compelled 
to  halt  and  face  the  thunderbolts  of  war  moving  eastward  on 
the  parallel  roadways.  At  11  A.  M.  Hancock  turns  his  face 
back  over  his  morning  pathway  and  hastens  to  aid  Getty  in 
the  defense  of  the  Brock  Road.  But  it  is  2  P.  M.  before  Han 
cock's  head  of  column  begins  to  assist  Getty  in  the  work  of 
erecting  fortifications  along  the  Brock  Road,  facing  Lee  on 
the  plank  road. 

That  space  of  three  hours  from  eleven  until  two  marks  the 
passing  of  a  rare  opportunity.  "  What  can  delay  General 
Longstreet  ?  "  The  crimson  flush  is  on  Lee's  brow,  and  every 
vein  in  the  temple  is  swollen  with  the  hot  blood  of  the  fury  of 
battle.  The  commander  rides  up  and  down  his  line,  his  quiet 
dignity  scarce  concealing  the  anxious  eagerness  of  the  moment 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     47 

as  he  longs  for  the  1st  corps.  With  those  10,000  men  he 
might  rush  between  the  divjded  wings  of  Grant's  army  and 
in  this  tangle  of  narrow  pathways  hold  one  portion  at  bay 
while  he  makes  assault  upon  the  other.  But  Longstreet  comes 
not.  Far  to  the  rear  of  Lee's  right,  beyond  the  plank  road 
he  plods  along,  misses  the  way,  retraces  his  steps,  and  reaches 
not  the  field  of  war. 

On  the  Brock  Road  Hancock  makes  ready  his  corps  for 
battle.  Behind  the  first  line  of  breastworks  he  piles  up  logs 
and  earth  as  a  second  intrenchment  and  behind  the  centre  of 
this  second  defense  he  erects  a  third. 

In  front  of  Hancock's  threefold  line  of  logs,  Heth's  men 
build  at  first  only  a  slight  defense  across  the  turnpike  ;  the 
line  is  in  horseshoe  shape,  behind  the  crest  of  a  slight  eleva 
tion  in  the  midst  of  a  dense  growth  of  young  trees.  But  be 
yond  this  intrenchment  advance  the  skirmishers  in  force,  and 
in  the  open  forest  300  yards  from  the  Brock  Road,  they  await 
the  coming  of  Hancock's  corps.  Wilcox  has  sent  brigades 
to  the  right  and  to  the  left  to  strengthen  Heth's  flanks  and 
to  keep  in  touch  with  the  right  flank  of  Swell's  corps. 
Poague's  battalion  of  heavy  guns  is  forward  with  the  fore 
most,  ready  to  defend  the  roadway.  The  other  heavy  guns 
cannot  reach  the  scene  of  strife  and  nearly  all  are  silent. 

At  4.30  Hancock's  corps  moves  to  the  attack,  strengthened 
by  Getty's  division  in  the  centre  and  Wadsworth  moving 
forward  on  the  right.  At  once  the  forest  is  ablaze  with  the 
flame  of  musketry.  The  music  of  deadly  combat  begins  its 
fierce  roar.  In  the  dark  woods  the  two  lines  of  men  approach 
each  other  until  almost  in  personal  touch.  As  the  night  falls 
upon  the  grim  wrestlers,  they  can  aim  only  at  the  flashing  of 
the  opposing  muskets,  not  one  hundred  feet  away. 

At  4.30  the  battle  is  joined,  and  at  7  it  still  rages  in  all 
its  fury.  Heth's  men  behind  the  intrenched  crest  of  the  ridge 
can  hear  the  moaning  of  the  leaden  hail  that  passes  above 
their  heads.  That  Federal  musketry  fire  cuts  off  the  forest  of 


48  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

saplings  "  four  and  five  feet  above  the  ground  "  as  regularly  as 
if  cut  by  a  machine.  With  laughter,  jokes,  and  general  cheer 
fulness,  the  Confederates  lie  prone  upon  the  ground,  and  with 
deliberate  aim  scatter  havoc  among  the  men  in  blue.  The 
smoke  of  battle  settles  down  like  a  thick  cloud.  The  two 
lines  fire  and  yell  like  demons  in  this  hell  on  earth. 

Alons:  the  entire  Confederate  line  the  smoke  and  roar  of 

O 

battle  cannot  smother  the  sound  of  the  "  rebel  yell."  When 
the  Federal  force  is  massed  against  Lee's  right,  he  sends  swift 
message  to  Ewell  to  capture  Wilderness  Tavern  Ridge  and 
cut  off  Grant  from  his  base.  Ewell  takes  the  aggressive  and 
sends  two  brigades  straight  into  the  centre  of  Sedgwick's 
corps,  and  stands  ready  to  follow  up  the  charge.  But  Sedg- 
wick  is  too  strong  in  his  house  of  logs,  and  Ewell  must  abide 
behind  his  own  works.1 

On  Lee's  right  centre  a  savage  counter-charge  by  Heth 
makes  capture  of  Rieketts's  battery,  but  again  the  guns 
are  lost  to  the  Federal  regiments.  Hill's  right  is  pushed  by 
Wilcox  around  Hancock's  flank,  and  two  Federal  brigades 
(Mott's  1st  and  2d)  are  driven  to  the  rear.  Hancock  makes 
"  repeated  and  desperate  assaults  "  [the  testimony  of  Lee],  but 
the  Confederates  are  unyielding.  Rosser's  cavalry  on  Lee's 
right  drives  back  the  Federal  cavalry  and  artillery.  A  heavy 
tribute  in  blood  has  Lee  exacted  from  Grant,  and  as  deep 
darkness  covers  over  the  weird  and  dismal  field  of  wounds 
and  death  Lee  can  send  dispatch  to  Richmond  that  all  is 
yet  well.  "  By  the  blessing  of  God,  we  maintained  our  posi 
tion  against  every  effort  until  night,  when  the  contest  closed." 

The  tardy  Longstreet  has  made  only  a  twelve-mile  advance 
eastward  during  the  entire  day,  May  5,  and  halts  at  Richards's 
shop  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  miles  away  from  Lee's  field  of 
action.  At  8  P.  M.  Lee  sends  courier  to  Longstreet  and  bids 
him  make  a  night  march  to  relieve  his  battled-wearied  men. 

1  Three  to  one  do  the  Federal  forces  outnumber  Ewell  on  the  Confederate 
left. 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     49 

At  the  same  hour  he  gives  Hill  the  promise  that  his  soldiers 
shall  be  relieved  at  the  coming  of  dawn.  The  commander 
seeks  rest  upon  the  ground  just  behind  his  own  hungry  and 
thirsty  veterans.  Already  has  he  ordered  Ewell  to  make 
early  assault  on  the  6th  of  May  with  the  left  wing  of  the 
Confederate  army.  His  plans  are  laid  to  push  Longstreet 
and  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps,  at  daybreak,  in  full 
offensive  battle  against  Grant's  left  and  centre. 

Hill's  worn-out  soldiers  sleep  on  the  ground  where  they 
have  fought.  No  food  passes  their  lips.  They  take  no  care 
to  strengthen  the  slight,  irregular  breastworks,  for  Long- 
street's  men  are  under  orders  to  march  and  take  Hill's  posi 
tion.  One  hour  after  midnight  Longstreet's  corps  breaks 
camp  and  follows  the  special  guide  toward  the  battle-ground. 
As  the  forest  birds  again  announce  the  dawn,  Ewell  opens 
fierce  fire  along  the  Confederate  left  wing  before  5  A.  M.  Lee 
has  taken  up  again  the  part  of  the  aggressor.  Warren  and 
Sedgwick  make  reply  to  Ewell's  firing,  and  then  from  left  to 
right  along  the  entire  Confederate  line  the  musketry  battle 
begins  its  deadly  work. 

During  this  night  has  Burnside  led  his  20,000  across  the 
Rapidan,  and  Grant  has  ordered  his  four  army  corps  to 
make  assault  "  along  the  whole  line  "  at  five  in  the  morning. 
Hancock  leads  nearly  one  half  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
against  Lee's  right,  and  Burnside  moves  forward  to  pierce 
the  Confederate  centre. 

Before  the  dawning  is  the  hour  set  by  Lee  for  Longstreet's 
arrival.  Hill  expects  to  be  withdrawn,  and  is  not  prepared 
for  battle.  But  Hancock's  assault  upon  Hill's  front  is  met 
with  obstinate  courage  ;  Hill's  centre  does  not  yield.  Wads- 
worth's  fresh  division  has  spent  the  night  in  touch  with  Hill's 
left  flank.  Hancock's  brigades  swarm  around  to  Hill's  right 
and  attack  the  flank  and  rear  of  Wilcox.  The  Confederate 
line  is  rolled  up  and  driven  backward.  Desperately  do  the 
men  of  Hill  contend  for  their  field,  delivering  fierce  fire  as 


50  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

they  retreat.  Close  and  savage  is  the  fight,  but  Lee's  right 
wing  is  broken.  One  hour  after  the  first  shot,  Hill  has  been 
forced  upon  Poague's  battalion  of  artillery  that  stands  defiant 
near  the  roadway.  Hancock  dares  not  pass  Poague's  grape 
and  canister.  Just  behind  the  guns  is  Lee  on  horseback. 
"  Why  does  not  General  Longstreet  come  ?  "  he  continually 
says  to  his  staff  as  he  rides  to  and  fro  to  rally  the  brigades  of 
Hill's  corps. 

From  the  Confederate  left  wing  come  the  sounds  of  heavy 
battle.  Ewell  has  made  his  log-works  to  bristle  with  cannon 
and  heaps  disaster  upon  every  assault  by  Warren  and  Sedg- 
wick.  But  at  last  Lee's  counter-stroke  against  Hancock's 
assault  is  prepared  to  fall.  In  closed  ranks  and  in  double 
column,  advancing  in  a  long  trot  down  the  plank  road,  rushes 
Longstreet's  corps,  Field's  division  on  the  left,  side  by  side 
with  Kershaw's  division  on  the  right. 

Already  is  the  sun  beaming  upon  the  awful  game  of  death  ; 
in  the  morning  light  the  forest  wears  the  smile  of  the  spring 
tide  ;  the  birds  in  the  treetops  are  singing  while  the  tempest 
of  wrath  breaks  below.  The  thunder  of  Poague's  guns  shakes 
the  very  earth.  Lee  rides  forward  to  meet  the  head  of  Field's 
division.  "  What  boys  are  these  ?  "  he  asks.  "  Texas  boys," 
is  the  quick  reply  from  the  brigade  that  once  followed  Hood, 
but  is  now  led  by  Gregg.  The  light  of  battle  is  shining  in 
Lee's  deep,  luminous  eyes,  as  he  calls  out,  "  My  Texas  boys, 
you  must  charge  !  "  The  Confederates  go  fairly  wild  when  they 
see  before  them  the  gray-bearded  man  with  the  gray  slouch 
hat.  The  voices  of  the  800  Texans  are  hoarse  with  joy,  and 
their  blood  takes  fire  as  they  hear  Lee  himself  give  the  order 
to  charge.  Up  go  ragged  caps  into  the  air  as  the  veterans  rend 
the  sky  with  their  wild  yell.  Then  the  line  of  battle  is  formed, 
and  forward  they  advance  beyond  the  batteries  against  Han 
cock.  Immediately  behind  the  line  rides  Lee  to  direct  the 
charge  in  person.  "  Charge,  boys !  "  is  Lee's  deep,  thrilling 
call  as  he  advances  into  the  thickest  of  the  fight.  Suddenly 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     51 

the  men  divine  his  desperate  purpose,  and  they  begin  to 
shout,  "  Mars  Robert,  go  back !  "  "  Go  back,  General  Lee !  " 
Then  the  artillerymen  whom  Lee  has  passed  respond  with 
the  answering  call,  "  Come  back,  come  back,  General  Lee ! " 
Lee  rides  onward,  waving  his  old  gray  hat,  but  the  very 
heavens  are  rent  with  the  cry,  "  Lee  to  the  rear  !  Lee  to  the 
rear !  "  A  tall,  lank  Texas  sergeant  in  gray  rags  moves  from 
the  ranks,  seizes  the  bridle-rein,  and  turns  Traveller's  head 
to  the  rear.  A  look  of  disappointment  crosses  the  face  of 
Lee,  but  he  yields.  A  last  earthly  salute  the  entire  line  waves 
to  the  commander,  and  forward  they  sweep  to  meet  the  ad 
vancing  Federals.  At  the  same  time  a  part  of  Poague's  bat 
talion  moves  forward  with  cannon.  "  Good-bye,  boys  !  "  cry 
the  advancing  gunners  to  the  comrades  left  behind.  Mori- 
turi  salutamus  —  we  who  are  about  to  die  salute  you.  Such 
is  the  spirit  of  the  veterans  who  face  the  storm  of  death  that 
is  breaking  upon  them.  At  the  head  of  the  return  charge 
dash  the  Texans.  They  are  the  heroes  of  Cold  Harbor,  Sec 
ond  Manassas,  Sharpsburg,  and  Round  Top.  At  the  very 
head  of  the  Federal  column  massed  in  the  plank  road,  the 
brigade  flings  itself.  The  ceaseless  fury  of  the  Federal  fire 
is  pouring  into  front  and  flanks.  To  right  of  them,  to  left  of 
them,  in  front  of  them,  muskets  and  cannon  volley  and  thun 
der.  Into  the  jaws  of  death,  into  the  mouth  of  hell,  charge  the 
800.  A  circle  of  fire  envelops  the  band,  but  already  the 
Federal  column  staggers.  Benning  and  Anderson,  with  their 
Georgians,  and  Law,  leading  his  Alabamians,  crash  forward 
against  the  encircling  host.  The  forest  rings  with  yells,  the 
roar  of  battle  becomes  terrific.  Half  of  the  Texas  brigade 
has  fallen  within  ten  minutes.  But  the  tide  of  Federal 
success  has  been  turned  backward  by  the  gallant  men  who 
have  shown  their  willingness  to  meet  death  and  to  spare  their 
beloved  leader. 

Lee's  counter-stroke  now  is  ready.    Three  guns  are  thrown 
forward  with  the  infantry  on  the  highway ;  Field  deploys  to 


52  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  left  and  Kershaw  to  the  right  of  the  plank  road.  The 
conflict  sweeps  to  and  fro  in  the  tangled  woods  and  marshes. 
The  crisis  in  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  has  come. 

Lee  waits  behind  his  field  battery  for  the  arrival  of 
Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps.  The  fight  is  raging  in  his 
front.  The  guns  of  Ewell  are  calling  across  from  the  turnpike 
that  all  is  well  on  the  left  wing.  An  engineer  is  sent  to  find 
an  opening  for  a  flank  attack  against  Hancock's  left.  At  this 
moment  of  anxiety  a  courier  —  a  mere  lad  —  dashes  up  to 
General  Lee  with  a  message  from  Anderson,  leader  of  the 
division  left  to  guard  the  rear  at  Orange  Court  House.  The 
courier's  small  pony  is  panting  like  a  hunted  deer.  Lee 
reads  the  message  and  turns  to  look  upon  the  tired  pony. 
"  Young  man,"  he  says,  "  you  should  have  some  feeling  for 
your  horse ;  dismount  and  rest  him."  Lee  thereupon  dra,ws 
forth  from  the  bag  attached  to  his  saddle  a  buttered  biscuit, 
and  half  of  this,  with  his  own  hand,  he  gives  to  the  courier's 
pony. 

Now  Anderson  comes  to  give  strength  to  Lee's  onset. 
Hill's  men  return  to  the  front.  At  10  A.  M.  Longstreet  moves 
four  brigades  under  Mahone  by  the  right  flank.  They  find 
a  covered  way  in  an  unfinished  railroad  that  brings  them 
to  the  left  end  of  Hancock's  regiments.  Facing  north  they 
fall  with  fury  upon  Hancock's  flank  and  rear  and  roll  up 
the  Federal  line  of  battle.  At  eleven  Lee  pushes  every  man 
forward  against  Hancock's  front  in  impetuous  charge.  The 
Federal  brigades  are  forced  backward  in  confusion.1 

The  descriptions  given  are  these  :  "  Broken  into  fragments  " — "  overlapped  " 
—  "crushed"  —  "driven  back" — "crumbling  away  under  fire."  Hancock's 
entire  left  wing  is  "  rolled  up  like  a  wet  blanket "  [Hancock's  own  admission 
to  Longstreet  after  the  war]  and  broken  into  fragments  —  Hill's  left  brigade 
"  is  struck  on  end,  broken  into  fragments,  and  hurled  back  in  dire  disorder." 
The  next  brigade  is  "  overlapped,  crushed,  and  driven  back."  Next,  Mott's 
division  "crumbled  away"  under  the  fire;  Wadsworth's  division  on  Hill's 
left  is  "  staggered  by  the  terrific  onslaught."  "  Down  the  plank  road  from 
Hill's  centre  a  stream  of  broken  men  is  pouring  to  the  rear,  giving  the 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     53 

Twelve  o'clock  finds  Grant's  entire  left  wing  in  confusion, 
with  Hancock  giving  the  order  to  retreat  behind  the  strong 
works  on  the  plank  road.  Like  a  lion  of  war,  Longstreet  is 
charging  in  front  and  on  the  flank.  Grant's  losses  have  been 
enormous  and  not  even  the  attack  of  the  tardy  Burnside  can 
retrieve  the  disaster. 

Now  the  blaze  of  muskets  has  ignited  the  dried  leaves,  and 
the  smoke  obscures  the  noonday  glow.  Longstreet's  regi 
ments  are  ablaze  with  the  ardor  of  battle.  The  gallant 
Georgian  places  himself  at  the  head  of  Kershaw's  division 
and  sets  it  in  charging  line  across  the  plank  road.  In  hot 
pursuit  of  Hancock  he  moves  rapidly  toward  the  eastward, 
nor  does  he  note  the  fact  that  his  four  flanking  brigades  have 
made  pause  in  line  just  southward  from  the  plank  roadway. 
Their  loaded  muskets  are  pointing  northward  to  command 
the  very  avenue  upon  which  Longstreet  rides.  In  full  volley 
they  fire  upon  the  general  and  his  staff.  The  brave  Brigadier 
Jenkins  falls  dead  and  Longstreet  is  disabled.  Friends  call 
out,  the  firing  ceases ;  but  the  advance  of  the  flanking  force 
is  checked.  Lee  hastens  to  the  front  and  seeks  to  straighten 
out  his  line  of  battle.  The  hour  of  four  o'clock  has  struck 
when  the  order  is  given  to  charge  through  forest,  flame,  and 
smoke  upon  the  Brock  Koad.  Before  this  hour  Burnside  has 
raised  a  storm  against  the  Confederate  centre,  but  Hill's 
troops  already  have  tamed  the  fury  of  the  9th  corps.  As 
Burnside  becomes  quiet  in  the  centre,  Lee  makes  ready  to 
deliver  assault  against  both  flanks  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  Ewell  sends  Early  and  Gordon  to  envelop  Sedgwick's 
right  flank  at  the  very  hour  when  Lee  urges  the  men  of 
Longstreet  and  Hill  to  the  charge  against  Hancock's  triple 

onlooker  the  impression  that  everything  had  gone  to  pieces  "  [Walker].  Webb 
says  *.  "  Ewell  had  most  effectively  stopped  the  forward  movement  of  the  right 
wing  of  Meade's  army  and  Hill  and  Longstreet  defeated  our  left  under  Han 
cock.  The  fact  is  that  the  whole  of  the  left  was  disorganized."  Wadsworth's 
division  to  right  of  Hancock's  is  driven  by  the  Confederate  tempest  into  dis 
order  and  they  retreat  over  the  fallen  body  of  their  brave  leader. 


54  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

wall  of  defense.  The  forest  has  communicated  its  fire  to  the 
front  line  of  Federal  logs.  Forward  rush  the  divisions  of 
Field  and  Anderson.  They  pour  in  a  hot  musketry  fire,  but 
Hancock's  second  line  is  bristling  with  heavy  guns,  and  their 
fire  sweeps  the  field.  Up  to  the  very  breastwork  on  Han 
cock's  left  the  Confederates  advance,  and  a  gap  is  made  and 
disorder  reigns  among  the  Federal  defenders,  who  turn  in 
flight.  The  Confederate  flag  is  planted  in  triumph  on  Han 
cock's  first  intrenchment,  but  his  second  and  third  walls 
are  impregnable.  The  Federal  artillery  is  aided  by  Carroll's 
brigade,  and  the  Confederates  are  compelled  to  loosen  their 
grasp  on  Hancock's  fortress. 

The  sun  is  yet  above  the  horizon,  and  Gordon  is  ready  for 
the  charge  against  Grant's  extreme  right.  Two  Confederate 
brigades  beyond  the  turnpike  are  facing  southward ;  their 
bayonets  are  pointing  directly  along  Grant's  line  of  battle. 
Forward  they  move  to  the  music  of  the  far-resounding  yell. 
Sedgwick's  right  brigade  is  engaged  in  the  busy  work  of  pil 
ing  log  upon  log,  but  the  men  lay  down  the  axe  and  the  spade 
and  join  their  brigadier  as  prisoners  of  war.  The  second  bri 
gade  is  likewise  rolled  up  and  broken,  and  a  second  brigadier 
is  captured.  Darkness  falls  upon  Gordon  in  possession  of  a 
mile  of  Grant's  rifle-pits,  600  prisoners,  and  Generals  Shaler 
and  Seymour.  The  dense  thickets  have  disordered  the  Con 
federate  line,  and  Gordon  halts.  The  6th  corps  spends  the 
night  in  drawing  back  its  front  and  right  to  a  line  of  defense 
entirely  new  along  the  Germanna  Koad.1 

The  awful  struggle  in  the  tangled  forest  has  closed  with 
Lee  pressing  the  attack  against  Grant's  right  and  left.  As  this 
second  day  fades  into  darkness,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is 
struggling  in  a  purely  defensive  contest,  and  holds  its  position 
behind  these  heavy  walls  of  log-work  on  the  left,  and  draws 
back  its  right  corps  behind  a  second  freshly  constructed  line 

Grant  writes,  May  7,  10  A.  M.:  "  Had  there  been  daylight,  the  enemy  could 
have  injured  us  very  much  in  the  confusion  that  prevailed." 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     55 

on  the  right,  and  with  Grant  ordering  Burnside  to  make  his 
position  strong  in  the  centre. 

When  Grant  looks  through  the  thickets  on  the  morning  of 
the  7th  of  May,  he  sees  Lee's  breastworks  crowned  with 
heavy  guns,  and  has  no  desire  to  renew  the  battle.  Likewise 
Lee  beholds  the  strength  of  Grant's  intrenchments,  and  does 
not  attack.  A  cavalry  battle  is  in  progress  this  day  to  the 
southward.  Fitz-Lee  on  the  Brock  Road  and  Hampton  on 
the  Catharpin  oppose  the  troopers  of  Sheridan. 

If  the  casualties  suffered  in  battle  are  an  indication  of 
success  or  failure,  we  may  place  the  17,000  Federal  disabled 
men  (regular  reports ;  Humphreys,  15,387)  in  contrast  with 
the  probable  Confederate  loss  of  less  than  half  that  num 
ber,  i 

Grant's  early  order  of  May  7  commands  Meade  to  make 
ready  for  a  night  march  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House. 
Hancock  must  hold  his  ground,  while  Warren  leads  the  5th 
southward  along  the  Brock  Road  and  Sedgwick  eastward  to 
Chancellorsville  and  thence  to  Piney  Branch  Church ;  Burn- 
side  eastward  to  Chancellorsville  and  thence  southward.  Two 
corps  draw  back  from  before  the  face  of  Lee  toward  the  east, 
while  two  remain  in  his  front. 

All  day  long  both  Grant  and  Meade  are  troubled  with 
anxious  fear  of  an  attack  from  the  Confederate  army.  The 
purpose  now  formed  in  Grant's  mind  finds  expression  the 
following  day  in  a  dispatch  to  Washington  :  "  My  efforts  will 
be  to  form  a  junction  with  General  Butler  as  early  as  possi 
ble,  and  be  prepared  to  meet  any  enemy  interposing.  .  .  . 
My  exact  route  to  the  James  River  I  have  not  yet  definitely 
marked  out."  We  hear  no  longer  the  command  to  Meade 
to  seek  Lee's  army  as  his  objective  point,  but  Grant  turns 
toward  Butler  on  the  distant  Jarnes. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  May  7,  Lee  orders  a  roadway 
cut  through  the  forest  directly  southward  from  the  plank 
1  Compare  footnote,  p.  120.  —  EDITOR. 


56  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

road.  He  seems  to  anticipate  Grant's  movement  from  the 
latter's  failure  to  renew  the  battle.  The  cavalry  soon  brings 
the  news  that  Grant's  trains  are  moving  off.  Ewell  sends  a 
force  to  reconnoitre  the  Federal  right,  and  finds  the  Ger manna 
Road  deserted. 

Grant  is  withdrawing  from  his  defenses,  and  behind  him 
remain  his  dead  and  some  of  his  wounded. 

At  the  coming  of  darkness  Lee  issues  the  order  to  Ander 
son  to  lead  the  1st  corps  as  soon  as  practicable  through  the 
new  forest  pathway  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  Ewell  is 
next  ordered  to  begin  the  night  march,  and  Hill  remains  to 
guard  the  rear.  Anderson  moves  out  at  11  P.  M.  of  May  7, 
and  through  the  Wilderness,  lit  up  by  burning  leaves,  he 
moves  southward.  In  a  shady  grove  near  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  the  men  of  the  1st  corps  halt  and  lie  down  to 
snatch  an  hour's  rest  and  await  the  coming  of  the  dawn.  Lee 
himself  bivouacs  at  Parker's  Store  with  Ewell,  and  awakes 
on  the  8th  of  May  to  move  with  Swell's  corps  toward  Spott 
sylvania. 

Grant  has  now  left  the  Wilderness  behind  him ;  so  many 
of  his  brigades  at  first  move  eastward  toward  Chancellors- 
ville  away  from  Lee's  presence  that  the  Confederate  com 
mander  conceives  the  view  on  this  morning  of  the  8th  that 
Grant  is  retiring  to  Fredericksburg.  He  therefore  leaves 
Early  with  Heth's  corps  in  front  of  Todd's  Tavern  to  hold 
the  position  of  Grant's  rear,  while  he  swings  two  corps  around 
by  his  own  right  flank  to  strike  Grant's  head  of  column  or  his 
flank.  Lee's  movement  is  executed  with  great  skill. 

Grant  remains  with  Hancock  near  his  own  rear,  and  until 
12.45  P.  M.  of  the  8th  issues  detailed  orders  to  his  army  for 
the  advance  beyond  Spottsylvania  to  the  James  River.  At 
1  P.  M.  he  learns  that  his  head  of  column,  5th  corps,  has 
received  a  check  at  Spottsylvania,  and  that  he  must  stand  and 
deliver  battle.  Lee  has  learned  in  the  early  forenoon  that 
the  Confederate  advance  corps  has  won  the  race  for  position 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     57 

and  holds   the  coveted   field  of   defensive   battle  on  Spott- 
sylvania  Ridge. 

Chiefly  to  Fitz-Lee's  division  of  Stuart's  cavalry  is  due  the 
praise  for  gaining  the  midnight  race.  The  report  of  Warren 
declares  that  his  5th  corps  was  retarded  in  the  southward 
movement  on  the  Brock  Road,  first,  by  the  cavalry  escort  of 
General  Meade ;  secondly,  by  Merritt's  Federal  cavalry  that 
blocked  the  way.  Small  mention  is  made  of  the  presence  of 
that  ever-serious  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  a  Federal  column, 
viz.,  Stuart's  troopers.  Throughout  the  night  has  Fitz-Lee 
held  his  dismounted  men  to  hot  work  on  the  Brock  Road 
against  the  advance  of  Warren.  Trees  are  felled,  attacks 
delivered,  and  obstinate  resistance  in  narrow  pathways  made. 
The  sun  rises  upon  Warren  still  distant  from  the  goal,  while 
Kershaw's  men  of  Anderson's  corps  are  resting  at  the  Court 
House  from  the  weariness  of  a  journey  more  circuitous  and 
hence  longer  than  that  of  Warren.  The  Confederates  drive 
out  a  wandering  body  of  Federal  troopers,  then  march  north 
ward  over  the  Brock  Road  to  render  aid  to  the  cavalry  in 
stemming  the  Federal  tide  of  war.  On  a  ridge  covered  with 
pines  a  mile  from  the  Court  House,  Anderson  constructs  a 
breastwork  of  logs  and  rails.  The  Confederates  wear  a  grim 
smile  behind  their  defenses  as  they  watch  Warren's  corps 
advancing  to  the  assault.  Onward  rushes  the  Federal  host  to 
the  charge.  Stuart  is  there  on  horseback,  amid  the  infantry 
men.  He  has  led  Anderson's  column  on  the  march.  The 
ascending  sun  glances  for  the  last  time  upon  that  plumed  hat 
in  the  presence  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Amid 
the  storm  of  bullets,  Stuart  wears  the  same  sweet  smile.  He 
laughs  and  makes  exchange  of  jokes  with  the  riflemen ;  he 
commends  the  accuracy  of  their  aim  and  the  rapidity  of  their 
fire.  They  have  marched  all  the  night  long,  but  unquenchable 
is  the  good  humor  and  the  courage  of  Stuart  and  these  musket 
eers.  His  shout  of  gratification  is  mingled  with  theirs  when 
they  behold  Warren's  corps  recoiling  from  the  deadly  fire 


58  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

that  blazes  along  the  ridge's  crest.  Just  once  again  three 
days  after  shall  we  see  the  gallant  Stuart  on  the  line  of  battle 
and  then  —  no  more.  Lee's  1st  corps  holds  the  Court  House 
cross-roads,  and  Grant's  advance  has  failed  to  take  the 
position. 

The  position  is  a  slightly  elevated  ridge  partly  covered 
with  pine-trees  and  dotted  with  open  farms.  The  elevation  is 
intersected  by  rivulets  and  ravines  along  the  eastern  and 
western  slopes.  The  two  armies  are  shaping  their  course 
southeastward  across  the  swamps  and  sluggish  streams  that 
feed  the  upper  York  River.  Between  the  two  rivers  lies  the 
Spottsylvania  Ridge  in  this  same  southeastward  direction. 
Along  the  western  edge  of  the  elevation  flows  the  Po,  and  at 
the  eastern  base  is  the  Ny.  Across  the  peninsular  ridge  are 
drawn  the  embattled  lines  that  face  each  other  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  8th  of  May.  Lee's  guns  are  pointing  northward ; 
fairly  across  Grant's  pathway  has  the  Confederate  commander 
planted  his  line  of  battle.  The  swifter  marching  of  the  night 
has  given  him  the  elevated  field,  and  now  must  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  deliver  battle  against  an  intrenched  foe. 

Lee  makes  more  speedy  concentration  on  the  8th  than 
Grant,  because  of  Early 's  threatening  attitude  at  Todd's 
Tavern.  The  Confederate  commander  rides  through  the  dust 
and  heat  of  the  day  with  Swell's  corps,  and  at  5  p.  M.,  by  a 
flanking  course  beyond  the  Po,  has  twice  made  passage  of 
that  stream,  and  near  sunset  looks  northward  from  the  ridge 
of  pines.  Lee's  1st  and  2d  corps  are  ready  in  position  to 
receive  the  charge  of  Sedgwick  as  he  leads  southward  the  5th 
and  6th  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  To  the  left  of  the  Brock 
Road  stands  Anderson,  and  on  the  right  moves  Ewell  to  battle, 
facing  northward  to  receive  the  charge.  As  darkness  falls,  the 
assault  of  Sedgwick  is  driven  back,  and  Ewell  advances  in 
a  counter-charge  a  half  mile  on  the  right  of  the  Brock  Road. 
Face  to  face  with  Sedgwick's  breastworks  he  finds  himself. 
The  Confederate  corps  is  halted,  and  in  the  darkness  the 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     59 

men  throw  up  intrenchments  where  they  stand.  We  are  now 
watching  the  formation  of  the  famous  salient ;  let  us  take 
careful  notice  of  positions. 

Ewell's  corps  forms  Lee's  right  wing  on  the  evening  of 
the  8th,  and  Anderson's  corps  is  Lee's  left  wing.  The  Brock 
Road  separates  the  two  forces.  The  division  of  Rodes  rests 
its  left  on  the  Brock  Road,  and  Johnson's  division  is  drawn 
out  to  the  right  of  Rodes.  Gordon  holds  his  division  in  re 
serve.  The  half-mile  movement  forward  has  brought  Ewell's 
advance  divisions  far  northward  beyond  Anderson's  corps. 
Lee's  entire  right  wing  faces  westward  while  his  left  wing 
faces  northward,  both  guarding  the  approach  of  the  Brock 
Road  from  the  northwest. 

The  early  morning  of  the  9th  of  May  finds  Lee  riding  along 
Ewell's  line  on  the  Confederate  right  wing.  Through  the 
pine-tree  groves  it  winds  and  curves  its  way  just  where  the  men 
have  halted  in  the  darkness.  As  Lee  continues  to  ride  toward 
his  right,  he  finds  the  line  turning  almost  northward  toward 
Sedgwick's  flank.  Johnson's  division,  on  the  extreme  right, 
has  pushed  its  way  through  the  forest,  across  rivulets  and 
through  a  tangled  marsh  beyond  the  Harrison  and  McCool 
farmhouses,  to  command  the  open  ground  that  slopes  away 
to  the  Ny  River  on  the  eastward.  At  Rodes's  right  brigade, 
the  line  bends  outward  in  a  salient,  and  in  the  centre  of  John 
son's  division  an  acute  angle  in  the  line  is  formed  by  bend 
ing  back  his  right  brigade  to  face  the  Ny  and  defend  the  right 
wing  from  a  flank  attack. 

As  Lee  glances  along  the  irregular  intrenchment,  he  ex 
claims  :  "  This  is  a  wretched  line.  I  do  not  see  how  it  can  be 
held!" 

But  Ewell  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  Johnson's  salient 
commands  a  high  open  point  on  the  Spottsylvania  Ridge  that 
must  be  held,  since  Grant's  cannon  from  that  point  would 
sweep  the  field.  Lee  orders  his  heavy  guns  into  strong  po 
sition  behind  his  entire  defenses,  and  commands  the  chief 


60  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

engineer  to  mark  off  a  second  line  behind  the  advanced  right 
wing  cutting  off  the  salients.  Gordon's  division  makes  a  slight 
beginning  in  this  second  line. 

Thus  far  have  we  seen  the  construction  of  the  western  face 
of  the  great  salient,  where  nearly  all  of  Ewell's  men  stand 
with  their  backs  to  the  eastward  and  watch  the  Brock  Koad. 

Far  behind  at  Todd's  Tavern  on  the  Brock  Road  has  Han 
cock's  corps,  except  one  division,  tarried  throughout  the  8th 
of  May.  Grant  fears  an  attack  from  Lee's  rear  guard,  com 
posed  of  Hampton  and  of  Hill's  corps  (under  Early).  He 
therefore  keeps  Hancock  from  the  field  during  those  golden 
hours  when  the  Confederate  intrenchments  rise  inch  by  inch. 
On  the  morning  of  the  9th  Grant  sends  Sheridan  on  a  cavalry 
raid  toward  Richmond,  and  thus  gives  Lee  a  longer  time  to 
concentrate. 

While  Ewell  and  Anderson  bar  Grant's  progress  southward 
between  the  rivers,  Hill's  corps  under  Early  hastens  toward 
the  field.  The  head  of  the  3d  corps  reaches  the  Court  House 
just  in  time  to  resist  the  advance  of  Burn  side  across  the  river 
Ny  from  the  eastward.  Far  afield  has  Burnside  marched, 
and  now  along  the  Fredericksburg  Road  he  moves  to  strike 
Lee's  right  and  rear.  Along  the  ridge,  Early  faces  his  line 
toward  the  east,  and  visits  confusion  on  Burnside's  attack. 
Early's  left  extends  northward  to  touch  Ewell's  right,  and 
now  the  great  salient  in  Lee's  line  is  completed.  It  thrusts  its 
head  northward  along  the  Spottsylvania  Ridge ;  the  western 
face  is  held  by  Ewell  and  the  eastern  face  by  Ewell  and 
Early.  Lee's  right  wing  now  forms  a  right  angle  with  his 
left  and  centre.  At  the  angle  the  Confederate  line  is  pushed 
out  northward  into  the  shape  of  an  acorn,  one  mile  in  length 
and  half  a  mile  in  width.  The  Confederate  soldiers  call  this 
excrescence  the  Mule  Shoe.  Along  the  eastern  face  of  the 
salient  is  first  an  open  field,  sloping  to  the  Ny  River,  then  two 
small  streams  are  crossed,  and  the  line  of  battle  climbs  north 
ward  to  the  summit  of  a  gentle  knoll.  Upon  this  knoll  the 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     61 

rifle-pits,  filled  with  Johnson's  division,  make  a  sharp  angle 
to  the  southward  and  wind  through  the  heavy  pine-trees  to 
form  the  westward  face  of  the  salient.  Lee  is  ready  for  battle. 
Heavy  guns  sweep  every  approach  toward  this  exposed  angle 
in  the  centre,  and  the  right  and  left  wing  are  made  strong 
with  artillery. 

Hancock  follows  the  Brock  Road  on  May  9  to  take  position 
on  Grant's  extreme  right.  He  sends  three  divisions  across  the 
Po  to  press  against  Lee's  left  and  rear.  Grant  proposes  to 
grasp  Lee's  peninsula  from  the  north  front  and  from  the  east 
and  the  west. 

Under  cover  of  darkness  Lee  makes  ready  his  counter- 
stroke.  Across  the  Po  below  the  Court  House  he  moves  Heth's 
division.  At  daylight  of  the  10th  Heth  falls  upon  the  flank 
and  rear  of  Hancock's  force,  just  as  Hancock  seeks  to  obey 
Grant's  order  to  withdraw  his  men  across  the  Po.  Amid 
the  thick-grown  pines  Heth  visits  fearful  loss  on  Barlow's 
division ;  through  an  Inferno  of  burning  woods  he  hastens 
Hancock's  retreat  across  the  Po  and  rejoices  over  the  capture 
of  one  of  Hancock's  heavy  guns. 

Now  Grant  begins  to  storm  the  Confederate  works  on  the 
ridge.  At  eleven  he  moves  a  line  of  battle  against  Field's 
division  in  a  grand  assault,  but  the  Federal  soldiers  pour  out 
their  blood  in  vain.  At  three  in  the  afternoon  the  men  in  blue 
uniforms  make  a  second  dash  against  the  wooded  crest  where 
the  guns  and  muskets  of  Lee's  1st  corps  are  hurling  a  tornado 
of  death  through  the  stunted  cedars.  Over  the  works  leap 
the  Confederates  to  gather  up  the  muskets  and  ammunition 
and  haversacks  of  Grant's  fallen  men.  These  are  distributed 
along  the  line,  and  now  each  Confederate  is  armed  with  more 
than  one  loaded  rifle.  The  sun  draws  near  the  hour  of  set 
ting.  Hancock  is  joined  with  Warren,  and  in  long  heavy 
lines  the  2d  and  5th  corps  dash  themselves  against  Lee's  thin 
left  wing.  But  Hancock's  front  line  goes  down  before  the 
multiplied  fire  of  the  Confederate  division.  Gallantly  onward 


62  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

rushes  the  second  Federal  line  and  over  the  breastwork  of 
the  Texas  brigade.  Like  tigers  fight  the  fragment  of  the  800. 
With  bayonets  and  with  clubbed  guns  they  carry  on  the  strug 
gle  hand  to  hand,  and  will  not  yield  to  numbers.  The  adjoin 
ing  brigade  turns  upon  the  flank  of  the  Federal  column,  and 
Grant's  assault  is  rendered  fruitless. 

At  the  same  hour  another  assault  is  raging  against  the 
west  face  of  the  salient.  Sedgwick  sends  Upton's  brigade 
to  charge  Swell's  centre.  In  four  lines  Upton  advances  and 
surprises  a  part  of  Ewell's  line;  he  breaks  through  Doles' 
brigade  and  sweeps  him  from  the  Confederate  works.  Daniel 
and  Steuart  unleash  their  brigades  (North  Carolinians  and 
Virginians)  against  Upton's  flanks.  Battle  draws  up  his 
Alabamians  and  Johnson  his  North  Carolinians  against  Up 
ton's  front,  and  yet  the  gallant  Upton  continues  the  strug 
gle.  Lee  hears  the  sound  of  continued  battle  near  the  centre 
of  his  field ;  the  message  comes  that  Ewell's  line  is  broken. 
He  spurs  his  horse  toward  the  place  of  strife,  and  finds  Gor 
don  arranging  his  men  for  the  charge.  Lee  moves  forward 
to  lead  the  regiments.  "  This  is  no  place  for  General  Lee," 
says  Gordon  in  stage  whisper.  The  soldiers  hear  the  words 
and  begin  to  shout,  "  General  Lee  to  the  rear !  "  "  These 
men  are  Georgians  and  Virginians ;  they  have  never  failed 
you ;  they  will  not  fail  you  now !  "  cries  the  impetuous  Gor 
don  to  his  commander.  And  now  a  ragged  soldier  steps  from 
the  ranks  and  turns  Traveller's  head  toward  the  rear.  The 
cry  of  "  Lee  to  the  rear !  "  rings  out  again  and  again,  and  then 
it  changes  to  the  battle-slogan  as  the  line  advances.  Gordon 
strikes  Upton  on  the  right  flank  just  as  the  Stonewall  brigade 
delivers  its  blow  on  the  Federal  left  flank.  Upton  is  forced 
back  with  heavy  loss  and  the  line  restored.  Ewell's  terrific 
firing  has  meanwhile  repulsed  the  reinforcements  pressing 
forward  to  the  aid  of  Upton. 

The  Confederate  right  wing  facing  eastward  under  Early 
has  not  escaped  attack  on  this  day  of  general  advance. 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     63 

Several  lines  from  Burnside's  corps  essay  to  seize  the  vener 
able  Court  House,  but  the  guns  of  Cutts  and  Pegram  speedily 
drive  Burnside  to  cover. 

This  day  of  Federal  sacrifice  is  followed  by  a  day  of  rain 
and  skirmishing.  May  10  Grant  wires  to  Halleck : l  "  Send 
to  Belle  Plain  all  the  infantry  you  can  rake  and  scrape." 
May  11  he  dispatches2  to  Washington  the  well-known 
declaration  that  he  will  "  fight  it  out  on  this  line  if  it  takes 
all  summer,"  and  adds  to  this  the  following :  "  The  arrival  of 
reinforcements  here  will  be  very  encouraging  to  the  men,  and 
I  hope  they  will  be  sent  as  fast  as  possible,  and  in  as  great 
numbers." 

From  the  upper  windows  of  the  brick  church  near  the 
Court  House  the  Confederates  possess  a  wide  view  over  the 
field  of  strife.  May  11  they  mark  commotion  and  movement 
on  the  Federal  line.  Burnside  turns  his  head  of  column 
northward  across  the  Ny,  and  then  marches  back  again  to  sit 
down  before  the  Court  House.  Far  up  the  Po  toward  Lee's 
left  marches  a  Federal  brigade,  and  Hancock  withdraws  a 
division  from  the  Federal  right.  Lee  interprets  this  restless 
ness  as  the  sign  of  a  withdrawal  from  the  field  by  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  He  orders  all  artillery  "  difficult  of  access  " 
on  the  Confederate  line  to  be  withdrawn  and  held  in  readiness 
for  the  march.  In  obedience  to  this  command,  Long  draws 
back  through  the  narrow  winding  roadway  the  guns  from  the 
Mule  Shoe  salient.  Johnson's  division  is  left  to  guard  the 
apex  with  muskets  and  two  pieces  of  artillery.  At  midnight 
Johnson  reports  the  massing  of  troops  in  his  front,  and  asks 
for  the  return  of  the  guns.  Early  thinks  that  Grant  will  assail 
the  Confederate  left ;  Johnson  insists  that  the  Confederate 
centre  will  be  attacked.  Ewell  orders  the  guns  returned  at 
daybreak  of  the  12th. 

Through  the  heavy  mist  at  the  dawn  of  May  12  Hancock's 
corps  dashes  from  the  pines  across  the  open  front  to  envelop 
i  68  W.  R.  595.  2  Ibid>  627. 


64  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  apex  of  the  salient.  Johnson's  division  is  alert,  but  the 
musketry  fire  cannot  shake  the  masses  of  the  2d  corps.  Over 
the  log-works  they  swarm;  Johnson's  division  of  2800  is 
made  captive,  and  in  bonds  with  them  are  borne  off  Generals 
Johnson  and  Steuart.  The  Confederate  batteries  rush  for 
ward  at  a  gallop,  and  reach  the  salient  just  in  time  to  become 
Federal  spoil.  Twenty  cannon  and  a  troop  of  banners  fall 
into  Hancock's  hands. 

Hancock's  corps  fills  up  the  inner  angle  of  the  salient.  His 
line  begins  to  sweep  down  within  the  Mule  Shoe  from  point 
to  heel.  Lane's  Confederate  brigade  from  the  eastern  face 
pours  in  a  galling  fire,  and  Hancock's  left  wing  recoils.  Across 
the  base  of  the  salient  Gordon  forms  his  line.  So  dense  is  the 
fog  and  smoke  of  battle  that  Hancock's  position  is  defined 
only  by  the  sound  of  his  muskets  and  the  direction  of  the 
bullets.  Like  a  primitive  bee-hunter  Gordon  follows  the 
course  of  the  leaden  messengers  back  to  their  origin.  The  din 
of  battle  swells  into  a  roar  where  Gordon  meets  Hancock 
amid  the  thickest  pines.  The  Federal  left  is  thrust  backward, 
some  of  the  Confederate  guns  recaptured  and  afterwards  lost 
again,  and  Gordon  sets  his  flag  above  the  eastern  face  of  the 
salient. 

Already  has  Lee  galloped  to  the  place  of  battle.  He  watches 
Hancock's  left  swing  back,  but  observes  the  Federal  right  still 
making  advance.  Now  Ewell  begins  to  press  Ramseur's  bri 
gade  against  Hancock's  right  flank.  From  Hill's  (Early's) 
corps  on  Lee's  right  are  drawn  two  brigades  under  Harris 
and  McGowan.  Some  of  Perrin's  men  follow.  Lee  spurs  his 
horse  forward  to  lead  Harris's  Mississippians  into  the  deadly 
breach.  But  again  rings  out  the  protest,  "General  Lee,  go 
to  the  rear !  "  "  Lee  to  the  rear  "  is  the  battle-cry  of  the  line 
that  drives  backward  Hancock's  right  wing.  Severe  losses  have 
come  to  Hancock's  corps.  Outside  the  salient  have  the  Con 
federates  driven  his  line.  But  Hancock  continues  to  hold  the 
outer  trenches  at  the  apex  and  along  the  western  face  of  the 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     65 

Mule  Shoe.  Two  divisions  from  the  6th  Federal  corps  advance 
to  support  Hancock's  right  along  this  western  portion  of  the 
angle.  Three  Confederate  brigades  occupy  the  inner  trenches 
of  this  western  side.  Across  the  pile  of  logs  for  twenty  hours 
the  murderous  struggle  continues  hand-to-hand,  until  this 
place  of  battle  is  baptized,  in  the  life  current  from  the  veins 
of  wounded  and  dying,  as  the  Bloody  Angle.  Mississippi  under 
Harris  holds  the  place  of  honor  on  this  day.  In  close  support 
stands  South  Carolina,  led  by  McGowan,  and  by  their  side 
stands  North  Carolina,  with  Ramseur.  These  three  brigades 
hold  the  inner  trenches  of  the  western  face  of  the  salient. 
From  the  apex  at  their  right  sweeps  an  enfilading  Federal  fire 
along  their  line.  Just  across  the  heap  of  logs  in  the  outer 
trenches  stand  the  Federal  divisions,  four  lines  deep. 

The  three  brigades  must  hold  this  key-point  in  the  Con 
federate  archway.  Lee  has  not  another  man  to  place  in  the 
imperiled  centre,  for  Grant  is  hurling  the  whole  Army  of  the 
Potomac  against  him  "  all  along  the  line."  The  5th  and  part 
of  the  6th  corps  are  charging  up  against  Lee's  left,  and  Burn- 
side  storms  the  right.  But  cannon  crown  the  Confederate 
lines,  and  the  story  of  Grant's  assaults  is  again  written  in  the 
blood  of  his  own  soldiers.  Continual  aid  is  sent  to  Hancock 
in  the  centre.  Ravines  and  forests  outside  the  salient  are  filled 
up  with  Federal  regiments ;  batteries  are  planted  to  fire  over 
the  works ;  mortars  drop  their  shot  among  the  beleaguered 
Confederates  ;  cannon  are  dragged  up  to  thrust  their  muzzles 
across  the  top  of  the  intrenchments.  And  yet  the  three 
brigades  stand  bravely  to  their  work. 

On  each  side  of  the  fortification  men  climb  upward  to  the 
top  and  fire  into  the  faces  of  the  foe.  They  grapple  one 
another  across  the  logs,  and  the  strongest  drags  his  antagonist 
over  the  top-log  as  a  prisoner.  Over  the  works  and  through 
the  crevices  are  bayonets  thrust.  A  cold,  drenching  rain  falls 
upon  the  wrestlers.  Both  trenches  are  partly  filled  with  water 
and  seem  to  run  with  blood.  The  heaps  of  dead  and  dying, 


66  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Federal  and  Confederates,  are  more  than  once  removed,  to 
leave  fighting  room  for  the  living.  Large  standing  trees  be 
hind  the  lines  are  cut  off  by  musket-balls. 

Throughout  the  day  the  roar  of  battle  is  continuous  in  this 
field  of  blood.  The  brigades  ordered  forward  by  Grant  to 
support  the  assault  suffer  more,  perhaps,  than  the  Federal 
force  in  the  trenches.  The  Confederate  fire  is  so  keen  that  it 
splits  the  blades  of  grass  around  the  approaching  lines  from  the 
6th  corps.  A  Federal  officer  speaks  of  the  "  minies  moaning 
in  a  furious  concert  as  they  picked  out  victims  by  the  score." 

Under  cover  of  darkness  Grant's  line  of  toilers  in  the  ditch 
is  relieved  by  men  who  take  their  places.1  As  these  Federal 
soldiers  withdraw,  they  drop  to  the  ground  from  exhaustion. 
But  the  three  Confederate  brigades  are  not  relieved.  Lee 
cannot  spare  the  men  to  take  their  places.  Without  food  or 
drink  or  rest  or  covering,  beneath  the  falling  rain  they  stand 
in  the  bloody  trenches  and  load  and  fire  throughout  the 
watches  of  the  night. 

Gordon's  men  are  toiling  to  erect  a  breastwork  across  the 
breast  of  the  salient.  At  early  dawn  of  the  13th  May,  the 
wearied  Confederate  troops  are  withdrawn  from  the  angle. 
Lee's  wings  are  bound  together  by  this  stronger  second  line. 
In  spite  of  Confederate  losses  by  capture  on  this  fearful 
12th  May,  Grant's  casualties  in  making  assaults  have  been 
so  great  that  the  lost  on  both  sides  stand  in  number  about  the 
same,  —  7000. 

From  May  13  to  18  Grant  "  mano3uvred  and  waited  for 
reinforcements."  Halleck  sends  him  24,500  and  to  Butler 
3000.  The  Confederates  rest  and  satisfy  their  hunger  from 
the  Federal  haversacks  left  on  the  field.  Real  coffee  and 
sugar  boiled  in  new  Federal  tin  cups  bring  additional  cause 
of  hilarity  to  the  Confederate  line  of  battle.  The  evening  of 
the  12th  brings  news  of  sorrow  to  every  Confederate  soldier. 
The  day  before,  May  11,  Stuart  has  given  up  his  life  to 
1  All  relieved  except  37th  Massachusetts. 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     67 

defend  Eichmond  against  Sheridan's  attack. l  But  May  17 
brings  unwelcome  messages  to  Grant.  Halleck  telegraphs 
as  follows :  "  Sigel  is  in  full  retreat  on  Strasburg.  He  will 
do  nothing  but  run.  Never  did  anything  else."  At  New 
Market  (on  the  12th  of  May)  Sigel  has  retired  before 
Breckinridge  and  left  six  Federal  guns  and  900  prisoners 
of  war.  Likewise  the  information  comes  to  Grant  that  May 
16  has  closed  on  Butler  fast  in  the  huge  bottle  formed  by 
the  James  and  Appomattox  rivers.  Beauregard  holds  the 
cork  of  the  bottle,  and  Butler  can  neither  advance  nor  re 
treat. 

On  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  May,  Grant  masses  the  2d 
and  6th  corps  and  sends  them  to  storm  the  salient.  Lee's 
heavy  guns  are  ready  along  the  new  base  line.  Spherical 
case  and  canister  from  twenty-nine  guns  break  the  Federal 
advance  host  of  12,000  and  drive  them  back.  At  the  same 
early  hour  Burnside  falls  back  from  his  attack  against  Lee's 
right  wing.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  drifting  toward 
its  own  left  flank ;  looks  for  weak  points  in  Lee's  line.  But 
at  every  assault  Lee  bristles  out  in  breastworks,  and  Grant 
draws  back.  May  19  Ewell  is  sent  around  the  Federal  right 
to  discern  Grant's  position.  He  finds  severe  battle,  and  is 
repulsed  with  the  loss  of  900  men.  But  Grant  has  been  held 
in  check  another  day.  The  night  of  May  20  finds  Hancock 
leading  Grant's  advance  southeastward  to  the  Fredericksburg 
Railroad.  The  chapter  of  Federal  losses  on  the  Spottsylvania 
field  recounts  the  fall  and  capture  of  nearly  18,000  men. 
Over  37,000  in  number  is  the  total  sum  of  disabled  in  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  since  the  passage  of  the  Rapidan. 
Probably  less  than  half  that  number  measures  the  reduction 
in  Lee's  effective  strength. 

At  noonday,  May  21,  Ewell  leads  the  advance  to  Hanover 
Junction  beyond  the  North  Anna  River.  Twenty-eight  miles 

1  Lee's  Order  pays  tribute  to  the  gallant  horseman,  as  a  man,  as  a  Christian, 
and  as  a  soldier.  —  Fitz-Lee's  Life  of  Lee,  p.  338. 


68  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

are  covered  in  less  than  twenty-four  hours,  for  the  forenoon 
of  the  22d  brings  Swell's  head  of  column  across  the  river. 
Noonday  of  this  same  22d  marks  the  passage  of  Anderson's 
column  across  the  Anna  Bridge,  while  the  morning  of  May 
23d  finds  Hill's  corps  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  stream. 
Lee  has  not  possessed  the  strength  to  strike  Grant's  flank  in 
the  latter's  circuitous  march.  The  Confederate  commander 
has  preferred  to  follow  the  shorter  pathway  and  block 
Grant's  journey  southward.  As  Lee  rides  away  from  Spott- 
sylvania,  he  remarks,  "  We  wish  no  more  salients."  Pickett 
and  Breckinridge,  with  9000  muskets,  await  Lee's  coming, 
and  midday  of  the  23d  finds  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
looking  out  northward  from  intrenchments  to  mark  the 
approach  of  Grant's  columns  beyond  the  river. 

In  the  centre  commanding  the  telegraph  road  stands  the 
1st  corps  behind  heavy  guns.  Lee's  right  is  held  by  the  2d 
corps  and  his  left  by  the  3d.  Farther  up  the  stream  the 
corps  of  Warren  finds  passageway  and  threatens  the  Con 
federate  left  flank.  Hill  sends  Wilcox  at  6  p.  M.  to  drive 
Warren  back,  but  Warren  shows  much  strength,  and  as 
darkness  falls  both  sides  begin  to  build  fortifications. 

Sunrise  of  the  24th  brings  Lee  to  his  left  wing  to  mark 
the  advantage  gained  by  Warren.  His  wrath  is  aroused.  The 
crimson  flush  mounts  high  on  neck  and  forehead.  The  eyes 
are  as  a  flame  of  fire.  The  courtly  manner  is  stiffened  into 
reserve.  His  words  of  questioning  fall  like  a  scathing  rebuke. 
"  General  Hill,  why  did  you  let  those  people  cross  the  river  ? 
Why  did  you  not  drive  them  back  as  General  Jackson  would 
have  done  ?  " 

Since  Hill  has  already  drawn  back  the  left  wing,  Lee  retires 
his  right  wing  from  the  river,  but  allows  his  centre  to  rest  on 
the  North  Anna  at  Ox  Ford.  The  Confederate  army  is  drawn 
up  in  form  like  a  wedge,  with  the  point  thrust  against  the 
stream.  Grant  pushes  his  5th  and  6th  corps  overstream 
above  to  face  southward,  and  Hancock's  2d  corps  crosses 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     69 

below  and  faces  northward.  Burnside  seeks  passage  at  the 
Confederate  centre,  but  suffers  loss  from  Lee's  guns  on  the 
river's  brink.  Grant's  army  is  cut  in  twain  on  the  point  of 
the  Confederate  wedge.  If  either  Federal  wing  shall  bring 
assistance  to  the  other,  the  Federal  force  must  make  a  double 
passage  of  the  Anna  River. 

At  this  juncture  Lee  is  seized  with  sickness.  During 
twenty  days  he  has  rested  little.  Not  until  ten  or  eleven  at 
night  has  he  sought  slumber,  and  three  o'clock  each  morning 
has  found  him  at  breakfast  by  candle-light,  and  then  to  the 
front  to  spend  eighteen  hours  along  the  line  of  battle.  His 
iron  frame  has  yielded  at  last,  but  he  remains  in  command.1 
As  Lee  lies  in  his  tent,  he  cries  out  in  impatience,  "  We  must 
strike  them  !  "  "  We  must  never  let  them  pass  us  again !  " 
"  We  must  strike  them  !  " 

The  morning  of  the  27th  May  dawns  upon  the  vacant 
Federal  encampment.  Grant  has  sought  the  northern  bank 
of  the  Anna,  and  is  heading  his  columns  southeastward.  Grant 
has  received  complete  checkmate  and  has  failed  to  cut  the 
Central  Railroad.  Lee  is  disappointed  that  greater  results 
have  not  followed  the  separation  of  Grant's  two  wings.  But 
the  combative  spirit  never  wavers,  and  at  a  swift  pace  the 
Confederate  column  starts  out  upon  the  home  stretch  in  the 
Wilderness  race.  Directly  southward  between  the  Central 
and  Fredericksburg  railways,  Lee  moves  the  2d  corps,  now 
under  Early.  The  1st  corps  swings  around  to  Lee's  right 
along  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad  to  Ashland.  A  journey 
of  twenty- four  miles  in  thirty  hours  brings  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  the  afternoon  of  28th  May,  into  line 
of  battle  facing  northeastward  on  the  central  ridge  between 
the  Pamunkey  and  the  Chickahominy  rivers,  and  more  par 
ticularly  between  the  Totopotomoy  and  Beaver  Dam  Creek. 

1  Hill's  strength  failed  after  the  Wilderness,  and  Early  commanded  the 
3d  corps  at  Spottsylvania.  Now  Ewell  retires  permanently  from  the  2d  corps, 
and  Early  assumes  control. 


70  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Grant  has  kept  close  to  the  northern  bank  of  the  Pamunkey, 
and  now  seeks  to  cross  that  stream  and  seize  Richmond. 
Fitz-Lee's  cavalry  division  has  retarded  Grant's  progress 
until  Lee  has  brought  his  entire  army  athwart  the  pathway 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Grant  moves  his  army  into  the 
region  between  the  two  sluggish  streams.  Lee's  front  is  for 
midable,  and  Grant  halts  to  await  reinforcements  from  Butler. 
May  30  W.  F.  Smith,  18th  corps,  reaches  the  White  House 
on  the  lower  Pamunkey,  and  marches  to  give  strength  to 
Grant's  left  wing. 

Lee's  sickness  continues  during  these  critical  days.  For 
the  first  time  in  the  campaign  he  spends  the  night  under  the 
roof  of  a  house  near  Atlee's  Station.  His  determined  will 
keeps  him  at  the  front  each  day. 

From  Beauregard's  army  south  of  Richmond  Lee  asks 
reinforcements.  Since  May  20  Beauregard  has  besieged  the 
Richmond  officials  with  proposals  for  a  game  in  grand  strategy. 
Grant  and  Butler  occupy  outside  lines,  while  Beauregard 
and  Lee  hold  the  inner  defensive  lines.  Let  Lee  fall  back 
to  the  Chickahominy  and  draw  Grant  after  him  is  Beau- 
regard's  suggestion.  A  portion  of  Lee's  force  may  hold 
Grant  at  bay  while  the  other  portion  brings  aid  to  Beaure 
gard,  and  Butler's  army  become  prisoners  of  war.  The  second 
step  in  Beauregard's  scheme  is  easy  of  comprehension.  Beau- 
regard  moves  northward  and  stands  by  the  side  of  Lee  to 
receive  the  capitulation  of  Grant  in  the  swamps  of  the  Chick 
ahominy.  Whatever  the  merits  of  the  scheme,  Lee  has  stead 
fastly  maintained  that  continual  battle  must  be  offered  to 
Grant.  When  at  length  he  does  reach  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  the  capital  city,  he  asks  Beauregard  to  lend  assistance. 
But  Beauregard  seems  unwilling  now  to  play  at  strategy.  He 
telegraphs  to  Richmond :  "  War  Department  must  determine 
when  and  what  troops  to  order  from  here."  Lee's  reply  to 
Beauregard  is  this :  "  If  you  cannot  determine  what  troops 
you  can  spare,  the  department  cannot.  The  result  of  your 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS       71 

delay  will  be  disaster.  Butler's  troops  will  be  with  Grant 
to-morrow." 

Grant  withdraws  from  Lee's  front,  and  once  again  moves 
by  the  left  flank  to  Cold  Harbor.  May  31  Hoke's  division 
from  Beauregard  confronts  the  Federal  advance  on  the  battle 
ground  of  1862.  Lee  extends  his  right  to  give  support,  and 
the  afternoon  of  June  1  witnesses  severe  battle  on  the  road 
way  between  Old  and  New  Cold  Harbor.  A  Federal  charge 
breaks  through  Lee's  right  wing  and  carries  away  500  cap 
tives.  But  Grant  pays  tribute  of  1200  men  for  this  Confed 
erate  loss.  The  two  lines  of  battle  are  formed  at  close  range, 
and  both  are  made  strong  with  intrenchments. 

During  the  hot,  sultry  night  of  June  1,  Grant  withdraws 
his  own  right  wing  and  moves  it  by  the  left  beyond  the  Cold 
Harbor  Road.  Lee  meets  this  change  of  position  by  sending 
Hill  and  Breckinridge  to  defend  his  own  right  flank.  In  this 
race  for  position,  the  Confederates  have  the  advantage. 
Breckinridge  and  Hill  reach  the  Confederate  right  and  make 
their  positions  strong  on  Turkey  Hill  just  as  Hancock  reaches 
the  position  by  moving  on  the  arc  of  the  circle.  Lee's  right 
wing  now  defends  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy  at  Grape 
vine  Bridge.  The  heat  of  the  second  day  of  June  brings 
weariness  and  thirst  to  the  men  of  both  armies.  The  dust 
from  marching  columns  hovers  over  the  field  in  dense  clouds. 
The  pangs  of  hunger  oppress  the  Confederate  regiments  as 
they  take  their  places  behind  the  earthworks.1 

In  Lee's  centre  at  the  Cold  Harbor  roadway  stand  Ander 
son  and  Hoke ;  Anderson  touches  the  left  side  of  the  road 
and  Hoke  the  right-hand  side  facing  eastward.  Beyond  Hoke 
southward  Breckinridge  and  Hill  extend  the  Confederate  line 
to  the  Chickahominy.  Fitz-Lee  patrols  the  region  south  of 

1  Since  the  departure  from  Hanover  Junction  the  troops  have  received  only 
two  issues  of  rations.  One  issue  contains  three  hard  biscuits  and  a  meagre  slice 
of  pork  to  each  man.  The  second  issue  of  one  cracker  to  each  man,  two  days 
after  the  issue  first  mentioned,  is  the  only  food  that  cheers  the  Confederates  as 
they  prepare  for  the  struggle  at  Cold  Harbor.  —  GEORGE  GARY  EGGLESTON. 


72  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

that  stream.  Looking  northward  from  Lee's  centre  along  the 
Confederate  works,  we  see  the  2d  corps  under  Early  at 
Anderson's  left  hand,  and  Heth's  division  holds  the  extreme 
Confederate  left.  In  the  afternoon  of  June  2  Lee  takes  the 
offensive,  orders  Early  to  move  against  the  right  flank  of 
the  Federal  army  and  drive  down  in  front  of  the  Confederate 
line.  Early  finds  Grant's  right  too  strong  for  his  charge,  but 
the  Federal  commander  makes  no  serious  counter-stroke,  and 
both  lines  intrench  where  the  darkness  finds  them. 

At  4.30  on  the  morning  of  June  3  the  assault  of  Grant 
is  delivered  all  along  the  line,  six  miles  in  length.  The  Con 
federate  works  are  full  of  salient  angles,  and  Lee's  batteries 
secure  a  cross-fire  against  nearly  every  Federal  division  that 
moves  against  their  front.  The  Confederate  rifle-pits  are  lit 
erally  enwrapped  in  flame.  Fierce  hunger  has  maddened 
Lee's  men,  and  they  multiply  their  shots  with  fearful  swift 
ness.  Federal  valor  can  only  rush  forward  to  die  before  the 
Confederate  marksmen. 

Against  the  Confederate  right  Hancock's  corps  moves 
gallantly  onward  in  double  line  of  attack  with  supports  in 
rear.  A  forward  salient  in  front  of  Hill  and  Breckinridge 
becomes  the  prey  of  Hancock's  men ;  300  Confederate  pris 
oners  are  added  to  this  initial  success.  But  the  counter-stroke 
from  Breckinridge  forces  Hancock  from  the  works ;  the  Con 
federate  heavy  guns  pour  an  enfilading  fire  along  the  line  of 
the  2d  corps,  and  Hancock  leaves  behind  him  on  the  field 
more  than  2000  disabled  men.  Before  the  fire  of  Lee's  centre 
a  thousand  men  have  fallen  in  Smith's  18th  corps,  and  near 
Lee's  left  the  Federal  6th  corps  has  paid  tribute  of  800 
men. 

The  order  comes  from  headquarters  to  renew  the  Federal 
attack.  Hancock  uses  his  discretion  as  corps  commander,  and 
declines  to  move  his  line  forward. 

Smith  says,  "That  order  I  refused  to  obey." 

M.  T.  McMahon  of  the  6th  corps  makes  this  statement : 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     73 

"  The  order  was  sent  to  the  soldiers  without  comment  by 
officers.  The  order  was  obeyed  by  simply  renewing  the  fire 
from  the  men  as  they  lay  in  position." 

Grant  now  orders  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  approach 
Lee's  lines  by  constructing  regular  approaches,  as  in  a  siege. 
His  professed  object  is  now  to  hold  Lee  back  from  sending 
aid  to  Hunter  in  the  Valley.  In  this  Grant  does  not  suc 
ceed. 

Lee  now  takes  the  offensive  on  ~a  wider  field  than  the 
Wilderness.  Two  assaults  are  delivered  by  Early  against 
Grant's  right  and  rear  on  June  6  and  7,  but  fortifications 
hold  him  in  check.  June  10  finds  Lee  detaching  Breckin- 
ridge  toward  the  Valley  to  oppose  the  march  of  Hunter. 
June  12  Hampton  crosses  the  path  of  Sheridan  at  Trevillian 
and  restrains  the  Federal  cavalry  from  the  advance  against 
Lynchburg  and  the  junction  with  Hunter. 

The  evening  of  June  12  marks  Lee's  order  to  Early  to 
lead  the  2d  corps  against  Hunter's  column  in  the  Valley. 
Thence  down  the  Valley  is  Early  directed  to  march  across  the 
Potomac  to  threaten  Washington.  Not  long  has  Lee  to  wait 
to  hear  of  Hunter's  repulse  and  to  learn  that  Early  is  in  front 
of  the  Federal  capital. 

Under  cover  of  the  night  of  June  12,  Grant  starts  two  col 
umns  across  the  Chickahominy  toward  the  James.  Lee  meets 
this  movement  by  dispatching  Hoke's  division  to  Petersburg 
on  the  morning  of  June  13,  because  that  place  is  "  now  threat 
ened,"  says  Lee.  He  moves  the  two  corps  of  Anderson  and 
Hill  by  the  right  flank,  and  covers  the  approaches  toward 
Richmond  by  a  line  of  battle  drawn  from  White  Oak  Swamp 
to  Malvern  Hill. 

Grant  veils  his  passage  of  the  James  by  a  cloud  of  cavalry 
on  his  right  flank  and  by  thrusting  the  5th  corps  along  the 
northern  bank  of  the  James  toward  White  Oak  Swamp. 
Smith's  corps  is  hurried  forward  to  aid  Butler  in  the  capture 
of  Petersburg.  Hancock  follows  in  the  track  of  Smith. 


74  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

Beauregard  sends  urgent  messages  to  Lee  calling  for  assist 
ance  to  withstand  the  Federal  assault  against  his  lines.1 

Lee  still  holds  his  two  corps  on  the  northern  bank  of  the 
James.  On  the  night  of  June  15  he  pitches  his  own  tent  on 
the  southern  bank  of  the  river  at  Drury's  Bluff.  Morning  of 
the  16th  he  moves  divisions  of  Pickett  and  Field,  and  June 
17  finds  them  in  part  of  Beauregard's  old  line  near  Ber 
muda.  At  3  P.  M.  June  16,  Lee  telegraphs  that  he  has  not 
heard  of  Grant's  passage  of  James.  At  this  same  hour,  Wil 
son's  division  and  the  6th  Federal  corps  are  still  on  the  north 
ern  bank  of  the  James.  It  is  still  possible  for  Grant  to  assail 
Richmond  from  the  direction  of  the  Chickahominy.  As  soon 
as  Lee  makes  himself  certain  that  Grant  will  not  assail 
Richmond,  he  throws  his  columns  forward,  and  the  evening  of 
June  18  finds  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  ready  to  throw 
back  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  its  attempt  to 
seize  Petersburg.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  has  manifested  a 
splendid  valor.  Between  the  15th  and  18th  of  June  10,000 
names  have  disappeared  from  the  Federal  list  of  present  for 
duty ;  54,926  is  the  total  number  of  casualties  between  the 
Rapidan  and  the  James.  These  losses  have  been  balanced 
by  55,000  men  received  as  reinforcements. 

Grant  writes  to  Meade  after  the  repulse  of  June  18  at 
Petersburg :  "  Now  we  will  rest  the  men  and  use  the  spade 
for  their  protection  until  a  new  vein  can  be  struck." 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  yet  retains  its  elasticity 
and  vigor.  Marchings,  perils  in  battle,  hunger  and  sleepless 

1  Lee  pays  little  heed  to  Beauregard,  because,  — 

(1)  Lee  has  divided  his  own  army.    Has  two  corps,  less  than  30,000.   Has 
returned  Hoke  to  Beauregard,  who  has  nearly  one  half  as  many  troops  as 
Lee. 

(2)  He  is  standing  on  the  defensive  before  Richmond.   Makes  little  effort 
except  with  cavalry  to  discover  Grant's  plans. 

(3)  Beauregard's  previous  calls  for  reinforcements  against  Butler  perhaps 
have  made  Lee  suppose  that  Beauregard  exaggerates  the  danger  to  Petersburg. 

Although  there  is  the  possibility  of  disaster  to  Petersburg,  yet  it  falls  not. 
Lee  shows  the  same  confidence  in  his  men  which  they  manifest  toward  him. 


LEE'S  WRESTLE  WITH  GRANT  IN  WILDERNESS     75 

nights  have  reduced  its  numbers,  but  have  not  broken  its  spirit. 
The  old  yell  has  gathered  additional  fierceness,  the  men  go 
into  battle  with  the  same  light-hearted  buoyancy.  Perhaps 
not  one  among  the  soldiers  holds  a  doubt  as  to  the  ultimate 
success  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Each  man  pos 
sesses  a  pardonable  pride  in  the  deeds  of  May-June,  1864. 
But  each  Confederate  soldier  has  profound  respect  for  his 
opponents,  and  is  ready  to  admit  that  in  this  Wilderness 
wrestle  Lee's  army  has  found  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
a  foeman  worthy  of  its  steel. 


Ill 

USELESSNESS  OF  THE  MAPS  FURNISHED  TO 
STAFF  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 
PREVIOUS  TO  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MAY  1864 

BY 

COLONEL  THEODORE   LYMAN 
A.  D.  C.  TO  MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  MEADE,  U.  S.  A. 


Read  before  the  Society  May  12,  1879 


USELESSNESS  OF  THE  MAPS  FURNISHED  TO 
STAFF  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC 
PREVIOUS  TO  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  MAY  1864 

EARLY  in  the  spring  of  1864  there  were  furnished  to  the 
general  and  staff  officers  a  series  of  topographical  maps  of 
the  country  south  of  the  Rapidan.  Coarsely  executed,  and 
printed  in  true  congressional  style  on  wretched  spongy  paper, 
which  wore  out  after  being  carried  a  few  days  in  the  pocket, 
these  maps  embraced,  nevertheless,  all  the  information  the 
Engineer  Department  had  been  able  to  compile  from  state, 
county,  and  town  surveys,  reports  of  spies  and  of  negroes,  and 
the  reconnoissances  of  cavalry.  As  the  army  advanced  during 
the  campaign,  the  topographical  engineers,  with  untiring  labor 
and  often  at  great  risk  of  their  lives,  surveyed  the  country, 
running  lines  rapidly  by  the  Schmalkalden  compass,  and  esti 
mating  distances  by  paces,  by  the  gait  of  their  horses,  or  by 
angles.  Each  day's  work  was  collated  at  headquarters,  drawn 
in  black  lines  on  a  white  ground,  photographed  in  white  lines 
on  a  brown  ground,  and  immediately  issued  to  the  command 
ers.  The  photographic  map  here  treated  is  on  the  same  scale 
as  the  lithographed  engineer  maps  referred  to  (one  inch  to 
the  mile),  and  embraces  the  country  from  the  Orange  Plank 
Road  on  the  north  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House  on  the  south  ; 
and  from  Corbin's  Bridge  on  the  west  to  the  "  Gate,"  so  called, 
on  the  east.  It  was  issued  about  the  middle  of  May,  1864. 
This  field  survey,  on  being  compared  with  the  three-inch 
engineer  map  of  1867,  is  found  to  be  practically  correct  in 
the  distances  and  directions  of  the  chief  points,  although  the 
courses  of  the  streams  and  details  of  the  roads  are  naturally 
only  approximate.  In  the  compound  map  herewith  presented, 
this  field  survey  (drawn  in  black)  is  superposed  on  the  litho- 


80  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

graphic  engineer  map  (drawn  in  red),  in  order  to  show  the 
gross  inaccuracies  of  the  latter.  Chancellorsville  being  made 
to  coincide  in  the  two,  we  immediately  note  the  following 
mistakes  in  the  lithographic  map  :  The  junction  of  the  Plank 
and  Brock  roads  is  one  and  one  quarter  miles  too  far  to  the 
northwest ;  Todd's  Tavern,  one  mile  to  the  north ;  Corbin's 
Bridge,  one  mile  to  the  northwest ;  South  Bend  of  the  Po 
Elver,  two  and  three  quarters  miles  to  the  west ;  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court  House,  two  and  one  half  miles  to  the  west ;  and 
the  house  of  S.  Alsop,  one  and  one  quarter  miles  too  far  to 
the  north.  These  discrepancies  are  in  a  territory  only  eight 
miles  by  nine.  Todd's  Tavern,  in  reference  to  Spottsylvania 
Court  House,  is  about  thirty  degrees  out  of  position,  and 
Piney  Branch  Church  at  least  forty-five  degrees.  The  Orange 
Plank,  from  Chancellorsville  to  Tabernacle  Church,  is  nearly 
correct,  and  so  is  the  Brock  Road,  from  the  Plank  to  Todd's 
Tavern,  and  the  Catharpin  as  far  as  Corbin's  Bridge  ;  but 
most  of  the  other  roads  are  quite  wild.  The  effect  of  such  a 
map  was,  of  course,  utterly  to  bewilder  and  discourage  the 
officers  who  used  it,  and  who  spent  precious  time  in  trying  to 
understand  the  incomprehensible.  To  march  a  column  from 
the  Orange  Plank  Road  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House  by  such 
a  map  would  be  comparable  to  marching  from  Boston  with 
intent  to  go  to  Quincy,  but  coming  out,  in  fact,  at  Milton 
Lower  Mills. 


IV 

NOTES   AND    RECOLLECTIONS    OF    OPENING 
OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

BY 

FIRST   LIEUTENANT   McHENRY   HOWARD, 
LATE  A.  D.  C.  AND  ACTING  ASSISTANT  INSPECTOR-GENERAL,  C.  S.  A. 


Read  before  the  Society  April  16,  1883 


NOTES  AND   RECOLLECTIONS    OF   OPENING 
OF  THE   CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

I.   IN  WINTER  QUARTERS 

AFTER  Meade's  demonstration  at  Mine  Run  and  withdrawal 
to  the  north  side  of  the  Rapidan,  in  the  last  days  of  Novem 
ber,  1863,  it  seemed  unlikely  that  there  would  be  any  more 
active  operations  that  year ;  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Vir 
ginia  (Confederate)  settled  down  in  winter  quarters.  Steuart's 
brigade,  of  Johnson's  division,  Swell's  corps,  which  had  been 
for  three  or  four  weeks  in  camp  on  Blackwalnut  Run,1  was 
moved  back  some  miles  to  a  position  near  Pisgah  Church,  on 
or  a  short  distance  from  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg  Stone 
Road,  about  six  or  seven  miles  east  of  Orange  Court  House ; 
and  General  Steuart  immediately  went  to  work  with  his  usual 
energy  to  clean  up  the  ground,  make  the  men  as  comfortable 
as  possible,  except  by  idleness,  and  to  improve  the  efficiency 
of  his  command  in  every  way.  Our  summer  camp  on  Poplar 
Run,  near  Montpelier,  ten  or  twelve  miles  higher  up  the 
Rapidan,  when  resting  from  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  had 
been  pronounced  to  be  a  model  one  in  the  army  ;  and  he  was 
determined  that  this  should  be  its  equal  in  every  respect,  while 
the  assurance  of  some  months'  inactivity  would  enable  him 
to  carry  out  many  practical  measures  which  could  not  be 
undertaken  in  the  uncertainty  of  ever  continuing  long  in  one 
stay  in  the  campaigning  season. 

Rising  ground  was  selected  for  the  regimental  camps,  and 
they  were  thoroughly  "  policed "  and  swept,  with  brooms 
made  of  twigs  bundled  together,  until  several  inches,  perhaps, 
of  the  loose  surface  soil  were  removed  and  a  hard  dirt  floor 

1  A  tributary  of  Mine  and  Mountain  Run. 


84  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

was  gained.  The  men's  quarters  were  kept  clean  and  well 
ventilated,  and  they  were  exhorted  to  have  their  bunks  raised 
above  the  ground.  The  morning  sick  reports  had  been  care 
fully  studied  in  our  summer  camp,  and  had  been  found  to  vary 
according  to  the  degree  of  attention  which  was  given  to  these 
details  in  the  different  regiments  ;  and  the  10th  Virginia, 
which  had  all  its  bunks  so  raised  and  well  swept  underneath, 
had  then  reduced  its  sick  list  to  a  lower  rate  than  we  had 
ever  known.  Now,  however,  to  keep  warm  was  the  overruling 
necessity,  and  this  regulation  could  not  be  enforced,  as  un 
doubtedly  next  to  the  ground  is  the  warmest  way  a  soldier 
with  a  scanty  supply  of  covering  can  sleep.  Wattled  cedar  or 
pine  fences  inclosed  a  space  around  the  brigade  guard-house, 
and  the  prisoners  were  kept  employed  corduroying  wet  places 
and  with  other  work  of  the  sort  about  the  camp-grounds.  The 
orders  against  burning  or  displacing  rails  were  strictly  en 
forced,  and  at  the  end  of  winter  all  fencing  was  in  as  good,  if 
not  in  precisely  the  same,  condition  as  we  had  found  it,  some 
new  rails  having  been  required  to  be  mauled,  I  think.  Even 
timber  used  for  fuel  was  estimated  by  a  board  of  officers  and 
certificates  given,  although  I  cannot  venture  to  affirm  that 
owners  were  ever  paid  for  it.  The  men  were  moderately 
drilled,  and  schools  of  instruction  were  ordered  for  the  officers. 
The  10th  Virginia  was  the  only  regiment  which  had  a  band  (I 
think  we  were  trying  to  organize  one  in  the  1st  North  Caro 
lina  with  some  instruments  captured  at  Gettysburg),  and 
we  utilized  it  to  the  best  general  advantage  by  having  daily 
brigade  guard -mounting,  with  as  much  military  pomp  and 
circumstance  as  we  could  get  up.  A  drum  beat  the  hours 
at  brigade  guard-house  to  regulate  the  time  of  all  the  camp. 

A  number  of  shoemakers  in  the  different  regiments  — 
seventeen,  I  think  —  were  encouraged  to  send  home  —  and  in 
some  instances  were  given  leave  to  go  —  for  their  tools,  and 
were  put  to  work  repairing  shoes,  being  exempted  from  guard 
and  other  routine  camp  duty,  but  ready  to  fall  in  with  their 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864      85 

muskets  on  any  call  to  arms.  The  shoe-shops  were  a  separate 
camp,  near  brigade  headquarters,  and  under  our  immediate 
supervision,  guarded  by  sentinels,  and  no  person  was  allowed 
to  visit  them  or  carry  his  shoes  to  be  mended  without  a  pass 
and  order  from  his  company  and  regimental  commanders, 
approved  by  the  adjutant  or  inspector  general.  A  careful 
estimate  and  report  of  the  saving  in  the  issue  of  shoes  to  our 
brigade  during  the  winter  was  made  to  the  higher  authorities 
at  one  time,  but  I  am  afraid  to  say  from  memory  what  the 
saving  was  confidently  stated  to  have  been,  certainly  several 
hundred  pairs ;  besides,  the  men's  feet  were  kept  in  better 
condition.1 

Having  taken  a  sort  of  census  of  the  entire  command,  we 
knew  exactly  where  to  look  at  any  time  for  skilled  workmen 
in  different  trades.  The  37th  Virginia,  from  the  mountains 
of  the  southwestern  part  of  the  state,  we  found  to  furnish 
a  greater  proportion  of  mechanics,  the  other  regiments  being 
more  largely  composed  of  men  from  the  farming  class. 
Wheelwrights  were  detailed  to  put  the  ambulances  (this 
under  the  zealous  charge  of  Surgeon  Henkel,  of  the  37th 
Virginia,  senior  surgeon)  and  transportation  generally  in  per 
fect  order.  I  think  log  shelters  were  made  for  the  horses,  and 
they  were  carefully  looked  after.  General  Steuart  had  also 
detailed,  or  meditated  detailing  tinners  to  mend  canteens, 
cups,  and  other  tinwork.  Drummers  or  tanners  were  given  a 
few  days'  leave  to  go  to  their  homes  or  places  not  far  distant, 
on  condition  of  bringing  back  dog-skins  for  drumheads ;  and 
although  the  animal's  integument  was  tanned  in  a  marvelously 
short  time,  it  was  found  to  answer  very  well. 

The  general  was  especially  desirous  of  establishing  tailor 

1  On  the  march  back  from  Gettysburg  in  the  summer  before,  the  barefooted 
men  of  the  division,  that  is  to  say,  those  whose  shoes  were  worn  out  or  whose 
feet  were  sore  from  wearing  bad  shoes  or  other  causes,  were  organized  into  a 
separate  command,  under  officers,  to  pick  their  way  on  the  grassy  roadside,  and 
by  easy  stages  on  each  day's  march.  My  recollection  is  that  this  barefooted 
and  sorefooted  command  sometimes  numbered  a  fourth  of  the  division. 


86  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

"  shops  "  to  patch  and  mend  clothing,  on  a  like  scale  with  the 
shoe-shops,  or  greater,  and  sent  up  urgent  applications  for 
waste  odds  and  ends  of  cloth  and  thread  at  the  government 
factories,  but  had  received  no  answer  when  the  opening  of 
the  spring  campaign  put  a  check  to  these  and  many  other 
schemes.  In  short,  recognizing  the  straits  that  the  Confed 
eracy  was  now  put  to  in  the  furnishing  of  supplies,  we  aimed 
to  save  and  eke  out  issues  in  every  possible  way. 

The  general  also  designed  cloth  badges  (metal  was  not  to 
be  had)  to  distinguish  the  men  of  different  regiments,  —  a  red 
cross  on  ground  of  different  colors,  or  something  that  way. 

The  physical  condition  of  the  men  I  do  not,  and  did  not 
then,  consider  good.  Their  rations  had  been  systematically 
reduced  to  the  smallest  possible  quantity  and  there  was 
almost  no  variety.  After  an  official  inspection  of  the  whole 
command  in  March  or  April  (I  was  acting  inspector-general 
and  made  stated  inspections,  reports  of  which  went  up  through 
inspectors),  I  had  deemed  it  a  serious  duty  to  make  it  a  part 
of  my  report  that  the  sallow  complexions  and  general  appear 
ance  of  the  men  indicated  that  they  were  insufficiently  fed, 
and  to  urge  that  the  rations  should  be  increased.  A  soldier 
fighting  for  the  best  of  causes  should  have  enough  to  eat  as 
long  as  food  will  hold  out  issued  in  that  way ;  he  may  put  up 
with  frequent  irregularities,  but  if  his  ration  be  systematic 
ally  insufficient  for  his  appetite,  his  spirits  and  endurance 
must  surely  fail  or  be  greatly  impaired.  It  is  to  be  wished 
that  we  had  statements  of  the  rations  actually  issued  to  the 
men,  particularly  during  the  last  two  years  of  the  war.  For 
illustration,  our  meals  at  brigade  headquarters  during  this 
winter  were  usually  as  follows :  Breakfast  consisted  of  a 
plate  of  "corn-dodgers"  (corn-meal  and  water)  and  mashed 
potatoes,  the  latter  not  issued,  I  believe,  but  bought  at  a  dis 
tance.  I  suppose  we  also  had  coffee,  that  is  to  say,  some  sub 
stitute  for  it,  but  I  do  not  think  there  was  often  sugar.  For 
dinner,  towards  sunset,  we  had  corn-bread  again,  and  soup 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864       87 

made  of  water  thickened  with  corn-meal  and  mashed  pota 
toes,  and  cooked  with  a  small  piece  of  meat,  which  last,  if 
salt,  was  taken  out  when  the  soup  was  done  and  kept  to  be 
cooked  over  again  in  the  mashed  potatoes  for  next  morning's 
breakfast.  A  dog  could  not  have  lived  on  what  was  left ; 
there  was,  in  fact,  nothing  left.  Officers  drew  one  ration 
each,  like  the  men,  were  prohibited  from  purchasing  from  the 
commissaries ;  and  as  nothing  could  be  had  in  the  neighbor 
hood  for  love  or  money,  we  could  only  occasionally  buy  a  few 
articles,  such  as  apple-butter  or  sorghum  molasses,  when  our 
wagons  went  over  to  the  Valley  or  other  remote  regions  for 
forage  or  supplies.  The  men  were  not,  therefore,  to  my  ob 
servation,  in  good  physical  condition.1  Vaccination  was  often 
followed  by  serious  consequences,  and  this  came,  I  think, 
from  a  low  condition  of  the  system  more  than  from  the  use 
of  impure  matter.  By  the  way,  it  was  curious  how  commonly 
men  returning  from  furlough  reported  that  they  spent  the 
first  part  of  their  leave  sick  at  home ;  they  were  never  taken 
sick  on  coming  back  from  home  to  open-air  life  in  the  field. 

They  were  often  sorely  tried,  too,  by  receiving  letters  or 
messages  telling  of  dire  distresses,  and  apprehensions  of 
worse,  in  their  families  at  home.  These  letters  were  constantly 
coming  up  to  brigade  headquarters,  appended  to  urgent  appli 
cations  for  furloughs.  They  were,  after  proper  investigation, 
usually  forwarded,  approved  by  General  Steuart,  who  thought 
that  they  should  be  liberally  given  in  such  cases,  both  from 

1  In  the  spring-  of  1863  Major-General  Trimble,  then  commanding-  this  divi 
sion,  published  an  order  enumerating  the  edible  wild  vegetables  and  plants, 
such  as  dandelion,  poke-sprouts,  curly  leaf  dock,  lamb's-quarter,  sheep-sorrel, 
watercresses,  etc.,  and  requiring  regimental  commanders  to  make  daily  details 
to  gather  them.  It  was  said  that  bags  of  plantain  were  sometimes  brought  in 
by  mistake,  with  disagreeable  results  when  eaten.  All  Confederate  soldiers  had 
long  since  learned  the  comparative  merits  of  rye,  wheat,  acorns,  chestnuts, 
sweet  potato,  dandelion,  browned  meal  or  flour,  as  substitutes  for  coffee ;  also 
sassafras,  etc.,  for  tea.  I  remember  an  alarming  rumor  that  once  spread  through 
the  army  and  country  of  certain  results  of  the  use  of  rye  coffee,  bearing  on 
the  future  increase  of  population  of  the  Confederacy. 


88  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

humanity  and  policy.  But  the  Confederate  ranks  were  thin, 
and  the  heavy  masses  of  the  enemy  always  threatening  in  our 
front,  and  only  in  extreme  instances  could  any  applications 
be  granted.1  Under  these  and  many  other  trials  and  daily 
hardships  the  men  bore  up  with  a  constancy  that  was  wonder 
ful  and  which  can  hardly  be  understood  by  the  outside  world. 
The  Rapidan,  the  dividing  line  of  the  two  armies,  was 
picketed  by  a  brigade  for  a  week  at  a  time  from  each  divi 
sion,  and  there  being  four  brigades  in  General  Edward  John 
son's  division,  the  turn  came  to  us  once  in  every  four  weeks. 
The  picket  line  assigned  to  this  division  was  the  right  of  the 
infantry  line,  and  extended  from  the  mouth  of  Mountain  Run 
(which  unites  with  Mine  Run  in  emptying  into  the  Rapidan) 
on  the  east  to  or  near  Mitchell's  Ford  on  the  west.  I  think  it 
was  only  towards  spring  that  our  line  stretched  as  far  as 
Mitchell's  Ford.  Except  at  one  point,  the  river-bank  was 
high  on  our  side,  in  places  very  lofty,  precipitous,  and  rough, 
and  level  on  the  other  side,  so  that  we  were  able  to  post  our 
chain  of  sentinels  immediately  along  the  river,  while  those  of 
the  enemy  were  thrown  back  a  couple  of  hundred  yards  or  so. 
The  exception  was  on  our  extreme  right,  where  the  mouth 
of  the  Mountain-Mine  Run  valley  made  the  ground  low  on 
our  side,  while  a  cliff  rose  from  the  water's  edge  on  the  fur 
ther  side,  and  the  vedette  there  posted  sometimes  gave  us 
a  good  deal  of  annoyance.  Our  own  sentinel,  being  almost 
underneath,  had  to  fortify  his  position  with  fence-rails,  and 
it  several  times  happened  that  his  vis-a-vis,  in  a  bad  humor 
perhaps  from  the  state  of  the  weather,  or  from  being  kept  on 
duty  over  his  time  by  a  negligent  corporal,  crept  down  to  the 
edge  of  the  cliff  before  dawn,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  light 

1  General  D.  H.  Hill's  ideas  were  more  philosophic  and  far-seeing1.  He  once 
indorsed  an  application  for  furlough  substantially  in  this  way  :  '  Respectfully 
forwarded  approved,  for  the  reason  that,  if  our  brave  soldiers  are  not  occasion 
ally  permitted  to  visit  their  homes,  the  next  generation  in  the  South  will  be 
composed  of  the  descendants  of  skulkers  and  cowards.' 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864       89 

enough  to  see,  fired  upon  him,  or  on  the  officer  of  the  day 
making  his  rounds.  There  were,  I  believe,  one  or  two  men 
wounded  in  this  way  during  the  winter.  It  was  reported,  too, 
that  a  colored  soldier  was  often  posted  at  this  point,  and  the 
rumor,  although  unfounded,  produced  additional  irritation 
among  our  men,  particularly  as  the  usual  truce  between  pick 
ets  was  pretty  well  observed  along  the  rest  of  the  line. 

But  if  at  a  disadvantage  here,  we  had  the  upper  hand  every 
where  else.  Once  some  North  Carolinians  of  our  neighboring 
brigade,  usually  a  staid  set  of  men,  undertook  to  vary  the 
monotony  of  picket  life  by  a  practical  joke,  which  might  have 
had  serious  consequences,  at  Mitchell's  Ford.  At  this  point 
a  strong  reserve  was  maintained  which  occupied  a  house  or 
yard  about  six  hundred  feet  back  from  the  crossing,  while 
at  the  same  distance  from  the  north  bank  the  enemy  had 
a  like  force  at  a  house  which  seemed  also  to  be  the  head 
quarters  of  some  officer  of  rank.  The  North  Carolinians 
had  found  a  pair  of  immense  wheels  with  a  tongue  attached, 
probably  used  for  hauling  timber,  which  at  a  distance  looked 
not  unlike  a  gun-carriage,  although  it  would  have  carried  a 
piece  of  great  calibre.  Upon  this  they  mounted  a  huge  hol 
low  log,  and  providing  themselves  with  a  rammer  and  some 
large  round  stones,  they  suddenly  dashed  out  with  it  from 
behind  the  house  halfway  to  the  river,  wheeled  into  position, 
and  pointed  it  at  the  opposite  house,  rammed  with  loud  words 
of  command  a  stone  into  the  log,  and  seemed  about  to  knock 
the  enemy's  headquarters  about  their  ears.  For  a  time  there 
was  considerable  commotion  on  the  other  side.  The  picket 
line  hurriedly  prepared  for  action,  and  the  house  was  speedily 
emptied,  the  inmates  not  standing  on  any  order  in  going, 
but  making  for  the  woods  at  once.  The  joke  was  presently 
appreciated,  and  with  much  laughter  the  lines  resumed  their 
status.  Such  was  the  account  at  least,  perhaps  a  little  colored, 
which  I  received  on  riding  up  to  Mitchell's  Ford  one  day  and 
noticing  the  "  quaker "  piece  with  its  rammer  and  pile  of 


90  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

stones,  and  the  picket  line  apparently  quieting  down  from 
some  excitement. 

On  another  occasion  we  had  a  little  alarm  on  our  side. 
Early  one  morning  a  messenger  came  in  haste  to  our  head 
quarters  at  Gibson's  house  to  report  that  an  enterprising 
fellow  had  stolen  forward  during  the  night  and  intrenched 
himself  behind  a  heavy  gate-post  in  such  a  position  as  to  have 
a  part  of  our  line  completely  at  his  mercy.  The  signal  corps 
men  stationed  with  us  looked  through  their  glasses  and  de 
clared  they  could  see  his  shadow  moving  about,  and  on  going 
to  the  river-bank  we  certainly  saw  the  shadow  plainly  enough 
with  the  naked  eye,  and  had  no  doubt  it  was  that  of  the  man 
digging  to  make  his  position  behind  the  gate-post  more  secure. 
Expecting  every  moment  the  fellow,  having  established  him 
self  to  his  satisfaction,  would  pick  off  one  of  us,  we  were 
devising  schemes  for  enfilading  and  dislodging  him  from  his 
stronghold,  perhaps  by  crossing  the  river,  when  some  one 
suddenly  made  the  discovery  that  the  shadow  was  simply  that 
of  the  gate-post  itself  running  up  and  down  the  bars  of  the 
gate  which,  apparently  closed,  was  imperceptibly  swinging  a 
few  inches  to  and  fro  in  the  wind. 

Another  time  an  officer  on  horseback,  accompanied  by  two 
Culpeper  damsels,  rode  down  to  the  river  near  Tobacco 
Stick  Ford,  midway  or  on  the  left  of  our  line,  to  propose  an 
exchange  of  newspapers,  as  had  been  practiced  in  the  time  of 
the  brigade  before  us.  We,  however,  were  more  strict  in  obey 
ing  orders  about  holding  communication  with  the  enemy,  and 
the  officer  was  immediately  covered  by  a  gun,  and  directed  to 
come  across.  Naturally  indignant  and  alarmed,  he  attempted 
to  explain  and  wished  to  withdraw,  but  our  men  would  by  no 
means  consent,  although  his  companions  added  their  entreat 
ies,  almost  in  tears.  They  were  held  as  prisoners,  with  the 
river  between,  while  a  dispatch  was  sent  to  our  headquarters 
for  instructions,  when  they  were  allowed  to  retire  with  an 
admonition  to  keep  their  distance  thereafter. 


NOTES  ON  6PENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864       91 

While  picketing  here  in  the  fall,  a  party  of  twenty  or 
thirty  of  us,  Major  Kyle,  Captain  Williamson,  Dr.  Johnson, 
and  myself  of  the  general's  staff,  with  some  men  of  the  23d 
Virginia  and  2d  Maryland  (then  attached  to  the  brigade), 
tempted  by  the  sight  of  some  sheep  and  cattle  daily  grazing 
on  the  low  grounds  opposite,  a  share  of  which  the  owner  said 
we  might  have  for  salvage,  crossed  the  river  at  Tobacco 
Stick  Ford  one  night  and  succeeded  in  bringing  back  about 
twoscore.  Emboldened  by  success  we  went  over  again,  de 
termined  to  attempt  the  capture  of  a  picket  post.  Guided  by 
a  citizen  of  the  locality,  whose  long  gray  hair  hung  down  his 
shoulders,  we  got  safely  behind  the  picket  line  and  were 
approaching  a  house  in  Indian  file,  when  a  sentinel  descried  us 
in  the  bright  moonlight  and  fired  on  us  at  short  range.  Our 
citizen,  who  was  armed  with  an  old-fashioned  bell-mouthed 
fowling-piece,  loaded  with  a  handful  of  powder  and  buckshot, 
promptly  replied  with  a  bright  glare  and  thunderous  report, 
whereupon  the  sentinel  cried  *'  Murder ! "  and  ran  for  the 
house,  we  in  pursuit.  But  the  reserve  there  stationed  was 
aroused,  and  the  whole  picket  line  alarmed,  so  after  exchang 
ing  a  brisk  fire  for  a  while,  we  were  fortunate  to  get  back 
without  loss  from  such  a  hare-brained  and  useless  enterprise. 
Next  morning  a  body  of  cavalry  was  parading  in  our  front, 
no  doubt  wondering  what  all  the  commotion  had  been  caused 
for.  We  had  full  rations  of  beef  and  mutton  served  out  to 
the  command. 

Such  were  some  of  the  little  excitements  which  varied  the 
dullness  of  picket  life. 

Having  the  extreme  right  of  the  infantry  picket  line  of  the 
army,  and  with  the  infantry's  distrust  of  cavalry  protection, 
we  watched  our  flank  also  in  a  measure,  especially  towards 
the  opening  of  spring.  During  the  winter  General  Steuart, 
always  active  about  something  or  many  things,  had  with  the 
assistance  of  Captain  George  Williamson,  assistant  adjutant- 
general,  as  indefatigable  as  himself,  perfected  a  plan,  accord- 


92  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

ing  to  which  on  a  moment's  notice  the  picket  posts  would 
deploy  so  as  to  form  a  connected  skirmish  line  a  mile  long 
with  reserves  at  the  more  important  points;  and  as  the 
ground  was  extremely  rough  in  places,  especially  on  the  right, 
and  communication  slow  and  difficult,  this  well-preconcerted 
arrangement  would  have  been  found  of  the  greatest  service 
had  any  attempt  been  made  on  our  front.  General  Steuart 
and  Captain  Williamson  also  examined  the  whole  river  front 
picketed  by  Ewell's  corps,  from  Mountain  Run  to  Somer- 
ville  Ford  on  the  west,  and  drew  up  an  elaborate  plan  for 
guarding  it,  with  a  complete  system  of  rules  for  the  govern 
ment  of  the  pickets,  which  was  adopted  by  General  Ewell 
and  adhered  to  for  the  rest  of  the  winter.  It  was  my  duty, 
or  practice,  to  ride  around  nightly,  but  at  uncertain  hours,  to 
inspect  our  line,  which  was  a  work  of  a  couple  of  hours  or  so. 
Indeed  one  or  two  posts  could  not  be  visited  after  dark  with 
out  dismounting  some  distance  back  from  the  river.  There 
was  also  a  field  officer  of  the  day,  and  General  Steuart  and 
Captain  Williamson  were  constantly  riding  about,  so  that  our 
pickets  were  certainly  kept  on  the  alert.  The  picket  line  was 
made  up  of  details,  the  main  part  of  the  brigade  being  in 
bivouac  a  short  distance  in  rear  behind  a  fringe  of  wood. 

General  George  H.  Steuart's  (sometimes  called  the  3d) 
brigade  was  composed  of  five  regiments :  10th  Virginia, 
Colonel  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  numbering  about  250  present  for 
duty ;  23d  Virginia,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fitzgerald,  about 
250  ;  37th  Virginia,  Colonel  Titus  V.  Williams,  about  300  ; 
1st  North  Carolina  State  Troops,  Colonel  Hamilton  A.  Brown, 
about  350 ;  and  3d  North  Carolina  State  Troops,  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  O.  M.  Parsley,  about  275. 

The  North  Carolina  regiments  were  so  designated  because 
they  were  two  of  a  series  of  ten  regiments  which  had  been 
at  the  beginning  mustered  into  service  for  the  war  instead  of 
the  then  usual  term  of  twelve  months,  and  officers  had  been 
originally  appointed  by  the  governor,  and  not  elected,  and 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864       93 

continued  to  be  nominated  by  him  to  the  War  Office  at 
Richmond.  All  of  the  ten  that  I  saw  during  the  war  were 
the  better  for  these  distinctions,  and  claimed  something  of  the 
esprit,  by  some  called  "  uppishness,"  of  regulars.  The  1st  was 
from  the  central  and  western  part  of  the  state ;  the  3d  was 
from  the  parts  around  Wilmington.  The  latter  was  certainly 
one  of  the  best  officered  regiments  I  ever  saw,  and  maintained 
a  very  high  state  of  discipline.  The  10th  Virginia  was  from  the 
Valley,  one  company,  however,  being  from  Madison  County  ; 
the  37th  was  from  the  mountains  of  the  southwest ;  the  23d 
(which  had  recently  lost  its  former  efficient  commander, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Walton,  in  a  very  sharp  engagement  of 
Johnson's  division  at  "  Payne's  Farm  "  on  the  27th  Novem 
ber,  the  day  Meade  crossed  for  the  Mine  Run  demonstration) 
was  from  Louisa,  Halifax,  Charlotte,  Prince  Edward,  and 
other  counties,  and  Richmond  City. 

General  Steuart's  staff  was  composed  of  Captain  George 
Williamson,  of  Maryland,  assistant  adjutant-general ;  Major 
Tanner,  quartermaster ;  I  had  been  volunteering  since  Gettys 
burg  as  assistant  inspector-general,  and  sometimes  as  adju 
tant-general,  General  Trimble,  upon  whose  staff  I  was,  being 
a  prisoner. 

It  would  be,  I  am  satisfied,  a  fair  estimate  to  say  that  in 
the  spring  the  effective  strength  of  the  brigade  in  line  of 
battle  was  1400  officers  and  men.  Major-General  Edward 
Johnson's  division  contained  three  other  brigades,  viz. : 
Brigadier-General  James  A.  Walker's  (the  old  "  Stonewall,  " 
and  sometimes  called  the  1st  brigade),  2d,  4th,  5th,  27th 
(a  battalion),  and  33d  Virginia  regiments ;  Brigadier-General 
John  M.  Jones's  (2d  brigade),  21st,  25th,  42d,  44th,  and 
50th  Virginia  regiments  (48th  ?)  ;  and  Brigadier-General 
L.  A.  Stafford's  brigade  of  five  Louisiana  regiments.  I  have 
no  doubt  the  division  numbered  closely  in  the  neighborhood 
of  5200  in  line  of  battle,  Stafford's  and,  I  think,  Jones's  being 
smaller  than  Steuart's  and  the  Stonewall. 


94  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Swell's  corps  was  composed  of  the  three  divisions  of  John 
son,  Early,  and  Kodes,  numbering  in  all  about  16,000  in 
battle.  Then  there  were  A.  P.  Hill's  corps  of  three  divisions, 
and  two  of  the  three  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps  lately 
returned  from  hard  service  in  the  West,  and  the  artillery 
and  cavalry. 

Colonel  Walter  H.  Taylor,  adjutant-general  of  the  army,  in 
his  "  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,"  quoting  from  the  official 
returns,  except  as  to  Longstreet's  two  divisions,  makes  the 
aggregate  strength  of  the  army  on  April  20,  1864,  63,984  of 
all  arms  present  for  duty.1 

The  men  were  fairly  equipped  as  to  arms  and  were  in  light 
marching  order,  having  certainly  no  superabundant  weight 
of  clothing  and  few  utensils  of  any  kind. 

II.  IN  THE  WILDERNESS 

On  or  about  the  29th  of  April,  1864,  Brigadier-General 
George  H.  Steuart's  brigade,  of  Johnson's  division,  Swell's 
corps,  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  left  its  winter  quarters 
near  Pisgah  Church,  six  or  seven  miles  east  of  Orange  Court 
House,  to  perform  a  tour  of  picket  duty  on  the  Rapid  an, 
about  six  miles  distant. 

The  face  of  the  country  had  been  greatly  changed  by  the 
prolonged  occupation  of  the  army,  fencing  being  gone  and 
fields  thrown  open,  and  extensive  forests  cut  down,  so  that  we 
were  able  to  pursue  almost  a  straight  course,  regardless  of 
roads,  to  our  destination.  The  road,  or  route,  led  sometimes 
over  cultivated  or  abandoned  fields,  across  marshy  places 
bridged  with  "  corduroy,"  and  often  for  a  long  stretch  through 
a  desolate  region  of  stumps  where  the  summer  before  had 
been  a  thick  growth  of  oak  or  pine  timber  with  luxuriant 
foliage.  The  country,  thinly  settled  before,  was  now  almost 
uninhabited,  and  not  even  the  bark  of  a  dog  or  song  of  a  bird 

1  Compare  footnote,  page  120.  —  EDITOR. 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864       95 

broke  the  dreary  silence.  After  a  leisurely  march  of  two  or 
three  hours,  we  halted  in  a  piece  of  woods  a  short  distance 
back  from  the  river,  near  the  mouth  of  Mountain  Run  and 
Gibson's  house,  and  in  another  hour  or  so  the  tedious  opera 
tion  of  relieving  pickets  was  completed  and  we  were  left  in 
occupation. 

As  we  were  almost  daily  expecting  the  spring  campaign  to 
open,  we  redoubled  our  vigilance  on  this  tour  and  looked  well 
to  our  flank,  being  the  extreme  right  of  the  infantry  picket 
line.  On  the  Culpeper  (enemy's)  side  the  woods  had  been 
so  thinned  out  in  the  course  of  the  winter  that  several  camps 
of  the  enemy  had  come  into  plain  view,  and  we  kept  a  close 
watch  on  them  for  any  signs  like  breaking  up.  For  two  or 
three  days  nothing  out  of  the  way  was  observed,  but  at  last, 
about  the  2d  of  May,  an  unusual  quantity  of  smoke  in  the 
daytime,  and  moving  of  lights  by  night,  gave  sufficient  token 
that  the  expected  movement  was  about  to  be  made.  The  last 
thing  a  soldier  does,  on  breaking  up  camp,  is  to  make  a  bon 
fire  of  his  surplus  wood  and  winter  "  fixings." 

On  the  morning  of  May  3  a  cloud  of  dust  was  seen  float 
ing  over  the  woods  in  front  and  stretching  in  a  long  line 
parallel  with  and  down  the  river,  and  at  one  exposed  point  the 
white  covers  of  wagons  and  glistening  bayonets,  or  pieces, 
were  visible,  passing  in  endless  succession,  and  there  was  no 
doubt  the  Union  army  was  moving  to  cross  one  of  the  fords 
below,  Germanna  we  rightly  supposed.  We  signaled  back 
to  our  principal  observatory  on  Clark's  Mountain,  but  were 
answered  that  they  had  a  full  view  of  the  movement  from 
that  elevated  point. 

Clark's  Mountain,  in  which  the  southwest  range  terminates 
in  this  direction,  is  a  short  distance  in  rear  of  the  Rapidan, 
and  commands  a  wide  view  of  all  the  country  in  front.  All 
day  long  we  watched  the  ominous  cloud  of  dust  hanging  in 
the  air  and  the  stream  of  wagons  and  glittering  metal,  and 
knew  that  a  few  hours  would  find  the  two  armies  contending 


96  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

once  more  on  a  Wilderness  battle-ground.  That  night  one  or 
two  deserters  came  over  and  gave  confirmation,  if  any  were 
needed,  that  Grant  had  put  his  whole  army  in  motion.1  The 
next  morning  showed  the  same  line  of  march  and  canopy  of 
dust  marking  its  course  down  the  river.  Two  more  deserters, 
one  a  Belgian  speaking  French  only,  came  across  at  Mitchell's 
Ford,  closely  pursued  and  fired  on  to  the  edge  of  the  water.  In 
the  afternoon  we  received  orders  to  march,  the  quartermasters 
and  men  in  camp  being  directed  to  pack  up  at  winter  quarters 
and  move  down  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg  Plank  Road 
to  join  us.  About  3  P.  M.,  May  4,  we  moved  out  under  cover 
of  the  woods,  and  took  a  cross-road  in  a  southerly  direction 
towards  the  Wilderness,  the  37th  Virginia  being  left  on  the 
picket  line,  with  instructions  to  withdraw  after  night  and  over 
take  us.  At  dark  we  struck  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg 
Stone  Road,  which  runs  parallel  with  and  a  mile  or  two  from 
the  Plank  Road,  and  went  into  bivouac. 

Early  in  the  morning,  May  5,  Johnson's  division  being 
now  united,  —  our  37th  Virginia  not  being  up,  however,  —  we 
started  down  the  Stone  Road  towards  Fredericksburg,  but  on 
reaching  a  point  nearly  abreast  of  Germanna  Ford  and  within 
two  miles  of  Wilderness  Run  and  Tavern,  were  brought  to  a 
halt  by  the  information  that  the  enemy,  having  crossed  there, 
were  moving  out  into  the  country  along  our  front.  A  brisk 
skirmish  fire  soon  began,  probably  with  J.  M.  Jones's  bri 
gade,  which  had  the  advance  ;  and  turning  down  an  old  wood 
road  which  went  off  from  the  Stone  Road  to  the  left  oblique, 
we  presently  halted  again  and  formed  in  line  of  battle. 

We  were  now  in  the  heart  of  the  "  Wilderness  "  country, 
a  well-named  tract  extending  from  the  Rapidan  on  the  north 
across  the  Stone  and  Plank  roads  to  the  south  and  to  near 

1  The  Union  official  reports  represent  the  movement  to  have  commenced  on 
the  morning  of  the  4th,  and  I  may  have  made  an  error  of  a  day  as  to  our  obser 
vations.  But  my  recollection,  reduced  to  writing  in  1865,  was  that  troops  and 
wagon-trains  were  visible  moving  down  the  river  on  the  3d. 


NOTES   ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864        97 

Fredericksburg  on  the  east.  It  is  in  places  level  and  marshy, 
or  with  numerous  wet  spring-heads,  but  for  the  most  part 
rugged  or  rolling,  with  very  few  fields  of  thin  soil,  easily 
washing  into  gullies,  and  still  fewer  houses  scattered  here  and 
there. ,  The  woods,  which  seem  to  stretch  out  interminably,  are 
in  some  places  of  pine  with  low  spreading  branches,  through 
which  a  horseman  cannot  force  his  way  without  much  turning 
and  twisting,  but  generally  the  oak  predominates.  In  many 
places  the  large  trees  had  been  cut  down  in  years  past,  — 
whether  for  the  construction  of  plank  roads  or  for  furnaces  I 
do  not  know,  —  and  a  jungle  of  switch  had  sprung  up  ten  or 
twenty  feet  high,  more  impenetrable,  if  possible,  than  the  pine. 
A  more  difficult  or  disagreeable  field  of  battle  could  not  well 
be  imagined.  There  is  no  range  for  artillery.  It  is  an  affair  of 
musketry  at  close  quarters,  from  which  one  combatant  or  the 
other  must  soon  recoil,  if  both  do  not  construct  breastworks, 
as  they  learned  to  do  with  wonderful  rapidity. 

Some  little  delay  occurred  in  making  a  connected  line,  but 
by  midday  the  men  were  lying  down  in  position,  our  brigade 
being  nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  Stone  Road,  which  was 
one  or  two  hundred  yards  from  our  right.  The  skirmish 
firing  indicated  that  the  enemy  were  moving  diagonally  across 
and  towards  our  front,  and  it  drew  closer  and  closer  until 
stray  bullets  were  cutting  through  the  branches  overhead. 
General  Johnson  now  rode  by  and  stated  that  it  was  not 
intended  to  bring  on  a  general  engagement  that  day.1  The 
men  were  getting  a  little  restless,  however,  with  suspense  at 
having  the  enemy  so  close  and  yet  unseen  ;  and  when  General 
Johnson  presently  rode  up  a  second  time  and  called  out, 
"  Remember,  it  is  not  meant  to  have  a  general  engagement," 
it  was  represented  to  him  that  the  two  lines  must  be  face  to 
face  in  a  few  moments ;  and  whether  a  general  engagement 
was  intended  or  not,  would  it  not  be  better  to  let  the  men 

1  No  doubt  General  Lee  desired  to  have  Longstreet  up  and  the  army  well 
concentrated. 


98  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

have  the  impetus  of  a  forward  movement  in  the  collision  ? 
"  Very  well,"  said  he,  "  let  them  go  ahead  a  little."  The 
order  was  immediately  given  "  Forward,"  which  was  responded 
to  with  alacrity,  and  almost  in  a  moment  a  tremendous  fire 
rolled  along  the  line.  Battle's  brigade  of  Rodes's  division 
had  just  been  placed  behind  our  right,  and,  catching  the 
enthusiasm,  rushed  forward  also.  We  pressed  right  on,  firing 
heavily  and  driving  the  enemy  through  the  dense  thicket. 
Large  bodies  were  taken  prisoners,  one  regiment,  the  116th 
New  York,  I  think,  in  new  uniforms,  with  heavy  yellow 
embroidery,  being  captured  almost  as  an  organization  ;  many 
of  them,  however,  lay  dead  or  wounded  on  the  ground.  For 
some  time  the  wood  road  (I  mean  simply  an  old  road  through 
the  woods,  little  used)  by  which  we  had  advanced  was  blocked 
up  by  a  mass  of  several  hundred  prisoners.  None  but  the 
slightly  wounded  were  allowed  to  guard  them  to  the  rear,  and 
in  most  instances  they  were  simply  directed  to  keep  that  road 
back  until  they  would  meet  troops  having  more  leisure  to  take 
charge  of  them.  Probably  many  escaped. 

Meanwhile  we  had  driven  the  enemy  through  the  jungle  to 
an  open  field  extending  on  both  sides  of  the  Stone  Road,  and 
as  they  were  pressed  over  it,  a  destructive  fire  was  poured 
into  them,  so  that  it  seemed  to  me  the  ground  was  more 
thickly  covered  with  their  dead  and  wounded  than  I  had  ever 
seen.  A  battery  had  been  in  the  act  of  crossing  this  field, 
all  but  two  pieces  of  which  had  wheeled  about  and  gotten 
off,  but  all  the  horses  and  many  of  the  drivers  of  these  two 
had  been  shot  down,  and  they  remained  standing  in  the 
midst  of  the  dead  and  wounded  for  the  next  two  days.  The 
officer  commanding  the  artillery,  mounted  on  a  fine  Morgan 
horse,  refused  for  a  time  to  yield  himself,  and  was  only  saved 
from  death  by  the  intervention  of  Colonel  Brown  of  the 
1st  North  Carolina,  who,  struck  with  his  gallantry,  called  out, 
as  an  inducement  to  surrender,  that  he  would  give  him  the 
special  honor  of  a  commissioned  officer  to  escort  him  to  the 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864       99 

rear.  The  colonel  mounted  his  horse,  however,  and  rode  him 
during  the  rest  of  the  fight. 

At  this  time  General  Johnson  again  passed  by;  and  it 
being  suggested  to  him  that  if  it  was  not  desired  to  have  a 
general  battle,  the  edge  of  the  wood  with  the  open  space  in 
front  would  be  an  excellent  place  to  halt  and  re-form  our 
line,  he  directed  this  to  be  done.  About  half  our  men  had 
eagerly  pushed  on  halfway  across  the  field,  and  when  re 
called,  some  fifteen  or  twenty  remained,  taking  refuge  in  a 
gully  to  avoid  the  stream  of  bullets  which  passed  over  their 
heads  from  friend  and  foe,  until  able  to  come  in  under  cover 
of  night. 

I  had  observed  some  confusion  on  our  right,  where  J.  M. 
Jones's  brigade  adjoined  us,  supported  by  part  of  Battles's. 
One  of  Jones's  best  regiments,  the  25th  (?)  Virginia,  being 
unfortunately  captured  almost  entire  on  the  skirmish  line, 
and  a  strong  attack  being  made  on  him,  —  which  we  by  our 
forward  movement  had  anticipated  with  such  good  results,  — 
his  men  gave  back,  and  Jones  himself,  apparently  disdaining 
to  fly,  was  killed  while  sitting  calmly  on  his  horse,  gazing  at 
the  approaching  enemy.  A  very  gallant  and  accomplished 
officer  of  the  old  regular  army,  his  loss  was  severely  felt  in 
the  next  few  days,  particularly  at  the  critical  moment  of  the 
assault  at  Spottsylvania.  Other  troops  assisted  to  repair  this 
temporary  reverse,  and  this  part  of  the  line  was  established 
and  advanced  with  ours,  or  nearly. 

On  our  left  the  Stonewall  and  Stafford's  brigades  had  been 
and  continued  to  be  hotly  engaged,  and,  being  partly  envel 
oped  on  the  flank,  lost  heavily ;  General  Stafford  was  killed 
some  time  during  the  afternoon,  and  most  of  his  staff  were 
killed  or  captured.  The  whole  division  finally  occupied  a  line 
extending  ours,  and  firing  having  ceased  except  in  a  desul 
tory  way,  we  began  to  construct  such  rude  breastworks  as  we 
could  without  implements,  and  the  enemy  on  his  side  busied 
himself  in  the  same  manner.  Opposite  the  right  of  Johnson's 


100  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

division,  which  rested  near  the  Stone  Road,  the  open  field 
separated  the  hostile  lines  by  a  considerable  interval,  com 
pared  at  least  with  the  distance  between  them  on  our  centre 
and  left,  where  the  breastworks  were  not  more  than  pistol- 
shot  apart,  but  with  a  thick  jungle  between.  I  think  Steuart's 
brigade  now  was  on  the  right,  Jones's  having  been  much 
shattered.  I  do  not  remember  that  a  single  piece  of  artillery 
had  been  so  far  used  by  either  side.  The  fighting  had  been 
close  and  the  loss  in  our  division  heavy,  including  Generals 
Jones  and  Stafford  and  many  other  officers  of  rank.  In 
Steuart's  brigade  the  10th  Virginia  had  lost  two  of  its  field 
officers  killed,  Colonel  E.  T.  H.  Warren  and  Major  Coffman, 
both  officers  of  unusual  merit.  Colonel  Warren  was  one  of  the 
most  efficient  regimental  commanders  in  the  service  and  a 
gentleman  of  most  amiable  character.  The  other  regiments 
also  suffered  severely  in  officers  and  men.  It  is  usual  to  spec 
ulate  on  a  far  greater  loss  on  the  enemy's  side,  but  as  our 
brigade  at  least  drove  them  across  open  ground,  it  is  reason 
able  to  suppose,  and  appearances  indicated,  that,  except  pos 
sibly  in  officers,  they  had  lost  more  heavily.  Certainly,  the 
field  in  our  front  was  strewn  very  thickly  with  their  fallen, 
mingled  with  whom  were  some  of  our  own.  This  being  now 
the  territory  of  neither  party,  the  wounded  of  neither  could 
be  removed  or  receive  any  attention.  Several  efforts  were 
made  to  relieve  them,  but  the  enemy  opened  fire  whenever 
we  exposed  ourselves  at  the  edge  of  the  thicket,  and  the 
attempts  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Our  picket  or  skirmish  line  had  been  established  a  few 
paces  in  advance  of  the  breastworks,  if  such  they  could 
then  be  called,  and  endless  alarms  and  exchanges  of  shots 
kept  us  on  the  alert.  It  was  half  a  dozen  times  reported  that 
the  enemy  were  advancing,  that  the  voices  of  their  officers 
could  be  plainly  heard  inciting  the  men,  but  no  serious  attack 
»was  made  for  some  time;  and  after  rushing  to  arms  more 
than  once  under  the  impression  that  a  charge  was  imminent, 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN3  W?' 186*4' 

we  presently  grew  accustomed  to  the  situation  and  received 
such  alarms  more  stolidly. 

Our  37th  Virginia,  which  had  been  left  on  picket  on  the 
Rapidan,  now  came  up,  too  late  to  participate  in  action  with 
us ;  but  being  sent  to  the  left  to  support  Pegram's  brigade  of 
Early's  division,  where  there  was  still  desultory  fighting,  it 
soon  found  itself  under  fire,  and  Colonel  Williams  was  slightly 
wounded  in  the  foot.  Just  about  dusk  the  enemy  in  our 
front  made  a  rash  charge  across  the  corner  of  the  open  ground, 
apparently  with  the  intention  of  recovering  their  abandoned 
artillery ;  but  a  couple  of  our  pieces,  which  had  now  been 
placed  on  rising  ground  at  the  mouth  of  the  Stone  Road  on 
our  right,  opened  with  grape  and  drove  them  back  with  loss. 
This  closed  the  operations  of  the  day. 

Shortly  afterwards  a  number  of  our  men  came  in  under 
cover  of  the  darkness  from  the  front,  having  lain  in  a  gully 
for  many  hours,  from  the  time  when  we  had  recalled  and 
re-formed  our  line.  When  the  enemy  made  their  last  charge 
at  nightfall,  they  had  passed  directly  over  the  gully,  and  in 
returning  several  stopped  in  it  for  shelter  from  the  fire  of 
grape.  These  our  fellows  had  immediately  captured,  finding 
on  them  some  canteens  of  whiskey,  a  very  scarce  article  with 
us,  and  both  parties  made  themselves  as  sociable  and  com 
fortable  as  their  situation  would  permit.  The  senior  officer 
of  the  squad,  Captain  de  Priest  of  the  23d  Virginia,  now 
brought  in  his  men  and  prisoners,  and  came  to  make  a  voluble 
and  unsteady  report  of  what  he  was  pleased  to  call  his  sep 
arate  operations  during  the  day. 

Usually  there  is  not  much  groaning  or  outcry  from  wounded 
men  on  a  battle-field  ;  they  do  not  feel  acute  pain  or  else 
bear  their  sufferings  in  silence.  But  on  this  occasion  circum 
stances  seemed  to  make  their  situation  peculiarly  distressing, 
and  their  moans  and  cries  were  painful  to  listen  to.  In  the 
stillness  of  the  night  air  every  groan  could  be  heard,  and  the 
calls  for  water  and  entreaties  to  brothers  or  comrades  by 


102  M£  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 


name  to  come  and  help  them.  Many,  including  some  of  our 
side,  lay  within  a  dozen  paces  of  our  skirmish  line,  whom  we 
found  it  impossible  to  succor,  although  we  tried.  I  was  my 
self  fired  on  while  making  two  separate  efforts  to  get  some  in. 
I  well  remember  that  at  midnight,  when  I  lay  down  to  rest, 
and  on  waking  during  the  night,  their  cries  were  ringing  in 
my  ears. 

The  next  day,  May  6,  was  spent  in  strengthening  our  slight 
works.  There  was  no  renewal  of  the  attack  in  our  quarter, 
although  the  pickets  fired  at  short  range  on  every  one  who 
exposed  himself,  by  which  we  lost  two  good  officers,  one,  I 
think,  Lieutenant  Cicero  Craig  of  the  3d  North  Carolina. 
Our  men  were  instructed  to  keep  a  jealous  watch  on  the  two 
pieces  of  artillery  which  still  stood  outside  the  line,  to  be  the 
fruits  of  that  side  which  should  in  the  end  remain  masters  of 
the  field.  We  understood  that  Hill's  corps  was  having  an 
engagement  over  to  the  right,  but  knew  no  particulars.  The 
sound  of  the  heaviest  firing  may  be  inaudible  at  a  short  dis 
tance,  comparatively  speaking,  in  this  gloomy  and  tangled 
wilderness,  although  distinctly  heard  perhaps  dozens  of  miles 
away.  I  have  known  well-authenticated  instances  of  the  sound 
of  battle  being  carried  to  the  mountains  of  Virginia  a  hun 
dred  miles  or  more  distant,  without  being  heard  in  a  great 
part  at  least  of  the  intervening  country. 

A  little  before  sunset  Brigadier-General  Gordon  (of  Early's 
division),  who  we  heard  had  been  asking  permission  all  day 
to  turn  the  enemy's  right  flank,  being  at  last  accorded  it, 
made  an  attack  with  signal  success,  capturing  Generals  Sey 
mour  and  Shaler  with  many  men,  and  sweeping  down  the  line 
for  a  considerable  distance.  We  meanwhile  stood  under 
arms  expecting  orders  to  carry  on  the  movement,  but  it  was 
deemed  too  hazardous.  It  seems  now  that  it  might  have  been 
followed  up  with  the  promise  of  important  results.1 

1  General  Edward  Johnson  told  me  a  few  days  afterwards,  when  we  were 
prisoners  together,  that  the  adjutant-general  of  the  Union  army  stated  to  him 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864     103 

At  any  rate  we  found  no  enemy  in  our  front  the  next 
morning,  May  7,  and  sallied  out  to  examine  the  ground,  push 
ing  our  skirmishers  forward,  who  finally  came  upon  the  enemy 
in  position  a  long  way  further  back  —  I  think  a  mile.  We 
now  hauled  in  our  two  captured  pieces,  removed  the  wounded, 
who  had  been  lying  unsuccored  for  two  days,  and  buried  as 
many  of  the  dead  as  we  could.  The  brush  had  caught  fire,  and 
the  creeping  flames  were  burning  up  many  of  the  latter  and 
no  doubt  some  of  the  wounded.  The  pioneer  corps  of  our 
division  reported  having  buried  582  of  the  enemy  in  front  of 
our  (Ewell's)  corps,  and  many  were  left  uninterred  for  want 
of  time.  The  enemy's  line  gave  evidence  of  having  been  aban 
doned  in  much  haste,  knapsacks,  haversacks,  rations,  etc., 
lying  strewn  around,  which  were  eagerly  gathered  by  our 
men.  About  midday  the  enemy  advanced  in  our  front,  and  our 
pickets  gradually  fell  back,  but  not  to  their  original  line  on 
the  left.  For  the  rest  of  the  day  there  was  incessant  firing 
between  the  skirmishers  or  pickets,1  but  without  much  damage 
done.  At  our  right,  near  the  Stone  Road,  there  was  a  loss  sus 
tained,  however,  in  the  death  of  Colonel  J.  Thompson  Brown, 
commanding  the  reserve  artillery  of  Ewell's  corps,  who  was 
shot  through  the  head  by  a  stray  bullet  as  he  rode  behind 
the  breastwork.  One  of  the  enemy,  having  climbed  a  tree, 
annoyed  us  by  attempting  to  pick  off  our  men  across  the  open, 
but  he  was  either  shot  down  or  made  too  uncomfortable  on  his 
perch. 

Towards  dark  we  were  notified  that  there  would  be  a  move- 
that  on  this  occasion  the  army  had  been  doubled  on  the  centre  and  its  safety 
seemed  to  be  endangered.  In  conversation  with  General  Collis  since  the  war, 
he  informed  me  he  was  with  General  Grant  at  the  time  when  General  Meade 
rode  up  and  reported  the  situation  to  be  serious,  but  General  Grant  remarked 
with  an  impatient  gesture  (pushing  up  the  front  of  his  cap),  that  Burnside's 
corps  had  not  been  put  in  action  and  could  be  used  if  necessary. 

1  At  this  time  and  thenceforward  a  picket  line  was  very  likely  to  be  a  skir 
mish  line  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  the  two  terms  came  to  be  used 
interchangeably. 


104  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

ment  by  the  right  flank  along  the  line  of  works,  and  were 
ordered  to  watch  the  troops  with  whom  we  there  made  connec 
tion  and  follow  them.  So  the  men  were  kept  under  arms  and 
strictly  prohibited  from  making  fires  or  noise  or  any  unusual 
signs,  such  as  rattling  of  canteens  or  metal  that  might  betray 
our  motions  to  the  enemy. 

About  nine  o'clock  p.  M,  our  neighbors  began  to  move  off 
by  the  right  flank,  and  we  followed,  the  skirmish  line  also 
facing  to  the  right  and  keeping  between  us  and  the  enemy 
outside  the  works.  The  line  of  breastworks  behind  which  we 
marched  ran  for  the  most  part  through  rugged  woods,  and  the 
night  being  very  dark,  horsemen  and  foot-soldiers  were  contin 
ually  stumbling  over  stumps,  running  into  trees,  or  falling 
into  gullies,  with  which  the  easily  washed  soil  of  the  country 
abounded.  We  seldom  marched  one  or  two  hundred  yards 
without  being  arrested  by  delays  in  front,  nor  were  these 
halts  long  enough  or  of  any  certainty,  so  that  the  men  could 
snatch  a  little  rest.  So  the  night  wore  on,  the  line  of  works 
seeming  interminable,  up  and  down  hill  and  winding  about 
through  the  desolate  Wilderness  country.  About  half  an  hour 
before  dawn  there  was  a  longer  halt,  and  the  men  lay  down 
in  their  places  and  took  a  brief  repose. 

At  six  or  seven  o'clock,  May  8,  we  resumed  the  march, 
striking  off  from  the  works  to  the  right  oblique,  and  presently 
found  ourselves  on  a  road  which  led  in  the  direction  of  Spott- 
sylvania.  The  troops  we  had  been  following  during  the  night 
had  disappeared  while  we  were  resting.  For  a  couple  of 
miles  we  were  compelled  to  pass  through  a  burning  forest,  the 
smoke  and  heat  of  which  were  very  distressing,  particularly 
as  there  was  a  scarcity  of  water,  this  being  on  the  ridge  be 
tween  the  waters  of  the  Rapidan  and  Mattapony.  We  now 
moved  for  a  time  in  the  reverse  direction,  on  the  identical 
road  by  which,  one  year  before,  Jackson  had  led  his  com 
mand  to  make  his  celebrated  flank  attack  at  Chancellorsville, 
and  the  men  were  continually  recognizing  old  landmarks 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864      105 

and  recalling  to  each  other  the  associations  of  that  time.1  By 
midday  we  were  becoming  much  exhausted,  and  the  rear 
guard  had  a  difficult  and  most  disagreeable  duty  to  perform 
in  keeping  the  men  from  falling  out.  The  dust,  too,  was  very 
distressing.  But  at  such  a  time  the  plea  of  physical  exhaus 
tion  had  to  be  disregarded,  and  stragglers  were  urged  and 
made  to  move  on  by  persuasion  and  almost  by  force. 

Later  in  the  day  we  struck  across  ihe  country  and  got  into 
another  road  leading  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House.2 

1  I  think  there  may  have  been  some  mistake  about  this,  and  that  Jackson's 
route  lay  further  to  the  east.   The  men  thought  so,  however. 

2  The  foregoing  account  having  been  read  by  Mr.  J.  C.  Ropes,  of  the  Military 
Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  and  author  of  the  late  history  of  the  Cam 
paign  of  1862,  it  was  by  him  sent  to  Colonel  Lyman  of  General  Meade's  staff, 
who  returned  it  with  a  letter,  from  which  the  following  is  an  extract :  — 

My  dear  Ropes :  .  .  .  I  lent  the  Wilderness  part  to  Gen.  Peirson  who  was 
Lit.  Col.  of  the  39th  Mass,  and  in  the  brigade  whose  fire  stopped  the  pursuit 
across  the  "  open  space  "  and  compelled  the  enemy  to  retire  to  the  opposite  edge 
of  the  woods.  He  says  the  account  (for  the  time  he  was  on  the  field)  is  very 
accurate.  What  is  curious  is  that  he  too  remembers  the  cries  of  the  wounded. 
Several  times  he  essayed,  with  volunteers,  to  go  out  with  stretchers  to  bring 
them  in,  but  was  received  by  such  a  fire  as  compelled  him  to  retreat.  Only  in 
the  footnote  on  page  10  [page  103]  of  the  Wilderness  do  I  observe  an  inaccu 
racy.  Gen.  Edw.  Johnson  must  have  misunderstood  Gen.  Seth  Williams  (who 
gave  him  a  good  breakfast  on  May  12th).  The  army  after  the  evening  attack 
on  the  6th  corps  was  not  "  doubled  on  the  centre,"  but  the  right  was  swung 
back.  If  the  Gen.  Collis  there  mentioned  was  Col.  of  the  114th  Penn.,  I  think 
his  memory  must  deceive  him.  .  .  .  Moreover,  I  rode  with  Gen.  Meade  on  that 
occasion  and  heard  what  was  said  and  have  no  remembrance  of  seeing  Gen. 
Collis  there.  Gen.  Grant  could  not  have  "  pushed  up  the  front  of  his  cap,"  for 
he  never  wore  a  cap.  Gen.  Grant  seemed  a  little  worried,  but  Gen.  Meade  was 
as  cool  as  possible.  He  said  to  me,  "  Nonsense  !  If  they  have  broken  our  line, 
they  can  do  nothing  more  to-night,"  or  words  to  that  effect ;  and  he  treated 
two  officers  of  the  6th  corps,  who  rode  in  with  panicky  reports,  to  very  sarcas 
tic  remarks.  He  told  Grant  he  had  ordered  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves  to  the 
right  and  that  was  enough.  Neither  before  nor  after  did  I  know  of  so  pro-» 
found  and  uncalled  for  a  panic  as  this  one  of  a  portion  of  the  ()th  corps.  .  .  . 

Truly  yours, 

THEODORE  LYMAN. 


106  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 


III.   SPOTTSYLVANIA  COURT  HOUSE 

About  an  hour  before  sunset,  May  8,  Johnson's  division, 
with  Steuart's  brigade  in  the  lead,  was  not  more  than  two 
miles  from  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  the  tired  men 
had  just  been  cheered  by  an  assurance  passed  down  the  col 
umn  that  they  were  presently  going  into  camp,  when  firing 
was  heard  to  the  left  oblique  and  news  came  that  Rodes's 
division,  which  preceded  us,  had  found  itself  in  collision  with 
the  enemy.  The  column  was  turned  from  the  road  in  that 
direction  and  formed  in  line  of  battle  in  rear  of  Rodes,  but 
although  under  the  sharp  fire  which  was  directed  against 
him,  we  were  not  brought  into  action.  About  dark  the  firing 
gradually  ceased,  both  sides  apparently  holding  their  own, 
and  our  division  was  moved  forward  and  to  the  right  so 
as  to  connect  with  and  extend  the  line  from  Rodes's  right. 
By  ten  o'clock  the  whole  division  was  stretched  out  in 
some  fashion,  and  was  ordered  to  rectify  the  alignment  and 
throw  up  breastworks  ;  but  the  ground  was  thickly  wooded, 
and  on  the  right,  which  was  held  by  Steuart's  brigade,  was 
covered  with  low  spreading  pines  absolutely  impenetrable 
in  places ;  so  that,  after  moving  forwards  and  backwards,  and 
closing  up  to  the  left  and  to  the  right,  we  got  very  much 
tangled,  and  the  prospect  of  making  a  straight  or  well-con 
nected  line  in  the  worn-out  condition  of  the  men  became 
worse  and  worse.  The  voices  of  Generals  Johnson  and  Steuart 
were  heard  far  in  the  night,  but  in  the  thicket  and  extreme 
darkness  the  men  could  not  see  them  nor  could  they  see  each 
other,  and  staff  officers  could  not  ride  through,  so  that,  tired, 
hungry,  and  sleepy,  they  finally  sank  down  where  each  one 
happened  to  find  himself. 

At  daylight,  May  9,  the  line  was  rectified  and  the  men  went 
to  work  intrenching.  The  enemy  soon  opened  an  artillery  fire 
from  opposite  the  left  of  the  division,  which,  enfilading  us  on 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864      107 

the  right  in  a  measure,  annoyed  us  a  good  deal,  although 
we  were  not  visible  to  them.  When  the  breastworks  of 
Steuart's  brigade  were  half  finished,  the  engineers  of  the 
army  came  along  and  ordered  us  to  abandon  them  and  con 
struct  a  new  line  turning  off  at  right  angles  from  the  front 
of  the  rest  of  the  division  and  the  army.  This  exposed  us 
much  more  than  before  to  the  enemy's  fire,  which,  now  pass 
ing  over  the  heads  of  the  brigades~on  our  left,  for  whom  it 
was  meant,  took  us  in  flank  and  rear,  so  that  it  was  only 
during  the  intervals  when  the  fire  slackened  that  we  were 
able  to  do  any  work.  When  completed,  therefore,  our  in- 
trenchments  were  constructed  for  protection  from  side  and 
behind  quite  as  much  as  for  defense  in  front,  and  consisted 
of  a  chain  or  series  of  deep  pits.  We  also  cleared  away  the 
pines  and  brush  for  a  space  in  front,  and  made  out  of 
them  a  very  tolerable  abatis  with  the  interlaced  branches. 
Having  few  tools  the  labor  was  tedious,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  middle  of  the  next  day  that  the  works  were  sufficient 
for  protection.  Meanwhile  cooking  details  were  sent  back 
to  the  wagons  who  brought  up  cooked  rations,  consisting  in 
the  main  of  cold  corn-bread. 

Towards  evening  on  May  10  there  was  some  sharp  firing  on 
the  skirmish  line  on  the  left  of  the  angle,  and  the  artillery 
opened  with  such  violence  as  to  cause  us  much  inconvenience, 
although  I  believe  little  or  no  loss  of  life  in  our  command.  A 
little  before  sunset  a  message  came  that  a  part  of  the  line  of 
Rodes's  division,  on  Johnson's  left,  had  been  captured  by  a 
sudden  attack,  and  our  brigade  was  ordered  to  his  support  in 
all  possible  haste.  The  distance  by  a  straight  line  across  the 
angle  was  only  a  few  hundred  yards,  but  the  emergency 
seemed  so  great  that  the  head  of  our  column  was  pushed  on 
at  a  double-quick,  leaving  the  rear  to  follow  as  best  it  could, 
so  that  the  men  reached  the  scene  of  action  with  a  good  deal 
of  ardor,  but  much  exhausted  and  strung  out.  Several  dead 
bodies  in  blue  uniform  were  passed  over  a  couple  of  hundred 


108  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

yards,  or  nearly  inside  the  line,  showing  that  the  enemy  had 
penetrated  thus  far,  but  they  were  now  limiting  themselves, 
or  limited,  to  holding  some  two  hundred  yards  of  the 
works,  from  which  they  poured  a  destructive  fire  to  their 
front  and  up  and  down  the  line.  Without  waiting  for  the 
rear,  our  advance  was  hurriedly  formed  and  pushed  for 
ward,  but  being  only  a  few  hundred  men  we  were  not  strong 
enough  to  retake  the  ground.  The  greater  part  bore  off  to 
the  right,  and,  reaching  the  works  about  where  the  enemy's 
left  was,  made  a  number  of  attempts  to  charge  down  the 
line. 

I  saw  many  instances  of  conspicuous  gallantry  on  the  part 
of  individuals,  but  the  fire,  possibly  in  part  from  our  own 
friends  on  the  other  side  of  the  gap,  was  so  withering  that  the 
men  recoiled  from  each  charge  and  could  only  hold  their  own. 
Lieutenant  William  Steuart,  who  had  just  been  appointed 
aide-de-camp  to  the  general,  his  brother,  but  had  not  yet  been 
so  announced  and  was  not,  I  think,  in  uniform,  attracted  my 
attention  by  the  very  daring  manner  in  which  he  headed  these 
charges,  first  attempting  to  lead  the  men  forward  down  the 
inside  of  the  line,  then  jumping  upon  and  walking  along 
the  top  of  the  breastwork  itself,  and  finally  leaping  upon  the 
outer  side  and  endeavoring  to  induce  them  to  sweep  down 
the  enemy's  own  side.  Captain  George  Williamson,  assistant 
adjutant-general,  I  saw  exposing  himself  in  the  same  way. 
Lieutenant  Lyon  of  the  3d  North  Carolina  seized  the  regi 
mental  colors,  and,  calling  on  the  men  to  follow,  rushed  with 
the  flag  so  far  in  advance  that  he  appeared  in  imminent  dan 
ger  of  being  shot  down  by  our  own  fire,  if  not  by  the  enemy. 
Captain  John  Badger  Brown  of  the  same  regiment,  one  of 
our  best  officers,  fell  badly  wounded,  and  many  other  officers 
and  men  were  killed  or  disabled.  We  regained  only  a  small 
part  of  the  works,  and  it  became  evident  that  the  recapture 
should  be  made  by  a  fresh  body  of  troops  marching  squarely 
up  to  the  gap.  General  Steuart  so  stated  to  General  Johnson, 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864     109 

who  accordingly  rode  off  in  search  of  such  assistance,  while 
we  desisted  from  further  attempts  and  confined  ourselves  to 
holding  what  we  already  had.  We  lay  down  behind  the  works, 
receiving  in  silence  the  enfilading  fire  which  continued  to  come 
down  them,  whether  from  foe  or  friend,  and  watching  to 
repel  any  attack  that  might  be  made  in  front.  Several  times 
it  was  reported  that  such  an  attack  was  being  made  or  threat 
ened,  and  the  men  rose  up  and  fired,  but  in  the  dusk  which 
was  coming  on  I  could  see  nothing.  A  more  disagreeable  half 
hour  could  not  well  have  been  spent.  Presently  Captain  Wil 
liamson  passed  along  and  informed  me  that  (General  Steuart 
was  about  to  re-form  the  brigade  about  a  hundred  yards  in  the 
rear,  expressing  a  quite  alarming  wish  that  I  might  not  be 
shot  down  in  passing  over !  Here  about  one  fourth  were  got 
together ;  and  learning  that  other  troops  were  passing  up,  and 
not  liking  the  idea  of  failing  to  participate  with  them,  the 
general  led  his  command  forward.  But  when  we  reached  the 
works  the  last  enemy  had  been  driven  out,  or  more  probably 
were  withdrawn,  and  about  ten  o'clock  we  returned  to  our 
own  position,  which  had  all  the  while  been  bare  of  defenders 
except  the  skirmish  line  and  artillery.1 

This  affair  impressed  us  with  the  necessity  of  strength 
ening  our  line,  and  next  morning,  May  11,  the  men  fell  to 
work  with  increased  energy,  particularly  on  the  abatis,  the 
importance  of  which  in  detaining  and  throwing  into  confusion 
an  enemy  within  point-blank  range  they  now  fully  appreciated. 
It  is  a  mistake  made  by  non-combatants  only  to  suppose  that 
a  field  breastwork  is  any  material  obstacle  of  itself  to  a 
charging  enemy,  it  being  a  cover  only  to  the  men  behind  it. 
Indeed,  with  all  its  advantages  in  economizing  life,  fighting 

1  Colonel  Lyman  of  Meade's  staff  writes:  "The  capture  of  a  part  of  the 
line  on  May  10  was  the  assault  by  Upton's  brigade  of  the  6th  corps.  By  gross 
neglect  somewhere  that  beautiful  attack  was  unsupported.  If  it  had  been,  the 
whole  salient  would  have  been  captured.  Upton  withdrew  unmolested  at  dark, 
and  took  nearly  1000  prisoners.  Going  over  that  front  in  the  spring  of  1866,  I 
found  it  thickly  strewn  with  sabots  from  the  enemy's  batteries." 


110  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

behind  slight  field-works  has  some  disadvantages  also.  Give 
a  man  protection  for  his  body,  and  the  temptation  is  very 
strong  to  put  his  head  under  cover  too. 

My  observation  during  this  and  other  campaigns  was  that 
behind  works  not  a  few  men  will  crouch  down  doing  nothing. 
Many  will  fire  far  above  the  heads  of  their  assailants,  often 
at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees,  and  few,  comparatively, 
will  raise  their  heads  and  shoulders  fairly  above  the  rampart 
and  level  their  pieces  with  effect.  When  an  enemy  reaches 
the  other  side  of  the  work,  in  five  cases  out  of  six  it  is  carried ; 
whereas  the  object  and  advantage  of  an  abatis  is  to  detain 
and  disorder  the  assailants  while  the  defendants,  although 
not  firing  with  much  accuracy,  yet  inflict  loss  and  suffer  com 
paratively  none.  But  generally  speaking,  the  result,  however 
favorable  to  those  behind  the  works,  is  only  a  repulse,  per 
haps  bloody,  and  is  not  followed  up  with  consequences  such 
as  attend  a  victory  in  the  open  field. 

During  the  morning  I  rode  over  to  our  field  hospital,  about 
two  miles  distant,  to  see  how  the  wounded  of  the  evening  be 
fore  were  getting  on.  Two  of  our  best  company  commanders, 
Captain  Brown  and  another,  were  among  them,  but  doing 
well.  The  sergeant-major  of  the  3d  North  Carolina,  a  boy 
who  was  a  favorite  with  all,  was  fast  sinking,  attended  by  his 
father,  a  surgeon  in  another  regiment.  In  his  last  conscious 
moments  he  was  thinking  and  talking  of  his  mother,  whose 
only  son  I  was  told  he  was. 

Our  senior  surgeon  gave  me  a  most  refreshing  cup  of  hot 
tea,  the  taste  of  which  had  been  long  unknown,  and  I  also 
had  the  luxury  of  a  change  of  underclothing,  having  been 
marching  and  lying  in  the  trenches,  with  the  same  clothing 
on,  for  a  week.  Riding  back  I  saw  General  Lee  examining 
that  part  of  Rodes's  line  which  had  been  broken  the  day 
before. 

Before  giving  an  account  of  the  disaster  of  the  following 
morning,  it  will  be  well  to  describe  briefly  the  character  of 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864     HI 

our  part  of  the  line  and  the  disposition  of  the  forces  behind 
it.1 

Of  the  four  brigades  of  Johnson's  division,  Walker's 
(the  Stonewall)  was  on  the  left,  next  to  which  was  Stafford's, 
then  J.  M.  Jones's,  and  Steuart's  held  the  right.  Generals 
Stafford  and  Jones,  two  very  gallant  men,  had  been  killed  in 
the  first  day's  battle,  and  a  part  of  the  brigade  of  the  latter 
was  said  to  be  a  good  deal  disheartened  by  its  losses  and  for 
want  of  a  commander.  All  four  had  suffered  heavily  since 
the  opening  of  the  campaign,  and  I  do  not  think  they  now 
averaged  1000  men  behind  the  works,  more  probably 
800  or  900.  The  three  brigades  first  named  held  a 
continuation  of  the  main  army  line,  and  running  northerly, 
but  Steuart's  turned  off  at  an  angle  of  ninety  degrees  from 
Jones's  right.  There  was  no  support  or  continuation  of  the 
line  from  Steuart's  right  (except  pickets),  there  being  an  in 
terval  —  one  mile  we  supposed  at  the  time  —  between  us  and 
part  of  Hill's  corps,  now  commanded  by  Early.  There  were 
no  reserves.  In  Steuart's  front  the  ground  was  densely  wooded 
with  oak  and  pine,  with  many  ravines  and  spring-heads, 
and  we  had  our  skirmishers  well  out  without  having  felt  an 
enemy,  except  on  the  left.  The  line  of  the  other  brigades  ran 
through  oaks  principally,  and  a  short  distance  in  front  the 
ground  was  partly  wooded  and  partly  open,  but  always  rough. 
The  point  of  the  angle  was  on  elevated  ground,  both  open 
and  sloping  towards  the  enemy,  giving  the  only  good  position 
for  artillery  along  the  line ;  and  both  for  this  reason  and 
because  it  was  impossible  to  concentrate  a  heavy  infantry 
fire  from  it,  the  salient  was  occupied  by  six  or  eight  pieces. 
There  were  also  two  guns  in  Steuart's  centre,  and  probably 
others  along  the  left  of  the  division.  Behind  the  division  line 
the  ground  was  wooded,  but  in  rear  of  Doles'  (the  adjoining 
brigade  of  Rodes's  division)  there  was  a  considerable  clear 
ing. 

1  See  W.  R.  Atlas,  plate  LXXXIII— 3. 


112  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

There  had  been  several  showers  during  the  day,  and 
towards  evening  the  air  was  damp  and  heavy  and  began  to  be 

f°ggy- 

A  little  before  sunset,  May  11,  we  were  surprised  to  notice 
all  the  artillery  in  the  salient  and  our  centre  limber  up  and 
move  to  the  rear ;  and  asking  an  officer  what  this  meant,  he 
replied  he  did  not  know  except  that  they  were  ordered  back 
to  camp.  We  discussed  this  movement  with  some  uneasiness, 
but  supposed  other  batteries  would  relieve  them.  It  is  well 
known  that  our  artillery  at  this  time  was  not  controlled  by 
the  infantry  commanders,  as  during  the  first  two  years  of  the 
war,  but  separately  organized  into  battalions  and  larger  com 
mands  with  its  own  line  of  officers.  I  suppose,  however,  that 
corps  commanders  must  have  exercised  some  authority  in 
time  of  battle  and  active  operations. 

Not  long  after  dark  a  message  came  in  from  the  skirmish 
line  that  there  was  and  had  been  for  some  time  a  steady  rum 
bling  in  front,  indicating  that  a  large  force  was  being  massed 
there  or  passing  around  to  the  right.  Captain  George  Wil 
liamson/  assistant  adjutant-general,  and  myself,  the  only 
two  staff  officers  present,  immediately  walked  out  some  dis 
tance,  and  afterwards  stood  for  half  an  hour  on  the  breast 
works  listening  to  the  subdued  roar  or  noise,  plainly  audible 
in  the  still,  heavy  night  air,  like  distant  falling  water,  or 
machinery.  If  night  has  the  advantage  of  covering  a  military 
movement  to  the  eye,  it  nevertheless  often  discovers  it  to  the 
ear. 

Convinced,  accordingly,  that  an  important  movement  was 
on  foot,  and  believing  that  it  portended  an  attack  on  our  weak 
angle  in  the  morning  (and  I  have  an  indistinct  recollection 
that  a  deserter  had  passed  over  to  the  enemy  shortly  be 
fore,  who,  we  apprehended,  might  have  disclosed  its  condi 
tion),  we  went  back  and  reported  to  General  Steuart,  by  whom 
a  dispatch  was  immediately  sent  to  General  Johnson  to  this 
effect :  — 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864 

Major  R.  W.  Hunter,  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  — 

Major  :  The  enemy  is  moving  and  probably  massing  in  our 
front,  and  we  expect  to  be  attacked  at  daylight.  The  artillery 
along  our  front  has  been  withdrawn,  by  whose  orders  I  know 
not,  and  I  beg  that  it  be  sent  back  immediately. 

GEORGE  H.  STEUART, 
Brigadier-General,  commanding.1 

A  circular  was  then  sent  around  to  our  regimental  com 
manders,  stating  that  we  would  probably  be  attacked  in  the 
morning,  and  ordering  them  to  have  their  men  in  the  rifle-pits 
half  an  hour  before  daylight. 

On  the  12th  our  men  were  in  readiness  before  daylight,  and 
so  early  that  at  least  one  company  commander  —  I  think 
Captain  Cantwell  of  the  3d  North  Carolina  —  afterwards  told 
me  he  made  his  men  draw  their  loads  and  clean  their  guns 
while  waiting.  Owing  to  the  fog  day  was  late  in  breaking,  and 
even  then  there  was  no  sign  of  an  attack,  which  I  began  to 
believe  would  not  be  made.  But  presently  there  came  the 
sound  of  a  distant  cheer  just  off  the  salient,  followed  as  sud 
denly  by  a  deep  silence,  the  suspense  of  which  was  most  try 
ing,  especially  as  we  now  eagerly  looked  and  wished  for  the 
arrival  of  our  artillery,  which  should  have  been  there  to  open 

1  The  next  day  when  we  were  prisoners  together,  and  often  afterwards,  Gen 
eral  Johnson  informed  me  that  on  receiving  the  dispatch  he  immediately  sent 
it,  or  one  similar,  to  General  Ewell,  commanding  the  corps,  urgently  requesting 
that  the  artillery  be  returned.  And  General  Ewell,  or  his  adjutant-general, 
told  me  on  my  exchange  from  prison  that  he  received  and  forwarded  such  a 
dispatch  to  General  Lee,  whose  headquarters  were  not  far  distant.  Mentioning 
these  facts  to  Colonel  Charles  Marshall,  military  secretary,  after  the  war,  he 
said  he  well  remembered  the  circumstances,  and  that  General  Lee,  on  receiving 
the  dispatch,  remarked  to  his  staff :  "  See,  gentlemen,  how  difficult  it  is  to  have 
certain  information,  or  how  to  determine  what  to  do.  Here  is  a  dispatch  from 
General  Johnson  stating  that  the  enemy  are  massing  in  his  front,  and  at  the 
same  time  I  am  informed  by  General  Early  that  they  are  moving  around  our 
left.  Which  am  I  to  believe  ?  "  —  that,  however,  General  Lee  ordered  the 
artillery  to  be  back  at  daylight. 


114  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

in  the  direction  of  the  cheering.  Then  came  a  few  dropping 
shots  from  that  part  of  our  picket  line  which  was  off  the  angle, 
marking  the  progress  and  direction  of  the  column  of  attack. 
Presently  a  blue  line  appeared  in  our  front,  to  the  right  of 
the  salient,  and  our  men  of  Steuart's  brigade  delivered  a 
volley,  perhaps  more,  which  had  the  effect  of  causing  it  to 
disappear.  I  do  not  think  this  was  a  very  considerable  body, 
but  one  which  must  have  missed  the  corner  of  the  angle  and 
passed  down  in  front  of  our  works  inside  our  picket  line, 
just  at  the  abatis.1  But  perhaps  I  have  underrated  the  force 
and  persistence  of  this  part  of  the  assault. 

About  this  time  our  artillery  came  up,  rather  slowly,  I 
thought,  and  unlimbered,  but  had  not  time  to  fire  a  shot,  ex 
cept  the  two  pieces  in  our  centre,  which  were  discharged  once 
or  maybe  twice.  Musketry  firing  was  now  quite  heavy  where 
Jones's  brigade  adjoined  us  on  our  left,  and  soon  a  crowd  of 
fugitives  came  pouring  down  our  line  of  works  from  the  angle, 
showing  that  something  must  have  gone  wrong  in  that  quar 
ter.  I  was  at  this  time  and  had  been  near  our  centre.  The  two 
pieces  of  artillery  in  our  centre  now  or  shortly  before  fired  their 
round  of  grape  —  as  I  knew  from  the  hollow,  rattling  sound 
—  but  those  in  the  angle  had  been  overwhelmed  as  soon  as 
unlimbered.2  I  saw  Captain  Williamson  pass  by  from  that 
direction,  and  knew  from  the  expression  of  his  face  that  some 
thing  momentous  had  happened  there,  but  had  no  time  to  stop 
or  question  him.  Soon  a  cloud  of  blue  uniforms  came  press 
ing  down  from  the  left  along  our  works,  in  front  of  them,  and 
by  far  the  greater  number,  completely  filling  the  space  within 
the  angle,  and  thus  directly  in  our  rear.  The  pits  in  our  centre 
and  right  being  deep  and  with  traverses  available  for  defense 

1  At  the  time  we  were  captured  our  pickets,  I  was  told,  were  bringing  in 
some  straggling   prisoners,  with  a  result  very  much  like  the  scene  between 
the  policeman  and  pirates  in  the  opera  of  the  "  Pirates  of  Penzance." 

2  A  captain  in  the  1st  North  Carolina,  which  was  on  our  left,  afterwards  told 
me  that  seeing  the  guns  in  possession  of  the  enemy,  he  ordered  his  men  to  shoot 
at  the  horses,  which  they  did  with  effect,  to  prevent  their  being  carried  off. 


NOTES  ON  OPENING  OF  CAMPAIGN  OF  1864     115 

in  front,  flank,  and  rear,  I  supposed  they  might  be  held  or  the 
enemy  checked  until  reinforcements  came  up,  as  on  the  even 
ing  of  the  10th ;  and  therefore,  standing  on  the  brink  of  one 
of  them,  I  pushed  passing  fugitives  into  it  until  it  was  full  and 
then  jumped  in.  I  remember  a  Federal  soldier  came  striding 
down  the  top  of  the  work  foremost  of  his  comrades,  shouting 
and  brandishing  his  gun  above  his  head,  when  a  man  of  the 
10th  Virginia,  —  Bragonier,  I  think,- —  in  obedience  to  orders 
to  fire,  did  so,  with  effect,  according  to  my  recollection.  The 
smoke  of  the  discharge  seemed  as  if  it  would  never  float  away 
in  the  heavy  air,  and  I  apprehended  we  would  pay  a  penalty 
for  our  temerity,  for  in  a  few  moments  we  were  surrounded 
on  all  sides.  The  Union  soldiers  did  bring  their  bayonets  down 
with  a  threatening  appearance,  but  it  was  only  for  the  purpose 
of  sweeping  away  the  bayonets  of  our  own  men,  which  were 
resting  on  the  edge  of  the  work,  and  we  were  ordered  to 
scramble  out. 

Our  stream  of  prisoners  passed  back  through  and  alongside 
of  the  still  swarming  column  of  attack  which  appeared  to  me 
to  be  a  dense  mass  without  much  order,  about  a  hundred 
yards  in  breadth ;  and  it  occurred  to  me  that  if  our  artillery 
had  been  in  position,  it  could  have  played  with  terrible  effect, 
even  by  commencing  to  fire  at  the  sound  of  cheering.1 

The  attack  was  well  planned  and  executed,  but  it  is  a  mis 
take  to  suppose,  as  sometimes  stated,  that  the  Confederate 
troops  were  taken  by  surprise.  The  sound  of  the  cheering 
would  have  given  time  enough  to  get  into  the  trenches,  but  in 
fact  they  were  prepared,  as  above  shown.  It  may  be  that 
some  were  interrupted  at  their  breakfasts,  as  that  meal 
was  then  and  generally  a  scanty  one,  perhaps  little  but  corn- 

1  Since  the  war  General  Collis  of  the  Union  army  has  informed  me  that  the 
attack  was  directed  on  the  angle  in  column  of  regiments  closed  in  mass,  but 
that  in  passing  so  far  over  rough  ground  the  men  necessarily  got  into  some  con 
fusion  and  crowded  up.  He  also  said  that  strict  orders  had  been  given  to  keep 
silence,  but  the  ardor  of  the  men  broke  into  cheering,  for  which  they  were  rated 
afterwards. 


116  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

bread  and  water,  and  often  dispatched  in  line  or  waiting  for 
action,  with  little  or  no  derangement.1  Holding  a  salient  in 
the  shape  of  a  right  angle,  and  having  a  thin  line  and  no 
reserve,  or  support  even,  on  the  right,  the  disaster  could  only 
have  been  averted,  if  at  all  against  so  strong  an  assault,  by 
the  services  of  artillery,  supported  by  a  force  drawn  from  some 
other  part  of  the  line.  The  artillery  alone  might  possibly 
have  checked  the  assaulting  column  long  enough  for  such  a 
support  to  come  up ;  it  would  certainly,  at  least,  have  inflicted 
a  severe  loss. 

The  line  was  broken  on  the  left  of  the  angle,  and  Steuart's 
brigade  was  thus  taken  in  rear  and  flank. 

The  long  struggle  afterwards  for  the  possession  of  this 
coveted  corner  of  ground,  perhaps  the  bloodiest  scene  of  the 
war,  in  which  trees  and  logs  were  splintered  into  "  basket 
stuff  "  and  bodies  of  the  wounded  and  dead  mangled  and  torn 
by  the  ceaseless  storm  of  bullets,  has  been  often  described. 
It  was  not  my  fortune  to  be  an  eye-witness. 

1  Details  of  men  were  from  time  to  time  sent  to  the  wagons  in  rear,  who 
brought  up  cooked  rations  swung  in  blankets. 


V 
BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

BY 

BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  W.  SWAN 

U.  S.  A. 


Read  before  the  Society  February  9,  1880 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

ALL  the  night  of  the  3d  day  of  May,  1864,  at  any  house  on 
the  Stevensburg  Road  leading  from  Culpeper  Court  House 
in  Virginia  to  Germanna  Ford  on  the  Rapidan,  or  on  the 
road  further  to  the  north  leading  to  Ely's  Ford  on  the  same 
river,  could  be  heard  the  hum  of  moving  troops  and  the  pecu 
liar  rattle  of  cup  and  canteen  which  is  heard  only  in  war. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  moving  out  to  grapple  once 
more  with  the  only  foe  it  ever  knew,  Lee's  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  It  moved  under  a  new  commander,  unknown  to  it 
save  by  reputation,  although  its  leader  of  the  preceding  year 
still  retained  nominal  command. 

Late  in  the  preceding  winter  Major-General  Grant,  who 
had  earned  his  reputation  and  his  rank  in  the  West,  had 
been  promoted  to  be  lieutenant-general,  and  early  in  March, 
1864,  had  been  assigned  by  the  President  to  the  command  of 
all  the  armies  of  the  United  States,  then  comprising  about 
1,000,000  men.  Towards  the  end  of  March  he  had  estab 
lished  his  headquarters  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and 
from  there  he  projected,  and  to  a  certain  extent  directed,  the 
future  campaigns  of  the  war.  Remaining  with  that  army  he 
became  so  identified  with  it  that  thenceforward  its  opera 
tions  were  known  to  the  world  as  Grant's  campaign  against 
Richmond. 

It  is  with  the  first  battle  fought  by  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  under  the  immediate  supervision  of  General  Grant  that 
we  have  to  do  this  evening. 

For  a  proper  understanding  of  any  battle  it  is  necessary  to 
take  into  account  not  only  the  troops  actually  engaged  or  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  battle-field,  but  also  the  general  condition 


120  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

of  the  belligerents,  —  their  comparative  numbers  and  wealth, 
the  entire  strength  of  their  respective  armies,  the  location 
of  their  territories  relatively  to  each  other  and  the  strategic 
points  in  each,  and  their  previous  campaigns.  But  with  all 
these  things  I  must  assume,  indeed  I  believe,  you  are  more 
familiar  than  I  am  myself.  I  am  expected  to  confine  myself 
to  the  operations  of  the  opposing  armies  during  the  two  days 
of  the  campaign  of  the  spring  of  1864  which  are  known  as 
the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness.  It  is  absolutely  necessary,  how 
ever,  for  me  to  state,  at  least  somewhat  generally,  the  posi 
tions  of  the  two  armies  just  before  the  campaign  began. 

General  Early  in  a  pamphlet  published  soon  after  the  war 
says  that  on  the  3d  of  May,  1864,  "  General  Lee  held  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Eapiclan  River  in  Orange  County,  with 
his  right  resting  near  the  mouth  of  Mine  Run,  and  his  left 
extending  to  Liberty  Mills,  on  the  road  from  Gordonsville 
to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  ;  while  the  crossings  of  the  river 
on  the  right  and  the  roads  on  the  left  were  watched  by  cav 
alry.  Ewell's  corps  was  on  the  right,  Hill's  on  the  left,  and 
two  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps  were  encamped  in  the  rear 
near  Gordonsville."  General  Lee  had  about  60,000  men 
under  his  command  of  all  arms.1 

It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
encamped  in  Culpeper  County,  north  of  the  Rapidan  and 
Robertson  rivers.  Some  of  the  troops  had  been  stretched 
along  the  railroad  towards  Washington,  but  by  the  night  of 
the  3d  of  May  they  had  pretty  much  closed  up  on  the  main 
body.  The  army  numbered  about  120,000  all  told.1  But  in 

1  Compare  Colonel  Thomas  L.  Livermore's  Numbers  and  Losses  in  the  Civil 
War  in  America,  1861-65,  second  edition.  Wilderness,  May  5-7. 

UNION  ARMY  CONFEDERATE  ARMY 

Effectives  estimated 101,895     Effectives  estimated 61,025 

Killed 2246  I  j  A  noo     Killed  and  wounded  (minimum 

Wounded 12,037  )    *  estimate  on  partial  returns) . .       7,750 

Missing 3383 

—  Note  by  EDITOR. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  121 

comparing  the  numbers  engaged  on  the  two  sides  in  the  Battle 
of  the  Wilderness,  it  is  hardly  fair  to  say  that  the  Union 
troops  numbered  nearly  three  to  one  of  their  antagonists. 
The  battle  was  an  infantry  battle,  —  artillery  could  not  be 
employed,  and  cavalry  was  not  to  any  extent,  —  and  then 
great  reduction  must  be  made  for  those  whose  duties  kept 
them  in  the  rear.  General  Meade  has  said  that  he  had  from 
75,000  to  80,000  infantry  whom  he  -could  use  in  the  battle, 
and  I  take  his  statement  as  correct. 

Reduction  must  be  made  in  estimating  Lee's  forces,  but 
undoubtedly  they  are  small  in  comparison.  He  probably  had 
considerably  over  40,000 l  infantry  who  were  actually  engaged 
in  the  battle. 

And  I  will  here  add  that  I  believe  that  Lee's  army  was 
made  up  of  better  material  than  Grant's.  They  were  native- 
born  citizens,  and  there  is  a  great  deal  in  that.  Can  we  who 
were  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  believe  that  the  men  we  led 
would  have  been  as  patient  and  enduring  of  hardship  as  were 
the  rebels,  if,  like  the  rebels,  they  had  been  but  half  fed  and 
half  clothed  ?  I  like  not  to  speak  in  disparagement  of  the  many 
brave  men  from  other  nations  who  fought  under  our  flag,  but  I 
do  believe  in  Americans.  And  I  think  that  any  American  to 
day  must  have  his  heart  swell  with  pride  when  he  remembers 
that  there  are  native-born  citizens  in  any  section  of  the  country 
who  can  spurn  death  as  did  the  Confederates  at  Gettysburg.  It 
is  true  troops  of  ours  have  shown  equal  bravery.  A  Confederate 
officer  told  me  not  long  since  that  at  Spottsylvania  and  Cold 
Harbor  he  might  have  walked  along  the  front  of  the  Confed 
erate  lines  and  at  every  step  placed  his  foot  upon  the  body  of 
a  soldier  clad  in  blue  lying  there  dead.  Yet  candor  compels 
me  to  say  that  in  my  opinion  the  men  in  the  ranks  in  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  as  a  whole,  were  superior  to  those 
who  carried  the  musket  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  And 

1  This  number,  I  am  now  inclined  to  think,  is  an  underestimate  of  the  rebel 
force  actually  engaged.  April  6,  1880.  W.  W.  S. 


122  THE    WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

surely  Lee's  army  was  not  weakened,  as  was  Grant's,  by  hav 
ing  in  it  foreigners  who  were  imported  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
serving  in  the  stead  of  men  from  whom  military  service  was 
due  the  country  by  reason  of  their  birthplace. 

In  enumerating  the  forces  under  Grant  I  must  not  forget 
Burnside's  army.  It  counted  20,000  men,  but  was  of  little 
service.  It  was  made  up  of  new  troops.  Our  government  had 
a  way,  peculiar  to  itself  among  all  civilized  nations,  of  organ 
izing  new  troops  by  themselves,  instead  of  sending  them  as 
recruits  to  old  organizations.  It  is  sufficient  for  the  present 
to  say  that,  the  two  armies  being  thus  situated  and  thus  made 
up,  Grant  determined  to  turn  Lee's  right. 

As  our  army  moved  to  the  left,  it  will  be  convenient  for 
me  to  speak  first  of  the  movements  of  the  2d  corps,  which  held 
our  left  during  the  two  days  of  fighting.  At  the  head  of  that 
corps  rode  Hancock.  There  are  different  opinions  as  to  the 
merits  of  this  officer,  but  all  will  admit  that  in  the  thick  of  a 
fight  he  was  superb.  Thousands  of  brave  soldiers  on  many 
a  battle-field  have  cheered  him  as  he  appeared  in  their  midst, 
and  every  man  who  saw  him  felt  that  he  was  under  a  charm. 

The  division  commanders  were  Barlow,  Gibbon,  Birney, 
and  Mott ;  while  among  the  brigade  commanders  were  Hays 
of  Pennsylvania,  Webb,  Miles,  and  Carroll.  There  were 
27,000  officers  and  men  for  duty,  including  nine  batteries. 

The  head  of  the  column  reached  Ely's  Ford  at  midnight. 
It  had  been  preceded  by  Gregg's  cavalry,  and  the  infantry  on 
coining  up  had  found  the  cavalry  well  across  and  the  pontoon 
bridge  nearly  down.  The  enemy  had  offered  no  resistance  to 
the  passage  of  the  river  by  the  cavalry.  The  infantry  began 
to  cross  the  bridge  before  daylight,  and  taking  the  road  to 
Chancellorsville,  had  begun  to  arrive  at  that  place  by  nine 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  5th.  At  noon  the  whole  corps 
was  up.  No  further  advance  was  made,  and  the  troops  biv 
ouacked  upon  the  battle-field  of  the  3d  of  May  of  the  preceding 
year.  A  part  of  the  cavalry  moved  well  out  towards  Freder- 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  123 

icksburg,  and  a  part  proceeded  in  a  southerly  direction  as  far 
as  Todd's  Tavern. 

The  5th  and  6th  corps  moved  down  the  Stevensburg  Road 
to  Germanna  Ford,  the  5th  corps  in  advance,  led  by  Warren, 
at  that  time  surely  having  the  reputation  of  being  a  dashing, 
energetic  soldier.  His  division  commanders  were  Griffin, 
Robinson,  Crawford,  and  Wadsworth. 

Preceding  these  corps  was  Wilson's  division  of  cavalry, 
3000  strong,  and  accompanied  by  two  batteries  of  horse  artil 
lery,  of  six  guns  each.  Wilson  reached  the  ford  at  three  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  and  immediately  threw  over  one  of  his  brigades, 
which  without  resistance  drove  away  a  small  cavalry  force  of 
the  rebels  observing  the  ford.  By  five  o'clock  his  whole  division 
was  across,  a  pontoon  bridge  had  been  put  down,  and  Griffin's 
division  of  the  5th  corps  was  crossing.  When  Griffin  was 
well  over,  Wilson  pushed  up  the  Germauna  Plank  Turnpike. 
Just  here  on  the  Pike,  a  few  roods  towards  Chancellorsville, 
is  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern.  Hence  Wilson  sent  a  strong 
party  west  up  the  Turnpike  to  Robertson's  Tavern,  and 
another  to  the  south  by  the  Germanna  and  Brock  roads. 

He  himself  with  the  main  force  moved  by  a  wood  road  out 
to  Parker's  Store  on  the  Orange  Plank  Road,  where  his  whole 
force  was  to  concentrate.  His  instructions  contemplated 
that  the  force  sent  to  Robertson's  Tavern,  after  driving  the 
enemy  from  that  place,  should  march  across  the  country  to 
Parker's  Store  ;  and  accordingly  there  was  no  cavalry  force  on 
the  Pike  during  the  night  of  the  4th,  nor  thereafter.  Wilson 
sent  a  strong  reconnoitring  party  up  the  Plank  Road  towards 
Mine  Run,  and  bivouacked  at  Parker's  Store  with  the  balance 
of  his  force.  The  reconnoitring  party  found  only  a  small 
cavalry  force  watching  the  crossing  of  Mine  Run,  and  from 
some  prisoners,  taken  by  the  troops  who  had  come  in  from 
Robertson's  Tavern  on  the  other  road,  it  seemed  that  the 
enemy  was  not  expecting  a  movement  in  that  direction. 

In  the  mean  time  Warren,  with  the  5th  corps,  was  pushing 


124  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

on  to  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern.  His  progress  was  slow,  for 
the  troops  were  somewhat  fatigued  with  their  night  march, 
and  some  of  them  had  been  marching  almost  without  cessa 
tion  from  a  long  distance  beyond  the  Rappahannock.  Then 
it  was  necessary  to  march  with  flankers,  and  it  was  difficult 
for  them  to  march  through  the  low  pines,  scrub  oaks,  vines, 
briers,  and  bushes,  all  growing  in  one  tangle  throughout  that 
region.  However,  Warren  was  to  go  no  further  than  the  Old 
Wilderness  Tavern,  and  he  had  his  whole  corps  well  in  hand 
at  that  place  early  in  the  afternoon.  The  leading  division  had 
arrived  between  three  and  four  o'clock,  and  had  been  thrown 
a  mile  and  a  half  up  the  Pike  towards  Robertson's  Tavern. 
Here  the  division  bivouacked,  Ayres's  brigade  on  the  right 
of  the  road,  Bartlett's  on  the  left,  and  Sweitzer  in  the  rear. 
Their  position  is  indicated  on  the  map  by  the  blue  line  of 
works  where  it  crosses  the  Plank  Road.  Pickets  were  thrown 
out,  but  not  with  such  care  as  should  be  exercised  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy. 

You  will  not  think  it  out  of  place  for  me  here  to  recount 
what  I  remember  myself.  At  this  time  I  was  upon  the  staff 
of  General  Ayres,  and  was  directed  to  put  out  the  pickets  on 
the  right  of  the  road.  I  did  so,  placing  the  left  of  the  line 
on  the  road  at  the  nearer  edge  of  the  open  field  half  a  mile 
in  front  of  the  troops,  the  right  extending  some  distance  be 
yond  the  field  into  the  woods,  but  how  far  I  do  not  remember. 
I  do  remember,  however,  that  I  was  told  that  I  need  not  be 
troubled  about  our  right,  for  it  was  said  the  pickets  of  the 
6th  corps,  although  not  yet  up,  would  find  the  right  and  pro 
long  it.  I  remember  also  that  on  going  back  to  the  left  of  my 
line  I  found  that  Bartlett's  picket  line  was  considerably  fur 
ther  out  than  that  of  Ayres,  being  nearly  at  the  further  end 
of  the  field  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road.  It  was  then  get 
ting  late,  and  the  officer  in  charge  of  Bartlett's  pickets  and 
I  thought  that  it  was  not  worth  while  to  disturb  our  men,  and 
we  let  the  lines  remain  as  they  were,  he  putting  a  strong  force 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  125 

on  the  road  at  his  right  and  a  line  along  the  road.  I  men 
tion  this  to  show  that  it  did  not  occur  to  us  that  a  battle 
was  to  be  fought  in  the  morning,  and  I  have  been  somewhat 
particular  in  describing  the  position  of  Griffin's  division, 
because  it  was  the  first  engaged. 

In  the  night  march  the  6th  corps  had  followed  close  upon 
the  5th.  At  its  head  rode  the  unassuming  Sedgwick,  now 
crossing  the  familiar  Rapidan  for  his  last  time,  but  soon  to  be 
ferried  over  a  wider,  colder  river,  across  which  none  but  the 
ferryman  returns,  and  to  leave  behind  him  more  sad  hearts 
than  mourned  for  any  other  officer  killed  in  battle  during  the 
war. 

His  division  commanders  were  Wright,  Getty,  and  Ricketts. 
The  corps  merely  crossed  the  river  on  the  4th  day  of  May, 
the  greater  part  going  into  camp  early  in  the  afternoon  from 
a  mile  and  a  half  to  two  miles  up  the  Germanna  Road.  One 
brigade  recrossed  the  river  to  look  after  the  trains,  but  nothing 
was  done  with  reference  to  the  position  of  the  5th  corps. 

No  one  was  expecting  a  serious  encounter  with  the  enemy 
the  next  day,  assuredly  not  even  the  lieutenant-general  com 
manding.  Yet  although  it  is  represented  by  Swinton,  who 
was  with  Grant  at  the  time,  that  Grant  was  hurrying  through 
the  Wilderness  in  order  to  avoid  a  battle  in  that  region,  I 
believe  that  it  was  Grant's  intention  to  have  the  whole  Army 
of  the  Potomac  substantially  in  line  of  battle  long  before  the 
close  of  the  5th  of  May,  ready  to  fight,  if  necessary,  and  that 
the  position  contemplated  did  not  differ  essentially  from  the 
first  position  occupied  by  the  Union  army  in  the  Mine  Run 
campaign,  excepting  that  the  left  was  to  extend  much  further 
than  the  rebel  right  had  then  extended. 

Lee  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  discovered  that  Grant  was 
crossing  the  Rapidan  at  Germanna  and  Ely's  fords,  and  re 
solved  to  assume  the  offensive.  His  headquarters  were  near 
Orange  Court  House.  From  that  place  two  broad  roads  run 
in  an  easterly  direction  towards  Fredericksburg,  uniting  about 


126  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

two  miles  west  of  Chancellorsville.  The  one  to  the  north  is 
known  as  the  Orange  Turnpike.  The  other  is  called  the 
Orange  Plank  Road.  At  the  point  of  the  battle-field  they  are 
something  over  two  miles  apart,  but  beyond  they  converge 
rapidly  to  their  junction.  The  Germanna  Road  from  Ger- 
manna  Ford  crosses  the  Pike  at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  five 
miles  west  of  Chancellorsville,  and  ends  in  the  Plank  Road 
some  three  miles  west  of  Chancellorsville.  A  mile  east  of  the 
Old  Wilderness  Tavern  lies  the  head  of  the  Brock  Road. 
Starting  here,  this  road  runs  southerly,  crossing  the  Germanna 
and  Orange  Plank  Roads,  the  latter  about  four  miles  west  of 
Chancellorsville,  and  then  on  to  Todd's  Tavern  and  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court  House  and  Richmond.  Todd's  Tavern  is  said  to 
be  seven  miles  below  the  intersection  of  the  Orange  Plank 
and  Brock  roads.  The  road  from  Chancellorsville  to  Todd's 
Tavern  is  by  the  Furnaces.  A  longer  road  is  by  way  of  Piney 
Branch  Church.  Another  road  from  the  Furnaces  comes  into 
the  Brock  Road  about  two  miles  south  of  the  intersection  of 
the  Brock  Road  and  Orange  Plank  Road.  This  intersection 
of  roads  I  shall  frequently  speak  of  as  the  cross-roads.  It  was 
by  this  last-named  road  from  the  Furnaces,  the  Brock  Road, 
and  the  Orange  Pike,  that  Stonewall  Jackson  moved,  when 
he  turned  Hooker's  right  on  the  2d  of  May  the  year  before. 
From  Germanna  Ford  to  Richmond  the  direct  route  is  by  the 
Germanna  and  Brock  roads. 

Lee  marched  to  strike  our  army  at  the  junction  of  the 
Orange  Pike  and  Germanna  Road,  and  the  junction  of  the 
Orange  Plank  Road  and  Brock  Road.  Ewell's  corps  came 
down  the  Pike,  and  Hill's  down  the  Plank  Road.  Longstreet, 
marching  from  Gordon sville,  was  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  a 
road  whose  general  direction  is  parallel  with  that  of  the  Pike 
and  Plank  roads.  The  Catharpin  Road  crosses  the  Brock  Road 
at  Todd's  Tavern.  Ewell  went  into  camp  about  four  miles 
east  of  Mine  Run,  but  Hill  did  not  succeed  in  reaching  a 
point  so  far  east  on  the  Plank  Road.  Our  army  was  not  aware 


BATTLE   OF  THE   WILDERNESS  127 

that  it  was  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
Confederates  only  knew  that  they  were  approaching  our  gen 
eral  line  of  march. 

Returning  now  to  our  army,  we  left  Wilson  with  his  cav 
alry  division  in  bivouac  at  Parker's  Store.  Five  o'clock  in  the 
morning  found  him  moving  by  wood  roads  to  Craig's  Meeting 
House,  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  having  left  one  regiment  to 
hold  the  position  at  Parker's  Store  until  relieved  by  the  in 
fantry,  when  it  was  to  rejoin  him  at  Craig's  Meeting  House. 

Five  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  the  5th  found  Hancock 
sending  out  the  head  of  his  column  from  Chancellorsville  to 
march  by  the  Furnaces  and  Todd's  Tavern  to  Shady  Grove 
Church.  It  found  one  division  of  the  5th  corps  already  mov 
ing  out  on  the  road  from  the  Lacy  house  to  Parker's  Store, 
and  the  remaining  divisions  preparing  to  follow.  The  pickets 
of  Griffin's  division  had  been  ordered  to  assemble,  that  they 
might  be  brought  into  their  respective  camps  and  be  ready 
to  march  with  the  commands  to  which  they  belonged.  The 
leading  division  moving  out  towards  Parker's  Store  was  made 
up  of  two  brigades  of  the  Pennsylvania  Reserves,  a  body  of 
men  as  well  known  to  the  country  through  the  press  as  any 
other  troops.  They  had  been  commanded  by  McCall,  by 
Reynolds,  and  by  Meade,  and  had  earned  a  fair  reputation. 
But  now  they  were  to  be  mustered  out  at  the  end  of  twenty- 
seven  days,  and  were  commanded  by  Brigadier-General  S.  W. 
Crawford.  They  crossed  Wilderness  Run  near  the  Lacy 
house  on  a  bridge  built  by  the  pioneers,  who  had.  also  built 
two  other  bridges  over  the  run,  and  three  bridges  over 
branches  of  the  run,  and  were  cutting  out  the  trees  on  the 
sides  of  the  road  to  make  everywhere  a  pathway  at  least 
twenty  feet  wide.  The  road,  though  narrow,  was  a  very  fair 
one  for  that  part  of  the  country,  most  of  it  exceedingly  good, 
although  a  traveler  unfamiliar  with  such  a  region  would  be 
apt  to  lose  the  road-bed  where  it  crosses  open  fields. 

Wadsworth's  division  followed  Crawford's,  and  in  rear  of 


128  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Wadsworth  marched  a  portion  of  Robinson's.  Crawford,  in 
a  couple  of  hours,  reached  Chewning's  farm,  a  commanding 
plateau,  the  best  fighting  ground  in  the  whole  region.  The 
map  shows  its  extent.  On  three  sides  the  approaches  are 
abrupt.  To  the  south  in  the  direction  of  the  Plank  Road  there 
is  a  gentle  descent,  which  is  covered  by  the  dense  thickets  for 
which  the  Wilderness  is  famous.  Through  this  wood,  how 
ever,  are  two  good  roads  to  the  Plank  Road,  one  coming  out 
at  Parker's  Store,  and  the  other  at  Widow  Tapp's  field. 

When  Crawford  reached  Chewning's,  he  heard  firing  in 
the  direction  of  Parker's  Store,  and  halted. 

We  shall  see  presently  that  the  enemy  was  stirring  early 
on  the  Pike.  On  the  Plank  Road  he  was  no  less  active.  On 
the  Pike,  however,  we  had  no  cavalry  to  tell  us  of  his  move 
ments.  On  the  Plank  Road  we  had  cavalry,  but  no  infantry 
for  the  cavalry  to  fall  back  upon.  Hammond  with  his  500 
men  was  contesting  the  road  with  infantry  belonging  to 
Hill's  division,  and  the  brisk  firing  heard  was  his.  Ham 
mond,  knowing  the  route  Crawford  was  to  take,  sent  back 
for  assistance,  representing  that  Crawford  would  have  time 
to  occupy  the  strong  position  at  Parker's  Store  ;  but  Crawford 
evidently  thought  otherwise,  and  indeed  it  was  but  a  short 
time  before  the  enemy  was  passing  along  what  might  now  be 
called  his  front. 

Crawford  sent  forward  a  couple  of  companies  to  reconnoitre. 
In  the  official  history  of  the  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  pub 
lished  by  the  State  of  Pennsylvania,1  I  read :  — 

"  Colonel  Tally  was  ordered  to  take  two  companies  to  recon 
noitre  the  position  in  his  front.  Approaching  the  Plank  Road, 
he  was  fired  upon  by  a  corps  of  rebel  troops  coming  up  the 
road.  Quickly  returning,  the  facts  were  reported  to  General 
Crawford,  who  ordered  him  to  withdraw  his  regiment  and 
return  to  the  main  line  of  the  army." 

I  think,  however,  that  Crawford  did  rather  more  than  this. 
1  History  of  Pennsylvania  Volunteers,  1861-65.  By  S.  P.  Bates,  1869. 


BATTLE  OF  THE    WILDERNESS  129 

From  all  I  have  read,  I  believe  that  he  did  throw  out  a  skir 
mish  line,  which  advanced  through  the  woods  to  within  some 
200  yards  of  the  Plank  Road  and  became  involved  with  the 
enemy's  flankers.  It  also  appears  that  the  enemy  sent  a  small 
force  up  the  road  towards  Chewning's,  who  fired  into  the 
rear  of  parties  sent  out  by  Crawford.  I  go  into  these  details 
because  the  position  at  Chewning's  was  an  important  one,  and 
much  could  have  been  made  of  it.  - 

But  long  before  the  time  at  which  Crawford  arrived  at 
Chewning's,  the  enemy  had  been  discovered  coming  down  the 
Pike  in  force.  I  remember  myself  that  the  break  in  Griffin's 
picket  line  was  immediately  rectified,  that  the  division  was 
formed  in  line  of  battle,  and  began  to  throw  up  a  breastwork 
of  logs  and  earth,  and  that  Generals  Griffin,  Ayres,  and  Bart- 
lett  rode  out  to  near  the  picket  line,  whence  the  enemy  could  be 
seen  leaving  the  road  and  entering  the  woods  to  the  right  and 
left.  I  know  that  generals  and  staff  officers  all  thought  that 
the  enemy  was  in  strong  force.  I  remember  that  word  to  that 
effect  was  sent  back  to  General  Warren,  and  I  am  sure  that 
not  long  after  I  knew  that  Griffin  had  been  ordered  to  attack. 
I  think  I  carried  the  order  from  Griffin  to  Ayres  to  attack. 
I  remember  that  Ayres  sent  me  back  to  Griffin  to  say  that 
in  his  judgment  we  ought  to  wait,  for  the  enemy  was  about 
to  attack  us  and  we  had  a  strong  position ;  and  I  remember 
that  Griffin  went  again  to  the  front,  and  then  sent  me  back 
to  say  to  General  Warren  that  he  was  averse  to  making  an 
attack.  I  don't  remember  his  words,  but  it  was  a  remon 
strance.  I  think  I  went  twice  to  General  Warren  with  that 
message.  The  last  time  I  met  him  on  the  road,  and  I  remem 
ber  that  he  answered  me  as  if  fear  was  at  the  bottom  of  my 
errand.  I  remember  my  indignation.  It  was  afterwards  a 
common  report  in  the  army  that  Warren  had  just  had  un 
pleasant  things  said  to  him  by  General  Meade,  and  that  Gen 
eral  Meade  had  just  heard  the  bravery  of  his  army  questioned. 

However,  the  attack  was  not  made  by  Griffin  until  Warren 


130  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

came  up,  although  in  the  mean  time  his  troops  had  advanced 
to  near  the  edge  of  the  open  fields,  shown  on  the  map  as  half 
a  mile  or  so  in  front  of  the  Union  breastworks. 

A  little  before  one  o'clock  the  charge  was  made  in  two  and 
three  lines,  the  regiments  resting  on  the  Pike  starting  first, 
and  those  to  the  right  and  left  taking  up  the  movement  as 
soon  as  they  saw  it  begun.  The  density  of  the  woods  pre 
vented  orders  from  being  given  by  brigades.  The  staff  officers 
had  difficulty  in  carrying  the  orders  to  regimental  command 
ers,  and  I  feel  certain  that  some  of  the  regiments  went  for 
ward  merely  because  they  saw  others  leave  the  wood. 

The  right  flank  of  the  corps  was  still  in  the  air,  extending 
but  about  half  the  front  of  a  brigade  to  the  right  of  the  Pike. 
Crawford  was  still  at  Che wn ing's,  where  he  had  thrown  up 
breastworks,  one  brigade  facing  to  the  west,  and  the  other 
to  the  south  ;  for  Confederate  troops  were  still  passing  along 
the  Plank  Road.  Wadsworth  and  Robinson,  who  we  have  seen 
followed  Crawford  out  from  the  Lacy  house,  were  in  line  of 
battle  along  the  road,  Wadsworth's  men  being  mostly  in  the 
open  field  to  the  right  of  Chewning's.  His  left  was  on  Wil 
derness  Run.  Robinson  was  on  Wadsworth's  left.  All  were  to 
go  forward.  And  the  orders  to  those  divisions  which  had  not 
yet  seen  the  enemy  were  to  advance  due  west,  keep  closed  up 
to  the  right,  and  attack  the  enemy  when  found. 

The  result  on  the  right  was  what  might  have  been  expected. 
The  attack  was  made  by  good  troops  and  with  much  spirit, 
but  the  exposed  flank  was  fatal  to  success.  The  brigade  of 
regulars,  though  under  a  murderous  fire  after  it  reached  the 
middle  of  the  open  space  and  began  a  slight  ascent,  entered 
the  opposite  wood  in  perfect  alignment. 

Soon  the  two  lines  which  had  charged  were  fighting  as  one, 
and  had  gained  a  few  yards,  when  it  was  found  that  they 
were  flanked,  and  in  five  minutes  more  all  but  the  killed 
and  wounded  had  run  back  to  the  edge  of  the  wood  on  the 
side  of  the  field  from  which  they  started,  where  they  were 


BATTLE   OF  THE    WILDERNESS  131 

speedily  re-formed  behind  a  liue  which  had  been  held  in 
reserve. 

The  brigade  immediately  on  the  left  of  the  road  did  better, 
driving  the  enemy  through  the  wood  in  great  confusion  nearly 
half  a  mile,  when,  finding  itself  alone,  the  regulars  having 
given  way,  and  the  division  on  the  left  being  it  was  not 
known  where,  the  brigade  was  compelled  to  retire.  The  men 
were  at  all  times  under  control.  When  this  charge  was  made 

<D 

two  guns  were  run  forward  on  the  Plank  Road,  and  went 
into  position  part  way  up  the  rise  beyond  the  open  field  on  the 
right.  The  retreat  of  the  regulars  caused  them  to  be  aban 
doned. 

Wads  worth  advanced  from  the  field  which  is  to  the  right 
of  Chewning's,  the  Maryland  brigade  and  Baxter's  brigade  of 
Robinson's  somewhere  on  his  right,  but  not  at  first  in  close 
proximity  to  him,  nor  again  very  near  Bartlett.  The  Mary 
land  brigade,  however,  had  not  advanced  far  before  it  was 
ascertained  that  their  skirmishers  were  marching  in  rear 
of  another  line  of  skirmishers,  and  in  front  of  one  of  Wads- 
worth's  brigades,  and  to  which  these  skirmishers  belonged. 
Luckily  no  mishap  befell  either  brigade  from  this  circum 
stance,  and  I  relate  the  story  as  it  is  told  by  the  command 
ing  officer  of  one  of  the  Maryland  regiments  in  his  diary, 
merely  as  an  example  of  the  difficulties  attending  the  fight 
ing  a  battle  in  the  Wilderness.  But  Wadsworth's  division 
soon  did  get  into  serious  trouble.  Passing  over  the  Maryland 
brigade,  it  lost  its  direction,  and  when  it  struck  the  enemy, 
merely  brushed  him  with  its  left  flank,  instead  of  meeting 
him  square  to  the  front.  One  brigade  was  instantly  in  fearful 
confusion,  and  the  calamity  spread  to  all  the  troops  in  that 
region.  Every  soldier,  however,  seemed  to  know  the  way  to 
the  Lacy  house. 

A  staff  officer  returning  at  this  time  from  Crawford  says  : 
"  I  found  the  little  road  crowded  with  stragglers  and  large 
crowds  of  soldiers  passing  out  of  the  wood  in  great  confusion 


132  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

and  almost  panic-stricken  ;  some  said  they  were  flanked,  others 
that  they  had  suddenly  come  upon  the  rebels  lying  con 
cealed  in  two  lines  of  battle  in  the  thick  underbrush,  and  that 
our  men  had  broken  and  run  after  the  first  volley.  Cutler's 
brigade  came  back  in  pretty  good  order.  Baxter's  brigade 
came  back  in  much  less  confusion.  The  stragglers  mostly 
halted  in  the  meadow  bottoms  around  the  Lacy  house." 

It  had  not  been  altogether  a  disgraceful  retreat,  for  Private 
Opal  of  the  7th  Indiana  Volunteers  in  Cutler'  s  brigade  came 
back  with  the  colors  of  the  50th  Virginia. 

As  I  have  said,  Crawford  was  also  ordered  to  join  in  this 
forward  movement.  He  sent  one  brigade,  that  of  McCandless, 
who  had  been  facing  west.  McCandless  marched  straight  on, 
and  of  course  never  joined  Wadsworth's  left.  After  Wads- 
worth's  disaster  it  became  necessary  to  recall  Crawford  from 
his  now  isolated  position  at  Chewning's.  And  that  officer 
with  the  brigade,  which  he  had  retained  at  Chewning's,  came 
back  without  difficulty,  but  McCandless  was  not  so  fortunate. 
The  staff  officer  sent  to  recall  him  was  captured,  and  McCand 
less  was  nearly  surrounded.  He  finally  escaped  with  consider 
able  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  nearly  an  entire  regiment 
captured. 

The  enemy  did  not  that  day  follow  up  as  far  as  the  road 
running  through  the  fields  near  Chewning's.  Both  Crawford 
and  McCandless  had  taken  batteries  with  them  which  they 
brought  back. 

The  rebel  account  of  this  part  of  the  battle  is  as  follows. 
General  Early  says  :  * 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  E well's  corps  was  put  in 
motion,  my  division  bringing  up  the  rear.  A  short  distance 
from  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  and  just  in  advance  of  the 
place  where  a  road  diverges  to  the  left  from  the  old  Stone 
Pike  to  the  Germanna  Ford  Pike,  the  enemy  in  heavy  force 

1  The  Last  Year  of  the  War,  by  Lieutenant-General  Jubal  A.  Early,  C.  S.  A., 
p.  16. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  133 

was  encountered,  and  Jones's  brigade,  of  Johnson's  division, 
and  Battles's  brigade,  of  Rodes's,  were  driven  back  in  some 
confusion.  My  division  was  ordered  up  and  formed  across  the 
pike,  Gordon's  brigade  being  on  the  right  of  the  road.  This 
brigade,  as  soon  as  it  was  brought  into  line,  was  ordered  for 
ward,  and  advanced  through  a  dense  pine  thicket  in  gallant 
style.  In  conjunction  with  Daniels's,  Doles',  and  Ramseur's 
brigades  of  Rodes's  division,  it  drove  the  enemy  back  with 
heavy  loss,  capturing  several  hundred  prisoners,  and  gaining 
a  commanding  position  on  the  right.  Johnson  at  the  same 
time  was  heavily  engaged  in  his  front,  his  division  being  on 
the  left  of  the  Pike  and  extending  across  the  road  [leading] 
to  the  Germanna  Ford  Road,  which  has  been  mentioned." 

There  was  great  indignation  at  headquarters  over  the  loss 
of  the  two  guns.  An  investigation  was  ordered  to  find  out  who 
was  responsible.  Colonel  Wainwright,  chief  of  artillery,  says 
the  guns  were  lost  as  honorably  as  guns  can  be  lost ;  and  this 
is  true.  Nearly  all  the  horses  were  shot,  Captain  Winslow 
and  Lieutenant  Shelton  both  wounded,  and  the  enemy  be 
tween  the  guns  before  they  were  abandoned.  The  guns  had 
been  ordered  forward  by  Griffin,  who  as  an  old  artillery 
officer  believed  that  guns  could  be  fought  anywhere.  But 
Warren  was  present  and  must  take  the  responsibility.  The 
investigation  took  place  before  the  guns  were  really  captured, 
for  it  was  while  they  stood  there  in  the  road,  neither  party 
venturing  to  move  them,  although  in  the  night  of  the  6th  the 
enemy  did  haul  them  within  his  lines.  But  no  investigation 
was  made  as  to  the  loss  of  the  hundreds  of  men  who  remained 
between  the  lines.  And  there  was  a  greater  loss  that  day  than 
either  the  guns  or  the  men,  —  the  loss  of  the  victory  which  was 
within  our  grasp. 

I  have  said  that  Warren's  right  brigade  retreated  from 
a  want  of  support  on  its  right.  The  enemy,  however,  did  not 
follow  up  his  success,  owing  to  his  own  reverse  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Pike,  the  severe  loss  sustained  by  those  who  had 


134  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

fought  the  regular  brigade,  and  very  likely  in  part  owing  to 
the  close  proximity,  or  the  arrival,  of  the  6th  corps.  That 
corps  may  have  got  up  in  time  to  save  the  5th  corps  from 
more  serious  disaster,  but  it  did  not  appear  until  too  late  to 
make  a  crowning  success  of  our  attack  upon  the  Pike.  The 
glory  of  the  6th  corps  for  that  day,  and  indeed  for  the  battle, 
was  earned  by  the  division  under  Getty  over  upon  the  Plank 
Road.  Although  there  was  some  fighting  by  the  main  body 
of  the  corps,  it  was  not  of  importance  on  the  5th.  It  merely 
occupied  the  attention  of  a  considerable  portion  of  the  enemy, 
preventing  him  from  going  elsewhere.  I  shall  therefore  merely 
read  a  few  extracts  from  reports  of  brigade  commanders,  with 
the  hope  to  make  it  as  clear  as  possible  when  the  corps  did 
arrive  upon  the  ground,  what  was  its  subsequent  position,  and 
where  the  blame  lies  for  the  failure  to  wipe  out  the  left  wing 
of  the  rebel  army  on  the  5th  day  of  May,  1864,  between  the 
hour  of  noon  and  the  going  down  of  the  sun. 

I  myself  feel  that  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  reckless  (brutal 
it  used  to  be  muttered  in  those  days)  way  of  fighting  battles 
by  hurrying  into  action  one  division,  one  brigade,  or  even 
a  single  regiment  at  a  time,  which  characterized  every  contest 
from  the  crossing  of  the  Rapidan  to  the  battle  at  Cold  Har 
bor. 

Colonel  Upton,  commanding  the  2d  brigade  of  the  1st  divi 
sion  says  : l  "  The  brigade  was  thrown  out  on  a  dirt  road 
leading  to  Mine  Run,  to  cover  the  right  flank  of  the  column 
while  passing.  Shortly  after  it  moved  by  the  left  flank  and 
formed  in  line  on  the  left  of  the  corps.  About  11  A.  M. 
orders  were  received  to  advance  to  the  support  of  the  5th 
corps,  then  engaged  with  the  enemy  on  the  Orange  Court 
House  Pike,  two  miles  from  Wilderness  Tavern.  The  advance 
was  made  by  the  right  of  wings,  it  being  impossible  to  march 
in  line  of  battle  on  account  of  the  dense  pines  and  nearly 
impenetrable  thickets  which  met  us  on  every  hand.  After 
i  67  W.  R.  665. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  135 

overcoming  great  difficulties  on  the  march,  connection  was 
made  with  the  right  of  the  5th  corps." 

He  then  says  that  he  came  suddenly  upon  the  enemy  and 
took  thirty -five  prisoners,  and  that  he  found  himself  some  two 
hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  line  of  the  5th  corps,  but  the 
position  being  a  fine  one,  the  line  was  established  there.  He 
adds,  and  I  again  quote  his  own  words:  "  The  woods  in  front 
and  around  our  position  had  been  set  on  fire  by  the  enemy  to 
prevent  our  advance.  The  ground  had  previously  been  fought 
over  and  was  strewed  with  wounded  of  both  sides,  many  of 
whom  must  have  perished  in  the  flames,  as  corpses  were  found 
partly  consumed." 

This  goes  to  show  that  Warren's  line  extended  some  con 
siderable  distance  to  the  right  of  the  open  field,  although 
I  have  never  elsewhere  seen,  or  heard  of,  the  fire  mentioned 
by  Upton. 

Major  Dalton,  A.  A.  A.  G.,  of  Wright's  division,  who 
signs  the  report  of  the  division,  says  : l  "  Early  the  following 
morning  the  march  was  continued  for  a  couple  of  miles  or 
more,  when  the  division  was  ordered  to  go  into  position  paral 
lel  to  the  Plank  Road  [the  Germ  anna  Road]  and  advance  to 
connect  with  the  5th  corps  on  the  left,  which  corps  had  begun 
to  feel  the  lines  of  the  enemy.  The  formation  of  the  division 
being  from  left  to  right,  —  2d  brigade,  Colonel  E.  Upton ; 
1st  brigade,  Colonel  H.  W.  Brown;  3d  brigade,  Brigadier- 
General  D.  A.  Russell."  The  4th,  Shaler's,  had  been  left  in 
the  rear.  He  adds :  "  The  skirmish  line  was  moved  [for 
ward]  with  the  greatest  difficulty  on  account  of  the  thick  and 
tangled  underbrush,  which  necessarily  impeded  the  progress 
of  the  line,  often  breaking  it  completely.  Having  made  con 
nection  with  the  5th  corps,  the  troops  remained  in  position 
until  the  next  morning,  having  been  engaged  only  in  brisk 
skirmish  firing." 

Major  Dalton  errs,  however,  in  saying  that  there  was  merely 
1  67  W.  R.  659. 


136  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

skirmishing  by  the  1st  division,  for  Colonel  Oliver  Edwards, 
afterwards  commanding  the  3d  brigade,  says  that l  "  having 
advanced  upwards  of  two  miles  through  dense  woods  in  line 
of  battle,  [he]  became  hotly  engaged  with  the  enemy.  The 
engagement  continued  with  severity  for  more  than  an  hour, 
and  the  fighting  did  not  entirely  cease  until  long  after  night 
fall."  He  says  he  captured  300  of  the  enemy  and  the  colors 
of  the  25th  Virginia  Regiment. 

In  this  latter  statement  he  is  supported  by  Brigadier- 
General  Neill,  who  commanded  a  brigade  of  the  1st  division. 
And  General  Neill  adds :  "  Later  in  the  day  we  made  several 
attempts  to  advance  our  lines,  but,  owing  to  the  strength  of 
the  enemy's  position,  failed  in  our  object." 

General  Meade  in  his  report  says  : 2  "  Towards  evening  the 
6th  corps  made  its  way  through  the  dense  thicket  and  formed 
connection  with  the  5th."  But  he  is  evidently  incorrect  in 
this  statement.  In  this  view,  that  Dalton  is  wrong,  I  am  sus 
tained  by  Confederate  accounts. 

Early  says :  3  "  After  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed,  Hays's 
brigade  was  sent  to  Johnson's  left,  in  order  to  participate  in 
a  forward  movement,  and  it  did  move  forward  some  half  mile 
or  so,  encountering  the  enemy  in  force ;  but  from  some  mis 
take,  not  meeting  with  expected  cooperation  except  from  one 
regiment  of  Jones's  brigade  (the  25th  Virginia),  the  most  of 
which  was  captured,  it  was  drawn  back  to  Johnson's  line  and 
took  position  on  his  left."  He  adds  :  "  Pegram's  brigade  was 
subsequently  sent  to  take  position  on  Hays's  left,  and  just 
before  night  a  very  heavy  attack  was  made  on  its  front,  which 
was  repulsed  with  severe  loss  to  the  enemy." 

I  will  add  here  that  Gordon's  brigade,  which  had  been  so 
successful  on  the  right,  was  towards  night  sent  to  the  extreme 
left  of  the  Confederate  army. 

1  67  W.  R.  672.  2  Ibid,  190. 

8  The  Last  Year  of  the  War,  by  Lieutenant-General  J.  A.  Early,  C.  S.  A., 
p.  16. 


BATTLE   OF  THE   WILDERNESS  137 

General  Wright  was  in  immediate  command  of  these  troops 
of  the  6th  corps.  Besides  his  own  division,  he  had  under  him 
Neill's  brigade  of  the  2d  division  and  Seymour's  of  the  3d. 
The  other  three  of  the  2d,  Wheaton's,  Grant's,  and  Eustis's, 
we  shall  see  had  gone  under  Getty,  the  division  commander, 
to  the  left  of  the  army.  What  became  of  the  other  brigade  of 
the  3d  division  I  do  not  know.  I  suppose  it  was  somewhere 
on  the  Germanna  Road.  The  right- of  the  6th  corps  at  the 
front,  I  feel  quite  sure,  was  not  far  from  Flat  Run,  as  indi 
cated  on  the  map  by  the  blue  line  of  breastworks. 

What  means  were  taken  to  protect  the  Germanna  Road 
against  attacks  by  way  of  the  roads  leading  into  it  between 
Flat  Run  and  the  Rapidan,  I  have  not  ascertained. 

Over  on  the  Plank  Road  we  left  Hammond,  with  his  500 
cavalrymen,  resisting  Hill's  advance ;  and  we  have  seen  that 
our  strong  position  at  Chewning's  had  been  given  up. 

Early  in  the  morning  the  2d  division  of  the  6th  corps,  under 
Getty,  had  arrived  at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern.  At  eleven 
o'clock  Meade  sent  that  division  to  seize  the  Plank  and  Brock 
roads  at  their  intersection.  Just  before,  he  had  sent  to  Han 
cock  to  move  his  command  up  the  Brock  Roatl  to  the  same 
point.  Earlier  in  the  morning  he  had  merely  sent  orders  to 
Hancock  to  halt  his  command,  for  the  enemy  had  been  dis 
covered,  the  order  said,  in  some  force  on  the  Orange  Pike, 
and  the  earlier  order  had  found  Hancock  with  his  advance 
upon  the  Catharpin  Road,  two  miles  beyond  Todd's  Tavern. 

The  order  to  Getty  was  not  too  late.1  This  is  all  that  can 
be  said.  If  Crawford  gave  Hammond  no  assistance  from 
Chewning's,  he  surely  could  not  have  hidden  the  fact  that  the 
enemy  was  moving  up  the  Plank  Road,  and  it  would  seem  that 
measures  ought  to  have  been  taken  to  seize  the  cross-roads 
before  eleven  o'clock.  I  cannot,  however,  think  that  the  enemy 

1  He  was  ordered  at  same  time  that  Hancock  was  ordered  up,  —  between 
nine  and  ten.  He  got  to  the  cross-roads  before  twelve  o'clock.  It  was  only  two 
miles  off.  —  A.  A.  Humphreys,  Va.  Camp.  25,  28. 


138  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

had  been  in  very  strong  force  in  the  early  morning,  for  had 
he  been,  he  surely  had  an  opportunity  to  seize  the  cross-roads, 
for  the  possession  of  which  the  real  fighting  of  the  Battle  of 
the  Wilderness  took  place.  Perhaps  the  knowledge  that  we 
were  at  Chewning's  made  him  cautious  in  his  advance.  At 
any  rate  Getty  arrived  in  time,  having  marched  by  the  Ger- 
manna  and  Brock  roads.  It  was  about  one  o'clock.  He  learned 
that  Hill's  corps  was  in  his  front,  and  momentarily  expecting 
an  attack,  began  throwing  up  breastworks  along  the  Brock 
Eoad.  Wheaton's  brigade  he  placed  with  its  left  on  the  Plank 
Road ;  a  brigade  commanded  by  General  L.  A.  Grant,  known 
through  the  war  as  the  Vermont  brigade,  he  placed  on  the 
left  of  that  road,  and  Eustis's  to  the  right  of  Wheaton. 

Our  cavalry  had  been  driven  back  nearly  to  the  Brock 
Road,  and  the  rapidity  and  character  of  the  enemy's  fire 
showed  that  an  infantry  force  was  advancing.  Two  regiments 
were  instantly  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  succeeded  in 
checking  the  further  advance  of  the  enemy.  Our  army  had 
not  been  cut  in  two. 

Hancock's  troops  began  to  arrive  somewhat  after  two 
o'clock,  the  narrow  road  having  become  blocked  with  artil 
lery  which  could  not  be  hauled  out  of  the  way  on  account 
of  the  density  of  the  wood  on  either  side.  Hancock  came  in 
advance  of  his  troops.  At  2.15  P.  M,  he  received  a  dispatch 
from  General  Humphreys,1  Meade's  chief  of  staff,  saying  that 
Warren's  left,  Crawford's  division,  was  within  a  mile  of 
Parker's  Store,  but  that  the  enemy  held  the  Plank  Road  nearly 
to  its  intersection  with  the  Brock  Road,  and  directing  him  to 
attack  with  his  own  command  and  Getty's,  and  endeavor  to 
connect  with  Warren. 

The  dispatch  said  that  Griffin's  division  had  been  driven 

back  on   the  Pike.    This  helps  us  fix  the  relative  times  at 

which  the  encounters  on  the  two  roads  took  place.    Fifteen 

minutes  later,  Hancock  received  a  second  dispatch,  to  the 

1  Sent  to  him  at  1.30  P.  M.  —  A.  A.  Humphreys,  Va.  Camp.  30. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  139 

same  effect  as  to  Warren's  position,  but  saying  that  our 
cavalry  had  been  driven  in  from  Parker's  Store,  and  that 
Getty  had  been  ordered  to  drive  the  enemy  back,  but  might 
not  be  able  to  do  so.  Hancock  was  ordered  to  support  Getty, 
drive  the  enemy  beyond  Parker's  Store,  and  unite  with 
Warren. 

Hancock,  when  he  first  appeared  at  the  cross-roads,  finding 
that  Lee  was  fighting  an  aggressive  battle,  gave  directions 
that  his  division  commanders,  as  they  came  into  position, 
should  erect  breastworks.  Birney,  coming  first,  went  into 
position  on  the  left  of  Getty,  then  Mott,  and  then  Gibbon,  — 
these  three  along  the  Brock  Road.  Barlow,  coming  last,  was 
thrown  forward  on  some  high  ground  in  front  of  the  Brock 
Road.  This  elevated  ground  commanded  the  country  for  some 
distance  to  the  right  and  left,  sweeping  the  unfinished  Fred- 
ericksburg  and  Orange  Railroad  in  front.  Owing  to  the  dense 
forest  in  Hancock's  front,  this  was  the  only  position  in  which 
artillery  could  be  used  ;  and  here  he  directed  all  his  guns,  some 
fifty  in  number,  should  be  posted,  with  the  exception  of  a 
single  battery  which  he  posted  near  the  extreme  left,  and 
a  single  section  of  another  battery  which  he  placed  at  the 
cross-roads. 

Barlow's  left  was  refused,  the  line  of  Frank's  brigade 
crossing  the  Brock  Road  just  below  a  road  coming  in  from  the 
Furnaces.  When  the  breastworks  had  been  erected,  Barlow's 
position  was  remarkably  strong.  Before  night  a  line  of  breast 
works  was  erected  the  whole  length  of  Hancock's  front ;  but 
in  the  mean  time,  as  we  shall  see,  a  part  of  his  troops  had 
become  heavily  engaged  some  distance  in  front  of  these 
works. 

Hancock  may  have  inferred  from  orders  received,  directing 
him  to  attack  with  Getty's  command,  supported  by  his  whole 
corps,  that  he  was  to  attack  when  he  had  the  whole  corps  in 
hand,  but  probably  he  exercised  his  discretion.  I  have  no 
authority  for  my  opinion,  but  it  seems  to  me  that  he,  too, 


140  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

found  that  he  had  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  in  his  immediate 
front,  and  knew  that  that  force  could  only  be  there  for  one 
purpose,  —  to  fight  a  battle  ;  that  he  felt  that  the  battle  was 
to  be  his  battle,  and  meant  to  be  sure  of  winning  before  he 
allowed  himself  to  become  engaged.  At  a  glance  he  had 
made  the  best  possible  disposition  of  his  troops  for  fighting 
a  defensive  battle,  as  any  one  may  see  who  goes  over  the  ground 
to-day. 

If  Hancock  delayed  his  attack  in  the  exercise  of  his  dis 
cretion,  he  is  open  to  censure.  It  might  have  happened  that 
Hill  was  sending  troops  to  reinforce  Ewell,  and  that  it  was 
desired  that  Hancock  should  keep  him  occupied  where  he  was. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  there  was  more  probability,  at 
that  time,  that  Ewell  would  be  sending  troops  to  Hill.  When 
the  two  orders  to  which  I  have  just  referred  were  received, 
Hancock  had  not  completed  his  formation,  and  he  seems  to 
have  determined  to  do  so  before  attacking. 

Between  three  and  four  o'clock  he  was  again  ordered  to 
attack  with  Getty's  troops,  supported  by  his  whole  corps  ;  but 
even  at  quarter  past  four  he  was  not  ready,  for  at  4.15  Getty 
moved  forward  alone.  Meade  had  directed  him  to  attack  with 
out  waiting  for  Hancock.  The  ground  was  generally  level. 
The  Plank  Road  in  front  of  the  Brock  Road  for  a  mile  or  more 
towards  Parker's  Store  may  be  called  a  level  road.  Looking 
at  Michler's  map  we  may  see  that  the  streams  here  run  north 
and  south  from  a  narrow  plateau  which  has  the  Plank  Road 
along  the  middle.  Some  way  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road 
are  depressions  which  perhaps  are  entitled  to  the  name  of 
ravines. 

Advancing  scarcely  two  hundred  yards  along  this  plateau, 
the  skirmishers  struck  the  enemy  —  or  the  enemy  struck  them 
—  either  way,  for  at  the  moment  Hill  was  advancing  upon 
Getty.  The  firing  began  first  on  the  extreme  right,  but  in  a 
moment  was  along  the  line  of  the  three  brigades.  The  enemy 
seemed  to  have  no  skirmishers,  and  ours  were  at  once  ab- 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  141 

sorbed  by  the  main  line.  Fifty  yards  apart  the  confronting 
lines  halted.  Neither  was  protected  by  breastworks.  They 
met  in  the  open  field,  if  it  may  be  called  open  where  the 
thicket  was  so  dense  that  neither  could  see  the  other.  But 
each  was  well  aware  of  the  presence  of  the  other.  The  firing 
was  such  that  neither  could  advance.  There  was  no  advan 
tage  in  position,  and  both  lines  hugged  the  ground,  not  how 
ever,  diminishing  their  fire. 

But  although  Hancock  was  slow  to  begin,  Getty  once 
engaged,  he  sent  Birney,  commanding  his  own  and  Mott's 
divisions  to  Getty's  support.  A  small  portion  of  Birney's  own 
division  was  sent  in  on  Getty's  right ;  the  remainder  sup 
ported  him  in  the  rear;  and  on  his  left  was  Mott ;  Owen's 
and  Carroll's  brigades  were  afterwards  sent  up  from  Gibbon, 
and  advanced  on  the  right,  Birney  at  that  time  relieving 
Getty,  who  had  been  in  the  front  line.  A  section  of  Ricketts's 
battery  advanced  along  the  Plank  Road.  It  was  captured  and 
recaptured  during  the  fight. 

The  battle  raged  with  great  severity  and  obstinacy  until 
about  eight  o'clock  without  decided  advantage  to  either  party. 
It  was  especially  severe  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  Plank 
Road,  and  the  division  of  the  6th  corps  lost  many  men.  It 
held  the  front  line  till  six  o'clock,  and  so  active  were  the 
enemy's  troops  that  when  it  was  relieved,  they  pressed  for 
ward  and  took  several  prisoners,  one  a  staff  officer,  who  brought 
the  word  for  the  troops  in  front  to  fall  back ;  for  the  front 
line  was  relieved  by  falling  back  through  a  new  line,  and  not 
by  the  fresh  troops  passing  over  them. 

The  enemy  in  this  affair  appeared  in  the  greatest  force  on 
the  south  side  of  the  Plank  Road,  the  left,  I  suppose,  being 
thrown  back  to  guard  against  an  attack  from  the  5th  corps. 
Yet  the  heavy  fighting  did  not  extend  as  far  down  as  Gibbon's 
right,  for  Webb,  who  held  that  position  and  was  at  work  upon 
his  breastworks,  says  that  the  enemy  did  not  advance,  but  kept 
up  a  very  annoying  fire. 


142  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Till  near  night  our  troops  as  a  general  thing  did  all  that 
could  be  expected  of  them,  maintaining  their  advanced  ground 
when  they  found  they  could  do  no  more,  although  they  knew 
of  their  substantial  breastworks  just  in  the  rear.  Then  for 
some  unaccountable  reason  Mott's  division  gave  way.  Colonel 
McAllister,  who  afterwards  commanded  the  1st  brigade  of 
that  division,  says  "  that  to  his  great  astonishment  the  line 
began  to  give  way  on  the  left.  It  is  said,  first  the  Excelsior 
brigade,  then  my  left  regiment,  the  1st  Massachusetts,  and 
regiment  after  regiment,  like  a  rolling  wave,  fell  back,  and  all 
efforts  to  rally  them  were  in  vain."  "  To  assign  a  cause  for  it," 
he  goes  on  to  say,  "  would  be  impossible,  unless  it  was  from 
the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  the  troops  were  about  to  leave 
the  service.  I  think  this  had  much  to  do  with  it." 

But  here  let  me  observe  that  in  all  this  wood  fighting  our 
troops  seem  to  have  been  greatly  alarmed  whenever  the  noise 
of  a  contest  to  the  right  or  the  left  told  them  that  there  was 
fighting  in  the  rear  of  a  prolongation  of  their  own  line.  Such 
noises  seem  to  have  caused  more  disturbance  than  a  foe 
directly  in  front.  And  I  think  it  was  the  same  with  the  enemy's 
troops.  However,  the  enemy  at  this  time  was  not  aware  of 
our  confusion. 

In  this  fight  General  Alexander  Hayes  was  killed. 

When  Getty  arrived  at  the  intersection  of  the  two  roads 
and  threw  out  his  skirmish  line,  he  thought  he  had  both  Wil- 
cox  and  Heth  in  his  front.  He  had  Heth  alone.  A  Confeder 
ate  account  states  that  just  before  this  time,  Lee,  who  was 
with  Hill,  had  directed  Wilcox  to  open  communication  with 
Ewell.  It  is  said  that  Wilcox  proceeded  through  the  woods 
to  Chewning's,  arriving  there,  I  should  infer,  just  after  Craw 
ford  left.  Indeed  he  took  a  few  prisoners.  Leaving  two  bri 
gades  at  Chewning's,  he  pressed  on  toward  the  Pike,  but  before 
his  command  could  reach  Ewell,  he  was  ordered  back,  and  on 
his  way  back  he  captured  300  prisoners.  This  account  I  think 
is  correct.  Before  I  read  it  I  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  143 

the  regiment  lost  by  McCandless  must  have  been  captured  by 
troops  advancing  from  the  Plank  Road. 

When  Getty's  fight  began,  Grant  and  Meade  were  at  the 
Lacy  house.  Something  like  order  had  been  restored  in  the 
5th  corps.  The  heavy  firing  told  that  a  severe  battle  was 
raging  on  the  left,  and  Grant  ordered  a  movement  in  favor  of 
the  troops  there  engaged.  Wadsworth,  who  was  there  also, 
was  much  chagrined  at  the  conduct  of  his  men  a  few  hours 
before,  and  at  his  request  his  troops  were  designated  to  rein 
force  the  left.  Baxter's  brigade  of  Robinson's  division  was 
added  to  his  command.  Between  four  and  five  o'clock  he 
entered  the  woods  southeast  of  the  Lacy  house.  Soon  after 
he  formed  in  line  of  battle,  his  own  division  in  front  and 
Baxter's  brigade  in  rear,  and  moved  towards  the  left.  After 
proceeding  half  a  mile,  the  skirmish  line  of  the  enemy  was 
struck.  It  made  but  feeble  resistance,  yet  the  progress  of  the 
troops  was  slow,  mostly  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  country, 
and  night  came  on  before  they  could  form  a  connection  with 
Hancock.  The  men  slept  in  line  of  battle  facing  the  Plank 
Road,  between  Widow  Tapp's  field  and  the  Brock  Road,  the 
left  about  half  a  mile  from  the  Brock  Road. 

Night  put  an  end  to  Hancock's  engagement.  The  disaster 
to  Mott  was  not  known  to  the  enemy,  who  for  an  hour  had 
been  praying  for  night  and  for  Longstreet. 

The  orders  of  the  Lieutenant-General  for  the  morning  were, 
"  Attack  along  the  whole  line  at  five  o'clock."  So  records 
Swinton.  He  also  states  in  substance  that  Lee  had  determined 
to  deliver  an  overwhelming  blow  upon  the  left  of  the  Union 
army,  and  that,  in  order  to  divert  attention  until  Longstreet 
should  be  up,  he  resolved  to  make  a  demonstration  against 
the  Union  right,  and  that  so  it  came  about  that  fifteen  minutes 
before  the  time  appointed  by  Grant  for  the  general  attack, 
Ewell  fell  upon  Sedgwick. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  Confederates  were  the  first  to  resume 
the  fighting  on  the  6th  of  May.  And  excepting  that  it  was 


144  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  fashion  of  the  battle,  I  should  doubt  whether  Warren  was 
ordered  to  attack  at  all.  The  enemy  had  a  strong  position 
in  his  front,  and  his  own  force  had  been  much  weakened. 
Wadsworth's  division,  we  have  seen,  had  gone  to  Hancock's 
support;  and  Robinson's  division,  excepting  the  brigade 
with  Wadsworth,  had  been  withdrawn  to  the  Old  Wilderness 
Tavern,  to  be  sent  where  most  needed.  I  feel  certain  that 
none  of  the  regular  regiments  made  any  attack  that  day,  and 
several  of  the  commanders  of  other  regiments  in  Griffin's 
division  report  that  they  occupied  the  breastworks  all  day. 

No  report  of  any  command  in  the  6th  corps  mentions  an 
attack  by  the  enemy  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  May,  but 
in  several  of  them  it  is  stated  that  the  6th  corps  advanced 
upon  the  enemy  at  five  o'clock.  Officers  unite  that  they  made 
repeated  attempts  to  carry  the  enemy's  line ;  and  Early  says : 1 
"  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  the  fighting  was  resumed, 
and  a  very  heavy  attack  was  made  on  the  front  occupied  by 
Pegram's  brigade,  but  it  was  handsomely  repulsed,  as  were 
several  subsequent  attacks  at  the  same  point." 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Sedgwick,  Hancock,  and  Wadsworth 
^were  ordered  to  attack  at  five  o'clock.  Three  divisions  of  Burn- 
side's  army  came  up  about  .this  time.  Of  these  Stevenson's 
was  sent  to  Hancock,  while  the  other  two  under  Burnside 
himself  were  directed  to  endeavor  to  seize  the  strong  position 
at  Chewning's.  The  colored  troops  had  been  stationed  upon 
the  roads  running  westerly  from  the  Germanna  Road  and  lying 
between  Sedgwick's  right  and  the  river. 

There  are  but  one  or  two  square  miles  upon  this  continent 
that  have  been  more  saturated  with  blood  than  was  the  square 
mile  which  lay  in  front  of  the  Brock  Road  and  had  the 
Orange  Plank  Road  as  a  central  avenue,  in  the  two  days  of 
the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness.  And  this  bloody  field  differs 
much  from  those  which  have  been  its  rivals  as  scenes  of 

1  The  Last  Year  of  the  War,  by  Lieutenant- General  J.  A.  Early,  C.  S.  A., 
p.  17. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  145 

slaughter.  Within  a  very  limited  compass  in  other  battles 
thousands  have  fallen  by  the  fire  generally  of  artillery,  not 
less  than  of  infantry,  as  they  pressed  forward  to  take  some' 
fortified  line ;  and  the  line  once  reached,  the  carnage  has 
been  awful.  But  here,  although  both  parties  had  breastworks, 
the  fighting  was  far  from  being  confined  to  those  breastworks. 
Nearly  every  square  yard  had  its  fill  of  blood,  and  on  nearly 
every  square  yard  was  Northern  "and  Southern  blood  inter 
mingled. 

And  although  the  battle  was  fought  with  the  hot  sun  of 
the  month  of  May  in  Virginia  glaring  overhead,  it  was,  as 
it  were,  fought  in  the  night.  Excepting  in  the  roads  the 
dense  wood  rendered  it  impossible  for  any  soldier  to  see  what 
was  going  on  three  rods  from  where  he  stood.  I  premise  what 
I  have  to  say  of  the  fighting  of  the  6th  of  May  with  this  gen 
eral  statement,  because,  with  such  labor  as  I  have  been  able 
to  give  to  the  subject,  I  have  not  been  able  to  satisfactorily 
unravel  the  story  of  that  day.  And  yet,  although  I  know 
that  much  more  can  be  done  than  I  have  done,  I  doubt 
whether  the  story  will  ever  be  satisfactorily  told,  more  espe 
cially  the  story  of  those  who  fought  under  the  Union  flag* 
That  of  the  men  who  fought  against  that  flag  has  been  pretty 
well  written  by  Leigh  Kobinson,  Esq.,  of  Washington,  who 
had  served  as  a  gallant  private  in  the  Richmond  Howitzers,  and 
had  been  chosen  as  the  orator  of  the  evening  at  the  Seventh 
Annual  Meeting  of  the  Virginia  Division  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  Association.  I  have  had  his  book  before 
me  while  writing.  He  has,  however,  fallen  into  many  errors, 
some  of  which  I  will  endeavor  to  point  out.  His  laudatory 
passages  will  frequently  cause  the  Northern  reader  to  smile, 
and  yet  his  book  is  a  valuable  contribution  to  the  history  of 
the  Wilderness  Battle. 

I  say  I  fear  the  account  of  the  doings  of  our  own  army 
will  never  be  written  to  our  satisfaction,  because  I  don't  see 
how  it  is  ever  to  be  determined  just  where  particular  troops 


146  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

were  engaged,  —  many  of  them,  —  or  just  when  they  were 
engaged,  or  just  whom  they  engaged.  The  official  reports, 
such  as  have  been  written,  were  all  written  three  months 
after  the  event,  when  many  subsequent  struggles  must  have 
dimmed  the  recollections  of  those  who  wrote.  Many  who  had 
known  most  were  dead,  and  it  is  always  difficult  to  describe 
clearly  deeds  which  were  not  understood  at  the  time  by  the 
party  performing  them.  I  have  read  about  all  the  official 
reports  which  have  been  written  concerning  this  fight.  They 
make  a  confused  tale,  and  much  of  it  a  confused  tale  about 
confusion.  Reports  are  contradictory  as  to  acts  and  as  to 
times.  I  can  therefore  only  describe  in  a  general  way  what 
took  place. 

Promptly  at  five  o'clock  Birney,  with  his  own  and  Mott's 
divisions,  passed  over  the  breastworks  and  moved  upon  the 
enemy  in  several  lines  of  battle.  They  were  supported  by 
Carroll's  and  Owen's  brigades,  sent  up  from  Gibbon,  and 
also  by  the  two  brigades  of  Getty's  division  of  the  6th  corps. 
Up  to  this  time  the  cavalry  had  reported  nothing  concerning 
Longstreet.  At  daylight  Hancock  was  informed  from  head 
quarters  that  Longstreet  was  passing  up  the  Catharpin  Road 
to  attack  his  left  flank,  and  he  accordingly  left  Barlow  in  his 
strong  position  to  receive  him,  taking  also  measures  to 
strengthen  considerably  the  extreme  left  where  the  line 
crossed  the  Brock  Road,  a  heavy  skirmish  line  being  thrown 
out  some  way  down  that  road.  Gibbon  was  given  the  com 
mand  of  the  left,  Webb's  brigade  remaining  in  the  breast 
works,  to  be  sent  where  most  needed. 

Wads  worth  also  made  a  demonstration  against  the  enemy 
at  five  o'clock.  He  was  then  facing  the  Plank  Road,  his  left 
about  half  a  mile  from  the  Brock  Road.  He  soon  found  that 
a  battery  was  enfilading  his  line  from  the  right,  and  holding 
back,  he  directed  a  strong  force  to  steal  to  the  right,  screened 
by  the  woods,  and  endeavor  to  capture  it.  The  movement 
failed.  Just  before  the  detachment  emerged  from  the  woods 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  147 

it  was  discovered.  The  battery  limbered  up  and  was  hastily 
driven  back  into  the  open  field  about  four  hundred  yards, 
when  it  again  opened,  this  time  upon  the  force  sent  to  capture 
it,  which  retired  with  some  loss.  The  battery  of  which  I  have 
spoken  was  upon  the  left  of  Hill's  corps. 

The  enemy's  line  was  considerably  in  advance  of  the  front 
line  of  rebel  breastworks  shown  on  the  map.  These  works 
were  probably  thrown  up  later  in  the  day  or  possibly  on 
the  7th.  Robinson  states  that  the  rebels  were  too  weary 
that  night  (the  night  of  the  5th)  to  erect  breastworks,  and 
that  they  expected  to  be  relieved  by  Longstreet  before  dawn. 
Heth  was  on  the  left  of  the  road,  the  enemy's  left,  and 
Wilcox  mostly  on  the  south.  He  had  one  brigade  at  Heth's 
left.  In  rear,  at  the  further  end  of  Widow  Tapp's  field,  were 
posted  two  batteries  in  strong  works.  This  was  the  reserve. 
I  will  add  that  in  the  space  between  the  two  opposing  lines 
of  breastworks  there  is  an  occasional  rifle-pit  which  appears 
to  have  been  used  by  both  sides.1 

Birney  with  his  strong  command  moved  solidly  but  slowly 
forward,  the  woods  obstructing  his  progress  more  than  the 
enemy. 

Hancock  in  his  report  says  :  2 

"  After  a  desperate  contest  in  which  our  troops  behaved  in 
a  most  intrepid  manner,  the  enemy's  line  was  broken  at  all 
points,  and  he  was  driven  in  confusion  through  the  forest  for 
about  one  and  a  half  miles,  suffering  severe  losses  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners." 

He  makes  a  mistake  as  to  the  distance,  and  it  was  some 
time  before  the  fighting  became  severe.  Although  Private 
Robinson  represents  that  Heth  on  the  Confederate  left  made 
no  fight  at  all,  and  that  Wilcox  alone  resisted  the  Union 
troops,  I  feel  sure  that  none  of  Hancock's  command  on  the 

1  Hancock  says  positively  in  a  dispatch  that  there  was  first  a  line  of  log  breast 
works,  then  a  line  of  earth  intrenchments.  —  68  W.  R.  443. 

2  67  W.  R.  321. 


148  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

right  of  the  road  reached  the  Widow  Tapp's  field.1  But  on 
the  left  our  troops  reached  a  considerably  more  advanced  posi 
tion  relatively  to  the  road,  forcing  Wilcox's  right  well  back. 
Indeed  a  large  portion  of  Wilcox's  division  was  driven  in 
disorder  entirely  across  the  Plank  Road,  where  Generals  Lee 
and  Hill  in  person  helped  to  rally  them.  In  rebel  accounts 
our  bullets  are  said  to  have  crossed  the  road  in  rear  of  their 
batteries  on  the  left  road.  A  glance  at  the  map  may  perhaps 
show  this  to  have  been  possible,  for  the  Plank  Road  here 
runs  diagonally  across  what  was  then  our  line  of  battle. 

It  was  now  that  the  fighting  became  severe.  Hancock  goes 
on  to  say :  "  Our  line,  which  had  been  somewhat  disordered 
by  the  long  distance  which  it  had  pressed  after  the  enemy 
through  the  woods,  was  now  halted  to  adjust  its  formation 
before  proceeding  further." 

But  it  was  the  enemy,  and  not  the  woods  wholly,  that  caused 
that  halt.  It  was  nearly  seven  o'clock,  and  Longstreet  had 
arrived.  This  was  entirely  unexpected  to  Hancock.  He  still 
believed  Longstreet  to  be  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  and  so  far 
away  that  he  had  just  before  directed  Gibbon  to  send  Barlow 
forward.  Webb,  with  his  brigade,  was  already  marching  up 
the  Plank  Road.  Gibbon  sent  only  one  brigade  of  Barlow's, 
Frank's,  probably  because  of  the  apprehended  attack  of  Long- 
street.  Hancock  says,  "  Frank  was  sent  to  feel  the  enemy's 
right,  and  after  an  obstinate  contest  succeeded  in  forcing 
a  connection  with  the  left  of  Mott's  division."  But  if  it  was 
at  this  time  that  Frank  joined  Mott,  I  cannot  believe  that  he 
encountered  any  troops  whatever  in  his  progress  through  the 
woods. 

About  the  time  Hancock  sent  for  Barlow's  division,  a  body 
of  convalescents,  that  had  been  sent  to  Chancellorsville  and 
afterwards  had  been  trying  to  overtake  the  2d  corps,  to  which 
they  belonged,  were  seen  coming  up  the  Brock  Road  from 

1  Since  the  discussion  upon  my  paper,  I  have  no  longer  this  confidence.  — 
W.  W.  Swan. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  149 

Todd's  Tavern,  and  were  mistaken  for  the  advance  of  Long- 
street's  column. 

As  late  as  ten  o'clock  cavalry  firing  was  heard  in  the  dis 
tance,  and  surely  this  was  Longstreet  —  of  so  much  assistance 
was  the  cavalry  to  the  infantry  this  day.  But  as  I  have  said, 
at  seven  o'clock  Longstreet  was  already  engaged  on  the  Plank 
Road.  Our  troops  had  now  fairly  routed  Hill's. 

Suddenly  at  some  distance  to  the  south  of  the  Plank  Road 
they  came  upon  a  brigade  belonging  to  Longstreet,  a  little 
way  in  advance  of  the  main  line  which  he  was  forming.  This 
brigade  was  quickly  driven  back  upon  the  main  line,  which 
consisted  of  three  brigades.  On  the  north  of  the  road  our 
troops  came  as  suddenly  upon  a  brigade  of  Texahs  belonging 
to  Longstreet's  corps,  at  the  head  of  which  Lee  had  placed 
himself,  in  Widow  Tapp's  field,  with  the  intention  of  leading 
it  against  the  enemy.  Private  Robinson's  account  of  this  inci 
dent  is  thrilling.  Lee,  however,  did  not  lead  the  brigade  into 
action,  and  when  it  met  our  troops  it  was  nearly  annihilated. 
A  brigade  of  Georgians,  forming  the  second  line,  met  the  same 
fate.  A  third  line  could  not  be  overpowered. 

Then  for  two  hours  there  was  no  fighting.  We  were  re 
adjusting  our  lines,  and  the  enemy  was  getting  together  Hill's 
scattered  troops  and  sending  them  to  fill  the  gap  as  far  as 
possible  between  Longstreet  and  Ewell. 

The  left  wing  of  our  advanced  line  was  now  parallel  to  the 
Brock  Road.  Wadsworth  had  swung  around  and  was  now 
facing  up  the  Plank  Road.  Stevenson's  division  of  the  9th 
corps  had  come  up.  Just  before  nine  o'clock  all  these  troops 
moved  forward,  and  then  followed  as  severe  fighting  as  at 
any  time  took  place  that  day.  Sometimes  one  party  gained 
a  little  ground,  and  then  the  other.  And  all  this  was  in  the 
dense  wood.  General  Hancock  says : l  "  The  undergrowth 
was  so  heavy  that  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  see  more  than 
100  paces  in  any  direction.  No  movements  of  the  enemy 
i  67  W.  R.  325. 


150  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

could  be  observed  until  the  lines  were  almost  in  collision. 
Only  the  roar  of  the  musketry  disclosed  the  position  of  the 
combatants  to  those  who  were  at  any  distance,  and  my  know 
ledge  of  what  was  transpiring  in  the  field,  except  in  my  imme 
diate  presence,  was  limited,  and  was  necessarily  derived  from 
subordinate  commanders." 

In  relieving  troops,  the  woods  were  the  cause  of  disaster. 
In  the  early  fight  the  troops  of  the  6th  corps,  although  some 
way  to  the  rear  in  the  beginning,  had  come  to  be  in  the  front 
line  on  the  right  of  the  road.  When  Wadsworth's  and  Steven 
son's  divisions  came  up,  Getty's  troops  were  crowded  to  the 
other  side  of  the  road.  This  was  not  known  to  Birney,  and 
he  directed  Webb  to  relieve  them  with  his  brigade.  Webb 
therefore  formed  in  line  of  battle  on  the  right  of  the  road 
and  went  forward,  intending  to  pass  over  the  troops  of  the 
6th  corps  when  they  were  reached.  Of  course  he  found  no  6th 
corps,  and  it  was  not  long  before  he  struck  the  enemy,  and  at 
great  disadvantage  to  himself,  for  he  was  advancing  without 
skirmishers,  thinking  he  had  Union  troops  in  his  front.  He 
was  soon  driven  back.  Webb  was  now  in  the  extreme  ad 
vance  upon  both  sides  of  the  road,  his  right  in  the  woods  that 
lie  between  the  road  and  the  big  circular  field,  as  shown  upon 
the  map,  of  Widow  Tapp's  farm.  Some  troops  of  the  Qih 
corps  were  close  in  rear,  and  General  Wadsworth  assumed 
command  of  the  whole. 

One  of  Webb's  regiments  on  the  left  of  the  road  was  the 
20th  Massachusetts,  and  while  Webb  was  upon  the  right  of 
his  line  looking  after  that  flank,  which  was  exposed,  that  regi 
ment  was  ordered  forward  by  Wadsworth,  and  in  the  at 
tack  which  it  made  as  an  isolated  regiment  suffered  severely. 
Colonel  Macy,  commanding  the  regiments,  was  wounded  in 
the  leg,  and  Major  Abbott  mortally  wounded. 

No  account  of  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  written  for  this 
Society,  which  is  made  up  so  largely  of  the  friends  of  Abbott, 
would  be  complete  should  it  not  contain  the  tributes  paid  to 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  151 

his  memory  by  his  corps  and  brigade  commanders  in  their 
official  reports  of  the  battle. 

General  Hancock  says  : *  "  Major  Henry  L.  Abbott,  20th 
Massachusetts  Volunteers,  was  mortally  wounded  while  lead 
ing  his  regiment  in  the  heat  of  the  action  in  the  morning  of 
the  6th.  This  brilliant  young  officer  by  his  courageous  con 
duct  in  action,  the  high  state  of  discipline  in  his  regiment,  his 
devotion  to  duty  at  all  times,  had  obtained  the  highest  repu 
tation  among  his  commanding  officers.  His  loss  was  greatly 
deplored." 

General  Webb  says :  2  "  Major  Henry  L.  Abbott,  20th 
Massachusetts  Volunteers,  died  from  his  wounds,  received  in 
the  advance  of  his  regiment.  He  lived  but  a  short  time  after 
being  wounded.  It  will  be  found  very  difficult  to  replace  him. 
No  truer  soldier  was  in  my  command.  His  reputation  as  an 
officer  stood  far  beyond  the  usual  eulogies  pronounced  upon 
dead  officers.  I  feel  that  his  merit  was  so  peculiar,  and  his 
worth  so  well  known  to  all  the  officers  of  the  corps,  and  to  the 
general  commanding,  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  attempt 
to  do  him  justice.  My  brigade  lost  in  him  its  best  soldier." 

You  will  also  gladly  place  upon  your  records  Webb's 
tribute  to  the  regiment.  He  says :  "  I  had  occasion  to  call 
attention  of  officers  and  men  to  the  manner  in  which  the  20th 
Massachusetts  fought  this  day,  and  to  point  out  particularly 
how  much  its  fighting  was  due  to  the  gallantry  and  discipline 
of  its  officers." 

Wadsworth  made  another  effort  to  advance,  but  the  men 
had  lost  their  dash,  some  of  them  being  greatly  disturbed  by 
the  change  of  front,  for  Webb  had  been  forced  to  face  a  part 
of  his  command  to  the  north.  Then,  too,  in  this  part  of  the 
field  no  regiment  in  the  line  had  a  regiment  of  its  own  corps 
on  either  flank.  Owing  to  the  woods,  some  of  the  best  regi 
ments  attacked  singly.  Many  lives  were  lost  and  nothing  was 
accomplished. 

1  67  W.  R.  326.  2  Ibid.  438. 


152  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

There  was  also  fighting  from  time  to  time  at  the  left.  Ker- 
shaw,  the  rebel  general,  speaks  of  the  enemy  as  at  intervals 
bearing  down  upon  his  lines,  but  always  without  any  success. 

I  have  represented  Hancock's  troops  as  clashing  with  Long- 
street's  before  the  early  halt  in  the  morning.  It  is  not  with 
out  hesitation  that  I  have  come  to  believe  this  to  be  true. 
Hancock,  as  I  have  said,  seems  to  think  that  his  troops  had 
become  so  disordered  by  pressing  after  the  enemy  a  long 
distance  through  the  woods  that  a  halt  was  necessary  to 
readjust  the  lines,  and  that  he  had  still  nothing  in  his  imme 
diate  front  but  Hill.  And  Wilcox  to  some  extent  sustains 
Hancock. 

Wilcox  is  reviewing  Taylor's  "  Four  Years  with  General 
Lee,"  and  is  commenting  upon  this  passage  in  that  work : 1 
"  General  Longstreet,  taking  in  the  situation  at  a  glance,  was 
prompt  to  act,  immediately  caused  his  division  to  be  deployed 
in  line  of  battle,  and  gallantly  advanced  to  recover  the  lost 
ground."  To  this  Wilcox  says  :  "  This  might  make  the  im 
pression  that  General  Longstreet  became  engaged  almost 
instantly  upon  reaching  the  field.  As  the  head  (Kershaw's 
division)  of  Longstreet's  column  arrived,  I  met  it  and  ordered 
it  to  file  to  the  right  as  rapidly  as  possible  into  the  woods,  so 
as  to  form  line  of  battle  speedily,  lest  my  division,  then  being 
forced  back,  might  be  driven  on  to  it  before  it  should  form. 
Less  than  a  brigade  of  Kershaw  had  filed  into  the  woods 
when  Longstreet  appeared  on  the  field.  I  pointed  out  to  him 
where  General  Lee  could  be  found  ;  he  was  within  200  yards 
of  us.  My  division  was  not  forced  back  upon  Kershaw ;  the 
enemy  halted  some  300  yards  short." 

But  here  is  an  admission  by  Wilcox,  who  is  defending  the 
reputation  of  his  own  troops,  that  Longstreet's  troops  were 
on  the  ground  in  line  of  battle  at  the  time  of  the  early  halt, 
and  that  this  was  some  time  before  the  nine  o'clock  advance. 

Longstreet  himself  says  : 2  "  Arriving  at  Parker's  Store 
1  S.  H.  S.  vol.  vi,  p.  72.  2  67  W.  R.  1054. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  153 

about  dawn,  I  was  directed  to  move  my  column  down  the 
Plank  Road  to  relieve  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox,  which 
were  in  position  in  face  of  the  enemy  on  the  right  and  left  of 
the  Plank  Road,  at  right  angles  with  it  and  about  three  miles 
below  Parker's  Store.  Kershaw's  division  was  in  the  lead. 
Arriving  in  the  rear  of  the  line  held  by  these  two  divisions, 
and  when  the  head  of  my  column  had  filed  to  the  right  and 
had  only  time  to  deploy  two  regiments  of  Kershaw's  old  bri 
gade,  an  advance  was  made  by  the  whole  line  of  the  enemy, 
and  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Wilcox  broke  and  retreated  in 
some  confusion.  With  considerable  difficulty,  but  with  stead 
iness,  opening  their  ranks  to  let  the  retreating  divisions 
through,  Kershaw  formed  his  line  on  the  right,  and  Field  on 
the  left  of  the  Plank  Road." 

Dawn  comes  at  a  very  early  hour  on  the  6th  of  May,  and 
Parker's  Store  is  less  than  three  miles  from  the  Widow  Tapp's 
farm.  And  then  every  man  in  the  South  fully  believes  the 
story  of  Lee's  attempted  charge  with  the  Texas  brigade, 
belonging  to  Longstreet's  corps.  And  Colonel  Venable,  who 
was  present,  represents  this  incident  as  taking  place  imme 
diately  upon  the  arrival  of  Longstreet's  divisions  ;  and  these, 
he  says,  came  the  last  mile  and  a  half  at  a  double-quick  in 
parallel  columns  along  the  Plank  Road. 

At  eleven  o'clock  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps  be 
ing  now  up,  and  its  brigades  having  been  sent  to  different 
places  in  the  lines  where  most  needed,  Longstreet  determined 
to  assume  the  offensive.  Kershaw  gives  the  best  account 
of  the  celebrated  flank  movement  which  was  then  executed. 
He  says : 1  "  The  lines  being  rectified,  and  Field's  division 
and  Wofford's  brigade  of  my  own  having  arrived,  upon  the 
suggestion  of  Brigadier-General  Wofford,  a  movement  was 
organized,  under  the  orders  of  the  Lieutenant-General  com 
manding,  to  attack  the  enemy  in  flank  from  the  line  of  the 
Orange  Railroad  on  our  right  with  the  brigades  of  General 
1  67  W.  R.  1061. 


154  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Anderson  of  Field's  division  and  Brigadier-General  Wofford's 
of  my  own,  supported  by  Mahone's  brigade,  while  we  con 
tinued  to  hold  the  enemy  in  front,  who  was  at  intervals 
bearing  down  upon  our  lines,  but  always  without  any  success. 
This  movement,  concealed  from  view  by  the  dense  wood,  was 
eminently  successful,  and  the  enemy  was  routed  and  driven 
pellmell  as  far  as  the  Brock  Road,  and  pursued  by  General 
Wofford  to  some  distance  across  the  Plank  Road,  where  he 
halted  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  Germanna  Road." 

There  is  but  little  which  is  satisfactory  in  our  own  accounts 
of  this  disaster.  Frank's  brigade,  which  formed  the  extreme 
left  of  our  advanced  troops,  was  instantly  overrun  ;  Mott's 
division  gave  way,  and  the  men  swarmed  to  the  Plank  Road, 
along  the  rear  of  the  troops  fighting  in  the  immediate  vicin 
ity  of  that  road.  An  attempt  was  made  to  swing  back  the  left 
of  these  troops,  but  it  was  useless.  They,  too,  soon  went  back 
in  disorder.  All  organization  and  control  seemed  to  have  been 
lost.  Except  in  a  few  instances,  even  regiments  could  not  be 
kept  as  entireties.  The  veterans  of  the  2d  and  6th  corps,  how 
ever,  remembered  where  the  Brock  Road  breastworks  were 
and  made  their  way  thither,  some  by  command,  but  many 
without.  Many  were  re-formed  without  much  delay  in  their 
old  positions  in  these  works,  notably  the  1st  and  3d  brigades 
of  Getty's  division  of  the  6th  corps,  occupying  their  former 
quarters  in  the  front  line  of  the  works  at  the  intersection  of 
the  roads,  which  they  themselves  had  begun  to  throw  up  upon 
their  opportune  arrival  about  twenty-four  hours  before,  and 
which  had  already  done  them  and  others  good  service.  They 
were  now  under  the  command  of  Wheaton,  for  the  fearless 
and  faithful  Getty  had  been  wounded. 

Most  of  the  men  of  the  5th  corps,  Wadsworth's  division, 
who  had  come  through  the  woods  from  the  Lacy  house,  sought 
that  place  of  refuge  once  more,  but  in  a  worse  plight,  if 
anything,  than  they  were  in  when  they  came  back  from  War 
ren's  attack  of  the  day  before.  Of  5000  men  only  480  could 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  155 

be  got  together  later  in  the  afternoon  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
scene  of  their  last  defeat.  But  it  should  be  added  that  the 
5000  had  not  all  run  away.  The  4th  division  of  the  5th  corps  in 
the  two  days  in  the  Wilderness  lost  16  officers  and  175  men 
killed,  and  40  officers  and  989  men  wounded.  And  most  of 
these  casualties  occurred  while  the  division  was  on  the  Plank 
Koad.  Moreover  the  5000  includes  Baxter's  brigade  of  the 
2d  division  of  the  5th  corps.  "Among  the  wounded  was 
the  noble  citizen  soldier,  Wadsworth.  He  died  the  next  day 
in  rebel  hands.  He  had  once  been  governor  of  the  Empire 
State,  and  had  he  lived,  I  think  he  would  now  be  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the  United  States. 

Webb's  single  brigade,  which  we  have  seen  was  fighting 
under  Wadsworth,  lost  in  the  two  days  23  officers  and  937 
enlisted  men,  killed  and  wounded. 

The  rebel  General  Mahone  says  in  his  report : 1  "  His  [the 
enemy's]  long  lines  of  dead  and  wounded  which  lay  in  the 
wake  of  our  'swoop'  furnished  evidence  that  he  was  not 
allowed  time  to  '  change  front,'  as  well  as  of  the  execution  of 
our  fire." 

Although  the  rebels  knew  they  had  caused  us  to  retreat  in 
disorder,  the  woods  did  not  allow  them  to  see  the  extent  of 
the  disorder.  It  is  reported  that  in  the  road  a  Maine  regi 
ment  did  excellent  service,  preventing  the  enemy  from  seeing 
the  rout  there.  We  lost  very  few  captured  by  the  enemy. 
I  do  not  know  that  any  were  thus  lost  at  this  time. 

Just  at  the  close  of  this  affair,  General  Longs treet  was 
wounded.  How  that  general  intended  to  follow  up  his  success 
is  told  by  Kershaw  in  his  report.2  "Returning,"  he  says, 
"  with  General  Wofford  up  the  Plank  Road  and  learning  the 
condition  of  things  in  front,  we  met  the  Lieuten ant-General 
commanding  coming  to  the  front,  almost  within  musket  range 
of  the  Brock  Road.  Exchanging  hasty  congratulations  upon 
the  success  of  the  morning,  the  Lieutenant-General  rapidly 
1  57  W.  R.  1091.  2  Ibid.  10C2. 


156  THE   WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

planned  and  directed  an  attack  to  be  made  by  Brigadier- 
General  Jenkins  and  myself  upon  the  position  of  the  enemy 
upon  the  Brock  Road  before  he  could  recover  from  his  dis 
aster.  The  order  to  me  was  to  break  their  line  and  push  all 
to  the  right  of  the  road  toward  Fredericksburg.  Jenkins's 
brigade  was  put  in  motion  by  the  flank  in  the  Plank  Road, 
my  division  in  the  woods  to  the  right.  I  rode  with  General 
Jenkins  at  the  head  of  his  command,  arranging  with  him  the 
details  of  our  combined  attack.  We  had  not  advanced  as  far 
as  the  position  still  held  by  Wofford's  brigade,  when  two  or 
three  shots  were  fired  on  the  left  of  the  road,  and  some  strag 
glers  came  running  in  from  that  direction,  and  immediately 
a  volley  was  poured  into  the  head  of  our  column  from  the 
woods  on  our  right,  occupied  by  Mahone's  brigade."  Long- 
street  was  wounded  by  this  volley. 

Perhaps  this  time  the  woods  were  our  safety,  but  I  cannot 
believe  that  Longstreet  would  have  had  any  better  success 
in  the  attempt  to  carry  our  intrenched  lines  than  Lee  had 
a  few  hours  later.  General  Hancock  says,  "  Order  was  soon 
restored ; "  and  I  feel  that,  if  there  had  been  danger  of  his 
losing  the  cross-roads,  he  would  have  ordered  to  that  point 
Leasure's  brigade  of  the  9th  corps  and  Eustis's  brigade  of 
the  6th  corps,  which  he  had  in  reserve  near  the  left  of  his 
line,  and  have  even  thrown  back  his  entire  left  to  the  Plank 
Road,  facing  it  to  the  south  to  cover  the  entrance  to  the 
Germanna  Road,  although  such  a  movement  might  have 
endangered  our  trains  at  Chancellorsville. 

At  army  headquarters  it  was  thought  that  Hancock's  left 
had  been  turned,  and  this  note  was  sent  to  General  Sheri 
dan  : 1 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 
May  6,  1864.    One  o'clock  p.  M. 

Major-General  Sheridan,  Comd'g  Cavalry  Division. 

Your   despatch   of   11.45   A.  M.   received.     Gen.  Hancock 
has  been  heavily  pressed  and  his  left  turned.     The   Maj. 
1  68W.R.  467. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  157 

Gen'l  Comd'g.  thinks  you  had  better  draw  in  your  cavalry 
so  as  to  secure  the  protection  of  the  trains.  The  order 
requiring  an  escort  for  the  wagons  to-night  has  been  re 
scinded. 

A.  A.  HUMPHREYS, 

Chief  of  Staff. 

And  here  let  me  refer  once  more  to  the  cavalry.  I  have 
said  that  they  rendered  us  very  little  —  too  little  —  assistance 
in  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness.  I  must  not  forget  the  good 
work  done  by  Hammond  and  his  500  cavalry  on  the  Plank 
Koad.  After  daylight  of  the  5th,  they  did  just  what  in  my 
opinion  is  to  be  expected  of  cavalry.  They  reported  that 
they  had  found  a  strong  infantry  force  approaching,  and  then 
they  obstinately  resisted  its  progress  until  our  infantry  came 
up.  Our  army  would  have  been  cut  in  two  but  for  that 
resistance.  General  Meade  had  delayed  dispatching  Getty  to 
the  cross-roads  until  the  last  moment. 

General  Sheridan  thinks  otherwise  of  the  office  of  cavalry. 
In  his  report  he  says : 1  "After  carefully  studying  the  topo 
graphy  of  the  country  from  the  Rapidan  to  Richmond,  which 
is  of  a  thickly  wooded  character,  its  numerous  and  almost 
parallel  streams  nearly  all  uniting  forming  the  York  River, 
I  took  up  the  idea  that  our  cavalry  ought  to  fight  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  and  our  infantry  the  enemy's  infantry.  I  was 
strengthened  in  this  impression  still  more  by  the  conscious 
ness  of  a  want  of  appreciation  on  the  part  of  infantry  com 
manders  as  to  the  power  of  a  large  and  well-managed  body 
of  horse ;  but  as  it  was  difficult  to  overcome  the  established 
custom  of  wasting  cavalry  for  the  protection  of  trains  and 
for  the  establishment  of  cordons  around  a  sleeping  infantry 
force,  we  had  to  bide  our  time." 

Now,  if  cavalry  were  to  fight  cavalry  only,  nothing  would 
be  accomplished.  If  all  the  troops  in  the  war  on  both  sides 
i  67  W.  R.  787. 


158  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

had  been  mounted,  we  should  be  scampering  over  the  country 
now.  What  is  wanted  of  cavalry  is,  first  of  all,  that  it  shall 
report  where  the  enemy  is  and  of  what  arm  his  force  consists, 
and  then  that  it  shall  obstruct  as  far  as  possible  any  advance 
by  the  enemy  until  the  infantry  is  ready  to  meet  him.  If  the 
infantry  is  already  in  position,  it  is  enough  for  the  cavalry  to 
report  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  describing  him  as  minutely 
as  possible. 

Having  these  views,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  inexcusable 
that  Hancock  should  not  have  been  informed  on  the  6th 
that  the  firing  on  his  left  was  merely  that  of  cavalry ;  and 
I  am  equally  strong  in  my  belief  that  cavalry  ought  to  have 
reported  the  advance  of  Ewell  in  time  to  have  prevented 
the  surprise  of  General  Grant  on  the  Pike. 

Wilson  did  have  a  hard  fight  with  the  enemy's  cavalry  off 
at  the  left,  got  into  considerable  trouble,  and  was  rescued  by 
Gregg,  but  this  fighting  was  almost  too  remote  from  the 
scenes  which  I  am  describing  to  be  considered  a  part  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Wilderness. 

I  have  omitted  to  say  by  what  road  Longstreet  came  to 
Parker's  Store.  I  write  this  at  the  last  moment  without  time 
to  look  the  matter  up,  but  I  have  always  supposed  that  he 
came  by  the  wood  road  which  runs  from  Parker's  Store  to  the 
Catharpin  Road,  entering  the  latter  two  miles  east  of  Shady 
Grove  Church.  At  any  rate  he  went  into  camp  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  5th  somewhere  on  the  Catharpin  Road  six  or  seven 
miles  from  Parker's  Store.  At  midnight  he  moved  again, 
arriving  at  Parker's  Store,  as  we  have  seen,  at  dawn.  Long- 
street  says  Rosser's  cavalry  was  skirmishing  in  his  front  all 
day  on  the  5th.  He  outnumbered  or  overpowered  Wilson. 
This  was  a  good  use  of  cavalry.  Wilson  could  not  tell  whether 
there  was  infantry  behind  or  not,  and  neither  he  nor  Gregg 
knew  when  Longstreet  left  the  Catharpin  Road.  Hancock,  on 
the  morning  of  the  6th,  was  told  before  five  o'clock  that  Long- 
street  was  approaching  by  the  Catharpin  and  Brock  roads. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  159 

The  reverse  of  Hancock  was  reported  at  headquarters. 
Again  the  order  was,  attack  along  the  whole  line  at  six  o'clock ; 
and  Robinson's  division  of  the  5th  corps  was  sent  to  Han 
cock. 

Hancock  says : 1  "  I  am  not  aware  what  movements  were 
made  by  General  Burnside  near  Parker's  Store  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  6th,  but  I  experienced  no  relief  from  the  attack 
I  was  informed  he  would  make  across  my  front,  —  a  movement 
long  and  anxiously  waited  for." 

This  is  what  he  did,  as  related  by  Potter,  Willcox,  and 
Hartranft.  He  was  directed  to  seize  the  high  ground  at 
Chewning's,  and  early  in  the  morning  he  moved  from  the 
Lacy  house  with  Potter's  and  Willcox's  divisions  by  the  road 
taken  by  Crawford  the  previous  morning,  Potter  in  advance. 
Hartranft,  one  of  the  brigade  commanders,  says  they  could 
hear  Hancock's  battle  on  the  Plank  Road.  Half  a  mile  out 
they  threw  out  skirmishers  and  flankers ;  half  a  mile  further 
they  met  a  skirmish  line  of  the  enemy.  But  Burnside's 
skirmish  line  found  no  difficulty  in  advancing  to  the  edge  of 
Chewning's  field,  when  they  received  a  musketry  fire  and  fell 
back.  Potter's  division  was  shelled  when  it  was  in  the  open 
field  on  the  other  side  of  the  run  from  Chewning's,  but  no 
attempt  was  made  to  occupy  Chewning's  field.  This,  I  think, 
might  easily  have  been  done.  The  enemy  could  have  had 
nothing  more  than  a  skirmish  line  there  in  support  of  the 
battery  until  long  after,  when,  as  we  have  seen,  some  of  the 
rebel  General  Wilcox's  scattered  men  were  got  together  and 
sent  thither,  and  very  likely  Anderson's  division.  The  lines 
of  works  shown  on  the  map  in  red  could  not  have  existed  at 
this  time.  After  considerable  time  idly  spent,  Burnside  de 
cided  to  do  his  fighting  near  the  Widow  Tapp's  field.  Leaving 
Christ's  brigade  on  the  Parker  Store  Road,  he  set  about  this 
new  movement  with  Potter's  division,  supported  by  Hart- 
ranft's  brigade. 

i  67  W.  R.  326. 


160  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Hartranf t  thus  tells  a  part  of  the  story  : l 

"  Soon  after,  Potter's  division  was  ordered  to  the  left,  and 
I  was  ordered  to  his  support.  This  movement  was  to  the  rear, 
and  on  account  of  the  underbrush  was  not  very  promptly 
made.  After  moving  back  nearly  a  mile,  the  lines  were  again 
formed.  I  formed  in  support  of  Bliss's  brigade  of  Potter's 
division,  facing  south,  perhaps  a  little  east  of  south." 

Finally,  he  says,  the  enemy  was  struck  in  works.  An  attack 
was  made  which  at  first  was  successful.  Hartranft  says  :  "  We 
carried  the  works  and  held  them  for  a  moment,  until  a  panic 
seized  the  left,  which  brought  back  the  whole  line  in  con 
fusion.  .  .  .  After  this  repulse,  Christ's  brigade  came  up  and 
took  position  on  my  left.  At  4.30  p.  M.,  in  obedience  to  orders 
from  the  general  commanding  the  division,  I  again  advanced, 
but  found  the  enemy's  fire  very  severe.  My  line  halted.  I  did 
not  order  it  forward,  but  reported  to  the  general  commanding 
the  division.  I  was  soon  after  notified  that  no  further  ad 
vance  would  be  made.  In  this  last  advance  my  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  larger  than  in  the  morning." 

Burnside,  however,  did  rather  better  than  Hartranft  repre 
sents.  Several  spirited  charges  were  made,  and  must  have 
had  the  effect  of  keeping  quite  a  large  body  of  men  from 
Lee's  support  in  the  final  attack  he  was  just  then  making 
upon  Hancock. 

One  of  these  brigades  of  Burnside's  lost  469  officers  and 
men  killed  and  wounded,  the  other  463.  Burnside's  three 
divisions  of  white  troops  seem  to  have  lost  pretty  evenly,  for 
Stevenson  lost  451  killed  and  wounded.  Burnside's  attack 
was  too  late  to  be  of  substantial  benefit.  Hill  was  now  in 
position  upon  the  left  of  Longstreet's  corps  and  stretching 
well  over  towards  Ewell.  Burnside  undoubtedly  encountered 
the  fresh  troops  of  Anderson. 

Lee  had  not  waited  until  six  o'clock  for  Hancock  to  renew 
the  battle.  When  Longstreet  was  wounded,  he  had  assumed 
i  67  W.  R.  948. 


BATTLE  OF  THE    WILDERNESS  161 

immediate  command  of  his  corps.  At  quarter  past  four  he 
had  re-formed  with  his  right  resting  on  the  railroad,  and  now 
he  was  advancing  upon  Hancock's  intrenched  position.  His 
advance  was  directed  against  the  part  of  the  lines  held  by 
Mott's  division,  his  left,  however,  overlapping  Birney,  and 
being  some  little  distance  south  of  the  Plank  Road. 

His  troops  pressed  forward  until  within  less  than  a  hun 
dred  paces  from  the  front  line  of  our  works,  where  they  halted 
and  kept  up  an  uninterrupted  fire,  but  with  little  execution. 
Then,  for  some  unaccountable  reason,  a  portion  of  Mott's 
division  and  Ward's  brigade  of  Birney's  gave  way,  and  the 
enemy  pushed  forward,  some  of  them  so  far  as  to  plant  their 
flags  upon  the  breastworks.  Carroll's  brigade,  however, 
which  was  then  under  Birney  and  in  reserve,  had  been  so 
drawn  up  relatively  to  the  point  of  attack  that  it  was  the 
work  of  but  a  moment  to  sweep  down  obliquely  upon  the 
enemy  and  drive  him  out. 

Gibbon,  too,  judging  from  the  firing  that  the  enemy  had 
broken  our  line,  sent  Brooke's  brigade  through  the  woods 
towards  the  point  of  attack,  but  it  arrived  only  in  time  to 
find  that  Carroll  had  repulsed  the  enemy. 

During  this  attack  by  Lee  our  breastworks  caught  fire  in 
several  places,  much  to  the  discomfiture  of  our  men ;  and  to 
this  fire  is  generally  attributed  the  temporary  loss  of  the 
works.  I,  however,  think  that  too  much  importance  has  been 
given  to  this  fire.  This  ended  the  fighting  on  the  left. 

There  remains  to  be  described  but  one  more  affair  of  im 
portance.  The  Confederates  had  known  all  this  day,  the  6th, 
that  the  right  flank  of  the  6th  corps  was  unprotected,  but 
no  attack  had  been  made  upon  it  because  of  the  movements 
of  Ferrero's  division,  which  we  have  seen  was  somewhere 
between  Sedgwick  and  the  river,  and  because  it  was  supposed 
that  Burnside's  corps  was  in  rear  of  the  6th  corps's  right. 
But  in  the  afternoon  it  was  discovered  that  Burnside  had 
gone  to  our  left,  and  it  was  determined  to  make  the  attack. 


162  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

It  was  made  at  seven  o'clock  by  Gordon's  and  Pegram's  bri 
gades,  supported  by  Johnston's.  It  fell  upon  Shaler's  brigade 
of  Wright's  division  and  Seymour's  brigade  of  Ricketts's 
division  of  the  6th  corps  ;  Shaler  being  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  army,  and  being  separated  from  the  other  brigades  of 
Wright's  division.  As  I  have  said,  Shaler  had  been  in  the 
rear  the  previous  day,  and  now  he  was  posted  out  of  his 
usual  place. 

It  was  an  extraordinary  affair.  Shaler  was  facing  at  right 
angles  to  the  rest  of  the  corps.  Gordon  marched  to  the  left 
and  formed  some  distance  back  in  the  woods  on  Shaler's 
flank,  as  he  thought,  but  in  reality  across  Shaler's  front.  So, 
when  he  advanced,  he  unexpectedly  struck  the  breastworks 
and  was  thrown  into  great  confusion.  Unluckily  for  the 
6th  corps,  Johnson,  who  was  following  Gordon,  by  a  mistake 
obliqued  too  much,  and,  losing  Gordon,  found  himself  in  rear 
of  the  6th  corps's  main  line.  This  threw  Shaler  into  disorder, 
and  also  Seymour,  although  Seymour  repulsed  an  attack 
made  in  his  front  by  Pegram.  Both  Union  troops  and  rebels 
were  beaten.  The  new  lines  taken  up  by  the  6th  corps  show 
the  defeat  on  our  part. 

Early  says : l  "  Notwithstanding  the  confusion  in  part  of 
his  brigade,  Gordon  succeeded  in  throwing  the  enemy's  right 
flank  into  great  confusion,  capturing  two  brigadier-generals 
(Seymour  and  Shaler),  and  several  hundred  prisoners,  all 
of  the  6th  corps  under  Sedgwick.  The  advance  of  Pegram's 
brigade  and  the  demonstration  of  Johnson's  brigade  in  the 
rear,  where  it  encountered  a  part  of  the  enemy's  force  and 
captured  some  prisoners,  contributed  materially  to  the  result. 
It  was  fortunate,  however,  that  darkness  came  to  close  this 
affair,  as  the  enemy,  if  he  had  been  able  to  discover  the 
disorder  on  our  side,  might  have  brought  up  fresh  troops 
and  availed  himself  of  our  condition.  As  it  was,  doubtless  the 

1  The  Last  Year  of  the  War,  by  Lieutenant-General  Jubal  A.  Early,  C.  S.  A., 
p.  19. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  163 

lateness  of  the  hour  caused  him  to  be  surprised,  and  the 
approaching  darkness  increased  the  confusion  in  his  ranks,  as 
he  could  not  see  the  strength  of  the  attacking  force,  and 
probably  imagined  it  to  be  much  more  formidable  than  it 
really  was.  All  of  the  brigades  engaged  in  the  attack  were 
drawn  back  and  formed  on  a  new  line  in  front  of  the  old  one 
and  obliquely  to  it." 

"  At  light  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  an  advance  was  made, 
which  disclosed  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  given  up  his 
line  of  works  in  front  of  my  whole  line,  and  a  good  portion  of 
Johnson's.  Between  the  lines  a  large  number  of  his  dead  had 
been  left,  and  at  his  breastworks  a  large  number  of  muskets 
and  knapsacks  had  been  abandoned,  and  there  was  every 
indication  of  great  confusion.  It  was  not  till  then  that  we 
ascertained  the  full  extent  of  the  success  attending  the  move 
ment  of  the  evening  before.  The  enemy  had  entirely  aban 
doned  the  left  side  of  the  road,  across  which  Johnson's  line 
extended,  and  my  division  and  a  part  of  his  were  thrown  for 
ward,  occupying  a  part  of  the  abandoned  works  on  the  right 
of  the  road,  and  leaving  all  those  on  the  left  in  our  rear. 
This  rendered  our  line  straight,  the  left  having  been  pre 
viously  thrown  back,  making  a  curve." 

"During  this  day  there  was  some  skirmishing,  but  no 
serious  fighting,  in  my  front." 

And  here  I  close.  The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  had  come 
to  an  end.  During  the  7th  day  of  May  there  was  no  serious 
fighting  in  any  one's  front.  A  reconnoitring  party  sent  out 
by  Hancock  found  the  enemy  behind  strong  works.  The  next 
serious  encounter  was  some  miles  to  the  south,  and  has  its 
own  name.  The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  may  be  called  a 
drawn  battle,  perhaps  a  success.  For  with  drawn  battles 
Grant  would  win  in  the  end.  We  lost  many  more  men  than 
the  Confederates,  but  that  was  in  the  programme.  And  never 
again  did  the  Confederates  attempt  to  assume  the  offensive. 


VI 

ADDENDA  TO  THE  PAPER  BY  BREVET  LIEU 
TENANT-COLONEL  W.  W.  SWAN,  U.  S.  A., 
ON  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

BY 

COLONEL  THEODORE  LYMAN 
A.  D.  C.  TO  MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE,  U.  S.  A. 


Read  before  the  Society  March  8,  1880 


ADDENDA  TO  THE  PAPER  BY  BREVET  LIEU 
TENANT-COLONEL  W.  W.  SWAN,  U.  S.  A.,  ON 
THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS 

I  OFFER  the  following  fragments  taken  from  my  contempo 
raneous  notes,  in  the  hope  they  may  serve  to  complete  the 
elaborate  paper  of  Colonel  Swan. 

12.10  p.  M.,  May  5,  1864.  Was  ordered  to  go  to  General 
Getty,  explain  the  position  of  the  army,  and  direct  him  to 
seek  roads  to  the  right  for  junction  with  Crawford's  left.  At 
beginning  of  cross-road  (continuation  of  the  Brock)  found 
Eustis's  brigade  going  into  the  woods.  Told  him  the  orders. 
He  said  he  would  send  troops  to  feel  towards  the  right.  Getty 
was  sitting  on  the  ground  on  the  cross-road  near  the  Plank. 
Two  or  three  dead  men  lay  near,  and  a  wounded  soldier  occa 
sionally  limped  past.  He  said  all  Hill's  corps  was  coming 
down  the  Plank,  and  the  skirmishers  were  within  300  yards. 

12.50.  Reported  back  at  headquarters  near  Wilderness 
Tavern.  Just  then  heavy  musketry  from  Griffin  in  our  front. 
This  fixes  the  moment  of  his  attack.1  The  fire  continued,  ris 
ing  and  falling,  for  about  one  and  a  half  hours. 

2.45.  Griffin,  with  his  mustering  officer  Captain  George 
Barnard,  rode  in  to  General  Meade.  He  called  out  loudly 
that  he  drove  Ewell  three  quarters  of  a  mile,  but  got  no  sup 
port  on  his  flanks,  and  had  to  retreat.  He  implied  censure  on 
General  Wright,  and  apparently  on  his  corps  commander, 
General  Warren.  General  Rawlins  was  very  angry,  consider 
ing  his  language  mutinous.  Grant  was  of  the  same  mind,  and 
asked  Meade :  "  Who  is  this  General  Gregg  ?  You  ought  to 
arrest  him !  "  Grant's  coat  was  unbuttoned,  and  Meade  began 

i  Ante,  p.  130. 


168  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 


to  button  it  up,  as  if  he  were  a  little  boy,  saying  in  a  good- 
natured  voice,  "  It 's  Griffin,  not  Gregg,  and  it 's  only  his  way 
of  talking." 

3.15.  Sent  with  a  written  order  to  Getty  to  attack  at 
once,  with  or  without  Hancock ! l  Delivered  it  at  3.25.  Getty 
in  the  same  place  —  very  cool  —  plainly  he  thought  it  poor 
strategy  to  attack  before  more  of  the  2d  corps  was  up,  but  he 
ordered  an  immediate  advance. 

4.45.  Eeported  under  orders  to  General  Hancock.  He  sat 
on  a  handsome  horse  at  the  junction  of  the  Plank  Road.  Vio 
lent  musketry  just  in  front,  but  the  close  saplings  kept  back 
most  of  the  bullets.  He  said  it  was  very  hard  to  get  up  troops 
in  this  wood,  but  he  was  doing  all  he  could.  Presently  Major 
Mundee  rides  up :  "  Sir,  General  Getty  is  hard  pressed  and 
his  ammunition  nearly  out."  "  Tell  him  to  hold  on,  and  Gen 
eral  Gibbon  will  be  up  to  help  him."  Soon  another  officer 
from  the  left :  "  Sir,  General  Mott's  division  has  broken  and 
is  coming  back."  2  "  Tell  him  to  stop  them  !  "  roared  Han 
cock.  Then,  "  Major  Mitchell,  go  to  General  Gibbon  and  tell 
him  to  come  up  on  the  double-quick."  In  a  short  time,  as  I 
stood  in  the  cross-road,  Sprigg  Carroll's  brigade  came  along 
at  the  double-quick,  the  men  all  out  of  breath,  and  faced  to 
the  left.  I  remember  the  cool  address  of  the  colonel  next  me  : 
"  Now,  I  don't  want  any  hollering ;  that 's  childish.  Prime  ! 
Forward !  "  Carroll,  as  full  of  the  gaudium  certaminis  as 
usual,  rode  into  the  sprout-growth  with  his  line,  and  soon 
came  back  shot  through  the  arm.  As  the  sun  was  declining, 
General  "  Aleck  "  Hayes  was  carried  past  me  shot  through  the 
head.3 

The  attack  for  the  morrow  (6th)  was  put  off  till  5.30,  to 
give  Burnside  time  to  be  in  position  to  go  in  on  Hill's  left 
flank. 

May  6.    In  the  gray  of  the  morning  General  Meade  was  on 

1  Ante,  p.  140.  2  Ante,  p.  142. 

8  Ante,  p.  142. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  169 

horseback  by  the  Germanna  Plank  Road.  Captain  Hutton 
rode  to  him  and  said  that  only  one  division  of  Burnside  was 
up,  and  the  road  was  blocked  by  the  artillery,  which  he  would 
order  out  of  the  way,  if  General  Meade  would  permit.  "  No, 
sir,"  replied  Meade,  "  I  have  no  command  over  General 
Burnside."  Here  was  a  mishap,  at  once,  from  a  divided 
leadership. 

5.15  A.  M.  As  I  passed  down  the  cross-road  to  report  to 
General  Hancock,  the  volleys  began.1  Hancock  was  on  the 
Plank  Road  —  radiant.  "  Tell  General  Meade,"  he  cried,  "  we 
are  driving  them  beautifully."  The  firing  then  lulled,  but 
broke  out  again  after  a  time.  I  think  Colonel  Swan  is  possi 
bly  mistaken  in  thinking  the  right  of  this  attack  never  got 
into  the  open  field  of  the  Widow  Tapp  house.2  In  April, 
1866,  Colonel  C.  L.  Peirson  and  I  visited  this  region  ;  and 
I  have  written  in  my  diary  that  our  troops  advanced  at  least 
300  yards  beyond  (west  of)  the  Tapp  field.  This  fact  was 
suggested  by  the  scattered  graves  of  Texan  and  Alabama 
troops,  buried  where  they  fell,  and  was  expressly  told  us  by 
Mrs.  Tapp  and  her  three  daughters,  who  during  the  fight 
were  at  a  hospital  just  in  the  rear. 

The  battle  revived  with  Longstreet's  arrival,  and  at  11.10 
A.  M.  occurred  the  fatal  break,  on  Barlow's  right,3  as  some 
said,  but  more  probably  on  Mott's  left,  as  maintained  by 
others.  Barlow's  brigade  there  was  commanded  by  Frank,  a 
former  officer  of  Saxon  flying  artillery,  a  pleasant,  talkative 
man,  but  one  who  tried  to  make  up  for  want  of  nerve  by 
strong  drink.  Barlow  was  obliged  to  relieve  him. 

1.15  P.  M.  After  reporting  to  General  Meade,  returned  to 
Hancock,  who  was  sitting  under  a  tree  just  behind  the  low 
breastwork.  Officers  very  busy  getting  the  men  in  order  and 
under  their  proper  colors. 

2  P.  M.    Burnside,  who  should  have  been  up  and  charged 

1  Ante,  p.  146.  2  Ante,  p.  147. 

3  Ante,  p.  154 


170  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

with  the  rest  at  5.30  A.  M.,  made  his  first  short  attack,  with 
loud  musketry.1  Hancock  regretted  he  could  not  go  forward 
also,  but  it  would  risk  too  much.  About  all  this  fighting  there 
was  at  the  time,  and  indeed  since,  the  greatest  discussion 
among  the  people  of  Webb,  Getty,  Birney,  and  Wadsworth. 
Those  of  the  last-named  officer  maintained  that  they  drove 
the  enemy  on  the  Plank  Koad,  and  that  one  of  their  brigades 
swept  the  front,  while  the  2d  corps  was  lying  behind  their 
breastworks.  Birney's  men,  per  contra,  said  that  Wads- 
worth's  attack  amounted  to  nothing,  although  he  himself 
appeared  on  the  Plank  Koad  and  interfered  with  the  order  of 
battle. 

4.30  P.  M.  The  artillery  on  Gibbon's  left  suddenly  opened, 
followed  by  sharp  musketry.2  This  was  the  short  rush  made 
by  the  enemy  when  they  broke  through,  just  on  the  Plank 
Road,  but  were  immediately  driven  out.  Of  his  own  accord 
General  Burn  side  immediately  put  in  a  division  to  relieve  the 
pressure.  "  The  best  thing  Old  Burn  did  during  the  day,"  as 
General  Meade  remarked. 

7  P.  M.  While  at  dinner  heard  a  little  scattering  musketry 
on  the  extreme  right ; 3  and  presently  up  gallops  Captain 
Beaumont,  followed  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kent,  in  a  great 
flurry,  saying  the  6th  corps  was  broken  and  driven  back, 
the  enemy  on  the  Germanna  Plank,  and  that  we  had  better 
look  out  and  not  get  captured.  General  Meade,  whose  dis 
position  was  always  to  grow  calmer  and  calmer  as  others  got 
more  excited,  asked  coolly,  "  And  where  are  Upton's  and 
Shaler's  brigades,  that  Sedgwick  said  he  could  spare  me  this 
morning  ?  "  "I  don't  know,  sir."  "  Do  you  mean  to  tell  me," 
continued  the  general,  "  that  the  6th  corps  is  not  to  do  any 
more  fighting  this  campaign ? "  "I  am  fearful  not,  sir,"  re 
plied  Kent,  who  for  the  first  and  last  time,  as  I  believe,  had  lost 
his  head.  This  stampede  was  the  most  disgraceful  thing  that 
happened  to  the  celebrated  6th  corps  during  my  experience  of 
1  Ante,  pp.  159,  160.  2  Ante,  p.  161.  8  Ante,  p.  162. 


BATTLE  OF  THE   WILDERNESS  171 

it.  The  handling  of  the  1st  and  3d  divisions  on  the  5th  and 
6th  of  May  was  slow  and  feeble,  while  that  of  the  2d  division 
was  beyond  all  praise. 

Getty  and  Hancock  were  the  stars  of  the  Wilderness. 
The  conduct  of  the  latter  was  brilliant.  The  vigor  with  which 
he  brought  up  his  men  on  the  5th  through  a  difficult  country, 
and  the  skill  and  rapidity  with  which  he  pushed  them  into 
action,  his  punctual  and  dashing  advance  on  the  6th,  and 
his  cheerful  courage  under  reverse,  justified  the  playful  praise 
that  General  Meade  once  gave  him,  "  Bully  Hancock  is  the 
only  one  of  my  corps  commanders  who  will  always  go  right  in 
when  I  order  him." 

The  next  day  Grant  made  one  of  those  short,  pregnant 
remarks  that  characterize  him.  Turning  to  Meade,  he  said : 
"Joe  Johnston  would  have  retreated  after  two  such  days' 
punishment !  "  He  had  come  with  the  idea  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  had  never  been  fought  to  the  top  of  its  bent, 
and  he  showed  his  observation  and  honesty  in  thus  perceiving 
and  admitting  the  inferiority  of  the  Western  Confederate 
armies. 

As  to  the  numbers  on  either  side,  I  feel  called  on  to  differ 
with  my  friend,  Colonel  Swan ;  and  the  more,  because  he 
throws  his  authority  on  the  side  of  the  Confederate  historians 
of  to-day,  who  seek  to  belittle  their  own  forces  and  to  exag 
gerate  ours ;  as  if  they  had  waged  a  short  and  weak  war, 
and  needed  an  excuse  for  failure !  Thus  Colonel  Taylor  dedi 
cates  his  valuable  book,  "  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,"  to 
the  8000  men  who  were  "  present  for  duty  "  at  Appomattox ; 
whereas  about  28,000  men  really  surrendered  there,  of  whom 
the  greater  part  had  been  so  exhausted  by  the  pursuit  that 
they  had  thrown  away  their  arms. 

Colonel  Swan  thinks  Lee  had  about  52,000  men  of  all 
arms.1  This  is  one  of  Swinton's  blunders,  who  was  much 
elated  by  some  partial  returns  he  had  been  permitted  to  see. 

1  Corrected  to  60,000,  ante,  p.  120.  —  ED. 


172  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

In  that   estimate,   Longstreet's   tvyo   divisions   are   entirely 
omitted  !   The  force  of  Lee  (Taylor,  pp.  125  and  176)  was : 

1st  corps,  Longstreet  (2  divisions),  say 10,000 

2d  corps,  Ewell 17,079 

3d  corps,  Hill 22,199 

Provost  marshal  and  unattached  infantry 1,125 

Cavalry 8,727 

Artillery 4,854 

63,984 
The  3  corps  of  infantry,  with  11  divisions,  had  about  49,278. 

Of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  Burnside's  9th  corps  only 
the  gross  aggregates  are  given  in  Report  of  Secretary  of  War, 
1865  (pp.  5  and  55),  which  are  120,384  for  the  Potomac 
army,  and  20,780  for  the  9th  corps,  a  total  of  141,164  on 
May  1,  1864.  But  this  number  is  of  no  service,  because  it 
gives  no  details,  and  because  we  do  not  know  that  all  this 
force  crossed  the  Rapidan.  Only  a  critical  examination  of  the 
Washington  archives  will  determine  the  exact  numbers 
opposed ;  and  meantime  I  must  rely  on  my  own  notes,  which 
are  usually  pretty  accurate. 

2d  corps,  Hancock 28,000 

5th  corps,  Warren 24,000 

6th  corps,  Sedgwick 26,000 

Cavalry,  Sheridan 13,000 

Engineers •. 2,000 

Artillery 4,000 

Provost  marshal 3,000 

9th  corps,  Burnside 21,000 

121,000 

Of  these,  according  to  a  recent  opinion  of  General  Hum 
phreys,  much  more  than  one  seventh  were  extra-duty  men, 
employed  in  the  vast  quartermaster,  commissary,  medical,  and 
signal  services.  Taking  away  one  seventh,  or  17,000,  we  have 
104,000  officers  and  men  in  line  of  battle.  Much  extra-duty 


BATTLE  OF  THE  WILDERNESS  173 

work  was  among  the  Confederates  performed  by  negroes, 
and  their  various  administrative  services  were  small.  General 
Humphreys  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  reported  aggregate  of 
Lee's  army  meant  the  line  of  battle.  Taking  these  data,  we 
should  have,  in  round  numbers,  a  Union  army  of  104,000 
opposed  to  a  Confederate  of  64,000,  or  as  5  to  3 ;  or,  if  we 
take  only  the  infantry,  then  as  84,000  to  49,000,  or  as  12  to  7.1 

1  Vide  note,  ante,  p.  120. 


VII 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE  WILDERNESS 

BY 

BREVET  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  HAZARD  STEVENS 
U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  February  14,  1887 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE  WILDERNESS 

AFTER  the  failure  of  Mine  Run  in  1863,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  went  into  winter  quarters  about  Culpeper  Court 
House.  The  troops  were  hutted  in  more  comfortable  fashion 
than  ever  before.  Drills  and  inspections  were  resumed.  Sup 
plies  were  abundant.  Towards  spring  convalescents  and 
recruits  were  rapidly  coming  in,  filling  up  the  depleted  regi 
ments.  Many  visitors  from  the  North,  not  a  few  of  whom 
were  ladies,  were  guests  at  the  several  camps.  The  monotony 
of  camp  life  was  enlivened  by  balls,  entertainments,  horse 
races,  and  cock-fights.  The  Sanitary  Commission  did  its 
utmost  to  promote  the  creature  comforts  of  the  troops,  and 
the  Christian  Commission  provided  large  tents  for  holding 
religious  services,  which  were  sometimes  desecrated  by  nigger 
minstrel  shows  and  midnight  suppers.  The  troops  were  in 
good  condition  and  good  heart.  There  was  general  confidence 
in  the  success  of  the  next  campaign,  but  all,  and  especially 
the  veterans,  looked  forward  to  an  arduous  and  bloody 
struggle. 

In  March,  1864,  the  five  corps  of  the  army  were  reduced  to 
three,  the  1st  and  3d  being  broken  up,  and  their  troops  dis 
tributed  among  the  2d,  5th,  and  6th,  and  many  changes  were 
made  of  subordinate  commanders  with  the  view  of  promoting 
harmony  and  concert  of  action  in  the  coming  campaign.  The 
3d  division  of  the  6th  corps  was  broken  up,  and  the  brigades 
of  Wheaton  and  Eustis  assigned  to  the  2d  division  as  its 
1st  and  4th  brigades  respectively,  and  the  brigade  of  Shaler 
became  the  4th  brigade  of  the  1st  division.  The  3d  division 
of  the  old  3d  corps  was  incorporated  with  the  6th  corps  as 
its  3d  division. 


178  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

The  corps  was  partially  filled  up  with  recruits  and  con 
valescents,  and  when  the  campaign  opened  mustered  49  regi 
ments  of  infantry,  containing  22,584  officers  and  men  effective, 
and  9  batteries  of  artillery  with  48  guns  and  1579  officers  and 
men  effective,  making  a  total  effective  strength  of  24,163. 
The  regiments  averaged  only  460  officers  and  men  each.  The 
infantry  were  organized  into  three  divisions,  the  1st  and  2d 
of  four  brigades  each,  the  3d  of  three  brigades.  The  artillery 
formed  a  brigade  by  itself. 

Major-General  John  Sedgwick  commanded  the  corps. 
Brigadier-Generals  Horatio  G.  Wright,  George  W.  Getty,  and 
James  B.  Ricketts  commanded  the  1st,  2d,  and  3d  divisions, 
respectively.  They  were  all  good  soldiers,  brave,  cool,  reso 
lute,  and  capable,  and  loyal  to  their  commanders,  without  a 
trace  of  that  dilatory  or  critical  spirit  to  which  no  small  share 
of  the  mishaps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  must  be  attributed. 
"With  the  exception  of  a  few,  who  were  soon  weeded  out,  the 
brigade  commanders,  four  of  whom  were  colonels,  were  also 
soldierly  and  competent  men.  Several  were  more  than  this  ; 
and  among  others  General  David  A.  Russell,  who  was  killed 
at  the  battle  of  the  Opequan  or  Winchester,  September  19, 
1864,  General  Frank  Wheaton,  and  Colonel  Emory  Upton, 
who  won  his  star  soon  afterwards  at  Spottsylvania,  leading 
the  gallant  charge  of  twelve  picked  regiments  on  the  10th 
May,  showed  the  stuff  of  true  soldiers  and  able  commanders. 
Sedgwick  was  a  methodical,  sagacious,  and  resolute  man.  He 
was  also  genial  and  buoyant  in  disposition.  He  possessed  the 
confidence  and  love  of  his  troops,  and  had  impressed  upon 
them  something  of  his  own  steadfastness.  They  believed  in 
"Uncle  John,"  as  they  affectionately  called  him,  and  they 
believed  in  "  Uncle  John's  Corps,"  as  they  called  themselves. 

Sedgwick  was  noted  for  his  care  of  his  troops,  as  the 
following  incident  well  illustrates.  Wheaton's  brigade,  which 
had  been  serving  in  West  Virginia,  on  its  return  to  the 
corps,  arrived  at  Brandy  Station  in  midwinter,  in  the  midst 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       179 

of  a  driving  storm  of  rain,  and  debarked  from  the  cars  upon 
the  soaked  and  muddy  ground.  All  the  available  groves  of 
timber  had  been  long  since  occupied  by  the  other  troops,  and 
there  seemed  no  recourse  for  the  travel-worn  and  bedraggled 
men  but  to  bivouac  in  the  open  muddy  fields  until  they  could 
haul  timber  from  the  woods  several  miles  distant,  an  almost 
impossible  task  in  the  existing  state  of  the  roads.  As  the  offi 
cers  were  disconsolately  looking  about  and  wondering  where 
they  could  go  and  how  escape  these  discomforts,  a  large,  stal 
wart  horseman,  in  a  plain  cavalry  overcoat,  rode  up,  splashing 
through  the  mud,  and  said,  "  General  Wheaton,  you  may  put 
your  men  in  those  woods,"  pointing  out  an  extensive  grove  of 
pines  near  by  which  was  already  occupied  by  the  headquarters 
of  a  brigade  commander  with  widespread  huts,  horse-sheds, 
quarters  for  guards,  orderlies,  cooks,  servants,  etc.,  monopo 
lizing  the  whole  tract.  Preceding  the  troops,  who  immediately 
started  for  the  welcome  shelter,  Sedgwick,  for  the  horseman 
was  no  other,  called  out  the  astonished  and  disconcerted 
general,  whose  cosy  winter  arrangements  were  about  to  be 
so  rudely  disturbed,  and  quietly  ordered  him  to  vacate  the 
greater  part  of  the  grove  forthwith,  in  which  the  troops  soon 
sheltered  themselves  with  their  axes. 

Of  General  Getty,  my  old  commander,  I  must  say  a  word. 
Modest  and  retiring,  he  combined  high  ideals  of  military  duty 
and  discipline,  great  firmness  and  resolution,  and  prompt 
decision  and  readiness  of  resource  in  emergencies.  He  had, 
too,  no  small  spice  of  dash  and  enterprise.  Personally  he  was 
kind  and  considerate  to  his  subordinates,  and  while  holding 
them  to  strict  discipline,  never  meddled  with  details  or  with 
their  methods  of  doing  their  work,  provided  only  that  it  was 
well  done.  Sincere  and  straightforward,  his  nature  was  thor 
oughly  loyal,  loyal  to  his  country,  to  his  superiors,  to  his 
companions  in  arms,  to  any  and  all  who  had  claims  upon  him. 
I  was  his  chief  of  staff,  and  intimately  associated  with  him 
for  nearly  three  years.  I  never  knew  him  to  do  an  unjust  act. 


180  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

I  cannot  now  point  out  a  single  instance  where  his  military 
judgment  was  wrong,  a  single  emergency  where  he  failed  to 
act  precisely  as  he  should  have  acted. 

"  I  always  obey  an  order,"  he  once  remarked.  "  If  I  was 
ordered  to  march  my  division  across  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  I  'd 
do  it.  At  least,"  he  added,  observing  a  smile  on  the  faces  of 
his  auditors,  "  I  would  march  them  up  to  their  necks  in  the 
sea,  and  then  withdraw  and  report  that  it  was  impracticable 
to  carry  out  the  order." 

At  the  siege  of  Suffolk  in  April,  1863,  he  discovered,  while 
reconnoitring  outside  the  town,  that  the  enemy  under  Long- 
street  were  planting  guns  and  making  preparations  to  cross 
the  narrow  Nansemond  Kiver  and  invest  our  position  on  every 
side.  At  daylight,  just  as  they  were  about  to  launch  their 
pontoons,  a  storm  of  shot  and  shell  from  Getty's  guns,  brought 
three  miles  from  Suffolk  and  skillfully  posted  in  the  night 
above,  below,  and  opposite  the  proposed  crossing-place,  fell 
upon  them  like  lightning  from  a  clear  sky,  and  soon  silenced 
and  demolished  their  batteries  and  frustrated  their  efforts. 

For  three  weeks  Getty,  with  inferior  and  scanty  forces, 
working  night  and  day,  baffled  every  effort  to  force  the  pass 
age,  erected  a  strong  continuous  line  of  works,  with  a  broad 
military  road  behind  it  for  seven  miles  along  the  river,  and 
finally,  throwing  a  party  of  250  men  across  the  stream  in  a 
ferry-boat  converted  into  a  gunboat,  captured  their  strongest 
battery,  with  5  guns,  5  officers,  and  248  men,  and  held  it  for 
16  hours,  then  withdrawing  every  man  and  gun. 

At  Cedar  Creek,  when  every  infantry  division  save  his 
was  broken  and  in  flight,  he  deliberately  moved  back  in 
line,  took  position  upon  a  ridge  only  100  yards  in  rear,  ex 
tended  his  command  in  one  thin  line,  and  for  an  hour  hurled 
back  repeated  heavy  assaults  of  Early's  columns.  When  the 
enemy  at  length  were  pushing  past  his  right  flank,  taking  ad 
vantage  of  a  lull  in  their  attack,  he  again  fell  back  in  line  as 
orderly  as  on  parade,  and  took  up  a  second  position  two  miles 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       181 

in  rear,  covering  the  Valley  Pike,  and  brought  up  and  posted 
there  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  corps,  which  by  his  stub 
born  stand  were  enabled  to  rally  and  re-form.  "  I  renewed  the 
battle  on  Getty's  line,"  says  Sheridan.  Nothing  but  Getty's 
military  sagacity  and  resolution  and  the  stubborn  fighting  of 
that  incomparable  division,  made  it  possible  to  retrieve  Cedar 
Creek.  Without  Getty  there  would  have  been  no  line  there. 

I  have  narrated  in  a  former  paper  before  the  Society  the 
part  taken  by  Getty  in  the  storming  of  the  lines  of  Peters 
burg  April  2,  1865,  and  how,  when  advancing  against  the 
inner  lines,  his  exposed  flank  being  threatened  by  a  force  of 
infantry  and  artillery  on  his  left,  he  pushed  his  troops  rapidly 
forward,  utterly  disregarding  the  enfilade  and  reverse  fire  of 
the  flanking  force,  until  they  found  themselves  about  to  be  cut 
off  from  their  works  and  were  forced  to  scamper  back  at 
double-quick. 

I  will  mention  but  one  more  incident  illustrating  Getty's 
readiness  of  resource.  After  recovering  from  his  wound  at 
the  Wilderness,  returning  to  his  command,  he  was  placed  in 
charge  of  convoying  an  immense  supply  train  from  the  White 
House  on  the  Pamunkey  across  the  Peninsula  to  the  James 
with  a  force  of  about  2500,  consisting  of  two  regiments  of 
hundred  days  men,  700  dismounted  cavalrymen,  and  a  new 
negro  regiment. 

The  second  day  out  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  two  divisions  of  cav 
alry,  fell  upon  the  train.  At  the  first  alarm  the  hundred  days 
men  fired  into  each  other  and  took  to  the  woods  in  flight. 
Getty  parked  his  train,  deployed  the  dismounted  cavalrymen, 
his  only  veterans,  against  the  enemy  in  skirmish  order,  broke 
up  the  black  regiment  and  distributed  them  among  his  troop 
ers  on  the  skirmish  line,  three  or  four  to  each  old  soldier, 
and  going  along  the  line  told  the  blacks  to  stick  to  the  white 
soldiers  and  obey  them,  and  ordered  the  latter  to  hold  their 
ground  and  make  the  niggers  fight.  This  ingenious  plan 
worked  well.  Every  trooper  felt  like  a  brigadier-general.  The 


182  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

blacks,  inspired  with  confidence  by  their  white  command 
ers,  stood  and  fought  well.  After  a  severe  brush,  Lee  was 
repulsed  and  retreated,  and  Getty,  gathering  up  his  fugitive 
hundred  days  men,  continued  his  march  next  day  without 
further  molestation.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  he  handed 
his  watch  and  papers  to  his  aide,  Captain  Henry  Murray,  with 
instructions  to  deliver  them  to  his  wife  in  case  he  fell. 

It  was  owing  chiefly  to  the  fact  that  the  corps  was  so  well 
commanded  in  all  its  parts  that  it  went  through  the  terrible 
struggles  and  enormous  losses  of  the  Wilderness  and  Valley 
campaigns  with  comparatively  so  little  impairment  of  its  morale 
and  efficiency.  Under  the  severest  losses  and  fatigues  of  that 
terrible  campaign  the  corps  never  lost  its  discipline,  its  pluck, 
or  its  confidence  in  itself.  It  became  a  byword  in  the  army 
that,  whenever  any  part  of  the  6th  corps  got  into  a  fight,  the 
rest  were  sure  to  come  speeding  up  to  its  support. 

The  corps  as  a  whole  was  in  excellent  condition  and  morale, 
especially  the  1st  and  2d  divisions,  which  were  not  surpassed 
by  any  troops  in  the  army. 

The  celebrated  Vermont  brigade,  2d  of  the  2d  division,  and 
the  Maine  and  some  of  the  New  Jersey  and  New  York  regi 
ments  were  splendid  specimens  of  the  best  types  of  American 
soldiery.  Twenty  thousand  such  veterans  would  have  added 
more  real  strength  to  the  army  than  the  50,000  raw  men, 
many  of  them  in  raw  regiments,  that  actually  joined  it  before 
and  during  the  campaign. 

The  breaking  up  of  the  1st  and  3d  corps  was  a  great  mis 
take.  These  troops  had  a  good  record,  and  took  great  pride 
in  it  and  in  their  corps  organizations  and  badges.  Their  very 
sacrifices  upon  former  fields,  by  which  they  had  become  much 
reduced  in  numbers,  were  put  forward  to  justify  consolidating 
them  with  other  troops.  Thus  their  well-earned  pride  was 
turned  to  bitterness,  their  morale  was  impaired,  and  though 
too  patriotic  and  brave  not  to  overcome  these  feelings  at 
length  and  do  their  duty,  yet  the  bitter  fruit  of  the  blunder 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       183 

was  felt  on  more  than  one  battle-field.  During  the  winter 
the  War  Department  was  reorganizing  the  9th  corps  under 
Burnside,  making  use  of  the  popularity  of  the  commander 
and  the  name  of  the  corps  to  facilitate  gathering  together 
a  large  body  of  essentially  green  troops.  Had  the  1st  and  3d 
corps  been  preserved  and  with  the  others  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  filled  up  with  recruits  and  strengthened  with  the 
regiments  which  went  to  form  the  new  9th  corps,  the  army 
thus  organized  would  have  been  far  more  homogeneous, 
reliable,  and  effective  than  the  same  forces  differently  organ 
ized  with  which  Grant  fought  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness, 
and  might  have  inflicted  a  decisive  defeat  upon  its  antagonist. 

The  historian  cannot  too  strongly  or  too  often  expose  the 
glaring  and  inexcusable  blunder  of  the  administration  in  suf 
fering  the  veteran  regiments  to  be  decimated  in  battle  and 
worn  out  in  service  without  an  effort  to  repair  their  strength, 
and  in  raising  green  regiments  instead ;  and  this  wasteful 
policy  was  pursued  despite  the  teachings  of  history  and  the 
remonstrances  of  every  American  commander  from  Washing 
ton  to  Grant. 

In  sober  fact,  the  politicians  who  were  running  the  gov 
ernment,  and  whom  it  is  now  the  fashion  to  beslobber  with 
indiscriminate  eulogy,  had  not  sufficient  faith  in  the  patriot 
ism  of  the  people.  While  the  masses  were  all  absorbed  in 
the  necessity  of  crushing  the  rebellion,  urgent  for  strong 
measures,  ready  to  undergo  any  privation,  do  anything,  spend 
everything  for  the  cause,  the  politicians  feared  that  strong 
measures  would  lose  votes,  and  therefore  deemed  it  a  polit 
ical  necessity  to  coax  and  bribe  men  to  serve  their  country 
instead  of  compelling  their  service  as  a  sacred  duty.  True, 
the  state  governors  and  authorities,  who  had  to  do  the  enlist 
ing  and  raising  of  troops  in  the  first  instance,  favored  this 
false  and  wasteful  policy,  because  it  gave  more  offices  to  be 
stow  upon  their  friends,  and  it  was  deemed  easier  to  induce 
men  to  enlist  in  new  regiments  than  in  old  ones. 


184  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

But  these  are  poor  excuses.  Had  Congress  early  passed  the 
necessary  acts,  the  people  would  have  cheerfully  sustained 
them,  and  the  army  would  have  hailed  conscription  with 
delight  and  confidence.  The  moral  weakness  of  the  admin 
istration  is  to  blame  for  the  ignoble  and  demoralizing  shifts 
to  fill  or  avoid  their  quotas  of  troops  resorted  to  by  so  many 
states  and  communities  during  the  latter  part  of  the  war. 

By  the  2d  of  May  everything  was  prepared  and  the  orders 
were  issued  for  the  advance. 

According  to  the  careful  estimates  of  Humphreys  in  his 
"  Virginia  Campaign  of  1864-65,"  the  three  infantry  corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  mustered  73,390  officers  and 
enlisted  men  effective,  the  cavalry  corps  under  General  Philip 
H.  Sheridan,  12,424,  the  artillery,  10,230,  with  274  guns  ; 
which,  with  3394  provost  guards  and  engineers,  made  up 
a  grand  total  of  99,438  officers  and  men  present  for  duty 
equipped.  Besides  these,  the  9th  corps  was  posted  along  the 
line  of  the  railroad  from  Washington  to  the  Rappahannock, 
having  just  relieved  the  5th  corps  in  that  duty,  and  numbered 
22,708,  with  42  guns,  making  the  total  Union  effective  force 
of  all  arms  120,146.  Humphreys  says  that  only  6000  men  of 
the  9th  corps  had  any  seasoning  as  soldiers.  One  division 
of  it  was  composed  wholly  of  negro  troops,  just  raised,  which 
were  not  put  into  action  until  the  Mine  affair. 

Lee's  army  on  the  other  hand,  according  to  Humphreys, 
comprised  61,958  effective  officers  and  men,  of  all  arms,  with 
224  guns.  The  2d  and  3d  corps  under  Ewell  and  Hill  held 
the  line  of  the  Rapidan  from  Barnett's  Ford,  five  miles  above 
the  railroad  crossing,  to  Morton's  Ford,  thirteen  miles  below, 
with  cavalry  picketing  the  fords  above  and  below  these 
points,  and  Longstreet  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps,  the 
1st,  lay  at  Gordonsville  in  reserve.  His  3d  division,  under 
Pickett,  5000  strong,  was  on  the  south  of  James  River. 

Humphreys's  estimate  of  Lee's  strength  is  manifestly  too 
small,  as  he  himself  intimates.  The  latest  report  of  the  1st 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS        185 

corps  before  the  campaign  opened  was  of  March  31 ;  of  the 
rest  of  the  army,  April  20 ;  and  Humphreys  simply  consoli 
dates  the  figures  there  given.  But  the  enemy  were  making 
every  effort  to  fill  up  their  army,  and  men  were  coming  in  rap 
idly  all  through  the  spring.  As  usual  with  them,  too,  they 
allowed  many  men  to  go  home  on  furlough  in  winter,  and  it 
is  not  probable  that  all  of  these  were  back  as  early  as  the  date 
of  these  reports.  Humphreys  puts  Longstreet's  two  divisions 
at  8417,  the  number  in  the  report  of  March  31,  but  states 
that  Colonel  Taylor,  in  his  "  Four  Years  with  General  Lee," 
gives  them  as  10,000  enlisted  men.  Yet  after  all  their  severe 
losses  in  the  Wilderness  and  at  Spottsylvania,  the  report  of 
Longstreet's  corps  for  June  30  shows  14,158  officers  and 
men. 

In  brief,  it  is  plain  that  Lee  had  an  army*  of  at  least 
75,000  effective.  General  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  commanded  his 
cavalry,  the  greater  part  of  which  wintered  in  the  peninsula 
between  the  York  and  Rappahannock  rivers,  and  was  now 
assembled  at  Hamilton's  Crossing,  south  of  Fredericksburg. 

Agreeably  to  orders  the  6th  corps  broke  camp  at  daylight 
May  4,  and  moved,  the  2d  division  in  the  lead,  following  the 
5th  corps.  As  the  sun  rose  into  the  heavens,  the  day  became 
bright  and  warm.  Many  of  the  troops,  especially  the  raw 
recruits,  had  loaded  themselves  down  with  much  useful  and 
useless  impedimenta,  and  long  before  reaching  the  river  the 
road  was  littered  with  thousands  of  overcoats,  blankets,  knap 
sacks,  and  articles  of  clothing  thrown  aside  by  them.  Some 
of  the  men  kept  exchanging  their  things  for  those  cast  upon 
the  ground,  while  others  were  picking  up  and  accumulating 
more  and  more  of  such  goods,  and  struggled  and  sweated  on 
under  increasing  loads  until  forced,  by  inability  to  keep  up 
or  by  their  officers,  to  throw  away  their  prizes.  I  well  recol 
lect  a  little,  dumpy,  round-shouldered  soldier,  apparently  a 
German  Jew  as  to  nationality,  who  was  struggling  along  out  of 
the  ranks,  and  who  had  so  loaded  himself  down  with  nice  new 


186  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

coats  and  blankets  that  he  resembled  an  enormous  animated 
pack  supported  upon  two  short  sturdy  legs.  He  was  well- 
nigh  breathless  and  exhausted,  and  evidently  in  the  deepest 
distress  at  the  necessity  of  abandoning  any  of  his  pelf.  For 
several  miles  before  reaching  the  ford  the  roadsides  were 
fairly  covered  with  abandoned  clothing  and  accoutrements. 
This  fact  indicated  a  large  number  of  raw  men  in  the  5th 
corps,  for  neither  the  discipline  nor  experience  of  veterans 
would  allow  of  their  loading  themselves  down  at  the  begin 
ning  of  a  campaign,  or  throwing  away  necessary  articles  on 
the  first  march. 

On  reaching  the  Germanna  Ford  a  halt  of  considerable 
time  was  made  to  allow  the  5th  corps  to  clear  the  road. 
Early  in  the  afternoon  the  6th  corps  crossed  the  Kapidan 
by  a  pontoon  bridge,  and  resumed  its  advance  on  the  Ger 
manna  Plank  Road  leading  to  the  Wilderness,  marching  left 
in  front,  so  as  to  front  into  line  facing  the  enemy  at  a 
moment's  notice.  The  artillery  and  ammunition  wagons  and 
ambulances  took  the  road,  the  troops  marched  along  on  the 
right  skirt  or  edge  of  the  road,  the  side  next  the  enemy,  with 
flankers  thrown  out  a  hundred  paces  in  the  thicket. 

After  advancing  in  this  way  about  two  miles  from  the 
river,  the  corps  went  into  bivouac  for  the  night,  the  advance 
division,  the  2d,  upon  Flat  Bush  Creek,  and  pickets  were 
thrown  out  connecting  on  the  left  with  those  of  the  5th  corps, 
and  extending  in  front  of  the  road  back  to  the  river. 

The  5th  corps  advanced  to  the  Wilderness  Tavern,  a  mile 
in  front  of  which,  on  the  Fredericksburg  and  Orange  Court 
House  Pike,  its  leading  division  took  up  a  strong  position. 

The  2d  corps  crossed  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  Ford  and  ad 
vanced  to  Chancellorsville. 

The  several  divisions  of  cavalry  under  Sheridan  covered 
the  movement  on  every  side  as  prescribed  ;  the  immense  artil 
lery  reserve  and  trains  were  crossing  at  Culpeper  Mine  and 
Ely  fords,  guarded  by  1200  infantry  from  each  corps. 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       187 

The  9th  corps  was  rapidly  marching  to  the  front  along 
the  railroad,  abandoning  it  as  it  passed,  and  dropping  direct 
connection  with  Washington. 

Thus  every  part  of  the  vast  host  performed  the  task  allot 
ted  to  it  with  the  precision  of  a  great  machine. 

Another  half-day's  march  by  the  2d  corps  would  place  that 
formidable  body  of  troops  on  the  Catharpin  Road  abreast 
with,  and  on  the  left  of,  the  other -two  corps,  and  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  could  then  move  forward  against  its  antagonist 
upon  three  parallel  roads,  sufficiently  extended  to  enable 
each  part  to  deploy  quickly  and  get  into  action,  yet  concen 
trated  within  supporting  distance,  while  the  9th  corps  was 
only  a  day's  march  behind  and  moving  up. 

Accordingly  such  a  forward  movement  was  ordered  for  the 
next  morning  at  5  A.  M.,  Hancock  with  the  2d  corps  to  march 
to  Shady  Grove  Church  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  Warren 
with  the  5th  corps  to  Parker's  Store  on  the  Plank  Road ; 
Sedgwick  with  the  6th  corps  to  Wilderness  Tavern,  leaving 
a  division  to  guard  Germanna  Ford  until  relieved  by  Burn- 
side's  troops,  —  all  in  readiness  to  move  forward.  Wilson  was 
to  move  to  Craig's  Meeting  House  on  the  Catharpin  Road, 
sending  parties  well  out  on  all  the  roads  in  front  and  flank, 
as  well  as  on  the  Orange  Court  House  Plank  and  Pike  roads. 
Sheridan  with  the  other  two  divisions  was  dispatched  against 
the  enemy's  cavalry  at  Hamilton's  Crossing.  The  reserve 
artillery  was  to  move  to  Corbin's  Bridge,  the  trains  to  Todd's 
Tavern. 

The  Wilderness  is  a  gently  undulating  tract  of  low  ridges 
and  swampy  swales  alternating,  covered  with  a  dense  second 
growth  of  small  pines  intermixed  with  oaks,  ash,  and  walnut, 
and  thick  and  matted  underbrush  in  patches  almost  impene 
trable.  It  is  from  ten  to  twelve  miles  across  in  any  direction. 
The  main  roads  which  traverse  it  and  a  few  clearings,  widely 
separated,  let  but  little  daylight  into  the  dense,  gloomy,  and 
monotonous  woods. 


188  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Once  off  the  roads,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  mano3uvre 
troops  through  this  region,  and  almost  impossible  to  preserve 
their  orderly  formation,  or  to  keep  them  in  any  given  direc 
tion  when  in  motion.  The  woods  are  almost  impenetrable  to 
horsemen,  and  aides  and  orderlies  were  baffled  and  bewil 
dered  in  them.  The  tactical  skill  or  personal  example  and 
influence  of  commanders,  so  all-important  on  the  battle-field, 
is  lost  in  this  dismal  forest.  Unable  to  see  but  a  hundred 
yards,  unable  to  fix  or  direct  the  movement  of  troops  but 
through  this  narrow  range  of  vision,  they  could  only  form  and 
deploy  properly  and  make  the  right  connections  on  the  flank 
at  the  outset,  and  then  start  them  forward  with  the  certainty 
that  the  lines  would  soon  become  crooked  and  disordered,  and 
might,  as  actually  occurred  on  several  occasions,  on  reaching 
the  enemy,  offer  an  exposed  flank  or  rear  to  his  attack,  instead 
of  striking  him  with  the  full  force  of  a  well-ordered  front. 

The  6th  corps  moved  at  seven  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  5th,  leaving  the  3d  division  to  guard  the  ford.  The  1st 
division,  Wright,  with  NeilTs  3d  brigade  of  the  2d  division, 
was  moved  up  in  line  through  the  woods  to  support  the  right 
of  the  5th  corps.  Getty's  division,  the  2d,  except  Neill's  bri 
gade,  was  massed  near  the  tavern  and  awaited  orders. 

Warren  moved  forward  in  the  morning,  according  to  orders, 
toward  Parker's  Store  by  the  cross-road,  from  his  position  to 
that  point.  His  leading  division,  Crawford's,  advanced  some 
three  miles  to  Chewning's  Farm,  where  it  was  halted  and 
thrown  into  position  on  the  high  ground,  for  the  enemy 
under  Ewell  was  found  in  force  about  two  and  a  half  miles 
out  on  the  Pike. 

Griffin's  division  at  once  attacked  him,  and  Wadsworth's 
division,  with  one  brigade  of  Crawford's  and  one  of  Robin 
son's,  was  pushed  forward  to  support  his  left,  while  Wright's 
1st  division  of  the  6th  corps,  with  Neill's  brigade  (3d)  of 
2d  division  advanced  on  Griffin's  right.  Griffin's  attack  was 
at  first  successful,  but  the  enemy  speedily  developed  and 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       189 

brought  up  a  superior  force,  forced  back  his  right,  and  then 
his  whole  division,  with  the  loss  of  two  guns.  The  troops  of 
the  6th  corps  could  not  make  their  way  through  the  dense 
woods  and  underbrush  in  time.  The  troops  advancing  on 
Griffin's  left  also  failed  to  get  up  until  after  his  repulse,  and 
then  arrived  in  front  of  the  enemy  with  their  lines  quarter- 
wheeled  to  the  right,  and  the  left  flank  offered  to  and  inviting 
his  attack.  The  enemy  quickly  -seized  the  advantage,  fell 
upon  them,  and  tumbled  them  back  in  some  disorder.  The 
result  of  this  moving  in  the  dark  was  that  Crawford's  divi 
sion  had  to  be  drawn  in  a  mile,  and  the  5th  corps  took  a 
defensive  line,  with  its  right  on  the  Pike,  and  extending  to 
the  left. 

Sedgwick's  troops  extended  the  line  to  the  right.  Seymour's 
brigade  of  the  3d  division  came  up  from  the  ford  and  joined 
late  in  the  afternoon.  The  enemy  attacked  sharply  and  were 
repulsed,  and  later,  about  5  in  the  afternoon,  Neill's  brigade 
of  the  2d  division,  and  Seymour's  of  the  3d,  and  Penrose's  1st 
brigade  of  the  1st  division  attacked  the  enemy  in  his  position, 
already  well  intrenched,  without  success,  but  suffering  heavy 
loss.  Night  fell  with  both  sides  facing  each  other  in  position 
across  the  Pike  and  well  intrenched. 

As  soon  as  Warren's  movements  and  the  reports  from  the 
cavalry  at  Parker's  Store  had  shown  that  the  enemy  was  in 
fighting  force  and  mood  on  the  Pike  and  Plank  roads,  orders 
were  sent  to  Hancock  to  halt  at  Todd's  Tavern,  but  the  head 
of  his  column  had  advanced  two  miles  beyond  that  point 
when  he  received  the  order. 

At  noon  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman  of  General  Meade's 
staff  delivered  an  order  to  General  Getty —  whose  division, 
except  Neill's  brigade,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  massed 
near  the  Old  Wilderness  Tavern  —  to  hasten  to  the  junction  of 
the  Plank  and  Brock  roads,  hold  that  point,  and  support  the 
cavalry  which  was  being  driven  in  from  Parker's  Store. 

The  division  marched  at  once  and  rapidly.   Just  as  its 


190  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

commander,  preceding  it  some  distance,  reached  the  cross 
roads,  a  detachment  of  cavalry  came  flying  down  the  Plank 
Road  strung  out  like  a  flock  of  wild  geese,  and  were  soon  out 
of  sight,  a  few  barely  pausing  to  cry  out  that  the  rebel  in 
fantry  were  coming  down  the  road  in  force,  a  statement  cor 
roborated  by  a  few  musket  shots  heard  in  the  woods  in  front. 
Getty  instantly  hurried  back  an  aide  to  bring  his  troops  up 
at  the  double-quick.  Surrounded  by  his  staff  and  orderlies, 
with  his  headquarters  flag  flying  overhead,  he  took  post 
directly  at  the  intersection  of  the  roads.  Soon  a  few  gray 
forms  were  discerned  far  up  the  narrow  Plank  Eoad  moving 
cautiously  forward,  then  a  bullet  went  whistling  overhead, 
and  another  and  another,  and  then  the  leaden  hail  came 
faster  and  faster  over  and  about  the  little  group  until  its 
destruction  seemed  imminent  and  inevitable.  But  Getty 
would  not  budge.  "  We  must  hold  this  point  at  any  risk,"  he 
exclaimed,  "  our  men  will  soon  be  up."  In  a  few  minutes, 
which  seemed  an  age  to  the  little  squad,  the  leading  regi 
ments  of  Wheaton's  brigade,  the  1st,  came  running  like 
greyhounds  along  the  Brock  Road  until  the  first  regiment 
passed  the  Plank  Road,  and  then,  at  the  commands  "  Halt !  " 
"  Front !  "  "  Fire !  "  poured  a  volley  into  the  woods  and 
threw  out  skirmishers  in  almost  less  time  than  it  takes  to  tell 
it.  Dead  and  wounded  rebel  skirmishers  were  found  within 
thirty  yards  of  the  cross-roads,  so  nearly  had  they  gained  it, 
and  from  these  wounded  prisoners  it  was  learned  that  Hill's 
corps,  Heth's  division  in  advance,  supported  by  Wilcox's 
division,  was  the  opposing  force. 

One  fellow  among  these  prisoners  caused  much  amusement 
by  his  ready  and  somewhat  impudent  replies.  "  Robert  E. 
mount  have  100,000  or  he  mount  have  200,000  men,"  he  said, 
when  asked  as  to  Lee's  force.  "  I  don't  reckon  Robert  E. 
intends  to  fight  here,  but  if  he  does,  he  '11  whop  you  sure." 
Finally  he  exclaimed,  as  he  was  taken  off,  "  Sure  enough, 
Robert  E.  has  n't  many  men,  but  what  he  's  got  are  right 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       191 

good  ones,  and  I  reckon  you  '11  find  it  out  before  you  leave 
yere." 

A  severely  wounded  orderly,  a  dead  horse,  and  two  bullet 
holes  through  the  headquarters  flag  were  the  only  casualties 
of  this  bold  stand. 

No  time  was  lost  in  forming  the  division  in  two  lines  in 
front  of  the  Brock  Koad,  Wheaton's  brigade  in  the  centre 
astride  the  Plank,  Eustis,  4th,  on  the  right,  Grant's  Ver- 
monters,  the  2d,  on  the  left.  Efforts  were  made  to  communi 
cate  directly  through  the  woods  on  the  right  front  with  War 
ren's  left,  but  without  success,  because  the  enemy  was  found 
in  force  between.  For  the  next  two  hours,  save  the  desultory 
fire  of  skirmishers,  everything  was  quiet.  The  enemy  was 
evidently  getting  into  position,  no  easy  matter  in  the  dense 
woods.  Getty's  second  line,  just  in  front  of  the  road,  labored 
to  throw  up  breastworks. 

This  point  is  the  very  centre  and  type  of  the  Wilderness. 
The  scrubby  woods  and  tangled  thickets  stretch  away  on 
every  side,  interminably  to  all  appearance.  The  narrow  roads 
offer  the  only  means  of  going  anywhere  or  of  seeing  anything. 
Once  off,  then  low  ridges  and  hollows  succeed  each  other, 
without  a  single  feature  to  serve  as  a  landmark,  and  no  one 
but  an  experienced  woodsman  with  a  compass  could  keep  his 
bearings  and  position  or  preserve  his  course. 

Meanwhile  orders  were  sent  to  Hancock  to  move  up  the 
Brock  Road  to  the  Plank  Road,  in  readiness  to  advance  on 
Parker's  Store.  He  had  already  advanced  several  miles  on 
the  Catharpin  Road  past  the  junction  of  the  Brock  Road  with 
the  former,  on  receipt  of  these  orders,  but  at  once  counter 
marched  and  turned  off  on  the  Brock.  At  half -past  three  the 
head  of  his  column,  Birney's  division,  came  up,  and  as  rapidly 
as  possible  was  formed  on  Getty's  left,  extending  along  and  in 
front  of  the  road. 

Getty  now  took  ground  more  to  the  right,  placing  Wheat 
on's  brigade  wholly  on  the  right  of  the  Plank.  A  section  of 


192  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Ricketts's  Pennsylvania  battery,  of  the  2d  corps,  was  planted 
at  the  cross-roads,  the  only  point  where  it  could  be  used. 

Meanwhile  army  headquarters  had  been  urging  Getty  to 
attack,  if  practicable ;  but  that  cool  veteran,  convinced  that 
the  enemy  were  far  stronger  in  numbers  than  his  command, 
withheld  his  attack  until  Hancock  could  get  up  and  go  in 
with  him,  in  which  view  he  was  fully  sustained  by  that  officer. 
At  length,  about  four  o'clock,  General  Meade  ordered  Getty 
to  attack  at  once  without  waiting  for  the  2cl  corps,  an  order 
immediately  reiterated  by  Colonel  Lyman  in  person.  The 
division,  being  in  perfect  readiness,  moved  forward  without 
a  moment's  delay. 

Ricketts's  two  guns  were  moved  up  the  Plank  by  hand 
with  the  second  line,  which  here  was  within  sixty  yards  of  the 
front  line.  The  lines  struggled  and  pushed  their  way  through 
the  dense  thickets,  becoming  more  and  more  crooked  and  dis 
ordered,  and  soon  drew  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  He  was  found 
in  strong  force  overlapping  the  division  on  both  flanks.  In 
the  centre  he  was  pressed  back  a  short  distance,  but  the  con 
test  at  once  became  a  heavy  pounding  match  between  masses 
of  brave  and  determined  men.  The  lines  did  not  move  much. 
Both  sides  hugged  the  ground,  or  whenever  possible  sought 
the  partial  shelter  of  a  ridge,  and  kept  up  a  steady  fire. 

Getty's  division,  weakened  by  the  detachment  of  Neill's 
3d  brigade,  which  ranked  second  only  to  the  Vermonters, 
mustered  14  regiments  and  6000  effective.  Its  antagonists 
comprised  two  full  divisions,  Heth's  and  Wilcox's,  having  28 
regiments  and  12,000  to  14,000  effective.  They  strengthened 
and  renewed  their  lines  wherever  they  showed  signs  of  weak 
ness  or  disorder.  The  musketry  was  terrific  and  continuous. 
Usually  when  infantry  meets  infantry  the  clash  of  arms  is 
brief.  One  side  or  the  other  speedily  gives  way.  Here  neither 
side  would  give  way,  and  the  steady  firing  rolled  and  crackled 
from  end  to  end  of  the  contending  lines,  as  if  it  would  never 
cease.  Manoeuvring  was  impossible.  But  little  could  be  seen 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       193 

of  the  enemy.  Whenever  any  troops  rose  to  their  feet  and 
attempted  to  press  forward,  they  became  a  target  for  the  half- 
hidden  foe,  and  lost  severely. 

At  half-past  five,  after  this  bushwhacking  combat  had 
lasted  an  hour,  numbers  of  the  enemy  were  noticed  jumping 
across  the  Plank  Road  from  side  to  side,  about  a  hundred 
yards  in  front  of  our  first  line.  Ricketts's  section  kept  firing 
at  these  squads  with  canister,  but  they  always  seemed  to  jump 
aside  just  in  time  to  escape  injury.  At  length  the  object  of 
this  performance  was  seen ;  namely,  to  draw  the  fire  of  our 
guns,  when  the  enemy  charged  in  force  on  both  sides  of  the 
road.  Our  lines  bent  inward  without  breaking,  and  for  an 
instant  the  assailants  reached  and  planted  a  color  at  Ricketts's 
guns ;  but  as  the  seasoned  bow  when  strongly  bent  springs 
back  with  redoubled  force,  so  the  men  of  the  white  cross,  who 
had  momentarily  given  ground,  with  a  cheer  rushed  forward 
upon  the  enemy  and  drove  them  headlong. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  troops  of  the  2d  corps  retook  these 
guns.  Part  of  that  corps  was  posted  at  the  cross-roads  in 
support,  and  may  have  moved  up  when  the  guns  were  endan 
gered,  but  as  an  eye-witness,  I  know  that  the  brave  Ver- 
monters  and  men  of  the  1st  brigade  next  the  Plank  surged 
forward  at  the  crisis  without  orders  and  drove  the  enemy 
from  the  guns,  and  that  the  presence  of  the  2d  corps  made 
no  difference  in  the  result.  I  know,  too,  that  Hancock  in  the 
evening  claimed  that  his  troops  recaptured  the  guns,  and  that 
Getty  was  indignant  thereat,  and  earnestly  protested  that  his 
division  retook  them  unaided. 

It  was  only  by  the  most  stubborn  fighting  that  the  division 
held  its  ground,  outnumbered  and  outflanked  by  Hill's  two 
large  divisions. 

All  this  time  the  2d  corps  was  getting  into  position  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  —  impeded  as  it  was  by  the  narrow  road,  blocked 
with  artillery  and  men,  and  the  dense  and  tangled  woods,  — and 
formed  on  Getty's  left,  first  Birney's  division,  next  Mott's, 


194  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

next  Gibbon's.  Barlow,  except  Frank's  brigade,  on  the  left, 
"  was  thrown  forward  on  high  clear  ground  in  front  of  the 
Brock  Road,  which  commanded  the  country  for  some  distance 
on  the  right  and  left,  and  covered  the  bed  of  the  Fredericks- 
burg  and  Orange  Court  House  unfinished  railroad,"  says 
Humphreys.1 

Here,  too,  the  only  ground  offering  effective  range,  all  the 
artillery  was  posted  except  Ricketts's  section  on  the  Plank,  and 
a  battery,  Dow's  6th  Maine  battery,  which  was  at  Mott's  left. 
Frank's  brigade  was  posted  across  the  Brock  Road,  on  the 
extreme  left.  Carroll's  brigade  of  Gibbon's  division  came 
up  in  support  of  Getty's  right.  Owen's  brigade  of  Gibbon's 
division  was  placed  on  either  side  of  the  Plank  Road.  Smyth's 
and  Brooke's  brigades  from  Barlow's  division  went  in  on  the 
extreme  left,  and  drove  back  Hill's  right  some  distance,  and 
with  Birney's  division  and  Mott's  division  greatly  relieved 
the  pressure  upon  the  Yermonters,  but  the  hard  fighting  was 
kept  up  until  night  put  an  end  to  it. 

After  dark  Getty's  division  was  relieved  by  the  2d  corps, 
and  withdrawn  from  the  front  line.  Not  all,  however.  One 
thousand  men  of  the  Vermont  brigade,  as  reported  by  its 
officers,  lay  dead  and  wounded  upon  the  ground  they  had  so 
well  defended,  and  the  losses  in  the  1st  and  4th  brigades 
were  nearly  as  severe. 

General  Getty  always  regarded  this  as  the  hardest  fought 
battle  he  ever  knew.  He  always  insisted  and  dwelt  upon 
the  superiority  of  the  enemy  in  numbers,  and  when  after  the 
surrender  at  Appomattox  he  met  Heth  and  Wilcox,  whom  he 
knew  well  before  the  war,  his  first  questions  were  as  to  their 
force  in  this  fight,  and  he  was  not  surprised  to  find  his  esti 
mate  fully  confirmed. 

In  wresting  the  cross-roads  from  Hill's  corps,  Getty  and 
his  brave  division  saved  the  army  from  disaster.  That  junc- 

1  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  1864  and  1865,  by  General  A.  A.  Humphreys, 
p.  31. 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       195 

tion  was  a  key-point  of  vital  importance  ;  and  the  occupation 
of  it  by  the  enemy's  strong  column  would  have  cut  the  Union 
army  in  two,  separating  the  2d  corps  from  the  5th  and  6th, 
exposed  to  capture  the  entire  artillery  reserve  then  moving 
up  the  Plank  Road  from  Chancellorsville,  and  would  have 
enabled  Hill  to  strike  the  right  wing  in  flank  and  rear  while 
it  was  held  by  Ewell  in  front. 

While  the  pounding  match  was  going  on  between  Hill  and 
Getty,  Wadsworth,  with  his  division  of  the  5th  corps,  and 
Baxter's  brigade  of  the  2d  division,  attempted  about  5  P.  M. 
to  move  from  the  left  of  the  5th  corps  position  in  a  southwest 
direction  in  order  to  strike  the  enemy  engaged  with  Getty 
upon  the  flank  and  rear ;  but  his  progress  was  so  impeded  by 
the  tangled  woods  and  thickets  that  he  only  encountered  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  or  flankers,  whom  he  drove  before  him, 
when  night  fell  and  he  was  forced  to  halt  in  line  facing  south 
or  southwest  in  the  midst  of  the  woods. 

The  corps  commanders  were  all  ordered  to  attack  at  five 
the  next  morning,  but  Hancock  was  expected  to  strike  the 
heaviest  blow  upon  the  left.  To  aid  him,  Burnside's  three 
white  divisions  were  ordered  up  from  Germanna  Ford,  and 
that  officer,  leaving  Stevenson's  division  at  the  tavern,  was 
with  the  other  two,  Willcox's  and  Potter's,  to  be  in  position 
on  the  left  and  front  of  the  5th  corps,  and  to  advance  with  the 
rest  of  the  army  at  five  o'clock,  get  possession  of  the  high 
ground  about  Chewning's,  and  fall  upon  Hill's  rear  and  flank. 

To  protect  the  flank  from  Longstreet's  threatened  approach, 
Hancock  left  Gibbon  with  part  of  his  own  and  all  of  Barlow's 
division  and  the  artillery  to  hold  the  position  taken  up  by  them 
on  the  day  before.  With  all  the  rest  of  his  troops  deployed 
in  four  lines,  —  Birney  and  Mott  in  front,  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  Plank,  Getty's  division  in  two  lines  in  support, 
the  Vermonters  on  the  left,  Wheaton  in  the  centre  crossing 
the  road,  Eustis  on  the  right,  Carroll's  and  Owen's  brigades 
of  Gibbon's  division  on  the  right  and  left  of  Getty,  —  he 


196  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

swept  down  upon  the  enemy.  Again  the  forest  resounded  with 
musketry.  The  pounding  match  was  resumed,  but  the  pressure 
upon  Hill's  troops,  weakened  by  the  fearful  struggle  of  the 
preceding  afternoon,  was  too  great  for  them  long  to  sustain. 
After  an  hour's  fierce  struggle  they  were  slowly  forced  back, 
fighting  stubbornly,  and  our  troops  pushed  forward  with 
redoubled  vigor. 

The  enemy  lost  ground  rapidly.  A  mile  from  the  cross 
roads  Wadsworth's  division  of  the  5th  corps  came  sweeping 
in  from  the  right,  driving  the  enemy  in  great  confusion,  and 
all  joined  together  and  pressed  on  after  the  now  almost  routed 
foe.  Hundreds  of  prisoners  were  taken,  passed  along  the 
lines  to  the  Plank  Road,  and  started  down  it  to  find  the  pro 
vost  guards  for  themselves.  The  road  was  thronged  with 
these  prisoners,  frightened  and  anxious  to  get  out  of  fire, 
wounded  men  and  stretcher-bearers,  all  flocking  to  the  rear, 
with  an  occasional  staff  officer  forcing  his  way  through  the 
throng. 

As  our  troops  advanced,  the  fire  of  our  own  guns  fell  upon 
them  and  inflicted  some  loss.  I  was  sent  back  to  stop  this 
artillery  fire,  which  I  did,  and  returned  by  the  Plank  Road. 
As  I  approached  the  front,  the  enemy's  guns  were  enfilading 
the  Plank  Road  with  a  sharp  fire  of  shell  and  shrapnel. 
Knowing  that  if  I  left  the  road  and  attempted  to  ride  through 
the  woods,  I  would  be  an  indefinite  time  in  rejoining  my  com 
mander,  I  set  spurs  to  my  horse  and  went  up  the  road  at  top 
speed,  when  suddenly  I  was  almost  stunned  and  covered  with 
smoke  and  dust  by  a  shell  bursting  apparently  in  my  very 
face.  I  felt  a  blow  just  below  the  knee,  thought,  "  There  goes 
a  leg,"  my  horse  swerved  and  then  jumped  forward,  and  the 
next  instant  I  was  among  the  group  on  a  little  knoll  by 
the  roadside,  consisting  of  Getty  and  his  staff,  receiving 
congratulations  at  my  escape.  My  only  hurt  was  an  ugly 
cut  just  below  the  right  knee,  from  a  piece  of  shell. 

The  troops,  still  advancing,  encountered  heavy  artillery  fire 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       197 

from  batteries  on  both  sides  of  the  road  which  were  effect 
ually  masked  by  the  dense  scrub.  General  Getty,  in  compli 
ance  with  orders  from  General  Birney,  now  moved  his  division 
wholly  on  the  left  of  the  road,  but  soon  after  on  his  respon 
sibility  moved  Wheaton's  and  Eustis's  brigades  back  to  the 
right,  as  that  side  seemed  nearly  bare  of  troops  and  the  enemy 
was  threatening  an  attack.  All  this  time  the  Union  troops 
were  steadily  advancing,  driving  the  enemy  in  some  disorder 
and  taking  many  prisoners,  and  had  reached  a  point  within 
a  mile  of  Parker's  Store.  The  advance  was  necessarily  very 
slow  and  laborious,  and  the  lines  became  much  broken,  dis 
ordered,  and  disconnected. 

The  threatened  attack  on  the  right  at  length  burst  with 
great  fury. 

Longstreet,  who  had  brought  his  corps  up  to  Parker's 
Store,  now  moved  forward  to  take  Hill's  place.  Field's 
division  of  his  corps,  supported  by  Anderson's  division  of 
Hill's  corps,  which  had  also  just  got  up  that  morning  from  its 
position  on  the  Rapidan,  fell  upon  our  right. 

The  line  in  front  gave  way.  Wheaton  and  Eustis  stepped 
into  the  gap  and  stubbornly  held  the  enemy.  Kershaw's 
division  of  Longstreet's  corps  advanced  against  our  left, 
which  was  further  advanced  than  the  right,  and  forced  it  back 
somewhat.  The  Vermonters  on  that  side  of  the  Plank  Road 
were  now  in  the  front  line,  and  the  firing  grew  heavier  on 
both  sides. 

While  this  contest  was  raging  in  front,  four  brigades  of 
the  enemy  —  viz.,  Wofford's  of  Kershaw's  division,  Ander 
son's  of  Field's  division,  Mahone's  of  Anderson's  division, 
and  Davis's  of  Heth's  division  —  filed  by  the  right  flank  down 
the  bed  of  the  unfinished  Fredericksburg  and  Orange  Court 
House  Railroad,  formed  facing  north,  and  about  noon  ad 
vanced  and  fell  with  fatal  force  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of 
the  Union  troops,  disordered  and  intermingled  in  their  long 
advance  through  the  tangled  thickets. 


198  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Frank's  brigade  of  Barlow's  division,  says  General  Fran 
cis  A.  Walker  in  his  history  of  the  2d  corps,  which  had 
already  lost  heavily  and  was  nearly  out  of  ammunition,  was 
struck  on  end,  broken  into  fragments,  and  hurled  back  in 
dire  disorder.  The  next  troops  encountered  comprised  Mc 
Allister's  brigade  of  Mott's  division,  and  they  too,  although 
they  had  partially  changed  front  on  the  alarm  given  by  the 
attack  on  Frank,  were  quickly  overlapped,  crushed,  and  driven 
back. 

Advised  now  by  the  firing  and  shouting  of  the  turning 
column  of  the  success  of  this  movement  against  our  flank, 
the  Confederate  divisions  of  Kershaw,  Field,  and  Anderson 
threw  themselves  with  great  impetuosity  upon  the  front  of  the 
Union  forces,  and  after  a  desperate  struggle  our  troops  began 
to  give  way. 

The  Vermonters,  according  to  the  report  of  their  brigade 
commander,  Colonel  L.  A.  Grant,  held  their  ground  until  the 
troops  on  the  right  and  left  were  forced  back  and  the  enemy's 
fire  was  coming  in  from  both  flanks.  Then  the  order  was 
given  to  rally  on  the  Brock  Road,  and  back  these  stanch  regi 
ments  went,  and  stayed  not  on  the  order  of  their  going.  Yet, 
though  terribly  scattered  and  broken,  the  men  lost  none  of 
their  cool  Yankee  courage  and  intelligence,  and  every  regi 
ment  soon  re-formed  upon  the  rallying  road,  sadly  diminished 
in  numbers  indeed,  but  with  its  colors  and  organization  intact. 

On  the  left,  says  Walker,  Mott's  division  was  fast  crumb 
ling  away  under  the  fire  upon  their  flank  ;  on  the  right  the 
heroic  Wadsworth  had  been  killed  at  the  head  of  his  division, 
and  his  regiments  were  staggering  under  the  terrific  blows  of 
the  encouraged  and  exultant  enemy ;  in  the  centre  Birney's 
division  and  the  brigades  of  Carroll,  Owen,  and  Webb,  worn 
with  fighting  and  depleted  by  their  enormous  losses,  were 
being  slowly  pressed  back  down  the  Plank  Road.  Thousands 
of  broken  men  were  going  to  the  rear,  giving  the  onlooker 
the  impression  of  a  perfect  rout. 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE  WILDERNESS       199 

Desperate  but  fruitless  efforts  were  made  by  Meade  and 
Hancock  to  stem  the  backward  tide  of  broken  men.  At  least 
three  lines  of  battle  came  sweeping  through  the  woods,  one 
after  the  other,  to  be  in  turn  shattered  and  forced  back. 
Carruth's  brigade  of  Stevenson's  division  of  the  9th  corps 
was  then  put  in.  A  part  of  Willcox's  division  of  that  corps, 
probably  Christ's  2d  brigade,  was  also  put  in,  for  I  myself 
met,  shook  hands,  and  exchanged  ar  word  with  Colonel  David 
Morrison  of  the  79th  Highlanders,  New  York  Volunteers,  as 
his  regiment  was  advancing. 

It  is  impossible  to  give  detailed  movements  or  even  to  state 
with  any  accuracy  the  constantly  changing  positions  of  the 
several  divisions,  brigades,  or  regiments  in  this  confused  and 
blind  bushwhacking,  which  broke,  scattered,  and  dispersed  in 
the  forest,  and  which,  sticking  to  the  colors,  went  back  slowly, 
resisting  stubbornly  at  every  ridge  or  rise  of  ground. 

Enough  that  after  a  severe  contest  of  two  hours'  duration 
the  troops  were  all  forced  back  to  the  Brock  Road.  The 
2d  division,  6th  corps,  throughout  all  this  righting  and  falling 
back  held  well  together.  Not  a  single  regiment  lost  its  colors 
or  its  organization,  but  many  men  were  scattered  and  separ 
ated  from  their  commands,  and  fell  back  singly  or  in  small 
parties.  Many  of  the  other  troops,  however,  were  completely 
dispersed.  The  woods  were  filled  with  fugitives  and  scattered 
men,  all  making  their  way  to  the  rear,  while  the  musketry  in 
front,  now  desultory  and  scattering,  now  breaking  out  in 
heavier  volleys,  nearer,  clearer,  deadlier  than  before,  showed 
that  some  of  their  comrades  of  sterner  stuff  were  still  strug 
gling  manfully  to  check  the  victorious  enemy. 

Soon  after  this  reverse  movement  commenced,  General 
Getty  was  severely  wounded  in  the  shoulder  and  obliged  to 
leave  the  field,  turning  over  the  command  of  the  division  to 
General  Wheaton. 

A  little  before  that,  a  bullet  coming  directly  from  our  left 
pierced  my  horse  through  the  heart.  He  gave  one  convulsive 


200  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

leap  in  the  air  and  fell  in  a  heap  dead.  I  mounted  the  horse 
of  an  orderly. 

When  it  was  seen  that  no  stand  could  be  maintained  far 
ther  in  front  than  the  Brock  Road,  all  the  officers  exerted 
themselves  to  rally  the  troops  upon  the  rude  and  incomplete 
breastworks  thrown  up  along  the  road  the  afternoon  before. 
Hundreds  of  fugitives  were  crossing  the  road  and  plunging 
out  of  sight  into  the  woods  in  the  rear,  and  others  were  going 
down  the  road  to  the  right,  and  hundreds  of  others  were 
breaking  out  of  the  woods  into  the  open  ground  near  the 
tavern.  There  was  no  panic.  They  were  not  running,  but 
diligently  making  their  way  to  a  place  of  safety.  Observing 
among  them  a  number  of  white  crosses,  I  called  upon  these 
men  to  stop  and  form  line  and  help  rally  the  others.  The 
white  crosses  stopped  at  once,  threw  themselves  into  line, 
many  others  fell  in  with  them,  and  in  a  short  time  I  started 
up  the  road  at  the  head  of  a  motley  column  of  several  hun 
dred  determined  men,  and  posted  it  in  a  vacant  space  behind 
the  breastworks  not  far  from  the  cross-roads.  The  men  were 
rallying  and  forming  fast.  Every  instant  an  officer  would 
break  out  of  the  woods,  followed  by  a  column  of  men  whom 
he  had  rallied,  and  file  into  position  in  the  rapidly  growing 
line.  The  alacrity  and  determination  evinced  by  these  whilom 
fugitives  showed  that  it  was  clear  grit  and  patriotism,  not 
merely  the  force  of  discipline,  which  kept  them  up  to  the 
work. 

While  the  Union  troops  were  thus  spontaneously  re-form 
ing  themselves,  the  enemy,  almost  equally  disordered  and 
scattered,  were  also  straightening  out  and  re-forming  their 
lines.  The  troops  which  made  the  fatal  flank  attack,  after 
sweeping  the  forest  nearly  to  the  Plank  Road,  wound  up  with 
a  volley  which  killed  General  Jenkins  and  severely  wounded 
Longstreet.  Doubtless  this  was  an  additional  reason  to  Lee, 
who  was  present  in  person  on  this  part  of  the  field,  to  re-form 
his  lines  before  pressing  his  advantage  further.  At  all  events 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       201 

half  an  hour's  respite  of  precious  time  was  afforded  the  Union 
troops,  which  was  improved  to  the  utmost,  as  already  nar 
rated. 

Soon  after  4  p.  M.  the  enemy  again  advanced  and  made 
desperate  charges  to  carry  our  last  defensive  position,  but 
all  in  vain.  Everywhere  he  was  handsomely  repulsed.  At 
one  point  only,  at  the  cross-roads,  he  gained  the  breastworks, 
but  was  immediately  driven  out  by  Carroll's  brigade  of  Gib 
bon's  division  of  the  2d  corps,  which  fortunately  happened 
to  be  in  the  second  line  at  that  point.  It  is  also  claimed  that 
Leasure's  brigade,  2d  of  the  1st  division,  9th  corps,  turned 
the  scale  at  this  critical  moment.  After  a  struggle  of  half  an 
hour  the  enemy  fell  back  into  the  woods,  leaving  the  ground 
covered  with  his  dead  and  wounded. 

The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  on  the  left  was  over. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  Leasure's  small  brigade  of  Steven 
son's  (1st)  division,  9th  corps,  which  had  been  sent  to  the 
extreme  left  to  support  Gibbon  on  that  flank,  deployed  in 
front  of,  and  at  right  angles  to,  our  works,  and  swept  along 
our  whole  front  from  left  to  right,  clearing  out  the  enemy's 
skirmishers  and  sharpshooters,  but  it  encountered  no  force. 
The  enemy,  having  withdrawn  a  few  hundred  yards,  was 
doubtless  engaged  in  taking  up  and  fortifying  his  position. 

During  the  afternoon  the  woods  took  fire  and  burnt  over, 
the  fire  reaching  even  to  our  breastworks  on  the  Brock  Road, 
which  were  consumed  in  several  places.  Hundreds  of  the 
wounded  of  both  sides,  scattered  through  the  great  forest 
tract,  five  or  six  square  miles,  so  stubbornly  fought  over,  must 
have  perished  in  the  flames. 

Efforts  were  made  during  the  day  to  push  General  Burn- 
side,  with  his  two  divisions,  out  on  Warren's  left,  and  upon 
the  flank  of  the  enemy  on  the  Plank  Road.  It  was  two  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  before  he  advanced,  and  his  attack  was  not 
made  early  enough,  or  with  sufficient  vigor,  to  accomplish 
anything. 


202  THE   WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

Warren  and  Sedgwick  held  the  centre  and  right  all  day, 
making  repeated  bloody  and  useless  attacks  upon  the  enemy's 
intrenched  position.  Just  at  or  before  dusk  the  latter  turned 
and  enveloped  Sedgwick's  right,  struck  it  with  great  force  and 
suddenness,  and  almost  in  an  instant  shattered  or  swept  away 
two  brigades,  —  Seymour's  of  the  3d  division  and  Shaler's  of 
the  1st,  —  both  of  whom,  with  several  hundred  of  their  troops, 
were  captured.  Sedgwick  at  once  drove  out  the  enemy  with 
Neill's  3d  brigade  of  the  2d  division  and  Upton's  2d  brigade 
of  the  1st  division,  and  reestablished  his  lines.  During  the 
night  he  took  up  a  new  position,  re-forming  his  lines  so  as 
to  cross  the  Germanna  Plank  and  the  road  to  Culpeper  Mine 
Ford. 

Sheridan  was  unable  to  carry  out  his  orders,  being  obliged 
to  remain  in  position  to  cover  and  guard  the  enormous  trains. 

Timid  strategy  and  aggressive  fighting  were  the  distinguish 
ing  features  of  this  battle  on  the  Union  side,  characteristics 
which,  it  may  be  said,  marked  and  marred  Grant's  entire 
campaign. 

Humphreys  and  Walker  give  some  sound  criticisms  which 
will  well  repay  attention. 

The  first  mistake  was  in  not  throwing  the  army  further 
forward  on  the  4th  of  May  and  seizing  and  fortifying  the  line 
of  Shady  Grove  Church,  Parker's  Store,  and  Kobertson's 
Tavern. 

This  would  have  placed  the  army  upon  more  open  ground 
and  in  better  position  to  advance  either  by  the  front  or  left. 

The  next  mistake  was  in  not  resolutely  pushing  Hancock 
forward  on  the  Catharpin  Road  on  the  5th  of  May.  Had  he 
been  allowed  to  push  on,  and  fallen  upon  Lee  at  Parker's 
Store,  what  could  have  saved  him  from  disaster?  Getty, 
reinforced  by  one  of  Hancock's  divisions,  or  by  two  brigades 
of  the  6th  corps,  could  have  held  Hill  until  the  pressure  of 
Hancock  upon  Lee's  rear  would  have  compelled  both  Hill 
and  Ewell  to  face  about. 


THE  SIXTH  CORPS  IN  THE   WILDERNESS       203 

Such  a  movement  by  Hancock,  it  is  true,  would  have  vio 
lated  the  rules  of  war,  but  it  was  necessary  to  take  some  risk. 

The  great  difficulty  was  to  bring  all  parts  of  the  army  to 
bear  upon  the  enemy  together ;  and  Hancock,  with  his  25,000 
men,  might  well  have  been  trusted  to  sustain  himself  until 
the  other  corps  in  contact  with  the  enemy  could  share  his 
burden. 

The  great  difficulty  on  the  Plank  Road  on  the  second  day 
was  the  massing  of  too  many  troops  in  a  comparatively 
narrow  field,  where  they  were  sure  to  be  confused  and  get 
out  of  hand. 

This,  however,  was  more  the  fault  of  the  ground  than  of 
the  commanders.  No  time  or  opportunity  was  afforded  them 
for  reconnoitring  the  ground  in  front  after  the  battle  was 
joined,  and  nothing  could  be  done  but  to  push  the  troops 
forward  and  bear  down  the  enemy  by  superior  force  and  hard 
fighting. 


VIII 

THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC  MAY  7-11  1864 

BY 

BREVET  BRIG.-GEN.  CHARLES  LAWRENCE  PEIRSON 

U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  November  10,  1879 


THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC  MAY  7-11  1864 

THE  object  of  this  paper  is  to  give  some  account  of  the  move 
ments  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  the  7th  to  the  llth 
of  May,  1864,  inclusive.  Before  proceeding  to  the  account  of 
the  operations  of  those  days,  it  will  be  well  to  look  at  the  situ 
ation  of  the  armies  as  developed  by  the  events  of  the  preceding 
days. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  crossed  the  Rapidan  River  on 
the  4th  of  May.  It  then  consisted l  of  125,000  effective  and 
non-effective  men  (including  Burnside's  command),  4300 
wagons,  835  ambulances,  and  56,500  animals ;  and  was  com 
posed  of  the  2d  corps,  under  Hancock ;  5th  corps,  under  War 
ren  ;  and  6th  corps,  under  Sedgwick ;  with  artillery  (300  guns), 
cavalry,  and  engineer  brigade,  besides  the  9th  corps,  under 
Burnside.  The  latter  was  left  temporarily  behind  to  protect 
our  communications,  as  far  back  as  Bull  Run,  during  the 
crossing.  The  army  was  in  splendid  condition,  thoroughly 
armed,  well  officered,  and,  with  the  exception  of  the  9th  corps 
(two  thirds  of  whom  were  new  troops),  well  disciplined,  and 
accustomed  to  the  hardships  and  dangers  of  actual  warfare. 
The  movements  were  to  be  under  the  direction  of  General 
Meade,  but  the  whole  army  was  under  the  personal  command 
of  General  Grant. 

Lee's  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  occupied  a  strong  posi 
tion  on  the  Rapidan,  well  protected  by  field-works  in  front, 
with  the  left  flank  covered  by  the  river  and  mountains,  and 
the  right  guarded  by  intrenchments  extending  from  the  river 
to  Mine  Run,  —  the  same  intrenchments  of  Mine  Run,  which 

i  67  W.  R.  277. 


208  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

General  Meade  had  wisely  refused  to  storm  the  previous 
November. 

Swell's  corps  was  on  the  right,  A.  P.  Hill  near  Orange 
Court  House,  and  Longstreet  at  Gordonsville.  The  morale 
of  this  army  was  admittedly  good,  it  had  cleared  itself  of  all 
possible  impediments,  and  was  in  condition  for  immediate 
action.  It  numbered,  as  stated  by  the  commander  of  one  of  its 
divisions,1  50,000  men  of  all  arms  (42,000  infantry),  doubt 
less  all  effective  men,  and  nearly  all  of  its  chief  commanders 
were  graduates  of  West  Point.  As  it  had  eight  divisions  of 
three  or  more  brigades  each,  this  estimate  of  42,000  infantry 
is  probably  too  small  by  perhaps  10,000. 

The  region  known  as  the  Wilderness,  into  which  our  army 
now  entered,  was  a  desolate  country  intersected  with  numer 
ous  small  ravines  and  crossed  by  narrow  county  roads,  and 
covered,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  small  open  spaces,  by  a 
thick  growth  of  scraggy  pine  and  scrub  oak  with  hard  under 
growth.  So  dense  and  impenetrable  was  this  growth  that  only 
about  twenty  guns  were  able  to  be  used  in  the  battles  of  the 
5th  and  6th,  and  the  cavalry  fought  mainly  dismounted.  This 
country  was  crossed  by  two  nearly  parallel  roads,  the  turnpike 
and  the  plank  road  running  from  Orange  Court  House  (the 
centre  of  Lee's  position)  to  Fredericksburg,  and  crossing  our 
line  of  march  nearly  at  right  angles.  Grant's  plan  of  advance 
upon  Richmond  seems  to  have  been  to  follow  a  line  nearly 
parallel  with  the  route  of  the  Fredericksburg  and  Richmond 
Railroad,  making  his  base  Acquia  Creek ;  and  his  intention 
was  to  turn  well  Lee's  right  flank,  to  avoid  the  Mine  Run  in- 
trenchments,  and  march  directly  upon  Spottyslvania,  —  from 
which  point  he  could  command  several  roads  leading  to  Rich 
mond,  —  prepared  to  accept  battle  from  Lee  wherever  he  met 
him,  hoping,  however,  to  meet  him  in  the  open  country  beyond 
the  Wilderness.  Orders  were  given  for  the  movements  of  the 

1  Lee  and  Grant  in  the  Wilderness,  by  General  C.  M.  Wilcox,  C.  S.  A.,  article 
on  Annals  of  the  War,  Philadelphia,  1879,  p.  485. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     209 

5th,  which  would  have  on  that  day  placed  the  army  outside 
the  Wilderness,  had  there  been  no  interruption. 

Lee  did  not  wait  to  be  attacked,  but  immediately  moved 
his  whole  army  out  from  his  intrenchments  towards  us  by  the 
before-mentioned  turnpike  and  plank  roads,  intending  to  force 
a  battle  while  we  were  still  involved  in  the  Wilderness.  Not 
withstanding  the  knowledge  we  had  gained  in  the  Mine  Run 
campaign,  we  were  without  any  but  the  most  general  informa 
tion  regarding  the  roads  and  paths  of  the  Wilderness,  while 
the  country  was  familiar  to  the  Confederates,  giving  them 
in  this  respect  great  superiority.  Lee's  effort  was  to  break 
Grant's  left  and  thus  throw  him  back  upon  the  Rapidan,  but 
the  successful  crossing  of  his  whole  army  in  one  day  enabled 
us  to  employ  our  whole  force  and  make  such  stubborn  resist 
ance  and  such  determined  counter-attacks  as  to  prevent  this. 
Burnside  even  had  been  able  to  come  into  action  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  6th. 

It  seems  to  have  been  unexpected  by  Grant  and  Meade  to 
be  attacked  by  Lee's  whole  army  in  the  Wilderness,  and  the 
latter  is  said  to  have  given  his  opinion  in  the  beginning  that 
only  a  division  of  the  enemy  were  attacking  while  the  remain 
der  were  on  the  way  to  the  position  of  the  North  Anna.  It 
gives  color  to  this  view  that  Hancock  had  been  recalled  from 
a  march  southward  from  Chancellorsville,  after  having  pro 
ceeded  ten  miles,  and  brought  back  to  hold  the  position  on 
the  Brock  Road.  The  battles  of  the  5th  and  6th  had  been 
terrible  and  bloody,  with  a  loss  on  our  side  of  over  15,000 
men,1  and  a  large,  though  from  their  superior  knowledge  of 
position  not  so  large,  a  loss  to  the  enemy ;  our  communi 
cations  with  the  Rappahannock  were  obstructed  by  some 
cavalry,  and  the  wounded,  who  were  sent  in  great  numbers 
in  army  wagons  in  that  direction,  were  recalled  and  sent  to 
Fredericksburg,2  where  we  soon  established  a  new  base  and 

1  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  by  William  Swinton,  p.  439. 
Revised  edition,  1882.   Compare  footnote  on  page  120. 

2  67  W.  R.  278. 


210  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

communication  with  Washington.  The  battle  had  continued 
with  unabated  fury  until  the  night  of  the  6th.  The  Confed 
erate  lines  were  complete,  as  were  ours,  and  the  position  sub 
stantially  the  same  as  was  established  the  night  of  the  5th, 
neither  side  having  secured  any  advantage.  Hancock  on  the 
left  of  our  line  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  heaviest  fighting. 
He  had  been  reinforced  by  Getty's  division  of  the  6th  corps 
and  one  brigade  of  Robinson's  division  of  the  5th  corps.  On 
his  right  lay  Burnside's  corps,  which  had  been  put  in  to  fill 
up  the  gap  between  Hancock  and  Warren.  On  Warren's 
right  was  Sedgwick  with  the  6th  corps.  The  latter  had  been 
thrown  into  some  confusion  by  a  feeble  attack  after  dark 
on  his  right,  in  which  Generals  Seymour  and  Shaler  were 
captured,  with  some  of  their  commands. 

The  intersection  of  the  Brock  Road  (running  south  towards 
Spottsylvania)  with  the  Orange  Plank  Road  formed  the  key 
of  Hancock's  position.  Here  were  seven  lines  of  troops  lying 
behind  log  breastworks  within  speaking  distance  of  each 
other.  So  severe  had  been  the  attack  at  this  point  that  some 
of  the  enemy  had  penetrated  the  line,  but  they  were  quickly 
driven  back.  The  fire  was  so  heavy  that  several  of  the  rear 
lines,  occupied  by  Birney's  troops,  at  one  time  broke  and 
fled,  but  recovering  themselves  soon  returned.  In  front  of 
the  lines  near  this  point  the  trees  were  scarred  by  bullets 
from  their  roots  to  their  tops,  and  in  great  spaces  the  whole 
tops  were  mown  down  by  bullets  as  with  a  scythe.  The 
woods  in  front  were  full  of  dead  and  wounded  men.  In  the 
rear  they  were  full  of  stragglers,  many  of  them  from  the  9th 
corps,  whom  the  provost  guard  were  arresting,  forming,  and 
restoring  to  their  commands.  The  ground  in  front  and  rear 
was  covered  with  arms,  knapsacks,  and  clothing  of  the  dead 
and  wounded.  Officers  in  those  days  lived  on  the  rations 
found  in  discarded  haversacks.  The  trains  were  far  in  the 
rear  towards  Chancellors ville,  and  did  not  come  up. 

Many  of  the  troops  had  never  before  been  in  action,  and 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  211 

all  had  been  inarched  hither  and  thither  through  the  thick 
woods,  fighting  and  retreating,  until  they  were  fairly  tired 
out.  Warren,  for  example,  had  during  the  second  day  re 
ceived  eighteen  orders  to  send  reinforcements  to  other  parts 
of  the  line.1  We  had  lost  Wadsworth,  Hayes,  and  scores  of 
officers  of  lower  grade,  and  thousands  of  killed  and  wounded. 
We  had  met  with  no  apparent  success,  we  were  in  a  coun 
try  of  gloom  and  desolation,  no  man  knew  what  the  mor 
row  would  bring  forth ;  but  the  men  were  patient,  brave, 
and  determined,  ready  to  resist  any  attack,  but  not  anxious 
to  assault.  Neither  were  the  enemy.  They  had  learned  the 
value  of  breastworks,  if  never  before,  and  hereafter  the  army 
never  stopped  without  immediately  covering  itself  with  in- 
trenchments,  even  of  the  slightest. 

This  was  the  situation  on  the  morning  of  the  7th.  An 
early  reconnoissance  showed  the  enemy  strongly  covered  by 
intrenchments  similar  to  our  own,  and  with  no  discernible 
intention  of  renewing  the  attack.  Indeed  Lee  never  was  the 
attacking  party  again  in  this  campaign,  but  adopted  the 
offensive  defensive  course.  General  Grant  says  Lee  had  fallen 
back  behind  his  intrenched  lines,  but  these  were  not  the 
intrenchments  of  Mine  Run,  now  some  eight  miles  in  the 
Confederate  rear,  but  improvised  works  like  our  own,  and 
directly  in  our  front.  General  Grant  also  says  in  his  report : 2 
"  From  this  it  was  evident  to  my  mind  that  the  two  days  of 
fighting  had  satisfied  Lee  of  his  inability  to  further  maintain 
the  contest  in  the  open  field,  notwithstanding  his  advantage 
of  position,  and  that  he  would  await  an  attack  behind  his 
works."  The  advantage  of  position  consisted  only  in  his  better 
communication  with  his  supplies,  and  his  knowledge  of  the 

1  Letter  of  Brevet  Major-General  Gouverneur  K.  Warren,  U.  S.  A.,  command 
ing  5th  army  corps.  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  6,  1879. 
My  Dear  General  Peirson:  — 

...  I  believe  I  received  18  orders  to  send  reinforcements  to  other  commands 
in  the  2d  day's  battle  in  the  Wilderness.  .  .  . 

Yours  truly,  G.  K.  WARREN. 

2  67  W.  R.  19. 


212  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

roads  to  be  used  in  falling  back  or  moving  by  the  flank  in  rear 
of  his  defenses,  thoroughly  secured  from  observation.  The  fea 
tures  of  the  ground  occupied  were  common  to  both  armies. 

But  whether  the  position  was  more  or  less  advantageous, 
Grant  decided  not  to  attack  it,  but  to  push  on  and  put  his 
whole  force  between  Lee  and  Richmond,  if  possible.  And 
showing  that  he  divined  the  effect  of  this  intention  upon  Lee, 
he  said  to  a  staff  officer  l  as  he  sat  under  a  pine-tree  on  the 
7th,  "  To-night  Lee  will  be  retreating  south."  Lee  did 
retreat  south,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  intercepting  the 
onward  movement  of  Grant,  and  he  retreated  so  rapidly  that 
we  found  him  in  position  at  Spottsylvania  when  we  emerged 
from  the  Wilderness.  Nightfall  of  the  7th  saw  our  whole 
army  on  the  march  for  Spottsylvania,  — Warren  leading  with 
Robinson's  division  by  the  most  direct  route,  which  was  by 
the  Brock  Road,  via  Todd's  Tavern,  —  leaving  on  the  field  all 
our  dead  and  many  of  our  wounded.  Grant  remarked  that 
if  Lee  thought  he  was  going  to  stop  to  bury  his  dead,  he  was 
mistaken,  but  a  few  days  later  he  sent  a  cavalry  force  back 
with  ambulances  who  succeeded  in  saving  some  of  the 
wounded  men.  Two  years  after  the  battle  the  ground  was 
revisited  by  some  officers  who  found  many  skeletons  unburied 
in  the  thick  woods,  although  a  burial  force  under  the  direc 
tion  of  the  War  Department  had  undertaken  the  duty  of 
covering  all  the  remains.  We  also  left  behind  two  guns  which 
were  on  the  turnpike  in  front  of  Warren's  position,  which 
were  lost  by  Griffin  on  the  5th  and  were  between  the  two 
armies  until  we  retired.  A  brigade  of  Robinson's  division 
vainly  attempted  a  charge  to  retake  them,  but  the  plain  was 
swept  by  canister  at  350  yards,  and  the  brigade  returned  with 
heavy  loss.  It  was  understood  that  the  6th  corps  was  to  join 
in  this  attempt ;  but  General  Upton,  whose  brigade  lay  on 
the  right  of  Robinson,  refused  to  move,  saying,  "  It  was  mad 
ness  !  "  2  So  sensitive  were  the  enemy  about  this  matter  that 

1  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman.  2  Remark  to  the  writer. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  213 

they  fired  on  our  stretcher-bearers  who  advanced  to  bring  in 
the  wounded ;  and  the  wounded  were  not  brought  in,  but  lay 
all  night  calling  for  water  and  help,  to  the  great  distress  of 
their  comrades. 

The  7th  was  hot  and  dusty,  and  as  it  was  necessary  in 
order  to  clear  the  roads  to  move  the  trains  by  daylight,  the 
movement  was  discerned  by  the  enemy.  The  5th  corps  in  the 
advance,  preceded  by  cavalry  and  -followed  by  the  2d  corps, 
took  the  Brock  Road.  The  6th  corps  moved  by  the  Plank  and 
Turnpike  roads  via  Chancellorsville,  preceded  by  the  train, 
and  followed  by  the  9th  corps,  who  were  the  rear  guard. 

Sheridan's  cavalry  had  been  guarding  the  left  flank,  and 
had  held  the  Brock  Road  for  some  distance  beyond  Todd's 
Tavern,  the  Catharpin  Road  as  far  as  Corbin's  Bridge,  and 
our  left  rear  as  far  as  Piney  Branch  Church  ;  but  when  Long- 
street  attacked  so  successfully  on  the  afternoon  of  the  6th, 
Sheridan  received  an  order  from  General  Humphreys,1  chief 
of  staff,  informing  him  that  our  left  was  turned,  and  that  he 
must  draw  in  his  forces  to  protect  the  flank  and  trains.  This 
he  did,  and  was  occupied  on  the  7th  in  regaining  some  of  the 
ground  which  he  then  gave  up,  and  suffered  considerable  loss 
in  driving  the  enemy  back  again  beyond  Todd's  Tavern. 

Lee  had  met  with  losses  in  the  Wilderness  almost  as  severe 
as  our  own,  as  he  had  been,  what  he  never  was  afterwards, 
the  attacking  party,  a  disadvantage  which  even  his  superior 
knowledge  of  the  country  hardly  offset.  He  had  lost  Generals 
Jones  and  Jenkins,  besides  Pegram  and  Stafford  severely 
wounded,  and,  worse  than  all,  Longstreet  had  been  disabled 
by  a  bullet  in  the  neck  and  shoulder.  His  men,  however,  were 
well  in  hand,  and  on  the  night  of  the  7th  were  marching 
toward  Spottsylvania  as  rapidly  as  we  were,  and  by  as  short 
a  road.2  His  cavalry  was  thrown  as  far  forward  as  possible, 

1  67  W.  R.  788. 

2  Letter  of  General  R.  H.  Anderson  to  Captain  Robins,  M.  H.  S.  M.,  post, 
p.  229. 


214  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

and  Stuart's  command  was  ordered  to  hold  their  end  of  the 
Brock  Road,  and  to  place  every  obstruction  to  the  advance  of 
the  Federal  troops,  in  order  to  gain  time  for  the  rebel  infantry 
to  get  into  position  at  Spottsylvania.  They  therefore  gave 
Sheridan  all  the  trouble  they  could,  and  were  only  cleared 
out  by  the  advance  of  our  infantry. 

The  5th  corps,  led  by  Robinson's  division,  marched  all 
night,  and  about  6  A.  M.  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  emerged 
from  the  Wilderness  near  Todd's  Tavern,  and  after  marching 
a  mile  or  two  came  up  with  our  cavalry,  who,  as  evidenced 
by  several  dead  cavalrymen  who  lay  by  the  roadside,  had 
recently  been  engaged  with  the  enemy. 

As  soon  as  the  cavalry  were  got  out  of  the  way,  Robinson's 
division  at  once  deployed,  with  Lyle's  brigade  on  the  left 
and  leading,  the  Maryland  brigade  coming  up  on  his  right, 
and  Baxter's  brigade  supporting  still  further  on  the  right. 
In  this  way  they  advanced,  driving  the  skirmishers  before 
them  by  and  beyond  Alsop's  house,  and,  reaching  a  wooded 
knoll,  re-formed  the  line,  which  had  become  somewhat  dis 
ordered,  casting  off  their  knapsacks  in  order  to  move  more 
quickly,  and  because  the  heat  made  them  almost  insupport 
able.  Pushing  forward  again,  they  came  in  sight  of  a  part  of 
a  light  battery  of  the  enemy  which  was  firing  down  the  Brock 
Road,  and  breaking  into  the  run  nearly  captured  the  two 
guns,  driving  them  well  to  the  rear.  The  leading  brigade  had 
now  advanced  some  two  miles  since  its  deployment,  and  had 
reached  a  heavily  wooded  rise  of  ground,  where  they  halted  for 
a  moment  to  get  breath  and  some  alignment ;  and  having  run 
much  of  the  distance,  had  left  the  rest  of  the  division  far 
behind.  The  men  were  very  much  blown,  and  many  had  fallen 
by  the  way  from  sunstroke  and  fatigue.  General  Warren  here 
rode  up,  and  saying  to  General  Robinson  that  his  orders  were 
to  go  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  ordered  him  forward. 
Robinson  asked  for  time  to  get  up  his  other  brigades,  but 
after  a  few  moments  of  waiting  Warren  became  impatient, 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  215 

and  General  Robinson  ordered  an  immediate  charge  upon  the 
enemy's  line,  then  in  plain  sight  behind  some  rude  breast 
works,  saying,  "We  must  drive  them  from  there,  or  they  will 
get  some  artillery  in  position." 

The  enemy's  line  was  formed  on  a  ridge  across  the  Brock 
Road,  near  its  junction  with  a  road  leading  to  the  Block  House, 
and  was  protected  by  an  incomplete  breastwork,  with  small 
pine-trees  felled  for  abatis  and  a  rail  fence  parallel  with  the 
line  to  the  front.  The  enemy  were  hard  at  work  finishing 
their  breastworks.  They  were  two  brigades  of  Kershaw's 
division  of  Longstreet's  corps.1 

Lyle's  brigade,  in  which  my  regiment  was,  charged  over 
500  yards  of  open,  badly  gullied,  ground  under  a  rapid  fire 
from  the  enemy's  muskets  and  from  the  artillery  we  had  so 
nearly  captured.  The  troops  went  over  the  rail  fence,  into  the 
abatis,  and  up  to  within  30  feet  of  the  works,  getting  shelter 
then  from  the  slope  of  the  hill  and  the  felled  pine-trees.  Here 
they  lay  to  recover  their  wind,  easily  keeping  down  the  fire 
of  the  enemy  in  their  front,  who  fired  hurriedly  and  aimlessly, 
and  while  waiting  saw  the  3d  brigade  (Marylanders)  ad 
vancing  gallantly  across  the  field  to  their  support.  The  latter, 
however,  after  getting  halfway  to  the  rebel  works,  broke 
under  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  right  and  retreated  in  con 
fusion,  General  Robinson  being  shot  in  the  knee  while  trying 
to  rally  them.  The  remaining  brigade  was  too  far  to  the  right 
and  rear  to  assist  in  this  assault.  Lyle's  brigade,  having 
rested  these  few  minutes,  started  to  go  over  the  works,  and 
would  have  gone  over,  but  at  this  moment,  discovering  a  fresh 
brigade  of  the  enemy  advancing  in  line  of  battle  upon  our 
left,  I  (a  lieutenant-colonel,  upon  whom  the  command  had 
devolved,  so  few  were  the  men  who  had  reached  this  spot)  re 
luctantly  gave  the  order  to  retire,  and  the  command  fell  back 
in  some  confusion,  but  re-formed  when  clear  of  the  flanking 
fire,  and  taking  advantage  of  the  accidents  of  ground  checked 

1  Post,  p.  231. 


216  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  advance  of  the  enemy.  The  sun  was  so  hot,  and  the  men 
so  exhausted  from  the  long  run  as  well  as  from  the  five  days 
and  nights  of  fighting  and  marching,  that  this  retreat,  though 
disorderly,  was  exceedingly  slow,  and  we  lost  heavily  in  con 
sequence  from  the  enemy's  fire.  My  own  experience  was  that, 
while  wishing  very  much  to  run,  I  could  only  limp  along, 
using  my  sword  as  a  cane.  My  color-bearer  was  shot  by  my 
side,  and  unheeding  his  appeal  to  save  him,  I  could  only 
pass  his  colors  to  the  nearest  man,  and  leave  the  brave  fellow 
to  die  in  a  rebel  prison.  The  flanking  brigade  of  the  enemy, 
which  so  nearly  succeeded  in  surrounding  us,  was  part  of 
Longstreet's  corps  (now  under  command  of  General  R.  H. 
Anderson),  and  it  was  his  line  we  had  so  nearly  broken.1  He 
had  succeeded  in  outmarching  us,  and  by  delaying  us  some 
two  hours  by  Stuart's  dismounted  cavalry  and  a  skirmish  line 
he  had  got  possession  of  the  crossing  of  the  Brock  Road  with 
his  line  of  march,  which  was  by  and  near  the  Block  House 
and  Shady  Grove  Church  road,  and  made  good  the  Spottsyl- 
vania  position.  He  had  also  been  able  to  spare  two  brigades 
of  Field's  division  to  drive  Wilson  out  of  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  which  he  had  occupied  for  a  short  time  with  his  cavalry, 
opposed  only  by  Fitz-Hugh  Lee's  division  of  cavalry.2  That 
Longstreet's  corps  had  but  just  arrived  at  the  time  of  our 
assault 2  is  evident  from  the  incomplete  nature  of  the  breast 
works,  and  from  the  fact  that  they  had  no  artillery  in  posi 
tion.  Had  there  been  any  support  for  the  brigade  which  got 
up  to  the  rebel  works,  the  enemy's  line  would  have  been 
broken,  and  our  army  would  have  been  between  Lee's  army 
and  Richmond ;  but  as  we  have  seen,  the  only  supporting  bri 
gade  was  far  behind,  and  the  rest  of  the  5th  corps  not  yet  up. 
It  is  important  here  to  notice  the  time  of  the  arrival  of 
Longstreet's  troops  at  the  crossing  of  the  Brock  Road  with 

1  Vide  Letter  of  Colonel  C.  S.  Venable  to  Captain  Robins,  M.  H.  S.  M.,post, 
p.  233. 

2  Vide  Letter  of  General  R.  H.  Anderson,  post,  p.  230. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  217 

the  Block  House  Road,  in  front  of  which  they  were  met  by 
Lyle's  brigade.  The  old  innkeeper  at  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  Sanford  by  name,  who  remained  in  his  house  all 
through  the  battles  around  that  place,  preferring,  however,  the 
seclusion  that  the  cellar  gave  (owing  to  the  frequent  ventila 
tion  of  the  upper  stories  by  our  shells),  imparted  to  a  brother 
officer 1  and  myself  in  April,  1866,  some  important  testimony 
on  this  point.  He  stated  that  he  saw  at  about  8.30  A.  M.  of 
the  8th  Longstreet's  men  advance  from  the  woods  on  the  left 
and  rear  of  his  house  (this  was  Field's  division)  in  line  of 
battle,  and  passing  beyond  his  house  drive  the  Federal  cavalry 
(Wilson's)  out  from  Spottsylvania  and  back  by  the  Freder- 
icksburg  Road.2  They  retired  slowly,  firing  as  they  went  with 
cannon  and  carbines.  Sheridan  states  in  his  report  that  Wil 
son  was  driven  out  by  Longstreet.  At  about  this  hour,  then, 
half-past  eight  or  a  little  earlier,  Longstreet  must  have  halted 
his  men,3  sent  two  brigades  to  drive  Wilson  out  of  Spott 
sylvania  Court  House,  and  advancing  two  more  half  a  mile 
or  more  up  the  Brock  Road  and  up  the  road  leading  from  the 
Block  House  to  Alsop's,  placed  them  in  position  across  the 
Brock  Road,  where  they  immediately  fell  to  intrenching  and 
improving  the  slight  cover  already  begun  by  the  rebel  cav 
alry.  Our  men,  as  we  have  seen,  passed  Todd's  Tavern  at 
6  A.  M.,  marched  some  distance,  perhaps  two  miles,  and  then 
deployed,  taking  the  place  of  our  cavalry,  who  undoubtedly 
caused  considerable  delay,  and  began  the  forward  movement. 
All  this  consumed  two  hours  or  more  ;  and  the  advance  in  line 
of  battle  over  more  than  two  miles  of  rough  country,  skirmish 
ing  all  the  way,  occupied  at  least  two  hours  more,  so  that 
Longstreet  had  several  hours,  say  three,  to  make  cover  for 
his  men. 

The  delay  in  Robinson's  movement  caused  by  the  cavalry 

1  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman. 

2  Vide  Colonel  Venable,  post,  p.  233. 

8  S.  H.  S.  vol.  vii,  pp.  491,  503.   Diary  of  Colonel  T.  Lyman,  post,  p.  240. 


218  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

was  unfortunate,  and  gave  rise  to  a  good  deal  of  feeling  at  the 
time.  General  Meade,  who  was  always  for  giving  the  infantry 
a  free  foot,  had  sent  orders  to  General  Sheridan  on  the  night 
of  the  7th  to  have  his  cavalry  out  of  the  Brock  Road,  but 
Sheridan,  not  receiving  them,  obstructed  the  road  with  a 
brigade,  and  as  the  cavalry  and  infantry  became  unavoidably 
mixed  up,  this  delayed  the  advance. 

Sheridan  claims  in  his  report  of  these  operations  that  had 
he  had  the  opportunity  to  carry  out  the  orders  he  had  issued, 
which  were  for  Wilson  to  go  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House, 
presumably  by  the  Brock  Road,  and  then  into  position  at 
Snell's  Bridge,  Merritt  to  proceed  to  the  same  point  via  the 
Block  House,  and  Gregg  via  Corbin's  Bridge,  he  would  have 
so  delayed  the  march  of  the  enemy  as  to  have  enabled  our 
infantry  to  have  reached  Spottsylvania  before  them ;  but  that 
these  orders  were  superseded  by  those  given  by  General  Meade 
upon  his  arrival  at  Todd's  Tavern,  and  consequently  Merritt's 
brigade  was  ordered  into  the  Brock  Road  in  front  of  the  in 
fantry,  and  Gregg  ordered  to  halt  at  Corbin's  Bridge.  Gen 
eral  Meade,  however,  in  his  report  merely  says  in  regard  to 
this  that,  as  it  was  impossible  to  get  the  infantry  up  in  season 
to  support  Wilson  at  Spottsylvania,  he  had  to  be  withdrawn. 

It  is  known  that  in  an  interview  at  this  time  General  Meade 
was  very  indignant  with  General  Sheridan,1  until  he  learned 
from  him  personally  that  he  had  never  received  the  orders  to 
clear  the  road,  when  Meade  frankly  apologized  for  what  must 
have  been  harsh  censure.  In  this  interview,  which  was  de 
scribed  to  me  by  a  staff  officer  who  was  present,2  General 
Sheridan,  being  much  chagrined  by  the  censure  of  his  superior 
officer,  stated  that  there  was  no  force  worth  speaking  of  in 
front  of  the  advance  of  the  5th  corps ;  but  he  seems  to  have 
withdrawn  this  view,  when  in  his  cooler  moments  he  came  to 
write  his  report.  Perhaps  the  feeling  which  caused  Warren's 
unjustifiable  removal  from  the  command  of  the  5th  corps  at 

1  Vide  post,  p.  240.  2  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     219 

Five  Forks  began  here.  It  is  unfortunate  that  Sheridan,  who 
seems  to  have  had  force  enough  to  beat  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
did  not  cross  thea  Po  at  Corbin's  Bridge  and  do  what  the 
enemy  did  to  us,  i.  e.  delay  their  march  on  Spottsylvania  on 
the  early  morning  of  the  8th.  He  claims  that  General  Meade's 
orders  prevented  this  ;  but  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  Meade's 
orders  must  have  been  misunderstood,  as  the  whole  object  of 
the  hurried  march  of  Warren's  corps  was  to  reach  first  the 
Spottsylvania  position. 

The  advanced  troops  fell  back  to  the  line  which  had  been 
taken  up  by  the  5th  corps,  intrenched,  and  waited  for  the  6th 
corps  to  come  up,  which  they  did  in  the  afternoon,  going  into 
position  on  Warren's  left.  Crawford's  division  of  the  5th 
corps  made  an  attack  in  the  afternoon,  but  with  little  result 
beyond  capturing  some  seventy  prisoners  and  losing  consider 
ably  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  2d  corps  were  massed  at  Todd's  Tavern  to  protect  the 
rear,  with  Miles's  brigade  out  towards  the  rebel  line  on  the 
Catharpin  Road,  where  he  repulsed  these  attacks. 

Burnside  made  the  extreme  left  of  our  line.  During  the 
day  all  the  corps  were  at  different  times  engaged  with  the 
enemy.  Our  cavalry  started  on  a  raid  towards  Richmond,  and 
we  sent  a  train  of  12,000  wounded  to  Fredericksburg. 

Our  lines  were  before  night  established  in  an  east  and  west 
direction,  nearly  two  miles  from  Spottsylvania,  the  whole 
army  being  clear  of  the  Wilderness  and  concentrated  around 
Spottsylvania  Court  House. 

Orders  were  sent  out  to  get  the  different  corps  ready  for 
a  movement  by  the  enemy's  right,  but  the  men  were  so  jaded 
and  worn  out  that  the  orders  were  afterwards  suspended  and 
the  army  was  to  rest.  The  rebel  army  had  been  occupied  as 
we  were  on  this  day  (8th)  in  getting  into  position  ;  Swell's 
corps  beginning  to  arrive  at  sunset,  all  getting  up  before 
morning,  and  Hill's  corps  (temporarily  under  command  of 
Early)  getting  up  during  the  morning  of  the  9th. 


220  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

They  had  all  been  very  busy,  and  their  line  on  the  9th, 
extending  from  the  Ny  on  their  right  to  Glady  Run  on  their 
left  flank,  occupied  a  commanding  position,  and  was  covered 
with  strong  earthworks  and  abatis,  with  approaches  swept  by 
infantry  and  artillery  fire  and  rendered  difficult  by  under 
growth. 

Their  troops  were  placed  by  divisions  as  follows :  Kershaw 
on  their  left  flank,  then  Field's  division,  both  of  Longstreet's 
corps;  then  Gordon's,  Rodes's,  and  Johnson's  divisions  of 
E  well's  corps ;  then  Wilcox's,  Heth's,  and  Mahone's  of  Hill's 
corps.1  Many  of  these  troops  arriving  at  night  and  imme 
diately  intrenching,  the  lines  required  correction  by  daylight, 
and  thus  was  formed  the  "  Salient,"  part  of  which  we  after 
wards  captured,  but  this  part  of  the  work  was  not  completed 
until  noon  of  the  10th. 

The  9th  was  another  hot  and  dusty  day,  and  the  5th  and 
6th  corps  occupied  it  in  pressing  the  enemy  and  developing 
his  position,  seeking  points  of  assault.2  The  enemy  were  still 
passing  down  during  the  morning  the  Parker's  Store  Road,  in 
dangerous  proximity  to  our  right  and  rear,  and  Hancock's  2d 
corps  was  at  about  10  A.  M.  moved  into  position  on  Warren's 
right,  making  line  of  battle  along  the  crest  commanding  the 
valley  of  the  Po,  the  artillery  shelling  the  rebel  trains  which 
were  in  sight,  causing  them  to  take  a  more  sheltered  road. 
Mott's  division  and  Burton's  heavy  artillery  were  left  to  hold 
the  Todd's  Tavern  position,  and  were  afterwards  moved  to 
the  left  of  the  6th  corps. 

Hancock  examined  the  ground  in  his  front  at  between  four 
and  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  with  a  view  of  crossing  the 
stream,  and  afterwards  directed  Birney's,  Barlow's,  and  Gib 
bon's  divisions  to  force  a  passage.  The  stream  was  deep  and 
the  passage  was  rendered  difficult  by  the  thick  undergrowth, 
but  it  was  successfully  carried  in  face  of  some  resistance  by 
the  enemy.  The  troops  were  pushed  forward  toward  the  rebel 

i  Post,  p.  234,  Captain  Venable.  2   67  W.  R.  191. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     221 

left,  building  three  bridges  in  their  rear  suitable  for  the  pass 
age  of  artillery,  completing  them  on  the  morning  of  the  10th. 

Burnside  moved  down  the  Fredericksburg  and  Spottsyl- 
vania  Koad,1  crossed  the  Ny  River,  and  pushed  Potter's 
division  close  to  the  enemy's  position  and  within  a  quarter  of 
a  mile  of  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  Willcox's  division  having 
previously  had  a  severe  fight. 

Thus  we  closed  in  upon  the  enemy  and  prepared  for  the 
general  assault  of  the  morrow.  This  day  the  army  lost  one 
of  its  chief  commanders,  Major-General  Sedgwick,  killed  by 
sharpshooters  and  falling  within  our  lines  a  sacrifice  to  his 
utter  disregard  of  personal  danger.  The  men  of  both  armies 
were  worn  out  with  digging  and  marching.  Every  regimental 
change  of  position  caused  fresh  protection  to  be  thrown  up 
(not  less  than  five  different  breastworks  were  made  this  day 
by  one  of  Robinson's  brigades),  and  all  welcomed  the  coming 
night  and  gratefully  took  the  needed  rest. 

Meantime  the  North  was  roused  to  enthusiasm  and  joy  by 
the  following  accurate  (!)  dispatch  from  the  Secretary  of 
War:  — 

"  Washington,  May  9th.  A  bearer  of  dispatches  from  Gen 
eral  Meade's  headquarters  has  just  reached  here.  He  states 
that  Lee's  army  commenced  falling  back  on  night  of  Friday, 
our  army  commenced  pursuit  on  Saturday.  The  rebels  were 
in  full  retreat  for  Richmond  by  the  direct  road.  Hancock 
passed  through  Spottsylvania  at  daylight  yesterday.  Our 
headquarters  at  noon  yesterday  were  20  miles  south  of  the 
battle-field." 

Tuesday,  the  10th  of  May,  is  known  as  the  first  day  of  the 
battle  of  Spottsylvania.  Our  army  occupied  a  crescent-shaped 
line  along  the  northerly  bank  of  the  Po  about  six  miles  long 
with  wings  towards  the  enemy,  a  portion  of  the  2d  corps  being 
across  the  Po  on  our  right  flank.  Our  artillery  were  all  up,  and 
for  the  first  time  since  we  crossed  the  Rapidan  were  enabled 

i  67  W.  R.  90& 


222  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

to  be  in  full  play.  The  country  in  our  front  was  on  the  left 
densely  wooded,  and  elsewhere  had  many  cleared  spaces.  The 
artillery  fire  was  incessant  all  day,  and  our  troops  pushed  the 
enemy  at  all  points,  trying  to  find  some  place  where  a  success 
ful  assault  could  be  made.  Late  in  the  afternoon  it  was  de 
cided  to  make  the  assault  upon  the  enemy's  position  of  Laurel 
Hill,  a  densely  wooded  crest  covered  by  earthworks  near 
Alsop's  house,  in  front  of  Warren,  and  Hancock  was  directed 
to  move  two  of  his  divisions  to  the  left  to  participate  in  it  and 
to  assume  command  of  the  movement.  Gibbon's  division  was 
crossed  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Po  and  formed  on  Warren's 
right ; 1  Birney  followed  and  was  massed  in  Warren's  rear 
as  reserve,  leaving  Barlow  to  hold  the  ground  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Po.  Birney  was  sharply  attacked  in  crossing,  and 
Barlow  was  so  pushed  by  Heth's  whole  division  that,  without 
bringing  on  a  general  engagement,  the  ground  could  not  be 
held.  Therefore  all  the  troops  were  brought  back  across  the 
Po,  Miles's  brigade  being  the  last  to  cross.  We  lost  heavily 
in  killed  and  wounded  in  this  affair,  many  of  the  wounded 
perishing  in  the  flames  of  the  burning  forest,  which  had  taken 
fire  during  the  action.  Two  guns  of  Arnold's  battery  were 
lost  here.  The  horses,  terrified  by  the  fire,  dragged  the  pieces 
into  the  woods,  and  so  jammed  them  between  the  trees  that 
they  had  to  be  abandoned. 

Birney  was  then  ordered  to  Warren's  right,  and  Barlow  to 
the  right  of  Birney. 

At  5  P.  M.  after  a  heavy  artillery  fire,  Warren,  supported 
by  Gibbon,  attacked  at  Laurel  Hill,  but  was  repulsed  and 
fell  back  in  some  confusion.  At  6.30  P.  M.  another  assault  of 
the  5th  corps,  with  Gibbon's  and  Birney's  divisions  of  the 
2d  corps,  was  made  under  the  personal  command  of  General 
Hancock  with  the  same  result ;  and  meeting  with  heavy  loss 
(General  Rice  of  Cutler's  division  was  killed  here),  this 
attempt  to  turn  the  enemy's  left  was  given  up. 

1  67  W.  R.  331. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     223 

The  ground  in  front  of  the  Laurel  Hill  position  was  swept 
by  the  enemy's  artillery,  and  our  men  suffered  severely 
from  it.  In  my  own  regiment  (39th  Massachusetts  Infantry) 
we  lost  several  men  killed  by  the  falling  limbs  of  the  huge 
pine-trees  cut  off  by  the  enemy's  artillery  fire.  One  of  our 
men  was  pinned  to  the  ground  by  one  of  these  limbs,  so  near 
to  the  enemy's  line  that,  when  we  retreated,  as  we  did  upon 
receiving  a  terrific  musketry  fire  at  point-blank  range,  he  was 
the  only  one  who  saw  that  after  the  volley  the  enemy  ran 
as  fast  as  we  did,  but  in  the  opposite  direction.  They  soon 
returned,  however,  and  captured  the  observer. 

At  some  points  our  troops  even  entered  the  breastworks, 
but  the  men  though  brave  were  easily  discouraged,  and  the 
long  continued  strain  and  fatigue  told  upon  their  spirit ;  and 
while  they  would  defend  their  position  to  the  last  or  retire 
in  the  face  of  heavy  odds  (as  Barlow's  men  did)  with  the 
utmost  coolness,  the  fact  remains  that  the  men  of  the  2d  and 
5th  corps  were  not  as  ambitious  on  the  10th  as  they  had  been 
on  the  6th  or  the  8th  days  of  May. 

General  Lee  telegraphed  to  Richmond  in  regard  to  these 
events  : 1  "  May  10.  Frequent  skirmishes  occurred  yesterday 
and  to-day,  each  army  endeavoring  to  discover  the  position 
of  the  other.  To-day  the  enemy  shelled  our  lines  and  made 
several  assaults  with  infantry  against  different  points,  par 
ticularly  on  our  left  held  by  General  Robert  Anderson.  The 
last,  which  occurred  after  sunset,  was  the  most  obstinate,  some 
of  the  enemy  leaping  over  the  breastworks.  They  were  easily 
repulsed." 

Birney's  men  in  these  assaults  were  not  as  steady  as  they 
might  have  been.  Hancock  reports 2  Ward's  brigade  of 
Birney's  division  as  retiring  in  disorder.  Birney's  division 
was  formerly  a  division  in  the  3d  corps,  and  was  somewhat 
demoralized  by  the  breaking  up  of  that  organization,  though 
they  had  previously  borne  the  best  of  records.  The  feeling 
i  68  W.  R.  982.  2  67  Wt  R.  334. 


224  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

ran  so  high  that  at  a  review  after  the  reorganization  some  of 
the  men  wore  the  3d  corps  badge  on  their  caps,  and  pinned 
the  2d  corps  badge  upon  the  tails  of  their  blouses. 

The  6th  corps  had  not  suffered  as  much,  or  worked  as  hard, 
in  the  preceding  days  as  the  2d  and  5th,  and  when  at  about 
the  same  time  General  Emory  Upton,  commanding  the  2d 
brigade  of  the  1st  division  of  this  corps,  made  a  diversion 
on  the  enemy's  right  centre,  he  met  with  more  success.1 

The  attack  was  made  at  an  angle  of  the  enemy's  works 
about  half  a  mile  to  the  left  of  the  Spottsylvania  Koad,  upon 
formidable  intrenchments,  with  abatis  in  front,  surmounted 
by  heavy  logs,  underneath  which  were  loopholes  for  musketry. 
A  battery  was  in  position  at  the  angle,  and  at  about  100 
yards  to  the  rear  was  another  line  of  works,  which  were 
partly  completed  and  were  occupied  by  a  second  line  of 
battle.  The  enemy's  troops  at  this  point  were  Rodes's  and 
Johnston's  divisions  of  Swell's  corps. 

The  position  was  in  an  open  field  about  200  yards  from 
a  pine  wood,  through  which  a  wood  road  led  from  our  lines 
direct  to  the  enemy's  works. 

The  column  of  attack  was  composed  of  twelve  regiments, 
formed  in  four  lines  of  battle  —  four  regiments  on  the  right 
of  this  wood  road,  and  eight  regiments  on  the  left.  The  men 
were  brought  into  position  in  silence,  with  the  pieces  of  the 
first  line  loaded  and  capped,  and  those  of  the  other  lines 
loaded  but  not  capped.  Bayonets  were  fixed.  The  instruc 
tions  were  precise,  and  provided  for  every  emergency.  The 
first  line  was  instructed  as  soon  as  the  works  were  carried  to 
turn  to  the  right  and  charge  the  battery ;  the  second  line  was 
to  halt  at  the  works  and  open  fire  if  necessary  to  the  front ; 
the  third  line  was  to  lie  down  behind  the  second ;  and  the 
fourth  was  to  halt  at  the  edge  of  the  woods  as  reserve. 

The  command  moved  forward  noiselessly  to  the  edge  of  the 
wood,  and  then  with  a  wild  cheer  rushed  for  the  works,  gaining 

1  67  W.  R.  665,  and  80  W.  R.  492. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  225 

the  parapet  under  a  terrible  front  and  flank  fire.  The  rebels 
at  first  refused  to  move,  but  sat  upright  in  their  pits  with  bayo 
nets  held  ready  to  impale  the  first  who  should  leap  over  the 
works.  A  hand-to-hand  fight  ensued.  Our  men  held  their 
pieces  at  arm's  length  and  fired  downward,  or  hurled  their 
pieces  upon  the  enemy,  pinning  them  to  the  ground.  Pat 
O'Connell,  96th  Pennsylvania,  was  pinned  to  the  parapet,  but 
was  rescued  by  his  comrades.  The  struggle  lasted  but  a  few 
seconds,  and  our  men  swept  over  the  works,  expanding  to 
the  right  and  left,  overran  the  battery  and  the  second  line 
of  works,  and  made  an  opening  in  the  enemy's  line  of  half 
a  mile  in  width,  ready  for  the  supporting  force  which  ought 
to  have  come  up  on  the  left,  but  which  did  not  arrive.  The 
enemy  made  repeated  attempts  to  retake  the  works,  but  with 
out  success ;  and  Upton's  brave  men  reluctantly  obeyed  the 
order  to  give  up  their  prize  and  retire,  when  such  an  order 
became  imperative  because  of  the  lateness  of  the  hour  and 
the  evident  failure  of  the  support. 

We  lost  about  1000  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  but 
took  nearly  1200  prisoners  and  several  stands  of  colors. 
Mott's  division  of  the  2d  corps  was  to  have  supported  this 
movement,  but  they  were  nearly  a  mile  from  the  point  of 
attack,  and  General  Upton,  being  ordered  to  attack  without 
delay,  had  no  opportunity  to  make  arrangements  with  them. 
General  Upton  attributes  the  unfruitfulness  of  the  charge  to 
the  difficulty  of  combining  the  operations  of  two  corps.  Thus 
the  opportunity  to  capture  and  hold  the  whole  left  of  the 
rebel  position  was  lost.  We,  however,  gained  some  valuable 
information  about  the  enemy's  position,  which  was  of  service 
when  on  the  12th  we  again  assaulted  near  this  spot  and  took 
the  Salient. 

Burnside's  corps  had  no  severe  fighting  on  this  day.  He  had 
moved  up  towards  Mott's  left  from  the  Fredericksburg  Road, 
and  Mott  had  succeeded  in  forming  a  connection  with  him. 
But  on  this  day  Burnside  lost  one  of  his  best  officers  killed, 


226  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

"  the  distinguished  General  Stevenson,"  as  General  Meade 
called  him.1 

The  attacks  on  Lee's  left  being  unsuccessful,  it  was  deter 
mined  to  attack  his  right  centre,  where  we  had  discovered  a 
salient,  and  the  llth  of  May  was  occupied  in  making  prepara 
tions  for  this. 

Wright  was  ordered  to  extend  the  lines  of  the  6th  corps,2 
and  "Warren  to  extend  the  5th  corps  to  the  right,  taking  the 
place  of  the  2d  corps,  who  were  so  well  covered  by  breast 
works  as  to  admit  of  their  being  wholly  released.  Hancock 
with  the  2d  corps  was  ordered  to  our  left  to  support  the 
attack  in  rear  of  6th  corps.  Some  of  our  artillery  was  moved 
from  right  to  left.  Burnside  was  ordered  to  assist  in  the 
assault  on  the  extreme  left. 

The  5th  corps  made  an  assault  to  keep  the  enemy  in  his 
lines,  and  the  closeness  of  the  armies  caused  desultory  fight 
ing  along  the  lines.  Mott's  division  was  sent  to  the  rear. 
Burnside's  men  were  withdrawn  across  the  Ny,  but  afterwards 
returned  to  their  old  position.  Reinforcements  came  up  from 
the  rear,  and  our  men  were  further  encouraged  by  the  reports 
from  Sheridan,  who  had  met  with  some  success  near  Yellow 
Tavern.  For  the  first  time  since  crossing  the  Rapidan  rain 
fell,  and  although  converting  the  dust  into  very  troublesome 
mud,  it  was  most  refreshing. 

We  had  lost  from  May  5  to  12,  29,400  men  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing,3  and  had  captured  7078  men  and 
22  guns,4  having  lost  two  guns. 

The  two  armies  were  now  facing  each  other,  both  strongly 
fortified,  and  were  waiting  for  the  next  deadly  struggle  which 
was  to  come  on  the  following  day. 

General  Grant  was  evidently  making  good  his  expressed 

determination  to  hammer  continuously  against  the  armed  force 

of  the  enemy  until  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way,  there 

should  be  nothing  left  for  him  but  equal  submission  with  the 

1  67  W.  R.  191.  2  Ibid.  192.  »  Ibid.  195.  *  Ibid.  196. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     227 

loyal  section  of  our  common  country  to  the  Constitution  and 
the  laws  of  the  land,  and  he  telegraphed  his  views  of  the 
situation  as  follows  : l  "  May  llth.  We  have  ended  the  sixth 
day  of  very  heavy  fighting.  The  result  to  this  time  is  much 
in  our  favor.  But  our  losses  have  been  heavy,  as  well  as  those 
of  the  enemy.  We  have  lost  to  this  time  11  general  officers, 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  and  probably  20,000  men.  I 
think  the  loss  of  the  enemy  must  be  greater,  we  having  taken 
over  4000  prisoners  in  battle,  while  he  has  taken  but  few 
except  stragglers.  I  propose  to  fight  it  out  on  this  line,  if  it 
takes  all  summer."  While  General  Lee  announces  a  few 
days  later  that  a  series  of  successes  have,  by  favor  of  God,  been 
achieved  by  his  army,  and  informs  that  army  that  it  is  in  their 
power,  under  God,  to  defeat  the  last  grand  effort  of  the  enemy 
and  establish  the  independence  of  their  native  land,  earning 
the  lasting  love  and  gratitude  of  their  countrymen  and  the 
admiration  of  mankind. 


Letter  of  Major-General  Richard  H.  Anderson,  C.  S.  A., 
Commanding  Division  A.  P.  Hill's  Corps,  Army  of  N.  V., 
afterwards  Commanding  Longstreet's  Corps. 

BEAUFORT,  SOUTH  CAROLINA, 

May  14,  1879. 
Captain  Edward  B.   Robins,   Secretary  Military  Historical 

Society  of  Mass.,  Boston,  Mass. 

Dear  Sir:  After  an  absence  of  some  days  I  found  your 
letter  of  the  2d  inst.  awaiting  my  return.  I  regret  to  say 
that  I  have  so  few  papers  and  so  treacherous  a  memory 
that  I  cannot  give  all  the  information  which  you  ask  for ; 
but  I  will  endeavor  to  comply  with  your  request  as  fully  as 
1  can,  consistently  with  accuracy. 

You  first  inquire  about  the  force  which  you  met  at  Laurel 
1  68  W.  R.  627. 


228  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Hill,  near  the  junction  of  the  Todd's  Tavern  and  Block  House 
roads ;  and  subsequently  you  ask  to  be  informed  of  the  order 
in  which  the  brigades  of  my  division  and  the  other  divisions 
came  into  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness.  In  the  narrative  which 
I  give  you  the  order  of  these  events  is  reversed. 

When  Lee's  army  moved  from  its  positions  at,  and  in  the 
vicinity  of,  Orange  Court  House  about  the  1st  of  May,  1864, 
my  division  was  left  to  observe  the  march  of  the  United 
States  forces  down  the  Rapidan,  and  to  oppose  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  cross  the  river  in  the  rear  of  Lee.  As  soon 
as  I  felt  assured  that  no  such  attempt  would  be  made,  my 
division  was  to  rejoin  without  delay  A.  P.  Hill's  corps,  to 
which  it  belonged. 

On  the  5th  of  May,  being  satisfied  that  the  whole  U.  S. 
forces  had  passed  down  the  Eapidan,  the  brigades  of  my 
division  were  withdrawn  from  points  at  which  they  had  been 
posted  along  the  river  and  directed  to  rendezvous  at  Verdier- 
ville.  At  2  o'clock  A.  M.,  on  the  6th,  the  division  was  put 
in  march  on  the  Plank  Road,  and  reached  the  vicinity  of  the 
battle-field  at  a  little  after  sunrise,  and  halted  for  about  an 
hour  to  wait  the  passage  of  the  rear  of  Longstreet's  corps, 
which  was  filing  into  the  road.  Closing  upon  this  corps,  we 
arrived  shortly  afterwards  at  the  scene  of  action. 

My  division  was  not  engaged  as  a  whole  body.  It  had  no 
sooner  arrived  than  orders  were  received  to  send  one  brigade 
to  reinforce  Longstreet  on  the  right  of  the  Plank  Road,  and 
another  to  report  to  A.  P.  Hill  on  the  left  of  the  same  road, 
to  move  up  two  other  brigades  in  line  of  battle  at  a  right  angle 
with  the  road,  the  right  resting  on  the  road,  and  to  attack. 
The  brigades  had  come  up  in  the  following  order :  Mahone's, 
Wright's,  Perrin's,  Perry's,  and  Harris's.  Mahone  was  sent 
to  Longstreet ;  Wright  to  Hill ;  Perrin  and  Perry  moved  to 
attack  as  directed ;  and  Harris  was  held  in  reserve. 

The  attacking  brigades  were  soon  engaged,  and  gained  some 
ground  slowly  until  about  midday,  when  there  was  a  lull  for 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     229 

some  hours,  both  parties  seeming  disposed  to  be  cautious  on 
account  of  the  extent  and  density  of  the  forest. 

At  3  o'clock  P.  M.  a  strong  force  [Union]  was  advanced 
against  Perry's  brigade,  and  it  [Perry's  brigade]  was  driven 
back  some  distance,  until  Harris  came  up  and  checked  the 
advance.  There  was  only  some  skirmishing  and  desultory 
firing  after  this.  Night  was  approaching.  Wright's  brigade 
had  returned  and  was  held  in  reserve  on  the  Plank  Road, 
Mahoiie  still  with  Longstreet.  On  the  7th  no  movement  was 
made  by  the  division  up  to  the  time  when  I  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  Longstreet's  corps,  a  little  after  midday,  if 
I  remember  correctly.  You  perceive  from  the  narrative  that 
my  division  was  the  last  to  come  upon  the  field.  I  am  unable 
to  give  you  the  order  of  arrival  or  the  position  of  the  other 
divisions. 

Longstreet  was  severely  wounded  about  midday  on  the 
6th,  and  soon  afterwards  General  Lee  placed  me  in  command 
of  his  corps  and  directed  me  to  retire  the  troops  quietly,  and 
as  soon  after  nightfall  as  practicable  ;  and  when  I  should  have 
reached  a  suitable  place  in  rear  of  the  line  they  had  been 
occupying,  to  let  them  have  rest,  but  to  forbid  fires  or  any 
noise  that  might  give  intelligence  of  the  withdrawal ;  and 
punctually  at  3  A.  M.  to  be  in  march  for  Spottsylvania  Court 
House  by  a  road  which  a  guide  would  show  me. 

Upon  withdrawing  the  corps  from  its  place  in  line  of  bat 
tle  (which  I  have  previously  stated  was  on  the  right  of  the 
Plank  Road),  I  found  the  woods  on  fire  and  burning  furiously 
in  every  direction,  and  there  was  no  suitable  place  for  a  rest. 
The  road  by  which  I  was  conducted  was  narrow  and  fre 
quently  obstructed,  so  that  at  best  the  progress  of  the  troops 
was  slow,  and  the  guide  having  informed  me  that  it  pre 
served  the  same  character  until  near  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  I  decided  to  continue  the  march  until  I  should  be 
within  easy  reach  of  that  place.  At  a  little  after  daylight, 
about  three  miles  from  the  Court  House,  I  found  some  open 


230  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

fields,  and  halted  there  to  let  the  troops  close  up  and  rest 
a  little.  The  orders  to  this  effect  had  scarcely  been  given, 
when  a  courier  from  Fitz-Hugh  Lee  arrived  with  an  urgent 
call  from  him  to  any  troops  that  might  be  met  to  come  to 
his  support  with  all  speed,  for  his  cavalry  was  hard  pressed 
and  could  not  hold  the  place  much  longer.  Field's1  division, 
which  was  leading  and  which  by  this  time  was  pretty  well 
closed  up,  resumed  the  march  immediately  at  double-quick. 
Before  the  head  of  his  column  could  reach  the  Court  House, 
a  scout  gave  me  information  of  the  approach  of  a  large  body 
of  U.  S.  infantry  from  my  left,  and  sending  Kershaw's  bri 
gade  to  the  support  of  Fitz  Lee,  I  turned  all  the  rest  of  Field's 
division  off  to  meet  the  approach  from  the  left.  Kershaw 
arrived  in  time  to  recover  the  Court  House  from  which  Fitz 
Lee  had  been  compelled  to  retire,  and,  as  fast  as  the  other 
troops  of  Longstreet's  corps  came  up,  they  were  pushed 
rapidly  to  the  support  of  Field's  division,  and  they  maintained 
their  position  until  Lee  arrived  with  the  main  body  of  his 
army. 

If  I  remember  rightly,  it  was  Humphreys's  Mississippi 
brigade2  which  first  encountered,  and  checked  the  approach 
of  the  U.  S.  infantry  on  the  Todd's  Tavern  Road. 

I  have  never  taken  the  pains  to  learn  accurately  by  what 
roads  Longstreet's  corps  was  conducted  from  the  Wilderness 
to  the  Court  House ;  I  think  they  were  wcod  roads  and  plan 
tation  roads,  and  I  doubt  whether  they  are  laid  down  on 
any  maps.  The  march  of  the  other  corps  —  their  times  of 
arrival  and  their  positions  —  I  am  sorry  to  say  I  cannot  give 
you  with  accuracy,  and  I  had  therefore  better  be  silent. 
Fitz-Hugh  Lee,  who  commanded  a  division  in  Stuart's  cavalry, 
can  doubtless  give  you  valuable  information. 
Yours  very  respectfully, 

R.  H.  ANDERSON. 

1  Apparently  this  should  be  "  Kershaw's."     See  67  W.  R.  1021,  1056,  post 
p.  231.  —  ED. 

2  Brigadier-General  Benjamin  G.  Humphreys,  C.  S.  A.  — *  ED. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     231 

Letter  of  Brigadier-General  Joseph  B.  Kershaw,  Command 
ing  3d  Div.  1st  A.  C.,  C.  S.  A. 

CAMDEN,  So.  Car-  Oct.  7,  1886. 

Dear  Sir:  Your  favor  of  last  month  has  been  awaiting 
a  reply  so  long  that  I  can  hold  it  no  longer  unanswered, 
though  my  information  on  the  point  of  your  inquiry  is  very 
limited.  I  had  two  brigades  at  the  place  mentioned  (early 
morning  May  8,  1864),  my  own  and  Humphreys's  Miss,  bri 
gade.  The  latter  was  on  the  right  and  must  have  encountered 
your  left  (Lyle's  brigade).  The  regiments  composing  the 
latter  brigade  were  all  from  Miss,  and  I  am  sorry  to  say 
I  cannot  now  give  you  their  numbers.  The  18th  was  one.  It 
(Humphreys' s  Miss,  brigade)  advanced  so  far  that  it  was  cut 
off  by  the  advance  of  your  people  and  we  thought  captured. 
It  came  up,  however,  at  night,  having  made  a  wide  detour.  I 
do  not  remember  where  the  hospital  (Federal  prisoners)  was 
exactly.  My  impression  is  that  it  was  immediately  in  rear  of 
the  famous  angle  which  was  the  scene  of  so  great  a  conflict 
and  slaughter  afterwards. 

Eureka  !  I  have  found  the  roster  I  was  wanting.  The  13th 
-17th-18th  &  2d  regiments  constituted  the  Miss,  brigade. 

We  moved  the  night  of  the  7th.  Early  in  the  morning 
we  came  to  a  point  in  rear  of  the  position  where  the  first 
infantry  fight  occurred.  Then  Gen.  Stuart  asked  for  support 
and  I  was  told  to  send  him  two  (2)  brigades,  which  I  did, 
as  mentioned.  I  was  ordered  to  take  possession  of  the  Court 
House  (Spottsylvania)  with  the  other  two  brigades,  which  1 
did.  I  do  not  know  whether  we  moved  by  the  Block  House. 
We  knew  that  your  people  were  moving  to  our  right.  I  saw 
and  suspected  that. 

We  moved  just  at  dark  to  our  right  and  so  continued  by 
road  parallel  to  your  line  of  march.  We  marched  all  night. 

Yours  truly, 

J.  B.  KERSHAW. 


232  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Letter  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Charles  Scott  Venable,  A.  D.  C. 
to  General  R.  E.  Lee,  C.  S.  A. 

CHARLOTTESVILLE,  April  25,  1879. 
Captain  E.  B.  Robins,  Secretary. 

Dear  Sir :  General  Lee  moved  down  from  Orange  Court 
House  with  Ewell's  corps  (consisting  of  Rodes's,  Early's,  and 
Johnson's  divisions)  and  with  two  divisions  of  Hill's  corps 
(viz. :  Heth's  and  Wilcox's),  sending  instructions  to  Long- 
street,  who  was  near  Gordons ville  with  his  two  divisions 
(Field's  and  Kershaw's),  to  move  up  after  him,  and  leaving 
Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps  to  hold  the  Rapidan 
Heights  for  a  while  and  then  to  move  on. 

Near  the  Wilderness  Ewell  marched  along  the  old  Rock 
Turnpike,  Lee,  with  Hill's  corps  (Heth's  division  in  front), 
moved  on  the  Plank  Road,  —  and  our  cavalry  moved  down 
the  Catharpin  Road  on  our  right.  On  the  afternoon  of 
May  5th  Ewell's  corps  became  engaged  on  the  old  Turn 
pike,  —  first  Johnson,  then  Rodes,  and  then  Early,  I  think. 
The  head  of  the  column  on  the  Plank  Road,  Heth's  division, 
became  engaged  about  the  same  time,  and  Wilcox's  division 
was  sent  in  to  his  support  as  it  came  up.  These  two  divisions 
held  at  nightfall  a  position  on  the  Plank  Road  extending 
considerably  to  its  right  and  a  very  short  distance  to  its  left. 
I  cannot  give  you  the  order  of  brigades,  except  that  Wilcox's 
division  was  on  the  right. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  May  when  Longstreet  arrived, 
just  as  the  Federal  attack  was  pressing  Wilcox's  division 
back  on  the  right  of  the  Plank  Road,  Wilcox's  and  Heth's 
divisions  were  withdrawn  (except  one  of  Heth's  brigades, 
viz. :  Davis's  Mississippi  brigade,  commanded  by  Col.  Stone), 
Longstreet's  troops  taking  their  place  on  the  right  and  left 
of  the  Plank  Road  (Kershaw's  division  on  the  right  and  Field's 
division  on  the  left),  the  two  divisions  of  Hill,  withdrawn, 
were  put  in  position  to  the  rear  of  Longstreet's  left  —  in 
echelon  in  a  manner.  Anderson's  division  of  Hill's  corps, 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     233 

left  at  Orange  Court  House,  arrived  on  the  field  some  little 
time  after  Longstreet  (about  9  or  10  o'clock,  I  think)  and 
was  put  in  with  Longstreet's  troops.  Longstreet's  flank  attack 
on  the  Federal  left,  made  just  before  he  was  wounded,  was 
made  by  three  brigades  under  Mahone  of  Anderson's  division. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th  the  dispositions  on  the  old  Turn 
pike  Road  of  Ewell's  corps  were  as  follows :  Rodes's  division 
on  the  right  of  the  Turnpike,  Johnson's  division  on  the  left, 
and  Early's  division  on  the  left  of  Johnson. 

Between  HilVs  left,  near  the  Plank  Road,  and  Rodes's 
right,  near  the  old  Turnpike  Road,  there  was  a  very  wide, 
unoccupied  gap  —  which  I  would  put  down  at  a  mile  or  mile 
and  a  half  from  riding  rapidly  over  it. 

In  the  march  to  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  Longstreet's 
two  divisions  (under  Anderson,  who  was  now  promoted  from 
his  division  to  its  command)  marched  first.  The  troops 
marched  on  the  roads  in  rear  of  our  position  at  Wilderness 
—  which  I  could  not  recall  without  a  map.  When  Anderson 
reached  the  junction  of  the  Block  House  Road  and  the 
Spottsylvania  Court  House  Road,  Stuart,  who  was  in  your 
front  up  that  road,  sent  to  him  for  assistance.  Anderson  sent 
him  three  brigades  of  Kershaw's  division,  and  ultimately 
strengthened  the  right  of  these  with  other  troops.  The  Fed 
eral  cavalry  occupied  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  having  Fitz 
Lee  with  his  division  of  cavalry  in  their  front  —  with  some 
brigades  of  Field's  division.  Anderson  took  the  position  of 
Fitz  Lee's  cavalry,  who  were  withdrawn.  The  Federal  cavalry 
soon  left  the  Court  House,  and  Field's  division  was  put  on 
Kershaw's  right.  General  Lee  arrived  later  at  the  head  of 
Rodes's  division,  who  was  the  head  of  Ewell's  march  —  and 
then  came  later  Johnson's  division,  and  Early's  under  Gor 
don  (Early  having  been  put  at  the  head  of  Hill's  corps  owing 
to  a  severe  attack  of  illness  which  disabled  the  latter). 
And  then  came  Hill's  corps  —  (Heth's,  Wilcox's,  and  Ma- 
hone's  (Anderson's  old)  divisions).  Then  the  line  taken  up 


234  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

at  Spottsylvania  was  by  divisions  as  follows :  Kershaw's  di 
vision  on  our  left,  next  Field's  division,  next  Gordon's  divi 
sion,  next  Kodes's  division,  next  Johnson's,  next  Wilcox's, 
next  Heth's,  and  next  Mahone's.  I  have  put  Gordon's  divi 
sion  between  Rodes  and  Field,  but  I  think  his  division  was 
mainly  in  reserve,  and  Rodes  had  a  brigade  in  reserve.  Ma- 
hone  on  the  12th  of  May  was  not  in  trenches,  but  on  the 
extreme  right  near  the  Church  where  our  line  bent  back  on 
the  road. 

I  see  I  have  not  answered  quite  definitely  enough  your 
questions  about  the  troops  on  the  Block  House  Road.  You 
first  met  Stuart,  and  to  him  Anderson  sent  the  three  brigades 
mentioned,  so  Stuart  really  commanded  in  that  encounter. 
I  cannot  give  without  reference  the  exact  time  of  Anderson's 
setting  out  from  the  Wilderness.  I  think  he  moved  a  part 
of  the  way  on  the  night  of  the  7th.  I  have  given  the  above 
from  memory  entirely,  with  the  exception  of  reference  to  my 
friend,  Major  Green  Peyton,  General  Rodes's  adjutant-gen 
eral,  as  to  the  positions  of  the  troops  on  the  Turnpike  Road. 
But  I  think  it  is  accurate  as  the  subject  is  fresh  with  me 
from  a  recent  re-writing  of  an  address  for  publication  on  the 
Campaign  of  '64,  made  in  1873. 

Yours  very  truly, 

CHARLES  S.  VENABLE. 

Extract  from  Diary  of  Colonel  Theodore  Lyman,  A.  D.  C.  to 
General  G.  G.  Meade,  giving  an  account  of  a  visit  to  the 
Wilderness  battle-field  in  April,  1866,  by  General  Peirson 
and  himself. 

April  13,  1866.  Not  long  after  we  began  to  see  traces 
of  the  rebel  rear  in  the  Wilderness  fight,  —  scraps  of  rubber 
blanket,  old  cartridge  boxes,  etc.,  and  presently  an  indication 
of  the  site  of  a  hospital,  with  the  grave  of  an  Union  officer, 
who  had  died  three  weeks  after  the  action  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  —  a  sad  fate  !  Then  came  their  short  second  line,  and 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     235 

then  their  first  line,  just  on  the  edge  of  a  clearing  in  the  thick 
wood.  To  the  opposite  side  of  this  clearing  Peirson's  brigade 
was  brought  on  the  double-quick,  and  stopped  the  enemy's 
advance  when  Griffin  was  forced  back  May  5.  On  the 
opposite  slope  two  guns  were  abandoned,  and  attempts  were 
made  to  get  them  off  without  success.  Peirson's  brigade 
(under  Leonard  of  13th  Massachusetts)  .  .  .  attempted  a 
charge  across  the  open,  but  was  met  by  a  storm  of  canister  at 
a  range  of  some  350  yards.  Upton  (who  joined  on  his  right, 
being  the  left  of  the  6th  corps)  refused  to  budge,  saying  it 
was  madness.  .  .  . 

Once  more  we  made  a  diagonal  walk  through  the  wood, 
which  brought  us  out  on  the  Brock  Road  in  a  few  hundred 
yards.  Well  do  I  recollect  that  road  on  those  two  days !  and 
the  musketry,  now  receding,  now  approaching,  and  the  streams 
of  wounded !  We  kept  down  this  road  and  fed  our  horses  at 
Stevens's  house,  which  marks  the  extreme  left  of  our  line.  An 
old  man  (the  uncle)  was  there,  and  the  woman  of  the  house, 
and  a  couple  of  daughters,  apparently  ;  also  a  rustic  lover  (?) 
and  a  poodle.  Thence  we  made  the  best  of  our  way  towards 
Todd's  Tavern,  which  I  did  not  fail  instantly  to  recognize, 
and  was  content  to  get  a  drink  from  the  old  well,  which  before 
our  cavalry  had  pretty  much  drunk  dry.  Thence  to  open  coun 
try,  above  and  below  Alsopp's,  proved  farther  than  my  recol 
lection  gave,  being  really  three  miles ;  and  from  that  point 
to  the  rebel  works,  where  the  road  turns  sharp  to  the  left 
towards  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  one  and  one  quarter 
miles.  In  this  opening,  not  far  from  AJsopp's,  I  saw  Sedg- 
wick,  Warren,  etc.,  the  day  of  the  8th,  after  Robinson  had 
been  driven  back  and  wounded.  Going  now  down  the  road 
past  Alsopp's,  we  turned  to  the  right  in  the  hollow,  and  kept 
over  the  oak  knoll  where  Grant  and  Meade  stood  among  the 
skirmish  bullets,  and  saw  nothing.  Just  beyond,  at  the  edge 
of  the  oak  timber,  was  a  battery  in  a  very  hot  position,  where 
Martin  was  hit  and  near  which  General  Sedgwick  was  killed ; 


236  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

and  no  wonder,  for  the  woods  to  the  front  and  left  were  full  of 
sharpshooters,  the  most  of  them  not  over  600  yards  off.  We 
took  a  preliminary  view  of  this  neighborhood,  where  Peirson's 
brigade  first  came,  the  advance  of  the  army  moving  from  the 
Wilderness,  and  promised  ourselves  a  more  complete  view  the 
next  day ;  for  the  evening  was  coming  on  and  so  was  a  heavy 
thunder-storm.  So  we  crossed  the  rebel  works  and  galloped 
for  it,  reaching  the  tavern  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House, 
just  before  the  hail,  wind,  and  rain  broke  heavily  over  the 
house.  The  tavern  is  a  big,  square  building,  and  mine  host 
(Sanford)  is  a  big  man,  who  possesses  much  language  and 
politeness,  and  not  much  else,  so  far  as  concerns  eating  and 
sleeping. 

We  took  straight  up  the  Fredericksburg  Koad,  which  is  just 
opposite  the  tavern,  to  begin  our  view  of  the  field.  We  used 
to  call  this  the  "  Gate  "  road,  because  of  a  gate  put  down  on 
the  U.  S.  map,  which  Burnside  was  ordered  to  halt  at  when 
he  moved  down,  and  which  he  naturally  could  not  distinguish 
any  more  than  one  could  distinguish  a  pair  of  bars.  The  court 
house  is  a  brick  building  of  substantial  make  and  surrounded 
by  a  low  brick  wall,  which,  with  the  court  house  itself,  was 
much  knocked  by  the  cannonading.  The  rebel  line,  which  is 
a  simple  one,  crosses  the  road  about  200  yards  from  the  court 
house.  Thence  to  our  front  line  is  from  700  to  800  yards.  Our 
works  are  much  more  complex,  as  they  come  in  by  successive 
approaches  from  the  crest  above  the  Ny  to  this  point.  On  our 
right  (east)  could  be  seen  the  battery  in  a  hollow,  whence  we 
saw  the  court  house  when  General  Meade  rode  along  the  lines 
held  by  the  6th  corps  (May  20).  Keeping  straight  on  we 
went  as  far  as  the  river  (or  "  creek,"  as  they  call  it  here), 
whence  could  be  seen  the  familiar  Gayle  house  opposite,  and 
the  Beverly  house,  where  Warren's  headquarters  were.  The 
Myers  farm,  whence  Upton's  brigade  was  driven,  and  which 
Ayres's  people  retook,  is  sold  now  to  a  Minnesota  family. 
Hence  we  sought  our  front  line  again,  working  to  our  right 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     237 

as  we  walked.  We  took  note  of  some  Massachusetts  graves 
on  the  way.  This  direction  brought  us  soon  to  a  point  oppo 
site  the  east  base  of  the  great  rebel  Salient,  and  where  the 
hostile  works  are  separated  only  by  a  pine-wood  a  couple  of 
hundred  yards  wide.  A  cluster  of  graves  marked,  as  usual, 
the  dangers  of  this  spot.  Crossing  the  belt  of  pines  diago 
nally  by  a  little  run,  we  came  on  the  east  extremity  of  the  final 
line  which  the  enemy  drew  across  the  base  of  the  Salient 
Angle,  when  it  was  captured  on  the  12th  of  May.  This  was 
a  curiosity  of  field  fortification  !  Warned  by  the  dreadful  loss 
and  carnage  of  that  day,  exposed  to  an  artillery  enfilade  from 
both  flanks,  and  fearful  of  a  repetition  of  the  terrible  assault, 
the  garrison  worked  with  the  energy  of  perseverance,  almost 
of  despair !  The  high  parapet  was  not  only  traversed  as  often 
as  every  ten  or  twelve  feet,  but  was  inclosed  on  the  rear, 
so  that  the  line  was  divided  into  a  series  of  square  pens,  with 
banks  of  earth  heavily  riveted  with  oak  logs.  From  space  to 
space  was  what  looked  like  a  wooden  camp  chimney,  but  in 
truth  was  an  elevated  post  for  sharpshooters  with  a  little  loop 
hole  in  front.  I  never  saw  any  like  them.  We  walked  along 
the  parapet  till  we  got  opposite  the  Harrison  house  (now 
occupied  by  a  stone-deaf  Rhode  Islander,  one  Peabody),  when 
we  struck  across  to  our  right,  to  the  first  or  advanced  cross- 
line  to  which  the  rebels  retired  ;  and  there,  turning  again  to 
the  right,  we  followed  it  back  till  we  got  to  the  east  face  of 
the  great  Salient,  at  the  point  where  our  left  rested  after  the 
capture  of  the  works.  But  before  arriving  there,  and  quite 
within  this  advanced  rebel  cross-line,  we  came  on  the  graves 
of  two  privates  and  a  sergeant,  known  only  as  belonging  to 
"  Corcoran's  Irish  Legion,''  brave  Irishmen  who  had  fallen  far 
in  advance  of  the  main  line  of  battle.  This  "  Legion  "  had 
come  down  from  below  Alexandria  as  a  reinforcement,  and 
was  attached,  I  think,  to  the  2d  corps.  McMahon's  brother, 
killed  afterwards  at  Cold  Harbor,  commanded  a  zouave  regi 
ment  in  it.  We  followed  the  Salient  northward  towards  its 


238  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

apex,  and  traced  the  way  in  which  our  men  had  turned  the 
works.  There  was  .open  country  all  about  this  part  of  the 
works ;  and  the  scattered  graves  marked  where  men  had  fallen 
as  they  advanced  from  the  edge  of  the  wood  to  the  assault. 
At  the  very  apex  (which  is  obtuse),  we  had  a  good  view  over 
the  country,  and  I  saw  the  Landron  house,  only  600  yards 
off,  where  Hancock  had  his  headquarters ;  and  to  the  left  and 
a  little  to  the  rear,  the  hollow  where  Wright  was,  and  where 
the  missiles  of  all  kinds  were  so  plenty.  The  point  termed 
"  Death  Angle  "  is  still  more  to  the  left,  where  the  west  face  of 
the  Salient  begins  to  slope  and  where  the  captured  portion  is 
connected  with  the  prolongation  of  our  line.  .  .  . 

We  turned  from  here,  crossed  a  field  strown  with  the 
sabots  of  a  rebel  12-pounder  battery,  and  passed  through 
a  wood  of  small  pines  all  scarred  by  rifle-balls.  This  brought 
us  out  in  the  clearing  east  of  the  road  from  Alsopp's  and 
Todd's  Tavern,  where,  as  I  understand  it,  Upton  made  his  fine 
charge  on  the  10th.1  This  road  is,  of  course,  where  we  crossed 
the  rebel  line  yesterday  eve  to  go  to  the  court  house.  Asked 
Peirson  about  the  attempt  to  drive  the  enemy  from  this  cross 
ing,  because  it  has  an  important  bearing  on  the  subsequent 
actions  round  Spottsylvania.  Somewhere  about  the  edge  of 
the  Hart  farm,  say  two  miles  by  the  road  from  the  present 
rebel  works  on  this  road,  the  infantry  deployed,  having  come 
upon  some  of  our  cavalry  who  had  been  engaged,  but  were 
then  lying  in  the  edge  of  the  woods.  Advancing,  they  began 
skirmishing  with  a  force  of  rebel  cavalry  supported  by  two 
guns,  and  drove  them  down  the  road,  nearly  capturing  the 
pieces.  This  deployment  and  the  skirmish  through  the  woods 
and  the  succeeding  open  occupied  as  usual  much  time.  Fol 
lowing  the  road  after  its  turn  to  the  right  over  the  wooded 
knoll,  they  came  to  a  halt  at  the  further  edge  of  the  wood,  for 

1  Or  rather  it  must  have  been  at  the  northwest  face  of  the  Salient  where  we 
saw  the  sabots  in  the  field.  See  General  Upton's  letter  in  M.  H.  S.  unpublished 
reports,  vol.  i,  p.  271.  —  ED. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  239 

there  was  the  enemy's  infantry  in  line,  with  a  breastwork  and 
a  rude  abatis  (how  heavy  the  work  was  Peirson  is  not  sure  ; 
probably  a  hasty  rifle-pit  at  that  moment).  The  exhausted 
men  lay  down  panting ;  since  the  evening  of  the  4th  they 
had  been  marching,  fighting,  and  digging  with  small  inter 
mission,  and  now  they  were  further  exhausted  by  a  running 
engagement  of  two  miles.  It  was  the  morning  of  the  8th. 
Robinson  rode  up  and  said  :  "  We  must  drive  them  from 
there,  or  they  will  get  a  battery  in  position  "  (the  advanced 
battery  directly  on  the  road  had  not  then  been  put  up).  A 
charge  was  made  over  500  yards  of  open,  Peirson's  brigade 
on  the  left  of  the  road,  the  Maryland  brigade  on  the  right. 
Where  Baxter's  was  he  is  not  sure.  The  Marylanders  re 
ceived  a  severe  musketry,  lost  a  number  of  men,  and  fell  back 
in  confusion.  His  brigade,  somewhat  covered  by  the  ground, 
advanced  to  within  75  yards  of  the  works  and  stopped  under 
protection  of  a  steep  crest.  There  they  lay,  firing  if  a  rebel 
raised  to  shoot.  Looking  to  left,  Peirson  now  saw  two  lines  of 
the  enemy,  a  good  brigade  front,  marching  out  of  the  woods 
in  excellent  order  upon  his  flank,  and  even  rear.  He  gave 
orders  to  his  color-bearer  to  take  the  flag  and  fall  back,  and 
the  whole  brigade  ran  for  it,  followed  by  a  shower  of  bullets. 
It  was  his  wish  to  keep  up  with  his  men  so  as  to  stop  them 
when  they  got  in  the  edge  of  the  wood,  but  he  was  so  totally 
exhausted  that  he  could  only  hobble  back  at  a  walk,  helping 
himself  with  his  sword.  One  of  his  color-bearers  was  killed, 
the  other  wounded,  but  both  flags  were  saved.  He  himself 
had  several  ball-holes  in  his  clothes  and  three  buckshot  in  his 
left  arm.  At  the  edge  of  the  wood  he  had  a  sunstroke,  and 
was  carried  off  by  one  of  his  men.  It  was  in  rallying  these 
troops  that  Robinson  lost  his  leg  by  a  musket-shot.  Now  it  is 
clear  that  when  our  advance  arrived  at  the  junction  of  the 
roads  by  which  the  enemy  and  we  advanced  on  the  court 
house,  the  enemy  were  already  in  position  with  a  line  of  battle, 
some  sort  of  protection,  and,  moreover,  a  spare  brigade  to  use 


240  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

for  flanking.  That  they  too  were  newly  arrived  is  plain, 
because  their  artillery  was  not  up.  These  were  Longstreet's 1 
people  ;  and  old  Sanford  testified  that  part  of  his  troops 
advanced  on  the  court  house  about  8.30  A.  M.  of  that  morning, 
and  drove  away  Wilson's  cavalry,  who  retired  slowly  by  the 
Fredericksburg  Road,  firing  with  cannon  and  carbines  as  they 
went.  These  rebel  troops  came,  not  by  the  main  road  from 
the  northwest,  but  across  the  fields  from  the  west.  Long- 
street,1  then,  seems  to  have  halted  his  first  division  at  the 
junction  of  the  roads,  to  stop  our  infantry,  and  to  have  sent 
the  second  by  a  back  road  past  A.  Perry's  to  drive  Wilson 
from  the  court  house.  Knowing  that  at  about  6  A.  M.  of  that 
morning  two  divisions  of  the  5th  corps  had  got  past  Todd's 
Tavern,  I  should  infer  (from  all  these  data)  that  Longstreet 1 
arrived  at  the  vital  point  —  the  junction  of  the  roads  —  about 
8  A.  M.,  that  Robinson  attacked  about  8.30  A.  M.,  and  that  he 
occupied  about  two  and  a  half  hours  in  skirmishing  over  two 
miles  of  country,  a  consumption  of  time  readily  understood 
by  those  who  have  seen  skirmishing.  Measured  from  the 
Plank  Road,  Longstreet l  had  to  march  ten  miles,  Robinson 
eight ;  but  it  seems  probable  that  Longstreet's l  starting-point 
was  south  of  the  Plank,  Robinson's,  north,  which  would  make 
the  distance  nearly  even.  The  delay  made  by  the  opposition 
of  the  rebel  cavalry,  supported  by  the  two  guns,  was  fatal  to 
our  tactics.  How  much  delay  was  caused  by  our  own  cavalry 
column  getting  in  the  road  I  do  not  know,  but  Meade  had 
a  hot  interview  with  Sheridan  about  it,  and  Sheridan's  as 
sertion  that  there  was  nothing  worth  speaking  of  to  stop  the 
advance  of  our  infantry  was  plainly  an  entire  mistake ;  and 
very  likely  the  remark  was  in  part  dictated  by  temper. 

A  few  hundred  yards  to  the  right  of  where  this  attack  was 
made,  we  visited  the  patch  of  pine- woods,  where  on  the  10th 
Peirson's  brigade  again  advanced  to  attack.  This  was  the  day 
General  Rice  was  killed.  The  brigade  advanced  to  within 
about  one  hundred  yards  of  the  works,  and  then  began  firing 

1  Anderson.  —  ED. 


OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC     241 

in  the  thick  woods,  being  exposed  to  a  tremendous  artillery 
enfilade,  whose  marks  still  remained  in  the  fallen  timber. 
Peirson  said  he  ordered  his  men  to  cease  firing,  finding  few 
balls  coming  the  other  way,  but  got  an  order  from  the  bri 
gade  commander  to  open  again.  "  It  always  seemed  to  me 
a  feeble  attack,"  said  he.  The  pines  on  our  side  were  all  shot 
up,  but  on  the  side  facing  the  rebels  there  was  not  one  tenth 
of  the  bullet  marks.  This  may  have  been  meant  only  as  a  de 
monstration,  but,  as  I  recollect  the  orders,  Warren,  and  Gib 
bon  on  his  right,  were  to  attack.  It  is  but  human  nature  to 
think  there  was  but  too  much  of  this  demonstrative  firing  to 
excuse  a  real  attack.  Then  Peirson  was  knocked  senseless  by 
a  shell,  and  as  he  came  to  himself,  saw  General  Rice  getting 
over  the  breastworks.  We  examined  the  graves  hereabout, 
of  which  there  are  many  in  the  hollow  to  the  rear.  After 
crossing  to  the  rebel  line  and  going  as  far  to  our  right  as 
the  J.  Perry  house,  we  faced  about  and  made  the  best  of 
our  way  to  the  tavern.  At  supper  was  a  bright  doctor,  ex- 
surgeon  of  a  Georgia  brigade,  and  a  dweller  near  to  the  spot 
where  Eobinson  was  wounded  —  his  name  Durrett  (immor 
talized  as  "  Dirt  "  on  the  map !). 


IX 
CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864 


BY 


MAJOR-GENERAL  FRANCIS   CHANNING  BARLOW 

U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  January  13, 1879 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864 

THE  following  account  of  the  attack  on  the  rebel  lines  at 
Spottsylvania  on  the  12th  of  May^  1864,  will  be  a  meagre 
and  unsatisfactory  one.  Fourteen  and  a  half  years  have 
passed  since  that  day,  and  many  of  the  incidents  and  events 
which  were  noticed  and  known  at  the  time  have  been  for 
gotten. 

I  have  no  memoranda  of  the  operations  of  that  campaign, 
nor  have  I  ever  made  any  official  report  of  them,  so  far  as 
I  remember,  and  I  have  been  ever  since  greatly  occupied 
with  other  matters,  which  have  pretty  nearly  banished  those 
occurrences  from  my  memory. 

I  shall  tell  only  those  details  which  I  positively  remember, 
except  that  I  shall  allude  to  some  particulars  which  have  been 
told  me  by  others  who  were  present.  I  relate  what  I  remem 
ber,  not  as  being  a  complete  history  of  these  occurrences,  but 
as  an  imperfect  contribution  which  may  hereafter  help  to 
throw  light  upon  them. 

I  understand  that  the  purpose  of  this  Society  is  not  o 
obtain  striking  and  picturesque  accounts  of  military  oper 
ations,  but  to  gather  together  facts,  carefully  and  accurately 
stated,  which  may  assist  the  future  historian. 

At  about  7  P.  M.  of  May  11  the  commanders  of  three  of 
the  divisions  of  the  2d  army  corps  were  summoned  to  corps 
headquarters  by  General  Hancock,  its  commander.  They 
were  General  Barlow  of  the  1st  division,  General  Gibbon  of 
the  2d,  and  General  Birney  of  the  3d.  The  4th  division 
(General  Mott's)  had  been  for  a  day  or  two  on  detached 
service  at  the  extreme  left  of  our  line,  and  its  commander 
was  not  present.  On  arriving  at  corps  headquarters  we  were 


246  THE    WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

told  by  General  Hancock  that  an  attack  upon  the  enemy's 
right  flank  by  the  2d  corps  was  intended  to  be  made  at  day 
light  on  the  next  day.  "We  were  told  that  it  was  a  movement 
of  more  than  usual  importance,  and  were  reminded  of  the 
gratitude  which  the  country  would  feel  for  those  officers  who 
should  contribute  to  the  success  of  the  enterprise. 

No  information  whatever,  so  far  as  I  can  remember,  was 
given  us  as  to  the  position  or  strength  of  the  enemy,  or  as 
to  the  troops  to  be  engaged  in  the  movement  (except  that  the 
2d  corps  was  to  take  part  in  it),  or  as  to  the  plan  of  the 
attack,  or  why  any  attack  was  to  be  made  at  that  time  or 
place.  The  sole  information  and  the  only  orders  given  were 
that  the  leading  division  was  to  report  at  corps  headquarters 
at  an  hour  named  of  that  night  (which  I  think  was  ten 
o'clock),  and  that  the  others  were  to  follow  closely.  At  the 
headquarters  we  were  to  meet  staff  and  engineer  officers, 
who  would  conduct  us  to  the  ground,  and  give  us  all  the 
information  needed. 

The  1st  division  had  the  advance,  and  we  were  at  the 
appointed  place  at  the  appointed  hour.  There  we  were  joined 
(at  the  head  of  the  column)  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  H. 
Morgan,  inspector-general  of  the  2d  corps  (a  most  active  and 
competent  officer),  and  an  engineer  officer  from  army  head 
quarters.  My  own  recollection  for  many  years  was  that  the 
latter  officer  was  Captain  Paine,  but  I  have  been  lately  told, 
upon  authority  which  seems  to  be  conclusive,  that  it  was 
Major  Mendell  of  the  U.  S.  Engineers.1  While  writing  this 
I  learn  from  General  Hancock's  official  report  that  this  is  the 
fact. 

The  night  was  very  rainy  and  dark,  and  the  roads  were 
very  muddy  and  heavy,  and  we  began  a  laborious  and  tire 
some  march  under  the  guidance  of  the  officers  above  men 
tioned. 

I  remember  well  the  loudly  expressed  indignation  of  those 

1  Lieutenant-Colonel  G.  H.  Mendell. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     247 

officers  at  being  sent  to  conduct  an  important  movement 
when  they  had  no  information  whatever  as  to  the  position  or 
strength  of  the  enemy,  or  indeed  upon  any  of  the  important 
points,  and  at  times  a  sense  of  the  ludicrous,  of  the  absurd 
ity  of  the  situation,  prevailed  over  the  feeling  of  responsibility 
and  indignation.  As  my  time  of  responsibility  had  not  yet 
come,  I  could  give  way  freely  to  the  ludicrousness  of  the 
scene,  and  the  others  could  not  resist  it.  As  we  staggered 
and  stumbled  along  in  the  mud  and  intense  darkness,  and 
I  vainly  sought  for  information,  the  absurdity  of  our  position 
—  that  we  were  proceeding  to  attack  the  enemy  when  no  one 
even  knew  his  direction,  and  we  could  hardly  keep  on  our 
own  legs  —  appealed  to  me  very  strongly  as  I  listened  to  the 
conversation  of  Colonel  Morgan  (who  was  what  might  be 
called  a  profane  swearer)  and  his  criticisms  on  the  "  conduct 
of  the  war." 

It  was  an  exquisitely  ludicrous  scene,  and  I  could  hardly 
sit  on  my  horse  for  laughter.  I  remember  that  I  finally  said 
to  Colonel  Morgan,  "  For  Heaven's  sake,  at  least,  face  us  in 
the  right  direction,  so  that  we  shall  not  march  away  from  the 
enemy,  and  have  to  go  round  the  world  and  come  up  in  their 
rear." 

Colonel  Miles  and  Colonel  Brooke,  commanding  two  of  the 
brigades  of  the  division,  rode  with  me  at  the  head  of  the 
column,  and  were  loud  in  their  complaints  of  the  madness  of 
the  undertaking.  The  former  was  so  emphatic  in  his  indigna 
tion  that  I  was  at  last  compelled  to  interfere,  and  tell  him 
to  be  quiet. 

I  do  not  think  these  details  as  to  our  march  are  trifling, 
because  they  throw  some  light  on  the  general  methods  of 
conducting  important  operations. 

After  a  march  of  about  two  hours,  we  reached  a  point 
which  we  were  told  was  to  be  our  position  and  the  base  of 
our  attack.  It  must  have  been  about  twelve  or  half-past 
twelve  in  the  morning.  It  was  an  intensely  dark  night,  and 


248  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

nothing  whatever  could  be  seen  of  the  surrounding  country.  I 
have  not  exaggerated  the  ignorance  of  the  officers  who  were 
sent  to  conduct  us.  I  have  since  laughed  with  Colonel  Mor 
gan  as  to  his  utter  ignorance  of  the  whole  situation.  It  is 
necessary  that  this  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  order  that  the 
purely  haphazard  character  of  this  apparently  brilliant  attack 
may  be  known. 

When  this  mass  of  darkness,  mud,  and  rain  was  pointed 
out  at  midnight  as  the  position  from  which  the  attack  was 
to  be  made,  the  functions  and  responsibility  of  the  staff  offi 
cers  ceased,  and  those  of  the  commanders  of  the  troops  began. 
Morgan  and  Mendell  could  do  little  more  than  indicate  in  a 
general  way  the  direction  in  which  the  enemy  lay,  and  inform 
us  that  we  were  about  at  the  point  at  which  their  line  of 
works  was  thrown  back  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  their 
flank.  That  is  to  say,  we  were  about  on  the  right  flank  of  the 
enemy.  As  to  how  far  distant  their  works  were,  the  character 
of  the  works,  and  their  construction,  the  nature  of  the  inter 
vening  ground,  and  the  force  opposed  to  us,  their  artillery, 
etc.,  these  officers  frankly  confessed  their  ignorance.  And  as 
to  our  own  forces  we  had  no  other  information  than  that 
three  divisions  of  our  corps  were  to  join  in  an  attack,  and  that 
we  were  on  the  flank  of  our  own  army  with  nothing  beyond. 

On  the  very  ground  on  which  we  were  was  the  4th  division 
of  our  corps  (Mott's),  which  had  been  sent  out  there  a  day 
or  two  before,  and  composed  the  left,  or  advance  (for  we 
moved  always  by  the  left  on  that  campaign)  of  our  army. 
This  division,  we  were  told,  had  made  an  unsuccessful  attack 
on  the  preceding  afternoon.  As  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  leading  division,  I  was  now  compelled  to  obtain  such 
information  as  could  be  had,  in  order  to  make  the  necessary 
dispositions.  It  must  have  been  half-past  twelve,  and  it  would 
be  daylight  soon  after  four. 

The  troops  were  ordered  to  rest  on  their  arms,  and  I  sought 
for  information  at  the  headquarters  of  General  Mott,  near  by, 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     249 

which  were  at  the  "  Brown  House."  His  division  had  made 
an  unsuccessful  attack  the  day  before,  and  had  approached 
more  or  less  near  the  enemy's  works.  I  must  have  seen 
General  Mott  that  night,  but  I  cannot  recall  the  fact,  nor 
do  I  remember  having  any  conversation  with  any  of  his 
officers,  except  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Merriam  of  the  16th 
Massachusetts  regiment. 

This  officer  (who  was  killed  the  next  day)  had  been  en 
gaged  with  his  regiment  in  the  former  attack,  and  had 
advanced  far  enough  to  obtain  some  kind  of  an  impression  as 
to  the  enemy's  works  and  the  intervening  ground.  He  drew 
upon  the  wall  a  sketch  of  the  position,  and  this  was  the  sole 
basis  on  which  the  dispositions  of  my  division  were  made. 
The  intervening  ground  was  open  and  comparatively  free 
from  trees  and  other  obstructions,  and  from  the  information 
which  he  gave,  we  were  able  to  form  in  such  a  position  that 
a  direct  march  forward  brought  us  nearly  upon  the  angle 
formed  by  the  refusal  of  the  enemy's  line. 

The  division  was  formed  in  column  of  regiments,  each 
doubled  on  the  centre.  In  the  first  line  were  the  1st  and  4th 
brigades  (Colonels  Miles  and  Brooke),  and  in  the  second  the 
2d  and  3d  brigades.  The  former,  the  Irish  brigade,  was  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Smythe,  and  the  latter  by  some  colonel 
whose  name  I  do  not  remember.  Between  the  first  and  second 
lines,  and  between  the  brigades  in  each  line,  some  small  space 
was  intended  to  be  left,  but  this  disappeared  as  soon  as  we 
got  into  motion,  and  the  division  became  a  solid  mass. 

On  the  left  of  the  column,  at  some  considerable  distance, 
I  placed  a  body  of  troops  (whether  more  than  one  regiment  I 
do  not  remember),  marching  by  the  right  flank  so  that  they 
might,  if  necessary,  come  to  the  front  and  face  to  our  left, 
thus  protecting  the  exposed  (left)  flank  of  the  column.  Of 
course,  in  the  darkness,  and  on  the  rough  ground,  these  dis 
positions  were  roughly  made,  but  this  was  the  general  plan. 

I  sent  word  to  Generals  Gibbon  and  Birney  of  what  I  had 


250  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

learned  and  done,  and  those  officers  formed  on  our  right. 
Birney  formed  contiguous  to  us  in  line,  two  lines,  I  think ;  at 
any  rate  not  in  solid  formation  as  we  were.  I  do  not  know 
whether  Gibbon  formed  on  Birney' s  right  or  in  his  rear,  as 
a  reserve.  I  find  it  stated  in  General  Hancock's  report  that 
Mott's  division  formed  as  a  second  line  to  Birney,  and  Gib 
bon  acted  as  a  reserve.  When  all  the  dispositions  were  made 
we  had  some  two  hours  of  sleep. 

I  was  aroused  at  four  o'clock,  and  when  I  went  out  (I  slept 
in  Mott's  house)  it  was  still  very  dark,  and  although  the  rain 
had  ceased  there  was  a  very  heavy,  clinging  mist.  The  men 
were  got  under  arms,  and  at  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  after 
four,  just  as  the  daylight  began  to  appear,  we  started.  My 
recollection  is  that  the  division  and  all  the  brigade  commanders 
marched  in  the  centre  of  the  column  between  the  first  and 
second  lines.  All  were  dismounted.  At  first  we  moved  slowly 
and  quietly,  but  before  long  the  whole  division  became  con 
fused  into  one  mass  and  passed  into  a  run. 

My  recollection  of  what  took  place  between  our  starting 
and  our  reaching  the  works  is  very  indistinct.  I  should  say 
the  time  was  very  short,  say  five  minutes,  though  no  doubt  it 
was  much  longer.  Fortunately  the  ground  was  very  open,  and 
I  remember  that,  as  we  got  in  sight  of  the  works,  the  mass 
instinctively  swayed  off  to  our  left,  that  it  might  precipitate 
itself  directly  on  the  Angle,  to  which  we  had  not  been  exactly 
directed  at  the  start.  The  men  soon  began  to  cheer. 

I  remember  the  thin  picket  line  of  the  enemy,  with  their 
bewildered  look,  of  which  no  one  took  any  notice.  There  was 
a  little  pattering  of  bullets,  and  I  saw  a  few  of  our  men  on 
the  ground ;  one  discharge  of  artillery,  that  I  remember,  and 
we  were  up  on  the  works  with  our  hands  full  of  guns,  prison 
ers,  and  colors. 

My  recollection  of  the  enemy's  resistance  is  only  as  I  have 
stated  it ;  it  seems  to  have  been  very  slight  and  ineffectual, 
as  if  they  were  overpowered  before  they  knew  what  was  upon 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     251 

them.  I  have  lately  talked  with  General  Miles  upon  the  sub 
ject,  and  he  thinks  there  was  a  considerable  fire  of  musketry 
from  the  enemy  (such  a  fire  as  could  be  delivered  by  several 
thousand  men  firing  and  reloading  two  or  three  times),  and 
that  there  were  three  discharges  of  artillery,  either  three  pieces 
fired  once  each,  or  one  piece  fired  three  times,  —  probably  the 
former,  —  and  that  our  loss  was  considerable  before  we  reached 
the  works.  But  my  recollection  is  otherwise,  and  I  think  he 
must  be  mistaken,  for  I  remember  that  I  saw  only  three  or 
four  of  our  men  down.  I  remember  this  because  I  was  sur 
prised  at  the  fact. 

It  is  true  that  the  records  of  the  adjutant-general's  office 
show  the  following  losses  of  our  division  on  that  day :  — 

Killed  in  the  First  Division,  Second  Corps. 

Commissioned  Officers.                        Enlisted  Men.  Total. 

15                                           206  221 

Wounded. 

Commissioned  Officers.                        Enlisted  Men.  Total. 

46                                          953  999 

Missing. 

Commissioned  Officers.                        Enlisted  Men.  Total. 

8                                             202  210 

Killed,  Wounded,  and  Missing. 

Officers.                                   Enlisted  Men.  Total. 

69                                          1361  1430 

I  add  here  the  total  casualties  (killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing)  in  the  2d  and  3d  divisions  :  — 

Second  Division 519 

Third  Division 726 

Artillery  Brigade 30 

But  the  losses  must  have  been  mainly  during  the  sub 
sequent  operations  of  that  day,  and  not  in  the  first  attack, 
which,  in  my  opinion,  involved  a  very  small  loss. 


252  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

To  return  to  the  attack.  The  enemy's  earthworks  were  very 
substantial  and  well  built,  with  a  very  thick  abatis  of  felled 
trees  in  front,  which  it  would  have  been  very  difficult  to  get 
through  under  a  cool  and  well-directed  fire.  But  this  mass  of 
men,  coming  so  unexpectedly,  was  irresistible,  and  they  surged 
over  the  works  like  a  flood. 

How  many  men,  guns,  and  colors  were  taken  I  cannot 
remember.  General  Miles  writes  "me,  and  it  is  so  stated  in 
General  Hancock's  official  report,  that  we  took  thirty  flags 
and  eighteen  field-pieces  at  the  first,  besides  two  guns  secured 
afterwards.  The  two  guns  last  mentioned  were  dragged  back 
by  the  enemy  some  distance  towards  his  second  line,  and 
taken  in  by  the  1st  division  during  the  next  day.  With  the 
eighteen  pieces  were  captured  their  horses,  caissons,  etc.,  etc. 
The  men,  guns,  and  flags,  above  mentioned,  were  the  spoils  of 
the  whole  corps.  I  do  not  remember  how  many  of  each  were 
actually  taken  by  my  own  division ;  I  have  never  seen  it 
stated. 

The  works  were  held  by  Johnson's  division  of  Swell's  corps, 
and  their  general  officers  were  Major-General  Edward  John 
son  and  Brigadier-General  George  H.  Steuart.  It  was  always 
said,  and  it  is  stated  by  General  Hancock  in  his  report,  that 
the  *'  Stonewall  Brigade  "  was  among  the  captured. 

I  reached  the  works  very  soon  after  the  head  of  the  column, 
and  have  a  distinct  recollection  of  the  situation  there  at  that 
time.  It  was  always  a  matter  of  contention  between  the  1st 
and  the  3d  (Birney's)  divisions  as  to  which  first  reached  the 
enemy's  lines.  I  cannot  decide  this  point,  though  I  think  my 
own  division  must  have  arrived  a  little  earlier  for  two  reasons. 
The  ground  over  which  we  passed  was  comparatively  open, 
while  the  ground  in  Birney's  front  was  quite  thickly  wooded 
and  somewhat  marshy.  Then  our  solid  formation  was  better 
adapted  to  quick  marching,  and  to  a  final  rush,  than  was  the 
long  line  of  Birney's  division. 

A  long  line,  endeavoring  to  keep,  to  some  extent,  its  align- 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     253 

ment,  always  must  move  more  slowly  than  a  solid  mass  hav 
ing  (as  was  the  case  with  us,  after  the  first  few  rods)  no 
formation.  But  one  thing  is  perfectly  clear,  that  the  1st 
division  struck  the  very  angle  of  the  enemy's  works,  and  Birney 
the  line  of  works  to  our  right.  The  intrenchments  were  full 
of  the  men  of  my  division  when  I  reached  them,  and  there 
were  few,  if  any,  of  Birney's  men  at  that  precise  point. 

When  I  reached  the  works,  there  was  only  a  scattering  and 
feeble  fire  from  the  enemy,  apparently  delivered  as  the  small 
number  of  his  men  who  had  escaped  fell  back.  The  country 
immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  Angle  was  nearly  open,  with 
only  an  occasional  tree,  and  it  could  be  plainly  seen  that  there 
was  no  force  of  the  enemy  there. 

I  at  once  directed  Colonel  Miles  to  get  his  brigade  together 
and  move  far  enough  forward  to  well  clear  the  works,  and  to 
form  a  line  there  in  order  to  guard  against  a  return  of  the 
enemy  and  also  to  extend  his  line  to  our  left  so  as  to  protect 
our  flank.  Off  on  our  left  the  country  was  considerably  wooded 
with  pine-trees.  All  along  to  our  right  there  was  a  forest  of 
large  trees  with  but  little  underbrush. 

What  ought  to  have  been  done  was  plain.  We  had  carried 
the  enemy's  line  at  its  extreme  right,  and  practically  de 
stroyed  its  defenders.  The  occasion  for  "charging,"  for 
rush  and  confusion,  was  past,  and  troops  ought  to  have 
been  soberly  and  deliberately  put  in  position,  and  ordered  to 
sweep  down  the  rebel  line  towards  his  left,  while  provision 
was  made  to  guard  against  an  attack  by  the  enemy's  second 
line,  or  the  remnant  of  his  defeated  troops,  upon  the  ground 
which  we  had  taken.  It  was  this  latter  object  which  was  sought 
to  be  attained  by  the  re-forming  of  Miles's  brigade,  which 
I  have  mentioned  above,  and  by  similar  orders  given  to  the 
rest  of  the  1st  division. 

This  sweeping  down  on  the  enemy's  flank  should  have 
been  done  by  fresh  troops,  moved  up  slowly  and  deliberately. 
Of  course  the  troops  which  had  made  the  assault  were  in  the 


254  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

/fhost  complete  confusion,  and  this  remark  applies  as  well  to 
•  Birney's  division  as  to  my  own.  Not  only  were  they  broken 
up  by  the  rush  of  the  attack,  but  the  men  huddled  together 
in  the  comparatively  small  space  occupied  by  the  Angle  and 
the  enemy's  guns  in  search  of  flags,  prisoners,  etc.  Every 
effort  was  made  to  restore  order,  and  to  separate  the  men  into 
their  own  companies  and  regiments. 

Although  there  was  more  or  less  of  a  scattering  fire  from 
the  direction  of  the  enemy,  yet  I  am  sure  it  was  not  severe 
enough,  at  least  for  an  hour  or  more,  to  interfere  with  re 
forming  the  troops.  What  did  interfere  with  the  restoring 
of  order  was  the  pouring  in  of  fresh  troops  upon  our  backs. 
These  did  not  come  from  our  own  corps  alone,  but  from  other 
corps  as  well.  The  fresh  troops  should  have  been  moved  up 
leisurely,  and  marched  down  on  the  enemy's  exposed  flank. 
Not  only  was  this  not  done,  but  they  were  poured  in  on  us  until 
the  men  were  forty  deep.  Our  re-forming  was  embarrassed, 
and  the  great  opportunity  was  lost. 

Generally  I  am  not  able  to  speak  accurately  as  to  what 
troops  were  sent  in  after  us,  nor  as  to  questions  of  time  ;  but 
of  two  things  I  have  a  very  distinct  and  positive  recollection. 
A  very  considerable  time  after  the  assault  I  heard  a  shouting 
in  our  rear,  and  on  looking  around  I  saw  a  brigade  coming 
up  upon  us  at  double-quick  and,  I  think,  in  solid  formation. 
I  was  told  that  its  commander  was  a  General  or  Colonel 
Grant,  and  my  impression  is  that  it  was  composed  of  Vermont 
troops.  It  did  not  belong  to  the  2d  corps.  It  reached  the 
works,  already  crowded  with  our  men,  and  mingled  in  the  con 
fused  mass.  This  was  not  the  first  or  last  of  these  tumult 
uous  accessions. 

The  second  fact  which  I  distinctly  remember  is  that  upon 
this  occasion,  the  coming  up  of  this  brigade,  I  rode  back  to 
where  General  Hancock  was,  and  said  to  him  :  "  For  God's 
sake,  Hancock,  do  not  send  any  more  troops  in  here."  And 
then  I  told  him  what,  in  my  opinion,  should  be  done ;  that 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     255 

is,  that  we  should  be  allowed  to  re-form  in  peace  and  hold 
what  we  had  taken,  and  the  fresh  troops  should  be  sent  to 
sweep  down  the  enemy's  lines.  A  trifling  incident  makes  me 
remember  this  meeting  with  General  Hancock  very  distinctly. 
It  is  that  in  my  excitement  I  called  him  "  Hancock,"  omit 
ting  the  "  General,"  which  I  never  did  before  or  afterwards. 

There  is  little  more  to  add.  My  own  division  remained 
during  the  day  in  about  the  same  position  that  it  was  in  an 
hour  after  the  assault,  except  that  it  was  extended  consider 
ably  to  the  left,  in  order  to  guard  against  any  attack  on  our 
flank. 

We  found  on  the  18th  of  May,  when  we  made  an  advance 
from  our  position  of  the  12th,  that  the  enemy  had  a  strong 
second  line  half  a  mile  or  so  in  the  rear  of  their  first  line. 
This  was  probably  in  existence  on  the  12th,  and  to  it  the 
remnants  of  the  shattered  division  fell  back,  and  no  doubt 
were  reinforced  by  other  rebel  troops.  Finding  that  we 
neither  advanced  materially  beyond  the  first  line  nor  swept 
down  it  in  flank,  the  enemy  gradually  pushed  forward,  until  in 
some  places  they  actually  reached  their  first  line,  on  the  outer 
side  of  which  our  men  were  lying.  During  the  greater  part  of 
the  day  I  was  with  General  Hancock  and  various  other  officers 
of  rank,  at  what  I  believe  was  called  the  "  Landron  House," 
within  short  musket-shot  of  the  works  which  we  had  taken, 
and  in  plain  sight.  You  could  see  men  of  all  commands 
intermingled  and  lying,  in  some  places  forty  deep,  on  the 
outer  side  of  the  captured  works,  and  on  the  slope  which  ran 
down  from  them.  This  was  especially  so  just  at  the  angle  of 
the  works.  The  enemy's  line  was  at  a  short  distance  in  the 
front,  and  it  grew  stronger,  judging  from  the  increase  of  the 
fire,  as  the  scattered  rebels  returned  into  line  or  reinforce 
ments  came  up. 

Further  to  our  right  the  enemy  even  returned  and  occupied 
their  works,  our  men  being  on  the  other  side  of  the  log 
breastworks.  I  know  that  this  is  so,  because  on  the  next  day 


256  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

I  myself  saw  in  the  excavations  on  the  enemy's  side  of  the 
log  breastworks  (it  was  at  some  distance  to  our  right  of  the 
Angle)  such  a  mass  of  the  dead  and  wounded  as  I  had  only 
seen  once  before,  and  that  was  in  a  sunken  road  at  Antietam, 
which  is  still  called  "  Bloody  Lane."  These  rebels  at  Spott- 
sylvania  could  not  have  been  killed  at  the  first  assault,  and 
hence  it  is  evident  that  they  must  have  returned  there  later 
in  the  day.  Our  men  were  plainly  visible  from  the  Landron 
house,  lying  on  the  outer  side  of  this  part  of  the  works,  and 
it  is  literally  true  that  the  enemy  must  have  been  immedi 
ately  on  the  other  side. 

My  object  in  this  paper  is  rather  to  give  my  personal 
recollections  of  what  I  saw  on  that  day  than  to  criticise  its 
operations.  But  I  will  make  one  or  two  general  observa 
tions. 

So  far  as  the  assault  was  concerned,  it  was  undoubtedly 
the  most  brilliant  thing  of  its  kind  of  the  war.  But  I  agree 
in  the  opinion  expressed  to  me  long  afterwards  by  Colonel 
Morgan,  that  it  was  "  a  lucky  accident."  It  was  an  accident 
that  we  struck  this  angle,  always  a  weak  point  in  a  line; 
an  accident  that  the  morning  was  misty  to  an  unusual  degree ; 
an  accident  that  we  found  a  space  for  our  rush  so  free  from 
obstacles ;  an  accident  that  we  so  escaped  the  observation  of 
the  enemy's  outposts  and  pickets  that  we  were  upon  them 
before  they  could  make  any  substantial  resistance. 

That  we  were  in  that  solid  formation  which  was  practically 
J    irresistible  was  of  course  designed,  but  that  such  a  formation 
was  practicable  was  because  at  the  last  minute  it  was  found 
that  the  nature  of  the  ground  permitted  it. 

As  I  have  stated  above,  when  we  marched  to  the  left,  on 
the  night  of  the  llth,  there  was  no  knowledge  on  our  part  of 
the  various  facts  on  which  the  success  of  the  operations  ulti 
mately  depended.  The  incidents  of  our  march  which  I  have 
mentioned  sufficiently  show  this,  and  Colonel  Morgan's  re 
mark  to  me,  long  afterwards,  that  it  was  "  a  lucky  accident " 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     257 

corroborates  my  most  vivid  recollection  of  the  want  on  his 
part  of  all  the  necessary  information.  And  I  am  told  that 
Major  Mendell's  account  of  that  night  substantially  agrees 
with  my  own.  I  know  that  when  we  reached  a  certain  point 
I  was  simply  told  that  there  was  the  spot,  and  beyond  that 
nothing. 

When  I  had  written  about  half  of  this  paper,  I  received 
a  copy  of  a  part  of  General  Hancock's  report  of  this  battle, 
and  of  the  operations  of  the  few  days  preceding  on  the  river 
Po. 

I  see  that  General  Hancock  speaks  of  his  having  delayed 
for  a  little  the  order  for  the  assault  on  May  12  on  account 
of  the  mist,  and  of  his  having  finally  given  the  word  at  4.35. 
He  does  not  say  in  terms  that  he  was  present,  but  his  state 
ment  of  course  implies  it.  I  have  no  recollection  whatever  of 
seeing  him  after  the  interview  at  his  headquarters,  early  in 
the  evening  of  the  llth,  until  I  rode  out  to  him  to  protest 
against  troops  being  crowded  in  on  us,  as  I  have  above  re 
lated.  He  did  not  move  with  us  on  our  march,  but  probably 
came  later  to  the  Brown  house,  General  Mott's  headquarters. 

But  that  I  had  no  communication  with  or  from  him  as  to 
the  plan  of  the  attack,  or  the  formation  of  the  troops,  or  the 
enemy's  position,  or  any  matter  material  to  the  assault,  I  am 
absolutely  certain.  He  speaks  of  information  derived  from 
Colonel  Merriam,  but  so  far  as  I  acted  on  such  information,  I 
received  it  from  that  officer  directly,  and  only  found  him  after 
considerable  trouble,  and  after  repeated  inquiries  for  some 
one  who  knew  about  the  ground.  What  General  Hancock 
says  about  Colonel  Merriam's  information  he  probably  learned 
from  me.  I  mention  these  facts  not  for  the  purpose  of  criti 
cising  General  Hancock,  whom  I  highly  esteem  and  respect, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  my  assertion  that  the  success  .  •• 
of  this  assault  was  a  mere  lucky  accident.  It  certainly  was 
not  one  of  those  enterprises  in  war  which  have  been  under 
taken  with  a  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  position  and  strength 


258  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

(or  even  with  any  speculation  on  these  subjects),  or  with  any 
well-defined  plan  of  operations. 

Except  in  the  first  assault,  the  operations  of  this  day  were 
(  a  failure.  At  its  close  we  had  made  no  substantial  advance 
(  beyond  the  ground  won  by  the  first  attack.  A  great  oppor 
tunity  had  been  lost.  The  reason  of  this,  in  my  opinion,  was 
that  no  one  had  foreseen  the  magnitude  of  the  success  which 
was  coming,  and  hence  no  one  was  prepared  for  it. 

It  is  easy  to  say  now  that  the  attacking  column,  especially 
if  formed  in  mass,  is  always  thrown  into  confusion,  and  that 
its  place  should  be  taken  by  troops  moving  up  deliberately. 
This  every  one  knows,  but  it  was  not  foreseen  that  we  should 
make  such  a  gap  in  the  enemy's  lines  and  troops.  At  first 
troops  were  poured  in,  I  suppose,  on  the  supposition  (if  there 
was  any  supposition  about  it)  that  what  was  still  needed  was 
the  impetus  of  a  blow,  while  in  point  of  fact  there  was 
nothing  to  strike  at,  and  the  only  result  was  an  increase  of 
confusion.  The  men  lay  all  day  firing  at  each  other,  and 
the  only  result  (except  the  guns,  prisoners,  and  colors  gained 
in  the  first  half  hour,  and  thereby  a  certain  consequent  de 
moralization  of  the  enemy)  was  a  multitude  of  killed  and 
wounded. 

During  the  night  the  enemy  withdrew,  and  on  the  18th  we 
assaulted  their  second  line  without  success. 

My  own  division  accomplished  little  after  the  first  assault. 
Some  men  were  got  together  in  each  brigade,  and  did  such 
service  as  was  to  be  done  in  the  then  situation  of  affairs,  but 
this  force  was  not  got  together  in  any  such  shape  that  it  was 
available  for  offensive  operations  to  any  great  extent.  If  it 
had  been  left  to  itself,  it  could  have  been  got  into  order,  and 
could  have  held  the  part  of  the  line  which  it  had  taken  (and 
perhaps  done  more),  leaving  other  troops  free  for  other 
service. 

General  Hancock  in  his  report  speaks  of  Brooke's  brigade 
being  sent  to  another  part  of  the  field  to  aid  in  repulsing  an 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     259 

attack,  but  I  am  confident  that  it  must  have  been  with  greatly 
diminished  numbers. 

I  send  herewith  an  extract  from  General  Hancock's  re 
port,1  and  also  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  General  Miles,  giving 
his  recollections  of  the  assault. 

Extract  from  letter  of  Lieutenant-General  Nelson  A.  Miles, 
U.  S.  A.,  dated  January  6,  1879. 

I  have  asked  the  assistant  adjutant-general  to  get  me  the 
report  of  the  casualties  in  your  division  at  Spottsylvania,  and 
I  inclose  his  reply  on  a  card. 

I  will  have  to-morrow  an  extract  of  General  Hancock's 
report  of  that  battle,  which  gives  the  number  of  killed  on  our 
side  and  the  number  of  prisoners  (about  4000)  taken.  Of 
course  the  [largest  loss  in]  killed  in  the  other  divisions  was 
occasioned  by  the  fighting  which  lasted  during  the  day  and 
into  the  night ;  but  the  prisoners,  thirty  colors,  and  twenty 
pieces  of  artillery,  were  the  result  of  the  main  assault. 

I  am  to  have  the  extract  to-morrow  at  eleven  o'clock,  and 
will  mail  it  to  you  at  once. 

My  recollections  of  the  movement  and  battle  are  that  after 
the  constant  marching  and  fighting  that  occurred  at  the  Wil 
derness,  Corbin's  Bridge,  and  the  Po  River,  we  were  on  the 
night  of  the  llth  of  May  ordered  to  move  to  the  left  and  be 
prepared  to  attack  at  four  o'clock  next  morning. 

My  brigade  had  that  evening  returned  from  a  disagreeable 
march  or  reconnoissance  in  the  direction  of  Corbin's  Bridge. 
We  were  moving  with  occasional  halts,  but  all  the  time  under 
arms  and  on  the  road  all  that  dark  and  dreary  night,  —  so  dark 
that  it  was  with  difficulty  the  troops  could  keep  the  road,  — 
and  at  one  time  two  of  my  regiments  got  off  the  road,  or  on 
the  wrong  road ;  yet  by  considerable  exertion  we  made  our 
way  through  the  dark  forests  and  country  roads  to  the  point 

designated. 

i  67  W.  R.  330-337. 


260  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

I  remember  that  my  brigade,  having  to  follow  the  rest  of 
the  corps  owing  to  my  just  returning  from  reconnoissance,  was 
the  last  to  get  into  line  ;  the  rear  regiments  marching  up  and 
forming  double  column. 

Without  a  halt,  and  with  a  few  commands  given  in  low 
:  voice,  we  moved  forward  into  the  mist  and  darkness,  it  being 
then  impossible  to  discern  any  object  of  attack.  Passing  over 
some  low  broken  ground  through  some  scattering  timber,  we 
came  out  in  an  open  pasture  where  was  posted  the  rebel 
picket  line.  The  solid  body  of  veteran  troops  appeared  not  to 
notice  their  presence,  though  they  fired  one  round  to  give  the 
alarm  and  then  ran  back  to  their  main  line. 
(  Moving  steadily  on  without  any  other  guide  (that  I  remem 
ber)  than  the  impression  or  instinct  that  in  that  direction  we 
would  find  the  enemy,  and  that  following  up  the  slope  we 
would  find  formidable  earthworks,  we  pressed  on  in  good 
order  and  keeping  a  fair  line.  As  we  had  passed  the  picket 
we  supposed  we  were  near  upon  the  enemy's  works ;  some 
one  raised  a  cheer  which  was  taken  up  by  the  great  mass  of 
determined  men,  the  sound  of  which  must  have  broken  like 
the  voice  of  thunder  upon  the  slumbering  warriors  within  the 
Confederate  line. 

The  mist  of  the  morning  was  so  dense  that  it  was  impos 
sible  to  see  any  considerable  distance  beyond  the  head  of  the 
column.  The  fire  of  the  enemy  soon  told  us  that  we  had  not 
mistaken  our  course. 

The  enemy  had  taken  pains  to  fell  trees  before  their  works, 
principally  small  pines ;  these  had  to  be  gotten  over,  or 
around,  or  pushed  aside,  and  were  found  when  within  a  hundred 
and  fifty  yards  of  the  main  line.  Pressing  on  over  these  diffi 
culties,  we  were  soon  under  fire  of  both  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  soon  came  within  view  of  the  enemy's  stronghold  :  and  a 
most  formidable  front  it  presented.  Behind  a  line  of  cheyaux- 
de-frise  was  a  strong  and  continuous  line  of  earthworks, 
manned  with  a  double  line  of  infantry  troops  with  the 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     261 

black  bellowing  mouths  of  upwards  of  twenty  pieces  of  artil 
lery. 

For  a  moment  the  powerful  column  was  checked  back  by 
the  obstacles  to  be  overcome,  and  the  deadly  fire  from  the  in 
trenched  line ;  every  shot  taking  effect  in  the  deep  column  of 
Union  troops.  You  could  hear  the  sputtering  sound,  like  the 
fall  of  hail,  as  the  thud  of  their  bullets  fell  on  the  head  or 
shoulders  of  the  men  of  our  ranks.  There  were  no  stray  shots 
or  wild  shooting  at  so  large  a  living  target.  As  those  in  front 
fell,  the  ranks  in  rear  stepped,  or  jumped,  over  their  bodies ; 
and  with  one  bold  determined  rush,  and  a  loyal  shout  that 
made  the  forest  ring,  the  Union  lines  quickly  tore  away  the 
strong  chevaux-de-frise,  and  brushed  aside  the  rebel  bayonets 
that  were  bristling  over  their  works. 

They,  having  discharged  about  three  rounds  per  man,  and 
not  having  time  to  load  again,  were  preparing  to  hold  the  line 
with  the  bayonet.  This  lasted  but  a  moment.  As  the  Union 
soldiers  jumped  into  their  works,  bayonets  were  crossed  for  an 
instant,  when  the  weaker  line  gave  way  to  their  more  powerful 
and  now  desperate  antagonist. 

Four  thousand  men  threw  down  their  arms  —  thirty  Con 
federate  flags  fell  before  the  Stars  and  Stripes  —  two  general 
officers  with  their  subordinates  sheathed  their  swords,  and 
several  of  the  eighteen  pieces  of  artillery  were  quickly  turned 
on  the  fleeing  remnant  of  Ewell's  corps. 

The  famous  Stonewall  Jackson  brigade,  whose  battle-cry 
had  led  many  a  gallant  charge  of  the  Confederate  lines,  with 
their  commanders,  were  marched  as  prisoners  of  war  to  the 
rear ;  while  the  broken  ranks  of  the  1st  division,  2d  corps, 
pressed  on  in  pursuit  of  other  foes,  soon  to  be  encountered  in 
formidable  numbers,  and  too  powerful  for  those  troops  who 
had  passed  through  the  storm  of  one  of  the  most  desperate, 
deadly,  and  successful  assaults  of  history. 

As  the  enemy  rallied  on  their  reserve  troops,  and  made 
counter-charges  to  regain  their  lost  ground  (but  without  sue- 


262  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

cess),  the  fighting  was  continued  from  early  morning  until 
late  at  night.  So  desperate  was  the  struggle  that  after  the 
battle  was  over  it  was  impossible  to  walk  over  the  field  near 
the  line  of  earthworks  without  stepping  upon  the  dead  bodies 
of  soldiers. 

The  firing  was  so  hot  that  the  forest  trees  were  cut  down, 
and  the  stump,  22  inches  in  diameter,  of  a  solid  live-oak  tree 
now  stands  in  the  War  Department  that  was  cut  in  twain  by 
bullets  during  the  battle ;  its  top  falling  amidst  the  living, 
and  upon  the  dead  and  wounded :  Major  Church  dodged  it 
as  it  fell. 

Later  in  the  day,  as  one  of  our  guns  was  going  into  action, 
the  horses  and  riders  fell  in  one  mass  before  the  deadly  hail 
of  lead  that  rained  upon  the  disputed  ground. 

After  the  struggle  was  over  the  field  presented  a  sight  that 
has  not  to  my  knowledge  been  equaled  in  any  battle-field 
of  our  war,  if  it  has  in  any  of  modern  times. 

In  the  above  lines  I  have  given  a  few  recollections  of  the 
incidents  of  that  brilliant  assault  and  of  its  results.  In  my  own 
brigade  I  lost  upwards  of  six  hundred  out  of  about  twenty- 
two  hundred,  which  was  a  heavy  loss ;  but  it  was  the  first 
over  the  works,  and  led  what  might  have  been  the  complete 
destruction  of  the  rebel  army.  These  facts  I  know,  for  I  was 
right  there. 

I  presume  you  are  more  familiar  with  many  points  of 
interest  regarding  that  battle  than  myself.  I  will  send  you 
the  extract  of  Hancock's  report  as  soon  as  received. 


X 

REVIEW  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  BARLOW'S 
PAPER  ON  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT 
AT  SPOTTSYLVANIA  MAY  12  1864 

BY 

BREVET  MAJOR-GENERAL  LEWIS   A.  GRANT 

U.  S.  V.,  BRIGADIER  GENERAL  COMMANDING  SECOND  BRIGADE,  SECOND 
DIVISION,  SIXTH  ARMY  CORPS 


Read  before  the  Society  March  14,  1881 


REVIEW  OF  MAJOR-GENERAL  F.  C.  BARLOW'S 
PAPER  ON  THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT 
AT  SPOTTSYLVANIA  MAY  12  1864 

MY  attention  has  been  called  to  a  paper  by  General  F.  C. 
Barlow,  read  before  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Mas 
sachusetts  on  "  The  Capture  of  the  Salient  at  Spottsylvania, 
May  12,  1864."  As  the  paper  contains  some  errors  and 
refers  to  my  presence,  it  may  not  be  improper  for  me  to 
state  "  my  recollection  "  of  the  events  unasked. 

My  command  was  the  2d  brigade  of  the  2d  division  of  the 
6th  corps,  generally  known  as  the  "  Old  Vermont  Brigade." 
Of  what  transpired  before  the  arrival  of  the  6th  corps  I  will 
not  speak,  except  that  it  is  a  matter  of  history  that  the  2d 
corps  under  General  Hancock  made  a  brilliant  attack  and 
captured  a  portion  of  the  enemy's  lines  and  forces. 

All  the  honor  and  the  success  of  the  early  morning  opera 
tions  belong  to  the  2d  corps,  while  the  subsequent  operations 
of  the  day  were  participated  in  chiefly  by  the  6th  corps. 

Considerable  time  elapsed  after  the  attack  before  the  arri 
val  of  the  6th  corps.  The  enemy  had  time  to  recover  some 
what  from  his  surprise,  and  to  send  forward  troops  to  recover 
the  works  lost.  While  the  6th  corps  was  marching  to  the 
scene  of  action,  and  before  reaching  the  open  space  in  front 
of  the  captured  works,  we  were  in  the  range  of  quite  a  heavy 
artillery  fire.  Though  probably  not  intended  for  us,  a  num 
ber  of  shells  passed  through  the  tree-tops  or  burst  over  our 
heads. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  open  space  referred  to,  I  was  ordered 
to  the  left  of  the  2d  corps  to  relieve  General  Barlow's  divi 
sion  from  the  front.  I  found  his  command  considerably 


266  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

broken  and  disorganized  —  no  doubt  the  result  of  the  attack. 
A  sharp  and  quick  attack  like  that  of  General  Hancock's, 
especially  in  a  broken  country  and  on  a  misty  morning,  will 
unavoidably  result  in  more  or  less  confusion  and  disorgan 
ization.  The  works  in  front  had  been  carried,  and  in  the 
timber  beyond  there  was  some  skirmishing  and  an  evident 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  recover  lost  ground. 

Whether  an  opportunity  had  been  lost  "  to  sweep  down 
the  rebel  line  toward  his  left,"  or  whether  there  had  been 
delay  and  loss  of  time  in  "  re-forming  the  troops,"  it  is  not  my 
province  to  say.  But  what  I  do  know  and  say  is  that  our 
arrival  DID  NOT  "  interfere  with  the  restoring  of  order  "  and 
did  not  in  any  wise  embarrass  "  reorganization  "  or  prevent 
any  aggressive  movement  designed  or  desired  on  the  part  of 
troops  already  there.  Our  arrival  was  not  only  orderly  but 
opportune.  There  was  no  organized  line  in  our  front,  and 
the  skirmishers  in  the  woods  were  being  pressed  back. 

In  marching  to  General  Barlow's  rear,  we  moved  by  the 
flank.  Arriving  there  we  threw  forward  a  skirmish  line  and 
advanced  in  two  lines  of  battle.  Whether  the  men  cheered 
or  not  I  cannot  say.  They  were  in  the  habit  of  doing  it  when 
advancing  upon  the  enemy's  lines,  and  it  is  quite  probable 
they  did  on  this  occasion.  But  I  am  quite  sure  they  would 
not  have  done  so  had  they  supposed  it  would  have  "  embar 
rassed  "  the  "  re-forming "  of  General  Barlow's  command. 
That  "  a  fire  in  the  rear  "  might  embarrass  the  "  re-forming  " 
of  troops  is  easy  to  be  seen,  but  how  "  a  cheer  in  the  rear  " 
and  the  arrival  of  fresh  troops  could  produce  that  result  is 
not  quite  so  clear. 

In  that  advance  our  lines  were  preserved  and  were  not 
broken.  And  my  troops  did  not  "  mingle  in  the  confused 
mass  "  of  troops  already  there.  The  only  confusion  possibly 
created  by  us  was  in  our  skirmishers  passing  the  troops  and 
relieving  the  skirmish  line.  This  was  done  quickly  and  with 
as  little  confusion  as  generally  attends  such  movements. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     267 

In  a  short  time  General  Hancock  came  there  and  called 
my  attention  to  the  fact  that  General  Russell  of  the  6th  corps 
was  actively  engaged  on  our  right  and  wanted  help,  and  told 
me  to  take  my  rear  line  and  go  to  his  assistance,  and  that  he 
would  send  the  rest  of  my  command  as  soon  as  he  could  bring 
down  troops  of  his  own  to  relieve  them.  Leaving  my  front 
line  and  skirmishers  in  the  command  of  one  of  my  colonels, 
I  immediately  marched  my  rear  line  to  the  right  as  far  as  the 
Angle,  and  then  moved  still  further  to  the  right,  where  I 
found  General  Wheaton  trying  to  advance  his  brigade  against 
the  enemy's  well-manned  works.  The  ground  was  nearly  level 
and  covered  with  thick  brush  and  trees  of  small  growth.  As 
he  occupied  the  front  line,  I  could  do  but  little  except  to 
form  in  his  rear.  The  advance  was  impracticable,  and  was 
soon  abandoned.  Leaving  one  regiment  with  General 
Wheaton,  I  took  the  rest  back  to  the  Angle  and  there  met 
the  balance  of  my  command,  which  had  been  relieved  and 
sent  up  from  the  left  by  General  Hancock.  The  subsequent 
operations  of  the  day  were  mostly  at  the  Angle. 

I  speak  thus  in  detail  of  my  own  movements,  not  only  to 
show  that  we  created  no  confusion  among  our  friends,  but 
to  show  that  I  had  some  means  of  knowledge  of  the  condition 
of  the  line,  and  of  the  position  of  troops.  General  Barlow  is 
evidently  laboring  under  a  misapprehension  of  facts.  He  not 
only  has  an  "  indistinct  recollection  "  of  what  occurred  that 
morning,  but  is  in  evident  error  as  to  the  position  of  the 
troops  and  the  location  of  the  Angle. 

General  Barlow  was  not  at  the  Angle  that  morning  when 
I  came  in  his  rear  and  relieved  him  from  the  front.  I  went 
into  position  in  the  manner  described  fully  one-half  mile  to 
the  left  of  the  Angle.  I  think  it  must  have  been  more.  That 
he  did  not  strike  the  Angle  in  his  attack  is  quite  apparent 
from  his  own  language.  He  says :  *'  Fortunately  the  ground 
was  very  open,  and  I  remember  that,  as  we  got  in  sight  of  the 
works,  the  mass  instinctively  swayed  off  to  our  left,  that  it 


268  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

might  precipitate  itself  directly  on  the  Angle,  to  which  we 
had  not  been  exactly  directed  at  the  start." 

Now  if  he  was  in  the  open  ground,  and  in  his  advance 
"  swayed  off  to  the  left,"  he  would  necessarily  have  passed  to 
the  left  of  the  Angle,  and  would  have  naturally  struck  the 
enemy's  lines  about  where  he  was  when  I  reached  him.  The 
ground  was  open  on  our  side  at  the  Angle  and  to  our  left  of 
it,  but  it  was  not  open  except  for  a  few  yards  to  our  right 
of  the  Angle.  To  the  right  of  the  Angle  was  a  thick  growth  of 
small  timber  and  brush  —  very  difficult  for  troops  to  advance 
in,  especially  before  light.  I  repeat,  if  he  was  in  the  open 
ground  and  then  swayed  to  the  left,  he  must  have  gone  to  the 
left  of  the  Angle. 

The  short  open  space  at  the  right  of  the  Angle,  and  between 
it  and  the  timber  and  brush,  was  occupied  at  about  eight  or 
nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  by  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  our 
noble  dead.  Every  man  at  the  guns  had  been  shot  down  in 
his  place. 

Unfortunately  I  have  not  read  General  Hancock's  report 
of  that  engagement,  and  can  speak  of  the  situation  only 
as  I  saw  it.  But  at  the  time  I  marched  in  and  relieved  Gen 
eral  Barlow's  command,  the  enemy  were  making  some  show 
of  strength  in  the  woods,  in  our  advance  of  the  works,  and 
there  was  hot  firing  of  musketry  on  our  right ;  and  when 
I  marched  to  the  right  of  the  Angle  (which  could  not  have 
been  much,  if  any,  over  half  an  hour  after  coming  into  the 
first  position),  the  enemy  was  in  full  possession  of  one  side 
of  the  works  at  the  Angle,  and  to  the  right  of  it.  It  was  quite 
evident  that  he  was  making  a  desperate  attempt  to  recover 
lost  ground. 

It  was  at  the  Angle  that  the  severe  fighting  of  the  day  took 
place.  It  was  there  that  at  least  five  of  the  eight  brigades  of 
the  6th  corps  fought  nearly  all  day.  General  Eustis  was  there 
with  his  brigade  ;  Colonel,  now  General,  Upton  was  there 
with  his  brigade ;  Colonel,  afterwards  General,  Bidwell  was 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     269 

there  with  his  brigade ;  I  was  there  with  my  brigade ;  and 
there  was  another  brigade  there,  commanded,  I  think  (though 
I  am  not  certain),  by  Colonel  Truax.  General  Wheaton, 
with  his  brigade  and  one  of  my  regiments,  was  in  the  thick 
brush  to  our  right.  I  do  not  recollect  seeing  any  of  the  2d 
corps  there,  but  there  were  troops  to  our  left  in  the  direction 
of  the  position  I  first  occupied  that  morning. 

The  Angle  became  at  once  the  key-point  and  the  scene 
of  a  terrible  struggle.  It  was  apparent  that  if  we  held  it,  all 
the  line  to  the  right  would  fall  into  our  hands,  and  equally 
apparent  that  if  we  failed  to  hold  it,  the  captured  lines  to 
the  left  would  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

Perhaps  there  was  not  a  more  desperate  struggle  during  the 
war.  It  was  not  only  a  desperate  struggle,  but  it  was  literally 
a  hand-to-hand  fight.  Nothing  but  the  piled-up  logs  or  breast 
works  separated  the  combatants.  Our  men  would  reach  over 
the  logs  and  fire  into  the  faces  of  the  enemy,  would  stab  over 
with  their  bayonets ;  many  were  shot  and  stabbed  through 
crevices  and  holes  between  the  logs  ;  men  mounted  the  works, 
and  with  muskets  rapidly  handed  them  kept  up  a  continuous 
fire  until  they  were  shot  down,  when  others  would  take  their 
places  and  continue  the  deadly  work. 

General  Upton  personally  attended  to  the  securing  of  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  which  when  loaded  were  repeatedly  wheeled 
up  by  hand  to  a  low  or  open  place  in  the  works  on  the  left 
side  of  the  Angle,  from  which  the  enemy's  lines  were  enfiladed 
with  great  effect. 

During  the  day  the  point  could  be  seen  from  the  "  Landron 
House "  in  the  rear,  and  it  is  not  strange  that  from  that 
distance  men  would  sometimes  appear  "  forty  deep." 

There  were  five  brigades  there,  and  they  were  considerably 
huddled,  but  organization  was  sufficiently  preserved  for  effect 
ive  work. 

Several  times  during  the  day  the  rebels  would  show  a 
white  flag  above  the  works,  and  when  our  fire  slackened,  jump 


270  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

over  and  surrender,  and  others  were  crowded  down  to  fill 
their  places. 

Scores,  and  no  doubt  hundreds,  of  men  are  now  living  who 
were  engaged  in  that  conflict,  and  whose  recollections  of  it 
are  vivid.  It  was  there  that  the  somewhat  celebrated  tree  was 
cut  off  by  bullets;  there  that  the  brush  and  logs  were  cut 
to  pieces  and  whipped  into  basket-stuff;  there  that  fallen 
men's  flesh  was  torn  from  the  bones  and  the  bones  shattered ; 
there  that  the  rebel  ditches  and  cross-sections  were  filled 
with  dead  men  several  deep.  It  was  there  where  General 
Barlow  says  :  "  I  myself  saw  in  the  excavation  on  the  enemy's 
side  of  the  log  breastworks  such  a  mass  of  the  dead  and 
wounded  as  I  had  only  seen  once  before,  and  that  was  in  a 
sunken  road  at  Antietam,  which  is  still  called  Bloody  Lane." 
He  clings  to  the  error  that  "  it  was  at  some  distance  to  our 
right  of  the  Angle,"  though  he  quite  naturally  concludes  that, 
inasmuch  as  these  rebels  "  could  not  have  been  killed  at  the 
first  assault,  it  is  evident  that  they  must  have  returned  there 
later  in  the  day." 

It  was  nearly  night  when  I  withdrew  my  command  from 
the  Angle,  and  after  dark  we  marched  into  a  dense  woods 
considerably  to  the  right.  Others  continued  the  conflict  late 
into  the  night,  and  the  result  was  that  the  entire  line  fell  into 
our  hands. 

I  was  at  the  Angle  the  next  day.  The  sight  was  terrible 
and  sickening ;  much  worse  than  at  Bloody  Lane.  There  a 
great  many  dead  men  were  lying  in  the  road  and  across  the 
rails  of  the  torn-down  fences  and  out  in  the  cornfield ;  but 
they  were  not  piled  up  several  deep,  and  their  flesh  was  not 
so  torn  and  mangled  as  at  the  Angle.  I  went  along  the  line 
to  the  right  of  the  Angle.  There  was  no  such  evidence  of 
a  conflict  there.  There  were  a  few  dead  men  scattered  along 
on  the  rebel  side  of  the  works,  but  not  more  than  might  have 
been  expected  from  the  effects  of  our  enfilading  fire  from  the 
Angle.  But  in  our  front  of  the  works,  all  along  to  the  right 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     271 

of  the  Angle  for  nearly  half  a  mile,  were  our  own  dead,  lying 
in  the  brush  from  200  to  400  yards  from  the  works,  where 
they  fell  in  the  assault. 

JThat  General  Barlow  is  laboring  under  a  mistake  as  to  the 
location  of  the  Angle  and  what  took  place  there  is  obvious 
for  other  reasons.  It  is,  however,  fortunate  for  history  that  of 
"  two  things  "  he  is  quite  certain,  that  he  "  heard  a  shouting 
in  our  rear,"  and  that  he  said,  "  For~  God's  sake,  Hancock,  do 
not  send  any  more  troops  in  here."  Of  these  "  two  things  "  he 
says,  "  I  have  a  very  distinct  and  positive  recollection."  It  is 
perhaps  not  strange  that  he  should  be  in  error  about  other 
and  minor  events  of  the  day. 


XI 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  AT  SPOTT- 
SYLVANIA  MAY  12  1864 

BY 

BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  WILLIAM  R.  DRIVER 

U.  S.  V.,  LATE  MAJOR  AND  A.  A.  G.  TO  GENERAL  W.  S.  HANCOCK 

REVIEWING  THE  PAPERS  OF  GENERAL  F.  C.  BARLOW,  U.  S.  V., 

OF  CAPTAIN  MCHENRY  HOWARD,  C.  S.  A.,  AND  OF 

GENERAL  LEWIS  A.  GRANT,  U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  April  10,  1882 


THE  CAPTURE    OF  THE    SALIENT  AT   SPOTT- 
SYLVANIA  MAY  12  1864. 

THE  encounter,  on  the  8th  May,  1864,  between  two  bodies 
of  hostile  troops  which  were  moving  towards  the  same  point 
led  to  the  intrenchment  by  the  rebel  forces  of  the  position  in 
which,  after  the  immediate  emergency  had  passed,  they  were 
halted  for  the  night.  Finding  on  the  next  day  their  oppo 
nents  still  in  their  front,  the  line  was  corrected  and  their 
right  thrown  back,  forming  the  now  historic  position  of  the 
"  Salient,"  the  location  of  the  most  prominent  if  not  the  only 
successful  attack  by  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during  the 
great  Rapidan  campaign.  There  were  no  natural  advantages 
in  the  position ;  it  was  merely  the  crest  of  a  low  ridge,  over 
looked  from  a  higher  elevation  in  its  immediate  front,  and 
with  but  a  short  space  of  open  ground  at  the  point  and  to  its 
left.  Accidentally  taken  up,  it  was  accidentally  discovered  by 
the  opposing  forces ;  and  at  its  fall  the  accidents  of  circum 
stance  so  favored  the  assailants  that  the  theory  of  an  acci 
dental  capture  was  not  without  apparent  justification.  Twice 
captured  by  the  Federal  troops,  it  was  only  finally  held  after 
obstinate  and  costly  fighting  against  the  determined  and  per 
sistent  efforts  of  its  builders  to  regain  its  possession,  and  by 
the  concentration  of  large  bodies  of  troops  on  both  sides.  The 
accidental  discovery  of  the  shape  of  the  line  here  determined 
the  attempt  to  force  it.  Beyond  the  fact  that  there  was  here 
a  projecting  angle  in  the  enemy's  line,  the  knowledge  of  the 
position  and  its  approaches  was  of  the  slightest,  and  the 
endeavor  by  officers  of  General  Hancock's  staff,  sent  out 
by  him  on  the  llth  after  his  receipt  of  orders  to  make  the 
attack,  resulted  in  little  addition  to  that  already  in  possession. 


276  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

General  Hancock  says  even  the  exact  location  was  unknown. 
A  demonstration  by  General  Mott,  commanding  the  4th  divi 
sion  of  the  2d  corps,  in  order  to  get  an  observation  of  the 
works,  was  only  partially  successful. 

The  2d  corps  had,  during  the  llth  of  May,  remained 
quietly  in  its  position,  and  except  Colonel  Miles's  brigade, 
which  had  reconnoitred  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  and  two  regi 
ments  that  had  been  sent  across  the  Po,  they  had  not  been 
engaged.  Late  in  the  day  General  Hancock,  having  received 
orders  to  make  an  attack  on  the  next  morning  (12th),  sum 
moned  the  commanders  of  the  1st,  2d,  and  3d  divisions,  to 
report  to  him  at  his  headquarters.  The  4th  division,  General 
Mott,  had  on  the  9th  been  sent  to  the  extreme  left  of  the 
army,  and  its  commander  therefore  was  not  sent  for.  Gen 
erals  Birney,  Gibbon,  and  Barlow  reported  in  obedience  to 
the  summons,  and  received  from  General  Hancock  his  in 
structions  for  the  movement,  with  such  information  concern 
ing  the  location  and  character  of  the  works  as  he  had  at  his 
disposal.  I  can  find  no  copies  of  written  orders  with  these 
instructions,  although  I  am  confident  such  were  prepared.  I 
presume  they  were  in  circular  form  and  have  from  some  acci 
dent  failed  to  find  their  proper  place  in  the  official  records. 
General  Barlow  remained  with  General  Hancock  after  the 
departure  of  the  others,  and  discussed  with  him  the  details 
of  the  operation.  The  formation  of  the  1st  division  in  a  close 
column  was  then  determined  upon  as  best  for  the  purpose, 
provided  the  nature  of  the  ground  should  be  found  such  as 
to  render  it  practicable.  It  was  expected  that  this  division 
would  take  the  burden  of  the  principal  attack,  and  the  ar 
rangements  were  all  made  with  that  view.  There  was  no  effort 
to  shut  from  view  the  serious  and  important  character  of  the 
affair,  and  the  details  were  arranged  with  all  the  careful  con 
sideration  which  they  demanded.  After  a  careful  settlement 
of  all  probable  questions  that  might  arise,  General  Barlow 
left  the  headquarters  to  put  his  division  in  motion  towards  the 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864      277 

point  near  the  Brown  house,  about  half  a  mile  from  the  work 
to  be  attacked,  which  had  been  designated  for  the  formation 
of  the  column. 

General  Barlow's  graphic  description  of  the  night  march 
of  the  troops  and  its  difficulties  leaves  nothing  to  be  said  to 
convey  a  complete  understanding  of  that  uncomfortable 
experience.  The  intense  darkness,  pouring  rain,  and  muddy, 
heavy  roads,  with  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  direction  and 
location  of  the  point  to  be  reached,  formed  just  the  combina 
tion  required  to  produce  a  "brilliant  display  of  grumbling  by 
officers  and  men,  such  as  General  Barlow  writes  of.  Indulg 
ence  in  this  under  such  circumstances  was  regarded  as  an 
inalienable  right,  which  was  fully  exercised,  but  in  no  way 
prevented  the  exercise  of  the  utmost  energy  in  the  removal 
of  obstacles  or  interfered  with  the  ability  to  discover  a  ludi 
crous  side  to  affairs  where  it  would  sometimes  appear  to  be 
closely  concealed  and  to  require  careful  search  to  bring  it  to 
light. 

General  Barlow  writes  of  this  movement  as  "haphazard  in 
its  character,"  but  I  doubt  if  the  term  will  apply  to  this  more 
than  to  most  similar  ones  during  that  campaign.  In  the  nature 
of  things,  little  could  be  known  of  the  enemy's  position  at 
a  particular  moment,  since  each  side  was  constantly  changing 
place  to  meet  actual  or  expected  changes  by  the  other.  To 
meet  the  enemy  with  a  stronger  force  than  his  own  at  the 
point  of  attack  was  the  problem  to  be  solved  by  each  of  the 
great  soldiers  then  face  to  face,  but  with  armies  unequal  in 
point  of  numbers.  An  attack  by  an  army  moving  only  in  one 
direction  must  be  made  without  previous  reconnoissance,  as 
the  chance  of  a  successful  second  attack  was  of  the  slightest. 

General  Barlow  says  the  head  of  the  column  reached  the 
vicinity  of  the  Brown  house  at  midnight  or  half  an  hour 
after.  Captain  Howard  says 1  that  shortly  after  dark  the  pickets 
in  his  front  reported  that  there  had  for  some  time  been  indi- 

1  Ante  p.  112. 


278  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

cations  of  the  movement  of  a  large  Federal  force  apparently 
massing  in  their  front,  or  moving  towards  their  (the  rebel) 
right.  I  can  hardly  account  for  this  by  the  movement  actually 
made,  as  the  darkness  on  that  stormy  night  came  on  early, 
and  the  sound  could  hardly  have  reached  them  long  before 
midnight,  when  the  head  of  the  column  reached  the  vicinity. 
If  the  sound  could  so  readily  be  heard  at  the  Angle,  it  should 
have  been  as  readily  heard  by  the  pickets  farther  to  its  left 
and  reported  as  moving  toward  it,  while  on  the  rebel  left  the 
reports  were  that  the  Federals  were  passing  towards  their 
own  right.  Captain  Howard  may  have  mistaken  the  time, 
and  the  movement  have  been  reported  to  him  while  it  was 
actually  going  on. 

Having  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Brown  house,  the 
dispositions  for  attack  were  at  once  made.  The  brigades  of 
Colonels  Brooke  and  Miles  were  placed  in  the  first  line,  each 
regiment  being  formed  in  column  doubled  on  the  centre  and 
closed  in  mass.  The  brigades  of  Colonels  Smythe  and 
Brown  were  formed  in  two  lines  and  closed  upon  the  leading 
brigades,  thus  forming  a  solid  column.  Colonels  Miles  and 
Brown  formed  the  right.  The  2d  Delaware  regiment  marched 
by  the  right  flank  on  the  left  flank  of  the  column  as  a  pro 
tection  against  attack  from  that  direction. 

Here,  then,  was  an  organization  whose  capacity  for  striking 
a  decisive  blow  was,  I  believe,  unequaled  by  any  formed  at 
any  other  time  during  that  campaign.  The  1st  division  of  the 
2d  corps  was  at  that  time  without  a  superior  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  In  the  Wilderness  and  on  the  banks  of  the 
Po  River  it  had  shown  by  the  eminent  ability  and  skill  of 
its  division  and  brigade  commanders,  and  by  the  steadfast 
courage  of  its  regimental  officers  and  men,  that  it  could  be 
safely  relied  upon  to  do  all  that  the  occasion  demanded. 

On  the  right  of  this  column  General  Birney's  3d  division 
was  deployed  in  two  lines,  with  General  Mott's  4th  division 
in  its  rear.  General  Gibbon's  division,  the  2d,  was  deployed 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864     279 

in  rear  of  the  1st,  but  was  not  to  move  with  it  nor  before  the 
column  had  struck  the  works. 

These  dispositions  made,  the  men  could  take  such  rest  as 
the  weather  allowed  till  daylight  should  bring  the  signal  for 
the  attempt  from  which  such  important  results  were  hoped. 
General  Barlow  has  given  the  results  of  his  search  for 
information  concerning  the  position  against  which  he,  as 
commander  of  the  division  from  which  was  expected  the 
important  work  of  the  morning,  was  to  deliver  the  decisive 
blow.  General  Hancock  says  the  direction  of  the  march  was 
determined  by  compass. 

At  four  o'clock,  the  hour  fixed  for  the  commencement  of 
the  march,  a  thick  fog  delayed  the  arrival  of  daylight,  and 
decided  the  usually  prompt  General  Hancock  to  delay  the 
order  to  move.  He  was  on  the  ground,  and  at  4.35  gave,  as  he 
says  in  his  report,  the  word  to  advance. 

In  the  column  the  commander  of  the  division  and  those  of 
the  brigades  marched  dismounted  in  the  centre.  General 
Barlow  had  given  this  to  General  Hancock,  on  the  evening 
before,  as  the  point  where  he  could  be  found  by  any  officer 
he  should  need  to  send  to  him.  At  the  moment  of  starting, 
the  fog  still  obscured  the  ground  to  be  passed  over.  It  may 
be  that  this,  with  the  almost  entire  lack  of  knowledge  of  the 
country  so  concealed  and  of  the  works  beyond,  against  which 
the  heavy  column  was  about  to  be  hurled,  gave  a  serious  tone 
and  air  to  the  conversation  and  bearing  of  those  composing 
it.  There  was  neither  despondency  nor  reluctance,  but  appar 
ently  a  full  appreciation  of  the  difficulty  of  the  undertaking 
gave  an  air  of  determination  to  those  engaged. 

Moving  silently  forward,  the  column  soon  encountered  the 
picket  line  of  the  enemy  posted  upon  a  ridge,  of  which  the 
nearer  slope  was  slight  and  easy,  but  the  farther  one  towards 
the  works  was  longer  and  more  abrupt.  These  pickets  fired 
and  fell  back  at  once  to  the  main  line. 

No  notice  of  this  was  taken  by  the  advancing  column, 


280  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

except  that  a  few  men  raised  a  cheer  and  all  quickened 
the  pace.  Passing  down  the  slope,  the  left  of  the  line  found  the 
ground  open  and  to  the  foot  of  the  slope  unobstructed.  On 
the  right  the  divisions  of  Birney  and  Mott  found  it  wooded 
and  marshy,  and  passed  over  it  with  some  difficulty.  At  a 
distance  of  about  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards  in  front  of  the 
works  a  difficult  abatis  had  been  made  by  felling  trees  and 
interlacing  the  branches.  This  caused  some  delay  in  the  1st 
division,  while  openings  were  made  for  the  passage,  and  here 
was  some  loss  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  This  obstruction 
was  soon  removed,  and  the  troops  pushed  on  and  over  the 
works.  Here  for  a  few  moments  the  fighting  was  at  close 
quarters,  and  the  bayonet  was  frequently  used.  The  state 
ment  that  troops  fought  with  the  bayonet  is  frequently  made 
without  a  solid  foundation,  but  there  is  good  authority  for  it 
in  this  instance,  and  I  think  it  can  be  maintained.  Here  was 
received  the  fire  from  two  guns  posted  a  short  distance  from 
the  Angle  towards  its  right  and  about  the  centre  of  Steuart's 
position.  Captain  Howard  says  the  guns  belonging  at  the 
Angle  had  been  withdrawn  on  the  previous  evening,  and,  re 
turning,  had  not  time  to  come  into  action  before  the  attack 
ing  troops  overran  and  captured  them.  Colonel  Brooke's 
brigade  struck  the  works  at  the  Angle  and  overlapped  the 
point  on  the  right  and  left.  Colonel  Miles  was  of  course  on 
its  (his)  right.  The  1st  division  having  during  the  advance 
borne  off  to  the  left,  an  interval  had  been  opened  between  it 
and  the  3d  division,  which  General  Mott  had  filled  with  his 
4th  division.  Brooke's  left  passed  near  the  Landrum  house. 
The  2d  division  was  to  have  delayed  its  movement  until  the 
column  had  struck  the  works,  and  I  think  did  so  delay  it,  but 
I  have  been  told  recently  by  officers  of  that  division  that  they 
were  among  the  first  in  the  rebel  works.  I  think,  however, 
that  this  is  a  mistake,  due  probably  to  an  imperfect  recollec 
tion  of  an  occurrence  of  eighteen  years  ago.  General  Webb 
has  promised  me  a  statement  of  his  recollections  of  the  day, 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864      281 

but  it  has  not  yet  reached  me.  Generals  Birney  and  Mott 
struck  the  works  in  their  front  at  the  same  time  with  General 
Barlow,  meeting  no  effective  resistance. 

I  do  not  quite  understand  what  troops  were  those  referred 
to  by  Captain  Howard l  as  appearing  and  disappearing  in  his 
front  some  minutes  before  the  arrival  of  the  main  force.  It 
may  have  been  that  the  detached  regiment  that  was  placed  on 
the  left  flank  of  the  column  found  -the  ground  easier  to  pass 
over,  and  thus,  being  so  far  to  the  left,  moved  down  the  line 
of  works  on  the  outside,  in  advance  of  the  movement  of  the 
principal  force. 

The  works  having  been  overrun  and  possession  taken  by 
the  assaulting  column,  the  rebel  defenders  surrendered  after 
short  resistance,  and  were  immediately  marched  to  the  Federal 
rear  and  placed  in  charge  of  the  provost  marshal  of  the  army. 
In  this  passage  a  few  of  the  unfortunates  were  struck  by 
bullets  from  their  friends  who  had  escaped  capture  and  who 
continued  their  resistance.  Generals  Johnson  and  Steuart 
were  taken  to  General  Hancock,  who  received  them  with  his 
usual  courteous  manner.  One  of  them,  however,  could  not 
control  his  feelings  sufficiently  to  accept  the  courtesy  of  his 
captor,  and  was  permitted  to  enjoy  his  martyrdom  in  his  own 
way. 

The  works  were  found  to  be  the  usual  structures  of  rails 
and  earth ;  and  for  a  short  distance  from  the  point  of  the 
Angle  on  each  side  were  built  square  pits,  like  pens,  for  a 
more  complete  protection  from  the  fire  to  which  the  position 
was  exposed  from  the  right,  left,  and  front.  Had  the  artillery 
of  the  enemy  been  in  position  to  open  its  fire  when  the  col 
umn  struck  his  pickets  and  while  it  was  passing  down  the 
farther  slope  of  the  ravine,  or  while  it  was  momentarily  delayed 
for  the  forcing  of  the  line  of  abatis,  or  during  the  advance  up 
the  slope  immediately  in  front  of  the  works,  the  depth  of  the 
column  must  have  been  the  opportunity  for  great  effect  and 

1  Ante,  p.  114. 


282  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

consequent  loss.  The  demoralizing  effect  of  artillery  fire  upon 
a  body  of  such  depth  would  have  been  serious.  While  pass 
ing  through  the  hollow  between  the  slopes,  the  left  of  the 
column  was  somewhat  sheltered  from  the  infantry  fire  from 
the  works  and  suffered  little  loss,  as  the  bullets  mostly  passed 
over  the  heads  of  the  men.  The  right,  being  on  somewhat 
higher  ground,  suffered  more. 

Passing  over  the  works,  the  successful  troops  pushed  on  in 
pursuit  of  those  who  had  escaped  capture  and  fled  to  the  rear. 
Here  the  country  was  wooded  and  broken,  sloping  from  the 
works,  in  places  quite  abruptly.  The  passage  through  woods, 
ravines,  and  marshy  ground  increased  the  confusion  ordinarily 
consequent  upon  even  a  successful  assault.  The  second  line 
of  the  Confederates  was  found  beyond  some  swampy  ground, 
but  the  troops  were  in  no  condition  to  attack  at  once,  and 
were  withdrawn  to  the  captured  works,  where  they  were  soon 
followed  by  the  enemy  and  attacked  with  tremendous  energy. 

This  occupation  of  the  enemy's  works,  with  the  possession 
of  many  guns,  colors,  and  prisoners,  completed  the  result  of 
the  morning's  work.  For  the  remainder  of  the  day,  the  defense 
of  the  line  against  the  persistent  and  desperate  attempts  of 
the  enemy  to  retake  it  gave  full  employment  to  the  men  of  the 
2d  and  6th  corps.  This  defense  was  successfully  maintained, 
but  with  serious  losses. 

Respecting  the  point  of  the  works  struck  by  the  attacking 
column,  I  doubt  if  General  Barlow's  claim  that  he  struck  the 
very  Angle  can  be  successfully  contested. 

General  Brooke  says l  that  his  brigade,  the  left  of  the  col 
umn,  struck  the  point  of  the  Angle,  overlapping  it  on  both 
flanks.  Captain  Howard  says2  that  Steuart's  brigade  was  at 
the  (his)  right  of  the  Angle,  and  that  the  other  three  brigades 
of  Johnson's  division  continued  the  line  from  that  point  to 
ward  their  left.  His  account  of  the  attack  definitely  states 
that  the  first  cheering  and  all  the  firing,  except  a  volley  from 
1  67  W.  R.  410.  2  Ante,  p.  111. 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864      283 

his  men  at  the  small  body  mentioned  as  appearing  and  disap 
pearing  in  their  front,  came  from  his  left  and  from  the  direc 
tion  of  the  Salient,  and  that  the  first  fugitive  came  from  the 
same  direction.  Then  the  prisoners  taken  were  all  from  the 
division  occupying  the  Angle  on  the  right  and  left.  If  General 
Barlow  had  missed  the  point  of  the  Salient  and  had  passed 
down  outside  the  works,  he  could  have  gone  but  a  short 
distance  before  entirely  passing  Steuart's  line  of  about  900 
men. 

That  General  Barlow  should  have  been,  not  at  the  Angle, 
but  half  a  mile  to  our  left  of  it,  upon  the  arrival  of  the  troops 
of  the  6th  corps,  is  not  surprising.  Indeed,  had  he  then  been 
there,  it  would  have  been  cause  for  wonder ;  for  after  breaking 
the  line,  the  whole  attacking  force  pushed  on  in  pursuit  of  the 
smaller  number  of  its  defenders  who  escaped  capture  at 
the  first  rush  and  ran  towards  the  second  line.  The  com 
mander  of  such  a  force,  successful  certainly,  but  in  confusion 
as  a  consequence  of  its  success,  if  not  with  his  men,  should 
show  a  pressing  need  for  his  presence  elsewhere  to  justify  his 
absence  from  his  troops.  The  men  of  the  1st  division  were 
then  some  distance,  probably  that  named,  half  a  mile,  from 
the  point  of  their  entrance  to  the  works.  General  Barlow's 
habit  of  keeping  well  to  the  front  was  perfectly  understood 
by  the  staff  officers  who  had  occasion  to  seek  him  in  action. 
I  find  no  claim  that  he  was  then  at  the  Angle.  Having  com 
pleted  his  business  there,  he  was  attending  to  the  reorganiza 
tion  of  his  division. 

On  returning  to  the  defense  of  the  captured  line  against 
the  enemy's  attempts  at  recapture,  the  1st  division  became 
the  left  of  the  2d  corps,  which  General  Hancock  says  was 
entirely  at  the  left  of  the  Angle  during  the  rest  of  the  day. 

General  Barlow  says  the  ground  over  which  his  division 
passed  to  the  attack  was  comparatively  open,  while  General 
Birney  on  his  right  advanced  over  a  thickly  wooded  and  some 
what  marshy  country. 


284  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

Captain  Howard  describes  the  ground  in  his  front  as  densely 
wooded  and  marshy,  while  off  the  Salient  it  was  comparatively 
open  and  sloping  from  the  works. 

By  those  acquainted  with  General  Barlow,  his  statement  of 
the  point  struck  by  his  column  would  be  accepted  as  final, 
without  question  that  he  might  be  mistaken  by  reason  of  con 
fusion  and  excitement  consequent  upon  an  attack  such  as  that 
described.  By  others  the  substantial  agreement  of  his  account 
with  that  of  Captain  Howard  may,  I  think,  be  accepted  as 
conclusive  that  he  did  strike  the  Angle  at  the  exact  point 
aimed  at. 

^Respecting  his  theory  that  the  assault  was  merely  a  lucky 
accident,  I  think  he  is  too  general,  and  does  himself  less  than 
justice.  To  be  sure,  all  the  accidents  were  in  our  favor,  but 
that  it  can  be  merely  accidental  that  such  superior  soldiers  as 
he  and  General  Morgan  should  succeed  in  doing  just  what 
they  were  directed  to  do,  and  should  strike  a  blow  just  where 
it  was  intended  to  fall,  even  against  a  defense  more  favored 
by  circumstances,  I  doubt. 

The  fog,  the  open  ground,  and  the  absence  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  were  so  many  chances  in  our  favor ;  but  had  all 
these  chances  been  against  them,  the  work  would  have  been 
done,  though  at  greater  cost.  The  2d  corps,  formed  for  attack, 
commanded  and  officered  as  it  was  on  the  12th  May,  would 
surely  have  reached  those  works,  even  though  the  favorable 
conditions  had  been  wanting. 

That  the  results  of  this  operation  were  merely  the  occupa 
tion  of  one  side  of  the  enemy's  works,  without  decisive  effect 
upon  the  general  objects  of  the  campaign,  owing  to  a  doubt  of 
its  success  and  a  consequent  failure  to  prepare  to  take  advan 
tage  of  the  opportunity  success  would  bring,  may  be  true,  but 
not  creditable  to  those  responsible  for  such  a  condition  of 
things. 

Swinton  says  that  a  partial  cause  for  the  stopping  of  the 
column  was  that  the  fire  and  enthusiasm  of  the  troops  were 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  THE  SALIENT  MAY  12  1864      285 

not  sustained.  Fire  and  enthusiasm  need  organization  to 
make  them  available  in  such  a  position  as  that  in  which  the 
2d  corps  found  itself  after  its  advance  beyond  the  captured 
works.  I  doubt  if  good  evidence  can  be  produced  that  the 
former  were  wanting.  Time  and  cover  would  have  supplied 
the  latter.  May  it  not  be  that  the  statement  made  in  the 
report  of  General  Grant,  that "  a  general  attack  was  made  on 
the  enemy  in  position,"  will  furnish  a  reason  for  the  failure 
to  take  advantage  of  the  first  success,  and  that,  in  pursuance 
of  the  attrition  policy,  any  incidental  advantage  was  of  little 
account  and  possibly  unexpected?  General  attacks  along 
the  entire  line  were  not  unknown  in  that  campaign,  but  the 
net  results  were  usually  long  lists  of  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing  on  our  part,  with  shorter  similar  lists  and  some  in 
convenience  on  the  part  of  the  enemy. 

Of  the  determined  fighting  during  the  rest  of  that  day, 
there  is  little  to  be  said.  The  troops  remained  in  their  posi 
tion  behind  the  captured  works,  firing  without  ceasing  and 
suffering  heavy  loss  until  long  after  darkness  hid  the  com 
batants  from  each  other's  sight. 


XII 

THE   OPERATIONS    OF   THE   ARMY  OF   THE 
POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864 

BY 

BREVET  MAJOR  WILLIAM  P.  SHREVE,  U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  February  14, 1881 


THE  OPERATIONS   OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC  MAY  13 -JUNE  2  1864 

THE  movements  you  are  asked  to  follow  to- night  are  those 
that  were  made  between  the  13th  of  May  and  the  2d  of  June, 
1864,  or  from  the  day  after  the  battle  at  the  Spottsylvania 
Salient  Angle  to  the  day  when  the  army  was  in  line  at  Cold 
Harbor,  being  all  but  the  first  six  days  of  the  second  epoch 
of  the  campaign,  the  whole  of  the  third,  and  six  days  of  the 
fourth.  In  contrast  with  what  took  place  before  and  that 
which  immediately  followed,  this  flank  movement  may  seem 
tame  and  uninteresting  to  study,  the  details  being  much  the 
same  as  those  of  other  marches.  But  little  that  is  new  can  be 
told  of  it,  or  of  the  fighting  that  occurred  during  its  execu 
tion,  and  my  only  hope  is  to  be  able  to  refresh  your  recollec 
tions  by  bringing  together  in  a  few  pages  what  is  scattered 
through  many  books,  and  supplementing  them  from  my  own 
notes  made  at  the  time  and  my  memory. 

General  Grant  says  in  his  report,  "  The  13th  to  the  18th 
were  consumed  in  manoeuvring  and  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements."  We  might  read  between  these  lines  of 
marching,  skirmishing,  and  assault,  of  road-building,  of  the 
throwing  up  of  the  simple  rifle-pit  and  the  more  elaborate 
earthwork,  and  shall  find  enough  if  written  in  detail  to  fill 
volumes,  and  so  we  shall  learn  of  that  of  which  the  report 
takes  no  note  (even  giving  us  the  impression,  as  we  hurry  on, 
that  those  were  days  of  rest  and  exemption  from  danger), 
that  in  those  few  days  many  hundreds  of  dead  and  wounded 
were  added  to  the  tens  of  thousands  all  about  us.  In  our  im 
agination  we  can  follow  that  long,  sad  procession  of  wounded 
comrades  moving  towards  the  north  via  Fredericksburg  and 
Acquia  Creek,  the  new  base  opened  about  this  time,  along 


290  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

with  whom  moved  the  prisoners  on  their  way  to  the  prison 
depots  ;  while  streaming  in  the  opposite  direction  were  the 
clean,  fresh  regiments  from  the  defense  of  Washington,  wag 
ons  loaded  with  subsistence,  clothing,  forage,  and  ammunition, 
the  new  horses  for  batteries  and  ambulances,  all  of  which 
were  to  be  distributed  along  that  line  of  men  in  the  front,  who 
had  but  a  vague  idea  of  the  immense  work  that  was  going  on 
behind  them.  Never  before  in  the  history  of  the  army  had 
such  a  wonderful  work  been  done ;  never  before  had  it  been 
attempted  when  the  army  was  actually  in  contact  with  the 
enemy. 

But  General  Grant  had  no  idea  of  changing  his  attitude 
while  replenishing  the  waste  of  his  army.  Evidently  in  his 
mind  fighting  was  the  first  thing  to  be  done,  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that  he  premeditated  another  blow  at  the  enemy's  right 
flank  on  the  14th,  although  we  find  nothing  that  can  be 
construed  into  an  order  to  that  effect.  If  it  was  so,  the  rain 
prevented  its  execution,  although  it  did  not  save  the  5th  and 
6th  corps  from  a  night  of  severe  marching.  On  the  morning  of 
the  13th  the  armies  faced  each  other  behind  their  earthworks, 
both  ready  to  carry  out  the  orders  that  were  sure  to  come, 
without  either  side  evincing  any  disposition  to  withdraw  from 
the  close  contact  which  had  been  maintained  for  one  week. 
There  was  everything  in  the  morning  that  was  disagreeable.  The 
rain  had  been  falling  for  hours.  The  rations  were  with  many 
—  and  probably  with  those  who  needed  them  most  —  entirely 
gone.  Very  few  had  tasted  a  drop  of  their  greatest  comforter, 
coffee,  for  more  than  twenty-four  hours ;  most  had  scarcely 
enough  muddy  water  to  quench  their  thirst ;  and  if  the  truth 
were  known,  it  would  show  that  that  with  which  many  men 
moistened  their  lips  through  the  long  hours  of  the  night  just 
ended  had  an  infusion  of  the  blood  of  their  comrades ;  and 
then,  to  crown  the  discomfort,  before  the  hour  at  which  it 
should  have  been  daylight,  the  firing  began  again  that  had 
ceased  since  midnight  on  all  the  line  excepting  where  the  2d 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      291 

corps  joined  its  right  to  the  6th.  Some  of  the  horrors  of  that 
morning  we  strive  to  forget  even  when  we  recall  our  miseries. 

Wet,  weary,  hungry,  thirsty,  how  little  the  army  of  this 
morning  resembled  that  of  the  week  before.  Out  of  it  had 
been  taken  Sedgwick  and  Wadsworth  and  Stevenson  and 
Hayes  and  Rice.  Among  the  wounded  or  prisoners  were  Getty, 
Webb,  Robinson,  Morris,  Shaler,  Seymour,  Baxter,  Carroll, 
and,  besides  them,  many  others  whose  names  will  ever  be 
associated  in  your  minds  with  these  days ;  to  which  we  must 
add  the  thousands  that  cannot  ever  all  be  named  of  dead, 
wounded,  prisoners,  and  missing.  And  when  we  have  summed 
up  the  aggregate,  we  shall  still  be  unable  to  conceive  how 
unlike  the  army  was,  on  the  13th  of  May,  to  that  which  went 
into  the  fight  on  the  5th. 

It  is  a  curious  coincidence  that  on  this  and  the  following 
day,  both  Generals  Meade  and  Lee  should  have  thought  it  a 
proper  time  to  issue  congratulatory  addresses  to  their  armies. 
General  Meade  in  his  sums  up  the  work  that  has  been  done, 
says 1  the  enemy  "  has  abandoned  the  last  intrenched  position 
so  tenaciously  held,"  announces  that  the  "  work  is  not  yet  over," 
and  that  "  we  shall  soon  receive  reinforcements,"  which  the 
enemy  "  cannot  expect."  It  is  an  order  far  from  the  vain 
glorious  mood  that  had  shown  itself  in  former  ones  we  had 
read  from  others,  not  overconfident  in  tone,  but  it  probably 
had  a  good  effect.  The  order  of  General  Lee  was  a  more 
subtle  one,  and  we  can  imagine  there  is  in  it  an  indication 
that  the  writer  saw  even  then  the  beginning  of  the  end ;  cer 
tainly  it  impresses  us  now  with  the  idea  that  thereafter  the 
Confederate  policy  would  be  simply  the  defensive  —  as  it 
certainly  was.  After  enumerating  seven  successes  achieved 
by  the  Confederate  armies  on  as  many  fields,  the  principal  of 
which  was  General  Banks's  defeat  by  General  Kirby  Smith, 
General  Lee  says,  "  The  heroic  valor  of  this  army,  with  the 
blessing  of  Almighty  God,  has  thus  far  checked  the  principal 
i  67  W.  R.  197. 


292  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

army  of  the  enemy  and  inflicted  upon  it  heavy  losses."  He 
claims  no  success  for,  admits  no  defeat  of  his  own  command. 

Our  line  on  the  morning  of  the  13th  was  constituted  with 
the  5th  corps  on  the  right,  then  the  6th,  2d,  and  9th,  crowded 
into  the  space  around  the  "  Great  Angle,"  and  extending  from 
the  Ny  River  on  the  left  to  the  road  to  Todd's  Tavern  on  the 
right.  There  was  probably  no  division  front  free  from  skir 
mish  firing  that  morning,  but  especially  was  it  severe  on  the  2d 
corps  front  when  we  were  anxious  to  know  how  far  back  the 
enemy  had  fallen,  and  they  anxious  to  keep  us  ignorant  as 
long  as  possible.  To  develop  their  new  line,  General  Gibbon 
was  ordered  to  send  out  a  brigade.  He  selected  that  of 
General  Owen  for  the  duty  and  Colonel  Carroll  to  command 
it,  and  after  some  sharp  work  the  desired  information  was 
obtained.  Colonel  Carroll  had  been  wounded  in  the  arm  a  few 
days  previously,  but  had  remained  on  duty,  although  much 
against  the  advice  of  the  surgeon,  and  in  this  affair  he  was 
struck  in  the  elbow  joint  of  his  sound  arm,  and  the  bones 
so  splintered  as  to  long  disable  him  from  active  service.  Six 
of  the  limbers  and  caissons  captured  the  day  before,  but 
remaining  between  the  lines,  were  brought  in  by  Captain 
Sleeper's  battery  (10th  Massachusetts).  They  were  a  mass 
of  splinters. 

About  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening,  the  5th  corps  began  to 
move  past  in  rear  of  the  2d.  The  evening  resembled  all  those 
we  knew  in  this  region,  in  that  a  thick  fog  arose  as  soon  as 
the  sun  went  down  which  rendered  the  night  doubly  dark. 
Through  fog  and  mud,  through  field  and  woods  all  unknown 
to  them  before,  the  5th  corps  pushed  on,  or  groped  rather ;  and 
at  daylight  the  head  of  its  column,  now  scattered  all  along  the 
path  it  had  marched,  came  out  upon  the  Fredericksburg  Road. 
The  6th  followed  the  5th,  but  the  day  was  far  advanced  before 
it  arrived  in  the  same  vicinity ;  in  fact  it  was  morning  before 
its  rear  was  really  under  way.  The  5th  pushed  its  line  for 
ward  as  soon  as  one  could  be  formed,  connecting  with  the  left 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      293 

of  the  9th  corps,  and  commenced  to  intrench.  It  was  very 
soon  discovered  that  its  position  was  commanded  by  an  emi 
nence  on  the  left  called  by  the  varied  names  "  Jet  House  " 
(by  Swinton),  "  Gayle  House  "  (by  the  government  map),  and 
elsewhere  as  the  "Myers  Farm."  Lieutenant-Colonel  Otis,  with 
some  "  regulars,"  occupied  the  ground  without  much  oppo 
sition,  and  General  Upton's  brigade  from  the  6th  corps  was 
sent  to  extend  the  line  and  intrench.-  This  it  had  just  com 
menced  when  it  was  suddenly  set  upon  and  driven  out.  Later 
in  the  day  the  point  was  reoccupied  by  the  brigade  of  General 
Ayres,  supported  by  a  detachment  from  General  Neill's 
division  (6th  corps).  General  Meade  speaks  of  this  point  as 
"  an  advanced  position."  It  afterwards  came  to  be  in  rear  of 
our  line,  and  evidently  was  not  considered  a  position  of  much 
importance  to  the  enemy,  and  their  push  for  it  could  only  have 
been  to  ascertain  what  was  being  done  beyond. 

General  Early  mentions  this  affair  in  his  "narrative."1 
"  General  Mahone  made  two  or  three  reconnoissances  to  the 
front,  in  one  of  which  he  encountered  a  body  of  the  enemy 
which  had  got  possession  of  Gayle's  house  on  the  left  of  the 
road  leading  from  our  right  towards  the  Fredericksburg  and 
Hanover  Junction  Road,  at  which  a  portion  of  our  cavalry 
under  General  Chambliss  had  been  posted.  He  drove  it  back 
across  the  Ny." 

On  the  morning  of  the  14th,  as  soon  as  the  enemy  noticed 
the  withdrawal  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps,  he  advanced  and 
occupied  a  portion  of  the  line.  The  2d  corps,  now  the  extreme 
right  of  the  army,  conformed  to  its  new  position  by  drawing 
back  from  the  old  breastworks  to  higher  ground,  where  new 
ones  were  constructed.  The  enemy  of  course  followed,  curious 
to  know  just  what  was  being  done,  and  once  a  considerable 
force  appeared  in  the  Angle,  and  Birney  sent  out  a  couple  of 
regiments  (86th  and  124th  New  York)  to  dislodge  it. 

On  the  15th  the  divisions  of  Barlow  and  Gibbon  were  with- 
1  The  Last  Year  of  the  War,  etc.  By  Lieutenant-General  J.  A.  Early,  p.  26. 


294  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

drawn  from  the  line  of  the  2d  corps  and  massed  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Ny.  Birney's  division  extended  the  line  to  the 
left  and  connected  with  the  9th  corps.  The  enemy  recovered 
thirteen  caissons  that  remained  on  debatable  ground,  near  the 
Angle.  Anderson  moved  to  Early's  right  at  night,  the  divi 
sion  of  Field  having  preceded  him. 

To  men  of  the  old  3d  corps  this  day  is  memorable  as 
witnessing  another  consolidation  of  what  there  was  left  of 
that  organization.  The  division  that  had  been  commanded 
by  General  Hayes,  and  by  General  Mott  since  his  death,  was 
merged  into  General  Birney's  division. 

The  16th  was  a  day  that  in  comparison  may  be  called  quiet, 
so  far  as  fighting  is  in  question,  but  there  was  digging  all 
along  the  line,  especially  on  the  flanks.  General  Burnside 
says  he  ordered  a  reconnoissance  "  by  the  1st  and  2d  divisions 
to  the  front,  which  resulted  in  developing  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy."  No  corroborating  testimony  to  this  is  found  in  any 
of  the  works  at  my  command,  and  it  may  be  concluded  that 
it  was,  like  most  of  the  9th  corps  demonstrations,  feeble.  An 
ambulance  train  under  strong  escort  went  out  beyond  our 
right  at  nightfall,  and  a  large  number  of  wounded  were 
brought  in.  No  opposition  was  offered  to  the  expedition. 

The  17th  was  another  similar  day  until  near  the  close, 
when  a  dash  was  made  on  our  right  flank  on  the  Ny  by  a 
brigade  of  the  enemy,  who  seemed  to  be  satisfied  upon  finding 
where  we  rested.  An  order  was  issued  reducing  all  the  six- 
gun  batteries  to  four. 

To  me  this  day  is  memorable  for  a  sensation  that  left  a 
lasting  impression.  Tyler's  division  of  heavy  artillery,  con 
verted  into  infantry,  had  arrived  from  Washington,  or  rather 
was  this  day  on  the  march  from  Fredericksburg,  and  an  order 
assigning  it  to  the  2d  corps  had  been  received.  Besides  this 
a  regiment,  or  it  may  have  been  a  brigade,  called  the  Corcoran 
Legion,  came,  which  was  placed  in  General  Gibbon's  division. 
The  first  notice  we  had  of  its  arrival  was  the  noise  made  by  this 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  186 '4      295 

body  of  men  (which  was  as  large  as  any  one  of  our  brigades, 
exhibiting  in  their  outfit  as  lamentable  a  contrast  to  our  tatter 
demalions  as  can  well  be  imagined)  coming  into  line  near  our 
headquarters  and  "  counting  off  by  twos."  This  remarkable 
sight  and  the  sound  of  that  well-remembered  enumeration, 
which  we  had  heard  so  seldom  of  late,  were  enough  to  bring 
our  men  running  from  every  direction  to  wonder  at  it.  It  was 
an  assuring  sight,  however,  and  did  us  all  good. 

During  the  night  the  6th  corps  and  the  two  divisions  of  the 
2d  were  marched  back  to  the  position  where  the  left  of  the  2d 
assaulted  on  the  12th.  The  9th  joined  the  line,  and  at  four 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  18th  moved  forward  to  a  useless 
assault  over  the  ground  where  our  dead  were  lying,  yet  un- 
buried,  up  to  the  main  Confederate  works.  It  seems  needless 
for  any  one  to  write  that  to  take  them  was  an  impossibility. 
An  almost  impenetrable  abatis,  or  slashing,  protected  them, 
and  what  they  were  in  part  may  be  gathered  from  the  diary  on 
file  among  the  papers  of  this  Society,  contributed  by  Colonel 
Lyman,  who  visited  the  spot  in  later  years.  He  said,1  "  The 
final  line  which  the  enemy  drew  across  the  base  of  the  Salient 
Angle  was  [is]  a  curiosity  of  fortification.  The  high  parapet 
was  [is]  not  only  traversed  as  often  as  every  ten  or  twelve 
feet,  but  was  [is]  inclosed  in  the  rear,  so  that  the  line  was 
[is]  divided  into  a  series  of  square  pens,  with  banks  of  earth 
heavily  riveted  with  oak  logs.  From  space  to  space  was  [is] 
an  elevated  post  for  sharpshooters,  with  a  loophole  in  front." 
The  same  diary  mentions  finding,  "  quite  within  the  advance 
rebel  cross-line  near  the  point  where  our  left  rested  after  the 
capture  of  the  works,  the  graves  of  two  privates  and  a  ser 
geant  of  the  Corcoran  Legion."  These  men  fell  in  their  first 
fight  on  this  day,  and  their  graves  no  doubt  mark  the  posi 
tion  to  which  the  division  of  Gibbon  advanced.  The  loss 
in  this  Corcoran  Legion  alone  was  seventy.  The  9th  corps 
assaults,  made  by  the  divisions  of  Generals  Crittenden  and 

1  Ante,  p.  237. 


296  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Potter,  met  with  no  better  success  than  did  those  made  by  the 
2d,  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  6th.  The  5th,  far  away 
on  the  left,  opened  its  artillery  and  pushed  out  skirmishers, 
but  its  participation  was  intended  to  be  only  demonstrative. 

The  division  of  Birney  was  in  reserve,  but  on  the  right  of 
the  6th  corps,  and  moved  out  to  the  face  of  the  Angle,  where 
it  had  gone  over  on  the  12th,  and  remained  there  during  the 
day.  The  division  of  Tyler  since  its  arrival  had  been  near 
the  Harris  house,  on  the  road  to  Fredericksburg. 

By  eleven  o'clock  A.  M.  the  attack  was  decided  to  be  a  failure 
and  the  men  withdrawn,  the  enemy  not  making  an  attempt  to 
follow.  At  night  the  6th  corps  returned  to  its  former  position 
on  the  left  of  the  5th,  the  9th  was  started  to  extend  the  line 
yet  farther,  by  forming  on  the  left  of  the  6th,  reaching  when 
in  position  to  the  Quesenbury  house.  The  rear  of  the  2d  corps 
left  the  Landrum  house  at  two  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  the 

O 

19th,  and  by  daylight  it  was  massed  on  the  Anderson  farm 
near  army  headquarters. 

It  is  noticeable  that  General  Meade  has  no  mention  in  his 
report  of  the  assault  of  the  18th  that  cost  us  at  least  1000 
men. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  the  5th  corps  was  the  right 
of  the  line  resting  at  the  Ny  near  the  Fredericksburg  Road, 
the  6th  on  its  left,  then  the  9th,  while  the  2d  was  across  the 
Ny  in  the  rear  of  the  5th.  It  might  be  quite  as  proper  to  say 
that  the  2d  was  the  extreme  right  of  the  line  in  reality. 

All  that  day  of  the  19th  there  was  remarkable  quiet,  which 
very  many  appreciated  because  it  was  the  first  day  from  under 
fire  since  crossing  the  Rapidan.  Those  who  had  writing, 
official  or  private,  made  good  use  of  the  time  to  dispatch  it, 
and  every  one  remembers  the  delight  from  a  bath  and  a 
change  of  clothing,  if  that  was  to  be  had,  on  that  delightful 
spring  day,  which  after  all  was  not  to  pass  without  an  excite 
ment  and  the  smell  of  powder  for  some  of  us. 

About  five  o'clock  we  heard  a  firing  as  of  skirmishers  that 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      297 

sounded  a  long  way  in  our  rear,  and  in  ten  minutes  thereafter 
we  saw  a  dashing  of  orderlies  hither  and  thither,  one  of 
which  brought  General  Birney  an  order  to  move  with  his 
division  in  the  direction  of  the  firing  at  once.  Dropping  every 
thing  in  hand,  not  stopping  for  blankets  or  to  pick  up  what 
under  other  circumstances  would  have  been  taken,  the  divi 
sion  was,  within  half  an  hour  of  the  time  the  first  shot  was 
noticed,  on  its  way  to  the  rear.  Before  we  reached  the  Fred- 
ericksburg  Road  we  saw  a  division  from  the  5th  corps  moving 
in  the  same  direction,  and  knew  that  our  trains  were  stam 
peded  from  the  rush  of  demoralized  drivers  and  non-combat 
ants  that  spread  all  over  the  open  field  over  which  our  march 
was  made.  The  increasing  musketry  told  us  that  the  stam 
pede  was  not  without  cause,  for  it  had  grown  from  a  skirmish 
fire  to  volleys.  When  very  near  the  Fredericksburg  Road  we 
came  to  the  spot  where  a  regiment  had  unslung  knapsacks 
and  piled  them  on  the  ground.  No  sooner  did  our  men  catch 
sight  of  them  than  deploying  at  double-quick  they  swept  over 
them,  every  one  the  possessor  of  a  fine  outfit  belonging  to  some 
unfortunate  heavy  artilleryman.  Then  they  "went  through 
them  "  on  the  double-quick,  until  empty  knapsacks  strewed 
the  ground  in  our  rear,  together  with  a  large  assortment  of 
the  same  goods  that  the  men  in  1862  started  out  with,  but 
which  now  as  veterans  they  knew  to  be  utterly  worthless  to 
them.  Even  "  boiled  shirts  "  had  no  attractions  for  the  masses 
then.  It  was  an  awfully  mean  thing  to  do,  I  confess  to-day, 
but  then  the  men  who  did  not  enter  into  the  sport  must  have 
been  entirely  without  a  desire  for  fun  or  mischief  or  devoid 
of  any  sense  of  the  humorous.  It  was  not  without  an  excuse 
either,  for  many  of  those  men  had  time  and  again  left  all 
their  worldly  possessions  in  some  similar  spot  under  similar 
circumstances  and  never  had  been  able  to  reclaim  them.  So 
they  argued,  if  we  do  not  have  these,  somebody  else  will,  or 
so  they  would  have  argued,  and  an  answer  to  that  in  the 
form  of  a  denial  would  have  been  useless. 


298  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

It  was  not  many  minutes  afterwards  that  we  went  through 
a  strip  of  pines  and  passed  through  the  line  of  Colonel  Tan- 
natt's  brigade,  formed  halfway  down  an  open  slope  at  the 
foot  of  which  was  the  river  Ny.  His  men  were  standing  there 
taking  the  fire  of  the  concealed  enemy  on  the  opposite  bank. 
Our  line  rushed  to  the  brink  and  soon  found  cover,  after 
which  little  more  followed  than  a  fitful  firing  when  Tannatt 
had  withdrawn  to  the  cover  of  the  wood.  Then  we  put  a 
picket  line  across  the  stream  and  lay  there  in  the  thick  fog 
that  rose  all  around  us. 

The  divisions  of  General  Crawford  from  the  5th  and  of 
General  Russell  from  the  6th  corps  came  also  to  Tyler's  sup 
port.  The  former  moved  up  the  river  in  an  attempt  to  get 
upon  the  flank  of  the  attacking  party,  but  neither  of  them 
was  engaged. 

The  1st  Massachusetts  and  5th  Maine  regiments  of  heavy 
artillery,  forming  a  brigade  under  Colonel  Tannatt  of  the 
Massachusetts  regiment,  bore  the  brunt  of  the  attack.  It 
commenced  to  skirmish  as  early  as  four  o'clock  p.  M.  with  the 
enemy's  advance,  and  very  soon  one  battalion  of  the  Massa 
chusetts  regiment  was  put  in  to  their  support,  was  quickly 
followed  by  the  second,  and  then  the  whole  of  the  Maine 
regiment  advanced  to  their  assistance.  Besides  these  were 
three  or  four  New  York  regiments,  forming  a  brigade  under 
Colonel  Kitching  of  the  6th  New  York,  which  were  of  no  more 
assistance  than  were  the  divisions  from  the  other  corps,  for  on 
their  arrival  the  affair  had  been  virtually  decided.  The  Mas 
sachusetts  regiment  went  into  the  action  with  1600  officers 
and  men,  and  its  aggregate  loss  was  394.  The  Maine  regi 
ment,  which  in  February  had  been  recruited  to  the  maximum 
(1800),  lost  476  men.  Our  loss  must  have  approximated  to 
1000  in  this  affair,  which,  in  the  midst  of  so  many  more 
bloody  fights,  is  almost  unknown.  It  is  claimed  that  about 
400  prisoners  fell  into  our  hands  as  one  of  the  results.  My 
notebook  says  over  400 ;  and  from  the  official  report  of  the 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      299 

2d  brigade,  3d  division,  2d  corps,  which  advanced  next  morn 
ing  across  the  Ny  and  thoroughly  scoured  the  country,  I  find 
that  it  claims  to  have  brought  in  200. 

General  Grant  in  his  dispatch  says  300,  but  he  also  places 
his  own  losses  at  750,  when  two  regiments  alone  lost  120  more 
than  that  number. 

We  of  the  2d  corps  were  in  the  habit  of  calling  this  "  the 
battle  of  the  Heavies,"  and  their  losses,  as  well  as  the  manner 
in  which,  under  fire  for  the  first  time,  they  drove  back  veteran 
troops,  tell  all  that  can  be  told  of  their  discipline  and  courage. 

The  attacking  party  on  this  day  was  General  Ewell,  who 
with  his  entire  command  crossed  the  Ny  to  strike  our  com 
munications  in  the  rear.  That  something  more  than  a  mere 
reconnoissance  was  intended  may  be  inferred  from  the  num 
ber  of  men  who  took  part  in  it,  as  well  as  from  its  being  com 
mitted  to  the  hands  of  a  corps  commander.  The  prize  to  be 
reached,  if  he  was  successful  in  driving  us  from  the  Freder- 
icksburg  Road,  was  our  entire  wagon  train,  —  with  everything 
that  implies,  —  which  was  parked  in  that  vicinity  for  miles 
and  filled  the  road  besides.  What  the  result  might  have  been 
beyond  the  acquirement  of  so  much  property,  it  is  useless  to 
conjecture.  That  it  was  not  left  out  of  the  account  with  them 
is  shown  by  the  "  Narrative  "  of  General  Early,  who  says  : l 
"  General  Ewell  made  a  movement  against  the  enemy's  right, 
.  .  .  while  the  whole  corps  (Hill's)  was  held  in  readiness  to 
cooperate,  should  his  attack  prove  successful."  And  General 
Anderson  in  his  diary  writes  :  "  Towards  evening  Ewell  under 
takes  a  movement  against  the  enemy's  right,  accomplishing, 
however,  little  save  some  information  of  the  enemy's  position." 
Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  country  over  which  Ewell  moved 
—  a  thickly  wooded  and  marshy  region,  for  the  most  part,  — 
he  was  obliged  to  cross  the  river  without  his  artillery ;  but 
General  Hampton,  who  accompanied  Ewell  with  his  brigade 
of  cavalry,  had  also  a  "  battery  of  horse  artillery,"  and  these 
1  The  Last  Year  of  the  War,  etc.  By  Lieutenant-General  J.  A.  Early,  p.  27. 


300  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

were  the  only  guns  heard  in  the  fight.  Hampton,  making 
a  more  extended  sweep  than  the  infantry,  being  on  their  left, 
came  upon  the  road  farther  down,  and  dashing  along  it  carried 
consternation  to  the  hearts  of  quartermasters,  mule-drivers, 
and  sutlers.  But  alas  for  the  gallant  Hampton !  He  was  met 
by  an  element  new  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  was  no 
other  than  a  division  of  colored  troops,  under  the  command 
of  General  Ferrero,  that,  although  belonging  to  the  9th  corps, 
had  not  been  put  in  to  fight,  but  kept  as  a  wagon  guard.  To 
them  belongs  the  honor  of  repulsing  the  famous  Hampton 
Legion. 

Whatever  may  have  been  intended  by  this  movement,  it  is 
certain  that  it  interfered  to  postpone  until  the  next  night  the 
plans  of  General  Grant. 

On  the  morning  of  the  20th,  after  it  had  been  ascertained 
their  presence  was  no  longer  needed,  the  three  divisions  sent 
to  General  Tyler's  assistance  were  returned  to  their  respect 
ive  corps,  and  enjoyed  another  day  of  grateful  rest  before 
starting  out  by  the  left  flank  once  more. 

The  order  for  the  march  of  the  21st,1  issued  by  General 
Meade  to  General  Hancock,  who  with  the  2d  corps  was  to 
lead  in  the  movement,  fixed  two  o'clock  A.  M.  as  the  hour  for 
starting.  After  having  reconnoitred  the  road  as  far  as  Guinea's 
Station,  General  Hancock  obtained  permission  to  start  at  eleven 
o'clock  P.  M.  of  the  20th,  which  gave  three  hours  more  for 
getting  well  under  way  before  daylight.  By  one  o'clock  A.  M. 
of  the  21st  the  rear  division  of  the  corps  (the  3d)  was  on  the 
road,  and  the  remainder  of  that  night  and  the  next  day  until 
five  o'clock  P.  M.  were  spent  in  making  a  march  of  somewhat  over 
twenty  miles.  The  order  was  "  To  move  to  Bowling  Green  and 
Milford  Station  via  Guinea's  Station,  and  take  position  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Mattapony."  This  was  complied  with  to 
the  letter.  The  cavalry  under  General  Torbert  that  preceded 
us  had  brushed  away  all  the  enemy's  scouting  parties  from 
1  67  W.  R.  340,  362. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      301 

Guinea's  and  Downer's  bridges  (which  were  on  our  right  flank 
after  passing  the  station)  across  the  Po  Ny  River,  and  leaving 
but  a  few  vedettes  to  watch  those  crossings,  the  main  force 
had  passed  through  Bowling  Green  and  arrived^  at  Milford 
Station  before  meeting  with  resistance.  There  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  Mattapony,  protected  by  rifle-pits,  was  a  force 
which  was  probably  a  portion  of  Kemper's  brigade  of  Pickett's 
division  on  its  way  from  North  Carolina  to  join  General  Lee. 
This  was  dislodged,  and  some  fifty  or  more  taken  prisoners 
before  the  head  of  the  2d  corps  arrived.  The  bridge  being 
saved  and  the  passage  of  the  river  assured,  Barlow  crossed 
his  divisions  without  experiencing  any  delay,  moved  a  mile 
beyond  to  high  land  and  a  strong  position,  and  was  followed 
by  the  remainder  of  the  corps  as  it  came  up,  all  throwing  up 
the  inevitable  line  of  defense  immediately. 

The  day  was  a  warm  and  pleasant  one,  and  our  march, 
through  a  country  as  fresh  and  bright  as  any  we  had  seen 
since  our  march  into  Pennsylvania  the  year  before,  was  more 
like  a  picnic  excursion  than  a  trial  of  speed  with  our  enemy. 
As  usual  the  men  managed  to  pick  up  something  in  the  line 
of  eatables,  and  to  replenish  their  stock  of  tobacco,  which  to 
some  was  quite  as  necessary. 

Excepting  by  our  cavalry  this  region  had  but  once  been 
visited  by  any  portion  of  our  army.  That  was  in  May,  1862, 
by  a  part  of  King's  division  of  General  McDowell's  corps, 
then  occupying  Fredericksburg.  In  it  was  my  regiment,  and 
I  passed  five  days  in  and  around  Guinea's  Station,  riding 
back  once  in  the  mean  while  to  Fredericksburg.  No  more 
pleasing  region  for  campaigning  purposes  ever  came  in  my 
line  of  march.  The  roads  are  good,  water  plenty,  and  there 
are  farms  enough  for  foraging  purposes  and  fences  enough 
for  fuel.  If  the  soldier  asks  for  anything  besides  these  requi 
sites  he  has  pleasing  landscapes,  extensive  views,  and  houses 
planned  on  a  grand  scale  dotting  them  here  and  there,  but 
will  miss  everything  that  can  remind  him  of  his  home. 


302  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Immediately  following  the  2d  corps  came  the  army  head 
quarters  train,  which  established  a  new  camp  at  "Guinea's 
Station  in  the  Motley  house,  overlooking  the  river  and  region 
beyond.  There  a  little  affair  occurred  which  has  been  called 
the  "  wagon  train  battle,"  which  cannot  be  better  described 
than  in  the  words  of  an  officer  who  witnessed  it.1 

"  That  was  May  21  at  Guinea's  Bridge  (near  which  is 
the  house  where  Stonewall  Jackson  died).  The  2d  corps  had 
passed,  and  the  5th  was  coming  along,  and  General  Meade 
was  riding  between  the  two.  Arrived  at  Motley's,  we  found 
our  train,  and  the  quartermaster  looking  very  blank,  for  the 
enemy  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  river  and  might  come 
over.  Headquarters  guard  and  some  provisional  militia  were 
soon  up.  These  were  the  114th  Pennsylvania  (a  zouave  regi 
ment  of  the  old  3d  corps),  the  Engineers,  the  68th  New  York, 
and  Adams's  squadron  of  the  1st  Massachusetts  cavalry.  Gen 
eral  Meade  gave  orders  to  force  the  bridge  at  once.  The  68th 
New  York  waded  over  and  freed  it,  when  Adams  galloped 
across  and  chased  the  enemy,  capturing  three  of  them."  That 
was  all  the  big  "  wagon  train  battle." 

The  5th  corps  coining  up  crossed  at  Guinea's  Bridge,  thus 
branching  off  to  the  right  from  the  road  taken  by  the  2d,  and 
halted  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Po  Ny,  the  cavalry  of  the 
enemy  hovering  all  around. 

The  orders  issued  for  the  9th  corps  march  were  discretion 
ary  as  to  the  route  it  should  take  after  the  5th  had  moved. 
They  were  that  it  should  cross  the  Po  River  at  Stannard's 
Mill  (Snell's  Bridge)  if  it  could  be  done  without  opposition, 
thus  opening  a  direct  road  by  which  it  would  have  been  on 
the  right  of  the  5th,  and  although  marching  later  would  have 
reached  the  first  halting-point  as  soon  as  it  did.  In  preparing 
to  execute  this  plan  the  brigade  of  Colonel  Curtin  of  General 
Potter's  division  was  sent  to  the  location  indicated,  and 
although  meeting  a  scouting  party  a  mile  before  reaching  the 

1  Colonel  Lyman. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  186 '4      303 

river,  had  no  difficulty  in  taking  his  force  to  the  spot,  from 
where  he  sent  back  word  that  the  enemy  was  in  force  on  the 
other  side.  General  Potter  hurried  the  balance  of  the  division 
forward  and  made  dispositions  to  cross ;  but  fearing  it  might 
bring  on  an  engagement,  Burnside  ordered  the  route  via 
Downer's  Bridge  to  be  taken,  and  after  an  all-night  march 
halted  near  Bethel  Church  (query,  JBethesda). 

The  6th  corps,  the  rear  of  the  army,  was  attacked  before 
the  9th  was  entirely  out  of  the  way  by  two  brigades  from 
Anderson's1  division,  which  came  upon  the  front  of  General 
Russell's  division  by  the  road  leading  past  the  Gayle  house. 
A  brisk  fight  resulted,  which  occasioned  so  much  noise  (Gen 
eral  Wright  making  good  use  of  his  batteries)  that  the  divi 
sion  of  Willcox  was  sent  back  by  General  Burnside  to  offer 
assistance,  which  was  not  needed  as  the  enemy  did  not  per 
sist  in  the  attack.  This  did  not  seriously  delay  the  withdrawal 
of  the  6th,  which  commenced  as  early  as  nine  o'clock  p.  M. 
(21st)  and  was  continued  via  Guinea's  Bridge  in  the  track  of 
the  5th.  Thus  between  midnight  of  the  20th  and  midnight 
of  the  21st  the  whole  army  was  withdrawn  from  Spottsyl- 
vania. 

On  the  22d  the  2d  corps  was  quiet,  although  I  remember 
that  Birney's  division  moved  about  a  mile  forward  and  built 
works  that  if  not  torn  down  must  be  there  to-day.  We  were 
out  of  sight  and  sound  of  the  enemy,  and  Colonel  Egan 
with  his  brigade  went  to  Polecat  Run  (or  Station),  finding 
but  one  forlorn  cavalryman,  who  came  back  with  them,  prob 
ably  without  persuasion. 

The  5th  corps  continued  its  march  on  roads  whose  general 
direction  was  west  and  south,  skirmishing  with  the  cavalry 
nearly  all  the  way,  crossing  the  Mat  River,  and  camping  about 
five  miles  west  of  the  2d  corps.  Before  starting  in  the  morn 
ing  a  brigade  under  Colonel  Bates,  from  General  Lockwood's 
division,  was  sent  out  at  five  o'clock  on  a  road  running  due 
west,  and  driving  the  enemy's  cavalry  before  it,  attained  as 
1  Wilcox's  ?  See  Va.  Camp.  122.  — ED. 


304  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

far  as  the  Telegraph  Road  (to  Mud  Tavern  ?),  where  it  learned 
that  both  the  divisions  of  Anderson  and  Early  had  passed 
southward  during  the  night.  This  probably  was  the  first 
satisfactory  information  of  the  Confederate  movement  to 
checkmate  us.  Now  Stannard's  Mill,  where  the  9th  corps  was 
directed  to  cross,  is  not  more  than  three  miles  from  Mud 
Tavern,  the  point  to  which  Colonel  Bates  pushed  his  recon- 
noissance.  Whatever  force  was  holding  that  ford  was  prob 
ably  the  rear  guard  of  Anderson's  column.  Had  a  crossing 
been  forced  (as  no  doubt  it  might  easily),  General  Burnside 
would  have  come  upon  Anderson,  who  moved  from  Spottsyl- 
vania  at  about  the  same  time  he  did  "  via  Dickerson's  and 
Mud  Tavern."  The  9th,  like  the  2d  corps,  remained  quiet  this 
day,  while  the  6th  did  not  make  more  than  temporary  halts 
from  the  time  it  left  the  line  before  Spottsylvania  Court 
House  until  it  camped  in  rear  of  the  5th,  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  Mat.  By  night  of  the  22d  the  army  was  disposed  in 
the  following  order  :  The  2d  corps  near  Milford  Station,  south 
of  the  Mattapony,  on  the  left  flank ;  the  5th  on  the  Tele 
graph  Road,  south  of  the  Mat,  on  the  right  flank ;  supporting, 
on  the  same  road,  but  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  was 
the  6th,  while  the  9th  was  midway  between  the  two  flanks, 
also  north  of  the  river.  Headquarters  were  in  rear  of  the 
9th  corps. 

The  enemy  seemed  to  be  perfectly  well  informed  of  our 
intention,  or  perhaps  it  took  no  great  sagacity  to  divine  it. 
No  sooner  was  the  2d  corps  on  the  road  than  Ewell  was  put 
in  motion,  and  Anderson  followed  in  the  afternoon  of  the  21st 
as  the  5th  went  after  the  2d.  These  two  marched  "  via  Dick 
erson's  to  the  Mud  Tavern  and  thence  down  the  Telegraph 
Road,"  halting  at  three  o'clock  A.  M.,  after  an  all-night  march, 
for  two  hours'  rest,  and  by  night  of  the  22d  the  whole  of 
General  Lee's  army  was  on  the  North  Anna.  General  Ewell 
proceeded  to  Hanover  Junction  and  formed  what  was  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  line,  General  Anderson  formed  on  his 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  18-JUNE  2  1864      305 

left,  while  General  Hill,  who  with  his  corps  had  taken  a  road 
west  of  the  Telegraph  Road,  came  in,  and  formed  the  left  of 
their  line.  They  had  also  been  reinforced  by  two  brigades  of 
Pickett's  division  (Corse  and  Kemper),  and  by  the  division 
of  General  Breckinridge  from  the  Valley.  These,  it  is  said, 
with  the  brigade  of  Hoke,  which  joined  them  on  the  21st  from 
North  Carolina,  were  all  the  reinforcements  General  Lee's 
army  received  between  the  Rapidan  and  Petersburg. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23d  General  Grant  set  his  whole 
army  in  motion  at  an  hour  which  did  not  indicate  any  hurry 
to  arrive  at  the  point  aimed  at.  The  2d  corps  did  not  start 
before  five  o'clock.  My  memorandum  says  six.  The  cavalry  in 
front  had  to  skirmish  continually  with  that  of  the  enemy,  and 
our  progress  was  halting  and  slow.  Although  the  distance  to 
the  North  Anna  was  not  over  eight  miles  in  a  straight  line, 
the  day  was  nearly  wasted  when  the  corps  was  in  line  of 
battle  within  half  a  mile  of  the  bank  ready  to  advance.  Gen 
eral  Birney's  division  was  on  the  right,  across  the  road  to 
Chesterfield  Bridge ;  General  Gibbon's  was  on  the  left,  extend 
ing  to  the  Fredericksburg  and  Richmond  Railroad,  General 
Barlow  between  the  two,  General  Tyler  in  rear  of  the  right 
division.  When  at  about  five  o'clock  the  line  advanced,  Gen 
eral  Gibbon  reached  the  river  in  his  front  with  little  opposition, 
while  Birney's  progress  was  somewhat  delayed.  The  bridge 
in  his  front  was  defended  by  a  small  redoubt,  flanked  by  rifle- 
pits,  while  on  the  farther  bank  of  the  river  was  another,  which 
commanded  not  alone  the  crossing  itself,  but  also  the  approach 
to  it ;  while  still  more  to  the  enemy's  left  were  other  works, 
occupied  by  artillery,  which  swept  all  the  plain  from  far  above 
to  far  below  the  bridge.  The  country  was  open  for  the  entire 
length  of  the  corps  line,  with  a  gradual  rise  to  the  river  after 
crossing  Long  Creek,  which  is  a  stream  of  no  consequence, 
a  mere  brook,  that  flows  but  a  short  distance  farther  before 
emptying  into  the  North  Anna.  There  was  an  excellent  oppor 
tunity  for  using  the  artillery  on  both  sides,  which  was  improved 


306  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

by  some  splendid  practice,  during  which  I  remember  one  of 
the  enemy's  limbers  was  exploded  in  a  battery  that  had  been 
extremely  annoying  to  us,  and  afterwards  we  heard  no  more 
from  it.  Birney  pushed  a  brigade  across  Long  Creek,  and 
a  section  of  Arnold's  Rhode  Island  battery,  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  Hunt,  was  taken  under  cover  of  a  few  trees  quite 
within  musketry  range  from  the  redoubt,  and  did  good  service 
in  keeping  down  the  fire  while  the  assaulting  column  was 
being  formed.  This  consisted  of  the  First  brigade,  commanded 
by  Colonel  Egan  of  the  40th  New  York  (who  later  earned  the 
brevet  of  major-general  for  his  gallantry  at  the  battle  of  Boyd- 
ton  Road),  and  the  Second  under  Colonel  (afterwards  Briga 
dier-General)  Pierce  of  the  3d  Michigan.  Forming  as  they  did 
under  heavy  fire,  no  time  was  wasted,  and  it  was  not  quite  seven 
o'clock  when  the  order  to  advance  was  given.  My  notes  say 
the  affair  was  decided  at  quarter-past  seven.  The  rush  that 
followed  across  that  open  plain,  a  distance  of  nearly  a  quarter 
of  a  mile,  was  one  of  the  sights  that  every  one  who  saw  will 
ever  remember  with  a  thrill  of  admiration,  not  only  because  of 
the  success  that  resulted,  but  also  because  the  occasion  was 
a  rare  one  when  the  forming  of  the  column,  the  advance,  and 
the  capture  of  the  position  could  all  be  seen.  General  Hancock 
was  one  of  the  enthusiastic  lookers-on,  and  in  his  report  says, 
"I  have  seldom  witnessed  such  gallantry  and  spirit  as  the 
brigades  of  Pierce  and  Egan  displayed." 

A  terrific  fire  both  of  musketry  and  artillery  showered  upon 
this  advancing  line  seemed  to  have  only  the  effect  to  cause 
the  right  wing  to  oblique  to  the  right.  There  was  an  interval 
between  the  two  brigades  at  the  start  which  was  somewhat 
opened  by  this,  but  the  left  flank  of  the  right  brigade  struck 
the  redoubt  and  went  over  it  almost  before  we  who  were  look 
ing  on  knew  it,  and  then  the  entire  brigade  closed  in  towards 
the  left  and  joined  the  other  at  the  bridge  head,  scooping  in 
a  score  of  prisoners.  The  safety  of  the  bridge  was  also  insured, 
although  there  were  repeated  and  perpetual  efforts  made  many 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  18-JUNE  2  1864      307 

times  in  the  night  to  destroy  it.  Below  us  at  the  railroad 
bridge  the  enemy  was  successful  in  his  attempt  and  gave  us 
a  blaze  that  lasted  for  an  hour. 

The  5th  corps  reached  the  river  at  Jericho  Ford,  a  point 
that  in  a  straight  line  is  between  three  and  four  miles  from 
the  Chesterfield  Bridge,  at  about  one  o'clock,  and  finding  not 
even  a  picket  to  give  warning  of  its  approach  commenced 
to  cross  without  delay,  and  brought  up  pontoons  and  laid 
a  bridge.  The  division  of  General  Griffin  was  leading,  that 
of  General  Cutler  followed  and  formed  on  the  right,  that  of 
General  Crawford  on  the  left,  and  the  advance  once  more 
commenced,  but  for  the  most  part  through  woods  with  an 
occasional  clearing.  It  was  not  long  before  the  skirmishers 
of  the  enemy  were  encountered.  Pushing  them  back  until 
a  suitable  ground  was  selected  on  which  to  form  a  line,  the 
corps  began  to  intrench  ;  but  this  work  was  but  just  organized 
when  the  centre  of  the  line  was  vigorously  set  upon  and  for 
a  time  forced  back,  but  finally  reestablished  itself.  Turning 
from  the  centre,  the  South  Carolina  brigade  in  command  of 
General  Brown  moved  to  our  right  along  the  Virginia  Central 
Kailroad,  and  fell  upon  the  flank  of  General  Cutler's  division, 
unexpectedly  to  both  sides  evidently,  for  there  was  much  dis 
order  on  both  sides,  which  resulted  in  the  Carolinians  being 
put  to  flight,  leaving  General  Brown  and  between  400  and 
500  of  the  rank  and  file  in  our  hands.  Warren  was  thus  left 
in  a  secure  position,  with  both  flanks  on  the  river,  which 
makes  a  curve  there,  and  the  6th  corps  across  the  river  in  his 
rear. 

The  9th  corps,  when  it  moved  on  this  day  (23d),  made  its 
way  "  over  plantation  roads  between  the  routes  taken  by  the 
2d  and  5th."  Its  orders  were  to  march  on  Jericho  Ford,  but 
subsequently  a  change  in  them  directed  the  head  of  column  to 
Ox  Ford,  where  a  brigade  under  General  Mott  represented 
the  right  flank  of  the  2d  corps.  Ox  Ford  is  a  mile  from  the 
Chesterfield  Bridge,  in  a  direct  line.  General  Willcox,  with 


308  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

his  division,  relieved  the  brigade  which  had  been  observing 
the  ford. 

This  night  the  army  was  disposed  in  'the  following  order : 
The  5th  corps  on  the  right,  south  of  the  North  Anna  River ; 
the  2d  on  the  left,  on  the  north  bank,  with  the  6th  and  9th 
lying  between  the  two,  about  a  mile  from  the  river.  Army 
headquarters  was  in  rear  of  the  9th  corps.  General  Grant  in 
his  dispatch  of  this  date  said  of  the  attack  on  Warren's  front, 
"  I  have  never  heard  more  rapid  or  massive  firing  either  of 
artillery  or  musketry."  He  also  gives  the  number  of  prisoners 
captured  as  "  not  far  short  of  1000."  Warren's  loss  he  puts 
at  not  over  "  300*killed  and  wounded."  This  affair  is  said  to 
have  been  the  occasion  of  a  letter  of  thanks  from  General 
Meade  to  the  5th  corps. 

The  operations  of  the  24th  developed  the  new  line  of  the 
Confederates  and  caused  General  Grant  to  write  afterwards, 
"  The  enemy's  position  is  stronger  than  either  of  his  previous 
ones."  General  Hancock  lined  the  river-bank  along  his  front 
with  batteries,  and  the  dueling  was  even  hotter  than  the  day 
before.  The  sharpshooters  kept  the  opposite  bank  clear,  and 
pontoons  were  laid  on  General  Gibbon's  front  over  which  he 
commenced  to  pass  by  eight  o'clock,  and  an  hour  later  General 
Birney's  command  was  crossing  on  the  Chesterfield  Bridge. 
Tyler's  division  was  left  on  the  north  side.  Barlow's  crossed 
after  Gibbon  and  formed  on  Birney's  left.  General  Potter's 
division  was  sent  from  the  9th  corps  during  the  day,  and  was 
placed  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  2d,  under  expectation 
probably  that  it  would  connect  with  General  Willcox,  who  was 
ordered  to  cross  at  Ox  Ford.  But  though  the  left  of  the  2d 
corps  swung  out  until  it  was  three  quarters  of  a  mile  from  the 
river,  the  right,  although  it  extended  up  the  river  nearly  half 
a  mile,  above  the  bridge  was  compelled  to  hug  the  bank.  All 
along  the  front  our  line  was  carried  quite  close  up  to  the 
enemy's  works,  and  the  firing  during  the  day  was  incessant. 
Towards  evening  a  heavy  attack  was  made  on  the  front  of 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      309 

General  Gibbon,  which  fell  principally  upon  the  brigade  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Smythe.  On  the  right  the  6th  corps 
crossed  early  in  the  morning,  and  forming  on  the  right  of 
the  5th,  advanced  and  extended  the  line  until  it  ran  from  the 
river  at  a  point  a  mile  above  Ox  Ford  to  and  across  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  Railroad,  in  a  southwest  direction,  nearly  to  the 
Little  River,  before  reaching  which  it  was  sharply  refused,  in 
a  line  parallel  to  the  railroad.  In  his  advance  General  Warren 
was  obliged  to  cling  to  the  river-bank  as  General  Hancock 
had  done,  and  most  of  his  fighting  during  the  day  was  on  this 
left  flank,  while  on  the  right  the  men  destroyed  the  railroad 
for  amusement.  A  regiment  from  General  Crawford's  divi 
sion,  the  1st  Pennsylvania  reserves,  sent  down  the  bank  of 
the  river  in  advance  of  the  main  line,  to  communicate,  if 
possible,  with  the  9th  corps,  was  completely  cut  off  and 
hemmed  in  at  Quarles  Ford ;  and  when  the  whole  division, 
hearing  the  firing,  advanced  to  the  relief,  it  was  cut  off  from 
the  corps.  Communication,  however,  was  opened  across  the 
river  with  General  Crittenden's  division  that  had  been  ordered 
to  that  place  to  cross  and  move  down  in  order  to  uncover  Ox 
Ford,  and  it  came  over  and  made  a  gallant  attack,  passing 
through  the  division  of  General  Crawford,  who  was  thus 
enabled  to  form  connection  with  his  own  corps,  already  ad 
vancing  towards  him.  It  was  found  impossible  to  uncover 
the  Ox  Ford,  however,  and  General  Crittenden  was  ordered 
to  report  to  General  Warren,  who  placed  him  on  the  left  of 
the  line,  thus  leaving  General  Burnside  with  one  division 
(Willcox)  under  his  command  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 
The  most  that  division  had  been  able  to  accomplish  during 
the  clay  was  to  occupy  a  small  island  in  the  river  on  his  front. 

There  was  a  tremendous  thunder-shower  in  the  afternoon, 
followed  by  another  on  the  next  day  (25th),  and  a  heavy  rain 
in  the  forenoon  of  the  26th,  the  first  we  had  had  since  the 
13th. 

The  enemy's  line  as  developed  by  these  operations  was  found 


310  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

to  rest  on  the  river  at  Ox  Ford,  with  the  left  thrown  back 
at  a  right  angle  to  it  and  extending  to  Little  River,  while  the 
right  ran  in  a  nearly  southeast  direction  across  the  Freder- 
icksburg  and  Richmond  Railroad  and  around  Hanover  Junc 
tion,  and  was  protected  there  by  almost  impassable  marshes  or 
swamp.  It  was  at  once  evident  that  our  army  was  hopelessly 
cut  in  twain,  and  a  forward  movement  in  that  direction  came 
to  an  end. 

After  abandoning  the  base  at  Fredericksburg,  a  new  one 
was  opened  at  Port  Royal,  and  within  a  day  or  two  after  this 
changed  to  the  White  house. 

On  this  day  the  order  was  issued  that  incorporated  the 
9th  corps  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  reason  why  this 
had  not  been  done  earlier  was  because  General  Burnside 
ranked  General  Meade,  as  in  fact  did  also  General  Parke, 
the  chief  of  the  9th  corps  staff,  but  it  had  been  found  im 
practicable  to  have  a  corps,  that  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
was  one  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  not  subject  to  the 
commander  of  that  army.  General  Burnside,  with  that  gen 
erosity  which  is  so  marked  a  characteristic,  waived  the  question 
of  rank  (as  did  also  General  Parke)  and  continued  in  the 
command. 

Colonel  Venable  writes,  "  In  the  midst  of  these  operations 
on  the  North  Anna,  General  Lee  was  taken  sick  and  confined 
to  his  tent.  As  he  lay  prostrated  by  sickness,  he  would  often 
repeat,  '  We  must  strike  them  a  blow ;  we  must  never  let 
them  pass  us  again  —  we  must  strike  them  a  blow.'  But 
though  he  still  had  reports  of  the  operations  on  the  field 
constantly  brought  to  him  and  gave  orders  to  his  officers, 
Lee  confined  to  his  tent  was  not  Lee  on  the  battle-field. 
I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  the  opinion  that,  had  not 
General  Lee  been  physically  disabled,  he  would  have  inflicted 
a  heavy  blow  on  the  enemy  on  his  inarch  from  the  Pamunkey 
to  the  Chickahominy."  1 

1  So.  Hist.  Srfc.  xiv,  535. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      311 

Knowing  to-day  how  perilous  a  position  our  army  occupied 
and  that  this  was  the  best  opportunity  that  ever  presented 
itself  to  General  Lee  to  attack  with  the  hope  of  doing  us 
serious  damage,  the  foregoing  sounds  much  like  an  apology 
for  his  failure  to  seize  what  chance  had  arranged  for  him. 
It  to  my  mind  is  far  more  satisfactory  to  think  that,  while 
knowing  the  opportunity,  he  knew  also  that,  with  all  the 
odds  in  his  favor,  he  could  not  risk  there,  within  fifteen  miles 
of  Richmond,  even  one  chance  in  a  thousand  of  being  defeated. 
To  act  on  the  defensive  was  his  only  hope. 

On  the  25th  and  26th  we  rested,  "  so  to  speak."  Not  but 
that  there  was  skirmishing,  artillery  practice,  intrenching,  and 
the  destruction  of  railroads,  even  as  far  in  our  rear  as  to 
Milf ord  Station.  Yet  to  many  it  seemed  like  rest.  Certainly  it 
did  to  me,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to  quote  fyom  the  longest 
letter  written  during  the  month.  "  I  am  sitting  on  my  blankets, 
with  the  river  before  me,  the  redoubt  we  took  and  works  we 
threw  up  on  the  other  side  in  plain  sight.  Behind  us  is  the 
enemy,  and  to  my  left  the  redoubt  he  built  to  protect  the 
bridge  from  this  side.  Away  to  my  left  are  the  remains  of  the 
railroad.  I  am  shaded  by  an  immense  tulip- tree  in  full  bloom, 
and  need  go  but  half  a  dozen  yards  to  pick  magnolias.  A 
band  is  playing  near  by,  while  not  much  farther  away  a  bat 
tery  is  practicing  on  something  that  has  just  attracted  atten 
tion,  and  out  at  the  front  —  which  is  nearer  a  quarter  than 
half  a  mile  off  —  there  is  a  continual  popping  of  muskets. 
You  cannot  imagine  that  we  have  pleasure  and  danger,  com 
fort  and  hardships  so  near  together,  or  so  strangely  mixed. 
The  weather  is  warm,  but  we  find  plenty  of  ice,  and  occasion 
ally  console  ourselves  with  milk-punches  and  mint-juleps." 

The  night  of  the  26th  saw  us  once  more  on  the  march. 
About  nine  o'clock  the  2d  corps  began  to  withdraw  across  the 
river,  halting  after  putting  perhaps  a  mile  twixt  it  and  us, 
leaving  a  party  to  destroy  the  bridge.  The  other  corps  exe 
cuted  the  same  movement  at  the  same  time.  The  6th,  which 


312  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

was  the  first  to  withdraw  on  the  right,  continued  its  march 
to  the  north  until  Chesterfield  Station  was  struck,  thence  to 
the  right  down  the  river.  General  Russell's  division  was 
in  the  advance,  following  close  upon  the  heels  of  the  cavalry, 
and  by  ten  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  27th  had  reached  the  Pa- 
munkey  at  Hundley's  Ford  (or  Nelson's,  as  it  is  better  known, 
although  the  first  is  the  name  given  it  by  General  Meade  in 
his  report),  and  secured  a  crossing.  The  5th  corps  followed  the 
same  path  and  halted  at  Mangohick  Church.  The  9th  halted, 
keeping  company  with  the  2d,  while  General  Crittenden  with 
a  brigade  at  Jacob's,  Quarles,  and  Ox  fords  remained  until 
all  the  troops  were  withdrawn  and  the  bridges  taken  up.  It 
was  morning  before  the  2d  corps  moved,  and  midnight  when 
it  halted  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Pamunkey  on  the  left  of  the 
5th  corps.  The  9th  followed  during  the  afternoon,  coming  up 
in  rear  of  the  5th,  and  the  two  continued  down  the  Pamunkey 
to  Hanover  Town,  where  both  crossed  on  the  28th,  excepting, 
however,  the  division  of  General  Willcox  left  at  the  fords, 
which  did  not  come  up  until  past  midnight  of  the  29th.  The 
2d  followed  the  6th  across  the  Hundley  Ford  (or  Nelson's) 
and  formed  on  its  left ;  the  9th  came  up  on  the  left  of  the  2d 
and  then  joined  its  left  to  the  5th.  The  left  of  our  line  was 
opposite  Hawes's  Shop  (or  Salem  Church). 

It  has  been  stated  (the  authority  is  unknown)  that  the 
original  plan  of  this  movement  contemplated  the  passage  of 
the  Pamunkey  by  the  6th  and  2d  corps  at  Hanover,  and  the 
5th  and  9th  at  Newcastle,  which  is  about  a  mile  below  in  a 
straight  line,  but  which  would  have  necessitated  a  march  of 
several  miles  more.  If  this  is  true,  the  mistake  that  it  is 
alleged  was  made  in  the  order  to  General  "Baldy"  Smith,  who 
joined  us  from  the  Army  of  the  James,  directing  his  march 
upon  the  road  to  Newcastle,  instead  of  New  Cold  Harbor, 
may  not  have  been  a  mistake  after  all. 

On  the  29th  reconnoissances  in  force  were  pushed  out  from 
each  of  the  corps  save  the  9th.  On  the  right  General  Russell 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      313 

moved  to  Hanover  Court  House,  and  his  4th  brigade  was 
advanced  to  Peake's  Turnout  on  the  Virginia  Central  Rail 
road,  which  with  the  buildings  was  destroyed  and  a  large 
amount  of  corn  brought  away.  He  rejoined  the  command  at 
Phillips's  Mill  on  the  night  of  the  31st.  General  Barlow 
moved  in  a  westerly  direction  towards  a  road  running  from 
Hanover  Court  House  to  Cold  Harbor,  found  the  enemy 
near  Gentry's,  and  drove  them  to  their  works  on  Swift  Creek, 
a  branch  of  the  Totopotomoy.  Word  being  sent  to  General 
Hancock  that  the  enemy  was  in  force,  he  moved  his  other 
divisions  to  the  vicinity  and  placed  that  of  General  Gibbon 
on  the  right  and  Birney  on  the  left  of  General  Barlow.  Gen 
eral  Griffin  from  the  5th  corps  marched  southward  toward 
Bethesda  Church.  By  night  the  entire  line  had  advanced, 
the  6th  closing  in  on  the  right  of  the  2d  and  the  5th  on  the 
left,  the  9th  being  in  rear.  Headquarters  were  at  Hawes's 
Shop.  To-day  General  Tyler's  division  (the  4th  of  the  2d 
corps)  was  discontinued,  and  the  1st  Massachusetts  and  1st 
Maine  regiments  of  heavy  artillery  were  assigned  to  the  3d 
division,  and  Kitching's  brigade  to  the  5th  corps  (General 
Crawford's  division).  The  fight  of  the  19th  at  the  Harris 
house  had  endeared  the  men  of  these  two  regiments  to  the 
men  who  wore  the  diamond  "  patch,"  and  they  received  them 
into  full  fellowship,  counting  them  by  the  time  they  arrived 
before  Petersburg  as  3d  corps  men  ("  as  we  understand  it  "), 
in  proof  of  which  their  officers  were  admitted  to  membership 
in  "  The  Third  Army  Corps  Union,"  a  mutual  relief  society 
that  had  been  formed  the  previous  autumn  at  Brandy  Sta 
tion. 

On  the  30th,  General  Warren,  who  already  had  a  part  of 
his  command  across,  moved  over  the  Totopotomoy,  and  the 
9th  corps  was  ordered  up  to  fill  the  gap.  There  was  the  same 
desultory  fighting,  so  hard  to  characterize,  in  which  artillery 
participated.  My  notes  merely  mention  being  "  out  nearly  all 
day  on  the  right  with  a  reconnoissance  that  determined  our 


314  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

new  line."  Late  in  the  afternoon  an  attack  was  made  on  the 
5th  corps  that  threatened  to  envelop  its  flank  and  resulted  in 
severe  fighting,  chiefly  borne  by  the  division  of  General 
Crawford,  which  had  attempted  to  gain  possession  of  the 
Mechaiiicsville  Road.  The  advance  brigade  under  Colonel 
Hardin  was  driven  back  upon  the  rest  of  the  division,  which 
secured  a  good  position  and  was  reinforced  by  the  brigade  of 
Colonel  Kitching  and  artillery.  The  enemy  attacked  three 
times,  according  to  most  statements,  and  upon  being  repulsed 
the  last  time  the  brigade  of  Pennsylvania  reserves  advanced 
and  captured  seventy  prisoners.  One  colonel,  five  line  officers, 
and  300  killed  and  wounded  were  left  on  the  field  by  the 
enemy.  This  engagement  is  noteworthy  as  the  last  fight  in 
which  the  Reserves  participated.  On  the  next  day  their  term 
of  service  expired.  Two  thousand  men  of  the  ten  who  two 
years  before  fought  at  Mechanicsville,  scarce  five  miles  away, 
ended  their  service  writh  the  same  heroism  that  had  been 
accorded  them  since  the  beginning  of  their  career. 

The  enemy  making  this  attack  was  of  Swell's  corps,  and 
it  is  mentioned  in  the  narrative  of  Early  as  follows : 1  "  On 
the  afternoon  of  the  30th  I  moved  to  the  right  across  Beaver 
Dam  to  the  road  from  Old  Church  to  Mechanicsville,  thence 
along  that  road  towards  Old  Church  until  we  reached  Be- 
thesda  Church.  At  this  point  the  enemy  was  encountered  and 
his  troops  which  occupied  the  road  were  driven  by  Rodes's 
division  towards  the  road  from  Hundley's  Corner,  which 
unites  with  the  road  from  Mechanicsville  east  of  Bethesda 
Church.  Pegram's  brigade,  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Edward  Willis  of  the  12th  Georgia  regiment,  was  sent  for 
ward  with  one  of  Rodes's  brigades  on  its  right  to  feel  the 
enemy  and  ascertain  its  strength  ;  but  meeting  with  a  heavy 
force  behind  breastworks,  it  was  compelled  to  retire  with  the 
loss  of  some  valuable  officers  and  men,  and  among  them  were 
Colonel  Willis,  12th  Georgia,  mortally  wounded;  Colonel 
1  Last  Year  of  the  War,  by  Lieutenant-General  Jubal  A.  Early,  1867,  p.  30. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      315 

Terrell,  13th  Virginia,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Watkins,  52d 
Virginia,  killed." 

While  this  fighting  was  in  progress  General  Hancock  was 
directed  to  attack,  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  5th  corps, 
and  a  brigade  from  General  Barlow's  division  was  sent  out 
which  drove  the  enemy's  skirmish  line  back  to  his  works. 

At  night  our  line  had  so  closed  towards  the  left  that  the 
2d  corps,  the  right  centre,  was  partly  across  the  Totopotomoy, 
while  the  9th  and  5th  were  both  over,  extending  to  Bethesda 
Church. 

On  the  31st,  the  same  general  operations  were  repeated. 
In  the  2d  corps  front  General  Birney  crossed  Swift  Run  and 
drove  the  enemy  out  of  his  first  line,  remained  there  during 
the  day,  and  withdrew  at  midnight.  This  was  the  most  im 
portant  movement  on  the  line  during  the  day,  which  was 
a  very  hot  one  and  memorable  to  many  because  of  the  absence 
of  eatables,  which  extended  to  division  headquarters.  An 
officer  told  me  his  men  had  been  on  roast  corn  diet  for  over 
twenty-four  hours,  and  he  knew  what  it  was  to  suffer  the 
pangs  of  hunger  for  the  first  time  in  his  life. 

Cohorn  mortars  were  used  here  for  the  first  time.  During 
the  night  of  May  31  and  June  1,  the  6th  corps  was  with 
drawn  from  the  right  and  moved  to  Cold  Harbor,  and  at 
midnight  of  June  1  the  2d  followed.  It  was  a  hot  and  dusty 
night.  An  officer  sent  by  General  Meade  to  guide  the  col 
umn,  in  his  eagerness  to  have  us  comply  with  the  order  which 
enjoined  "  every  exertion  to  reach  Cold  Harbor  as  soon  as  pos 
sible,"  tried  to  take  us  a  short  cut  through  a  woods  road,  the 
result  of  which  was  that  the  artillery  came  to  a  standstill, 
the  column  was  broken  up,  and  it  took  the  entire  night,  or 
what  remained  of  it,  to  remedy  the  evil,  which  prevented  our 
arriving  at  Cold  Harbor  before  noon  of  June  2. 

We  went  into  position  on  the  left,  and  thus  completed  the 
formation  in  which  substantially  the  battles  of  Cold  Harbor 
were  fought,  as  follows :  2d  corps  on  the  left,  next  the  6th, 


316  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

then  the  divisions  of  General  Smith  from  the  Army  of  the 
James,  then  the  5th  and  the  9th.  Army  headquarters  moved 
to  Cold  Harbor. 

It  is  not  in  my  power  to  offer  any  criticism  on  these  move 
ments.  Whatever  I  might  say  would  be  but  the  opinions  of 
others,  just  as  their  statements  of  facts  have  been  used  to 
make  up  my  own  account  of  them.  But  I  do  not  feel  any 
hesitation  in  putting  upon  record  my  opinion  of  the  morale 
of  the  army.  This  opinion  is  one  that  to  my  knowledge  has 
never  been  contradicted  except  by  inference,  and  it  is  that 
never  were  the  men  more  hopeful  or  in  better  spirits,  more 
willing  for  marching,  more  ready  to  fight,  than  at  this  time. 
Swinton,  after  narrating  the  battles  around  Spottsylvania, 
says :  "  The  exhausted  army  began  to  lose  its  spirit."  But 
to  Swinton's  opinion,  expressed  as  this  is,  no  weight  can  be 
attached ;  and  if  one  is  inclined  to  accept  it,  I  might  quote 
the  words  of  Coppe'e,1  who  of  a  little  later  date  says  :  "  The 
troops  were  in  capital  spirits,  most  anxious  to  be  led  against 
the  enemy."  Of  course  my  opinions,  formed  at  the  time,  are 
from  contact  with  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  army,  and  yet 
that  does  not  to  me  invalidate  them.  If  you  should  be  inclined 
to  differ  from  me  here,  let  me  remind  you  that  the  fraction 
to  which  it  was  my  fortune  to  be  connected  is  that  part 
which  has  been  accused  of  bad  behavior  on  more  than  one 
occasion,  —  the  only  part  of  that  army  whose  record  stands 
impeached  in  the  writings  of  this  Society,  —  and  for  them 
I  claim,  what  I  concede  to  every  other  brigade  of  every  other 
corps,  that  they  fought  readily,  and  marched  willingly  upon 
every  occasion.  If  non-success  in  attack  had  a  tendency  to 
dampen  their  ardor,  the  continual  movements  by  the  flank  were 
an  antidote  for  it,  having  none  of  the  dispiriting  effects  that 
a  retreat  would  have  had.  There  was  an  idea  that  we  were 
still  advancing,  that  there  was  a  plan  that  would  be  carried 

1  Grant  and  his  Campaigns,  by  Henry  Coppe'e,  1866,  p.  335. 


ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  MAY  13-JUNE  2  1864      317 

out  successfully.  If  there  was  less  alacrity  in  rushing  upon 
intrenchments,  it  was  because  the  men  saw  at  once  what  were 
their  chances  of  success  and  went  only  so  far  as  they  saw 
them  in  their  favor.  By  the  time  we  reached  Cold  Harbor  we 
began  to  be  wary  of  them,  finding  them  across  every  road 
we  took,  and  were  in  the  condition  which  General  Hancock 
described  when  he  said :  "  They  went  as  far  as  the  example 
of  their  officers  would  carry  them."  When  we  reached  the 
North  Anna  I  think  the  general  feeling  was  that  we  should 
roll  on,  like  a  wave,  up  to  the  very  gates  of  Richmond.  With 
that  feeling  all  the  fighting  was  done  which  pushed  the  enemy 
into  his  breastworks.  When  we  saw  them  before  us  we  halted, 
and  I  very  much  doubt  if  an  assault  ordered  upon  them 
would  have  been  anything  more  than  a  demonstration.  If 
charges  of  misconduct  are  brought  against  the  army  as  a 
whole,  or  any  part  of  it,  it  is  but  fair  to  consider  all  extenu 
ating  circumstances,  and  these  were  many. 

While  not  allowing  they  are  needed,  let  me  mention  one  or 
two.  One  element  that  tended  to  a  certain  degree  of  laxity 
in  discipline  and  a  disinclination  to  exposure  to  danger  was 
the  presence  of  men  whose  term  of  service  was  to  expire  in 
a  few  days  or  weeks.  In  May  already  some  began  to  be  with 
drawn  from  the  oldest  regiments  and  mustered  out,  and  the 
numbers  increased  every  week.  To  say  that  these  men,  with 
their  homes  almost  in  sight,  were  less  ready  to  face  danger 
than  usual  is  to  impugn  no  man's  courage. 

Another  element  was  the  loss  of  trusted  because  well- 
known  leaders.  Brigades  commanded  by  colonels,  regiments 
by  captains,  companies  by  sergeants,  were  not  uncommon 
all  through  the  army.  Here  are  the  casualties  on  the  5th 
and  6th  of  May  in  one  brigade :  the  commander  killed,  four 
colonels  severely  wounded,  two  lieutenant-colonels  wounded 
(one  mortally),  one  major  taken  prisoner.  These  were  all 
in  command  of  regiments.  You  will  remember  many  of 
these  small  regiments,  if  they  had  two  field  officers,  had  all 


318  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

they  were  allowed,  hence  captains  in  command  were  common. 
There  were  cases  in  which  an  officer  was  detailed  from 
one  of  the  more  fortunate  regiments  to  the  command  that 
had  thus  devolved  upon  a  captain,  but  we  question  if  it 
improved  its  condition  much. 

My  position  of  mustering  officer  brought  me  into  more 
contact  with  the  line  officers  than  if  I  had  performed  other 
duty.  They  came  to  me  at  all  hours  of  the  day  and  night  to 
be  mustered,  and  my  testimony  must  stand  in  favor  of  their 
universally  cheerful  and  hopeful  dispositions. 

It  was  easy  for  a  newspaper  correspondent  to  say  that  such 
and  such  troops  behaved  badly,  or  to  say  that  the  army  was 
dispirited,  to  account  for  a  failure  or  to  turn  a  sentence ;  but 
let  us,  who  are  trying  to  write  the  whole  truth  and  nothing 
but  the  truth,  not  repeat  any  such  statements  without  weigh 
ing  all  the  facts  and  summing  up  all  the  excuses  that  may  be 
urged  in  their  favor.  Even  if  we  cannot  find  them,  let  us 
turn  to  the  record  of  their  services  before  and  after  the  time, 
and  judge  by  them  what  their  conduct  on  any  occasion  was 
likely  to  have  been. 


XIII 
THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

BY 

CAPTAIN   CHARLES   H.  PORTER 
39TH  MASSACHUSETTS  INFANTRY,  U.  S.  V. 


Read  before  the  Society  December  12, 1881 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

LET  us  consider  for  a  few  moments  the  movements  which 
resulted  in  this  battle,  the  last  one  fought  north  of  the  James 
in  that  tremendous  campaign  of  1864. 

The  operations  at  the  North  Anna,  brilliant  as  was  the 
work  of  Warren  at  Jericho  Ford  and  of  Hancock  at  Chester 
field  Bridge,  only  served,  when  pushed,  to  develop  a  magni 
ficent  position  held  by  General  Lee's  army,  directly  across  the 
advance  of  General  Grant.  Lee's  lines  were  well  manned. 
They  occupied  a  fine  defensive  position,  and  for  field  works 
were  exceedingly  well  constructed.  Certainly,  those  in  front 
of  the  5th  corps  were  as  good  as  troops  could  wish. 

There  was  but  one  course  to  pursue,  and  that  was  to  turn 
them  by  a  flanking  march,  either  by  the  right  or  left.  The 
march  by  the  left  was  made. 

On  the  22d  of  May  General  Grant,  having  determined  that 
General  Butler  had  too  many  "men  at  Bermuda  Hundred  to 
be  used  to  any  advantage  behind  the  lines  he  had  so  carefully 
constructed,  ordered  him  to  dispatch  reinforcements  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  by  way  of  White  House  on  the  Pamun- 
key  River.  In  accordance  with  these  instructions,  detachments 
from  the  two  corps  of  Butler's  army  (the  10th  and  18th) 
were  organized  under  the  command  of  General  W.  F.  Smith, 
put  on  transports,  and  sent  to  White  House  Landing.  They 
arrived  on  the  30th  of  May.  There  were  in  all  about  16,000 
men  in  this  movement,  and  they  were  organized  in  four  divi 
sions.  One  division  was  left  at  the  landing  to  hold  the  place, 
and  the  three  remaining  divisions,  under  the  command  of 
Generals  Devens,  Martindale,  and  Brooks,  advanced  to  Old 
Cold  Harbor,  and  reported  to  General  Meade.  These  troops 
are  known  in  the  reports  as  the  18th  corps. 


322  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

The  9th  corps,  which  had  been  under  the  direct  command 
of  General  Grant,  was  on  the  24th  of  May  joined  to  the 
command  of  General  Meade,  and  for  the  first  time  the  move 
ments  about  to  be  made  were  executed  under  orders  from  one 
headquarters.  The  delay  in  assigning  the  9th  corps  to  Meade 
is  generally  supposed  to  have  been  caused  by  the  desire  of 
Grant  not  to  have  Burnside  serve  under  his  junior  in  rank, 
Meade. 

The  successes  at  the  North  Anna  River,  though  small  in 
themselves  as  affecting  the  campaign,  had  nevertheless  given 
the  troops  a  great  deal  of  confidence.  The  repulse,  without 
much  loss,  by  Griffin  and  Cutler  of  the  determined  assaults 
of  Heth  and  Wilcox,  served  to  give  the  new  troops  which  had 
joined  the  5th  corps  much  vigor,  and  the  gallant  assault  at 
Chesterfield  Bridge  was  of  like  valuable  service  to  the  2d 
corps,  and  when  the  army  took  up  its  march  on  the  25th  and 
26th  of  May  it  was  in  excellent  condition  and  temper.  At  no 
time  did  the  troops  make  better  marches  than  these  to  be  now 
related,  and  the  morale  was  higher  than  at  any  time  after 
May  10  and  12  at  Spottsylvania.  Grant  made  a  feint  to  the 
right  with  Wilson's  cavalry  on  May  25,  under  cover  of 
which  the  6th  corps,  which  occupied  the  extreme  right  of  our 
lines,  was  withdrawn,  and  massed  on  the  northerly  bank  of 
the  river.  Lee,  who  was  on  the  alert,  reported  to  the  author 
ities  at  Richmond  that  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  movement 
by  his  (Lee's)  left. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  of  May,  General  Sheridan, 
with  the  divisions  of  Torbert  and  Gregg,  was  ordered  to 
advance  on  Hanover  Town,  on  the  southwesterly  side  of  the 
Pamunkey  River.  Torbert  was  first  to  touch  the  Pamunkey 
at  Taylor's  Ford,  and  make  a  demonstration  of  crossing  there. 
Gregg,  with  his  division,  was  to  occupy  Littlepage's  Ford,  and 
demonstrate  in  the  same  way.  At  nightfall  both  were  to  retire 
with  the  larger  portion  of  their  troops,  but  leaving  a  small 
force  from  each  division  to  continue  the  demonstrations,  while 


THE   BATTLE    OF   COLD  HARBOR  323 

the  main  army  was  to  reach  the  Pamunkey  opposite  Hanover 
Town,  and  at  this  point  make  the  real  crossing.  Russell's 
division  of  the  6th  corps  was  the  infantry  support  to  this 
mano3uvre  of  the  cavalry. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  the  leading  brigade  of  Tor- 
bert's  division  crossed  the  Pamunkey  at  Hanover  Town  and 
quickly  drove  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  the  town,  driving  it 
in  a  northwesterly  direction  to  Crump's  Creek,  where  Gregg, 
who  had  now  come  up,  formed  in  line  with  Torbert.  Russell's 
division  followed  quickly,  and  was  soon  on  the  southerly  bank 
of  the  river.  The  remaining  divisions  of  the  6th  corps  were 
moved  on  a  road  following  the  Pamunkey.  The  2d  corps 
marched  directly  in  rear  of  the  6th.  A  greater  detour  was 
made  by  the  5th  corps,  its  march  being  by  the  Mangohick 
Church  and  McDowell's  Mills  road.  The  9th  corps  followed 
the  5th.  Wilson,  with  his  cavalry  division,  covered  the  rear, 
and  also  the  trains  which  were  soon  on  the  road  to  the  new 
base  of  supplies  to  be  established  at  White  House,  the  depot 
at  Port  Royal  having  been  given  up. 

On  the  28th  the  entire  army  was  across,  or  well  up  to,  the 
river.  The  other  two  divisions  of  the  6th  corps,  as  also 
the  2d  corps,  crossed  the  Pamunkey  at  a  point  between  where 
Crump's  Creek  empties  into  it  and  Hanover  Town.1  The  5th 
corps  crossed  at  Hanover  Town ;  the  9th,  however,  remained 
on  the  northerly  bank.  A  line  of  battle  was  formed  about 
a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  river,  the  6th  corps  being  on  the 
right,  the  2d  in  the  centre,  and  the  5th  on  the  left ;  the  9th 
being,  as  it  were,  in  reserve,  in  the  position  above  stated.  The 
line  was  about  three  miles  long,  and  extended  from  the  Jones 
farm  on  the  right  to^the  Dunn  house  on  the  left,  which  was 
within  about  half  a  mile  of  Hawes's  Store.  Sheridan's  cavalry 
was  thrown  out  on  the  left  flank  nearly  to  Hawes's  Store. 

General  Lee  had  been  prompt  to  discover  this  turning 
movement.  He  withdrew  his  army  to  Ashland  Station  on  the 

1  Hundley  Ferry. 


324  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  Railroad,  where  he  had  it 
well  in  hand  to  meet  any  advance  that  might  be  made,  ready 
also  to  strike  a  serious  blow,  should  any  mistake  be  made  in  the 
tactical  movements  that  Meade  seemed  likely  to  undertake. 

The  country  about  the  Pamunkey  River  is  fairly  open, 
though  in  some  places  the  pine-trees  and  shrub  undergrowth 
make  it  impossible  to  handle  troops  with  success.  From 
Hawes's  Store  three  good  roads  run  directly  to  Richmond,  — 
one  via  Meadow  Bridge,  at  which  point  it  crosses  the  Chicka- 
hominyjustto  the  west  of  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  cross 
ing  ;  another  via  Cold  Harbor,  crossing  the  Chickahominy  at 
New  Bridge ;  while  the  middle  road,  which  crosses  the  Chick 
ahominy  at  Mechanicsville,  is  known  as  the  Mechanicsville 
Turnpike,  or  the  Old  Church  Road.  It  was  of  great  import 
ance  that  the  position  at  Hawes's  Store  should  be  in  our  pos 
session.  With  this  in  our  lines,  a  country  road  which  intersects 
the  three  roads  before  mentioned,  which  start  from  the  store, 
would  give  us  the  power  of  advancing  by  either  of  them.  As 
is  well  known,  Sheridan  made  a  brilliant  fight  here,  and 
succeeded  in  driving  out  the  enemy  and  giving  us  possession 
of  this  important  point. 

General  Lee,  after  massing  his  army  at  Ashland,  retreated 
to  Atlee's  Station,  from  which  point  he  pushed  out  his  lines 
to  meet  any  advance  that  Grant  might  make,  correctly  divin 
ing  that  his  old  foe  was  massed  behind  the  Totopotomoy  Creek. 

On  the  29th  of  May  the  attempt  was  made  to  develop  the 
enemy.  The  6th  corps  was  pushed  quite  up  to  Hanover 
Court  House.  The  2d  and  5th  corps  advanced  almost  di 
rectly  to  the  front,  nearly  to  the  creek.  The  9th  corps  now 
moved  across  the  river  and  was  put  into  line  between  the  2d 
and  5th  corps.  The  skirmishing  was  very  lively  ;  no  engage 
ment  was  actually  brought  about,  but  the  enemy  was  devel 
oped  in  strength,  well  in  hand,  and  intrenched. 

May  30.  The  6th  corps  was  recalled  from  Hanover  Court 
House  and  placed  on  the  right  of  Hancock,  and  the  grand 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  325 

advance,  or  reconnoissance  in  force,  was  continued.  Four 
corps  in  line  of  battle,  with  contracted  fronts,  well  supported, 
advanced  on  the  enemy.  It  was  determined  to  extend  our 
lines  to  the  left,  and  Hancock  reached  the  creek.  Burnside 
was  on  his  left,  across  the  creek,  with  Wright  holding  the 
extreme  right  of  the  line.  Warren  was  on  the  extreme  left, 
moving  up  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road  and  the  Mechanics- 
ville  Turnpike.  With  the  usual  good  fortune  this  advance  was 
successful  in  every  particular  with  this  exception,  that  General 
Crawford's  division  (3d  in  the  5th  corps)  was  thrown  into 
considerable  confusion  by  a  rapid  attack  by  Rodes,  of  Early 's 
corps.  The  enemy,  successful  at  first,  was  happily  repulsed  by 
the  arrival  of  reinforcements,  which  restored  our  line,  and  the 
lost  connection  was  regained  without  great  disturbance. 

The  enemy  were  particularly  vigilant  and  active,  taking 
advantage  of  all  flanks  that  were  in  the  air.  Determined  not 
to  hazard  a  general  engagement,  Lee  was  sure  to  observe  all 
defective  formations,  and  to  take  prompt  action  in  every  case. 
However,  we  were  not  entirely  the  losers  by  these  manoeuvres 
of  the  enemy,  for  Meade,  upon  being  informed  that  Lee  was 
in  great  force  in  Warren's  front,  directed  a  general  assault. 
Hancock  received  the  order  in  season  and  made  a  bold  and 
rapid  advance  on  the  enemy's  lines,  capturing  their  rifle-pits 
and  causing  them  to  fall  back  in  some  confusion.  Our  line  at 
this  point  was  over  nine  miles  long,  extending  from  the  Tinsley 
farm  on  the  right  to  Bethesda  Church  on  the  left.  Thus 
slowly  but  surely  our  lines  were  being  extended  to  the  left. 
General  Lee  was  always  on  hand  and  met  these  thrusts  of 
Meade  with  great  skill,  and  parried  them  without  difficulty. 

General  Lee,  when  at  Ashland,  had  the  choice  of  resisting 
this  advance  either  in  the  rear  of  the  Chickahominy,  —  using 
that  river  with  its  swamps  for  his  outposts,  and  the  fine  high 
positions  to  the  rear  for  his  line,  —  or  of  fighting  in  front  of  it. 
He  did  not  hesitate.  Determined  to  defend  Richmond,  he  met 
the  enemy  at  once,  and  interposed  his  army  between  that  city 


326  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

and  our  forces  in  advance  of  the  river.  He  was  undoubtedly 
governed  to  a  great  extent  by  political  reasons,  but  also  by 
the  very  cogent  one  that  Grant  would  feel  very  much  elated 
indeed,  could  he  put  his  advance  within  five  miles  of  Rich 
mond,  and  that  the  Federal  troops  would  feel  the  greater 
inspiration  from  the  nearness  of  their  Mecca.  It  was  also 
quite  clear  that  the  position  north  of  the  Chickahorniny  com 
manded  more  roads,  and  that  its  possession  would  necessitate 
greater  detours,  if  a  turning  march  were  again  to  be  made. 
The  die  was  cast,  and  the  grand  battle  was  to  be  on  the  north 
bank.  It  is  quite  surprising  that  Lee,  having  determined  that 
he  would  fight  right  here,  did  not  at  once  possess  himself  of 
the  great  strategic  point  in  this  military  territory.  I  mean 
Old  Cold  Harbor.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  its  import 
ance.  To  Grant  it  was  of  great  moment  that  it  should  be  in 
his  possession,  as  it  covered  the  advance  of  Smith  from 
White  House.  With  Cold  Harbor  in  the  possession  of  Lee, 
our  base  was  greatly  in  danger,  and  the  trains  would  be  in 
danger  of  interruption.  The  crossing  of  the  James,  after 
wards  determined  upon,  would  have  to  be  made  much  fur 
ther  down  the  river  than  was  actually  done.  That  Lee  knew 
all  about  this  country  goes  without  saying.  It  would  be  the 
height  of  absurdity  to  accuse  him,  who  made  the  brilliant 
campaign  of  1862  against  McClellan,  of  ignorance  of  the 
great  strategic  value  of  Old  Cold  Harbor.  That  he  did  occupy 
it  is  true,  but  with  so  terribly  small  a  force  that  it  was 
quickly  brushed  away  when  Grant  wished  to  secure  it. 

We  left  General  W.  F.  Smith  at  White  House  Landing. 
General  Grant  was  informed  of  his  arrival,  and  at  once 
ordered  him  to  report  to  General  Meade.  He  was  to  march 
up  the  south  bank  of  the  Pamunkey,  and  was  especially 
cautioned  to  look  out  for  any  force  that  Lee  might  interpose 
to  prevent  his  making  the  connection  desired.  In  closing 
his  dispatch  to  him,  Grant  said  that  he  would  like  nothing 
better  than  to  have  Lee  send  a  body  of  troops  to  prevent 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR       327 

his  advance,  as  he  felt  that  Lee  was  so  closely  observed 
by  Meade  that  a  break  in  his  lines  could  be  made  should  the 
force  be  sent. 

On  the  30th  of  May  the  position  of  the  army  was  as  fol 
lows  :  Warren  on  the  left,  at  or  near  Bethesda  Church,  nearly 
three  miles  south  of  Totopotomoy  Creek,  then  Burnside,  Han 
cock,  Wright.  The  right  was  about_six  miles  from  Hanover 
Court  House.  Lee  was  in  position  with  his  right  thrown  for 
ward  to  the  vicinity  of  Cold  Harbor,  though  not  at  that  point ; 
Hill  on  the  right,  Ewell  in  the  centre,  Anderson  on  the  left. 
The  left  rested  in  advance  of  Atlee's  Station.  On  the  31st  of 
May  Sheridan  was  ordered  to  advance  with  two  divisions 
of  cavalry,  Torbert's  and  Gregg's,  and  to  occupy  Old  Cold 
Harbor.  At  once  pushing  on  his  force,  he  reached  the  place 
and  found  it  occupied  by  a  slight  force  of  cavalry  and  in 
fantry.  He  assaulted  at  once  and  with  success,  driving  out 
the  cavalry  force  under  Fitz  Lee,  and  occupying  the  lines. 
By  this  time  Lee  evidently  was  well  aware  of  the  necessity  of 
holding  this  position.  He  determined  to  reinforce  the  cav 
alry  with  infantry  and  drive  Sheridan  off.  For  this  purpose 
he  sent  Hoke's  division,  which  had  been  brought  up  from 
Petersburg,  as  a  reinforcement  to  assist  in  driving  Sheridan 
from  the  position.  The  attempt  was  made  by  Hoke,  but  with 
out  success.  Upon  information  being  given  to  General  Grant 
that  we  were  in  possession  of  Old  Cold  Harbor,  Sheridan  was 
ordered  by  him  to  hold  it  at  all  hazards,  and,  to  make  sure 
of  it,  Grant  ordered  General  Meade  to  detach  General  Wright 
with  the  6th  corps  from  the  right,  and  move  it  to  the  left, 
and  occupy  and  hold  Old  Cold  Harbor.  Sheridan  reported 
that  the  enemy  was  very  active  in  his  front,  and  that  in 
fantry  was  being  used,  and  that  he  felt  unable  to  hold  his 
line.  Word  was  dispatched  that  it  must  be  held  at  all  haz 
ards,  and  held  it  was. 

General  Lee  quickly  discovered  that  the  6th  corps  was 
withdrawn  from  our  extreme  right,  and  instantly  divining 


328  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  purpose  of  this,  immediately  ordered  Longstreet's  corps 
(in  command  of  Anderson)  over  to  his  extreme  right.  Of 
course  this  was  a  race.  The  dust  made  by  the  moving  col 
umns  and  the  skirmishers  on  duty  observing  the  same  gave 
ample  warning  to  General  Grant  that  Lee  was  now  bent  on 
regaining  Cold  Harbor.  Wright  was  hurried  up ;  and  just  as 
McLaws  had  formed  his  men  for  the  grand  assault  which 
was  to  give  Lee  possession  of  this  valuable  point,  the  heads 
of  Wright's  column  came  into  line,  relieving  the  cavalry,  and 
our  possession  was  secure.  It  had  been  hoped  that  General 
Wright  would  arrive  at  daybreak,  but  it  was  quite  9  A.  M. 
when  he  came  up  and  our  force  was  content  with  holding  in 
a  firm  grasp  so  important  a  prize  until  later  in  the  day,  when 
an  assault  was  made.  The  position  at  this  time  was  such  that 
Wright  was  not  in  close  connection  with  the  rest  of  the  army, 
but  was  quite  isolated,  and  to  reinforce  him  General  Smith 
was  ordered  to  move  to  Old  Cold  Harbor. 

A  singular  accident  prevented  Smith  from  being  in  posi 
tion  at  an  early  hour.  The  order  was  written  by  a  staff  offi 
cer  at  Grant's  headquarters,  and  directed  Smith  to  move  to 
Newcastle  on  the  Pamunkey.  In  order  to  execute  this  move 
ment  he  had  to  go  off  from  the  road  he  was  on,  and  march 
directly  away  from  the  field.  He  was  informed  that  the  5th 
and  6th  corps  would  be  at  the  point  designated.  To  his  sur 
prise  on  reaching  the  town  no  troops  were  near  there.  Smith 
discovered  the  mistake,  and  sent  for  instruptions ;  but  before 
his  messenger  returned,  a  staff  officer  from  Grant's  head 
quarters  arrived  and  informed  him  that  Old  Cold  Harbor 
was  the  point  intended  in  his  instructions.  The  staff  officer 
had  made  a  mistake.  The  line  of  march  was  resumed,  this 
time  to  the  proper  point.  The  day  was  quite  warm,  the  roads 
dusty,  and  the  troops,  being  somewhat  unused  to  marching, 
were  greatly  fatigued,  and  their  ranks  were  quite  thin.  One 
division  had  been  left  at  White  House ;  and  the  force,  now 
estimated  at  about  10,000  men,  did  not  reach  their  place 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  [329 

between  Wright  and  Warren  until  about  3  P.  M.,  after  a  march 
of  more  than  twenty-five  miles. 

General  Lee  had  extended  his  line  as  before  mentioned, 
and  Hoke  held  the  extreme  right,  Anderson  (Longstreet)  in 
close  connection  with  him. 

Having  determined  to  push  the  enemy  back  from  their 
front,  the  two  corps  (the  6th  and  the  18th)  were  formed  in 
line  of  battle  as  follows:  In  the  6th  corps  Ricketts  held 
the  right,  Russell  the  centre,  and  Neill  the  left ;  in  the  18th 
corps,  Martindale  held  the  right,  W.  H.  T.  Brooks  the  centre, 
and  Devens  the  left.  The  two  corps  extended  from  near  the 
Woody  house  on  the  right  to  Old  Cold  Harbor  on  the  left. 
The  troops  were  to  advance  over  an  open  field  from  three 
hundred  to  twelve  hundred  yards  in  width,  on  the  farther  side 
of  which  was  the  Confederate  line  in  thick  woods.  The  slope 
was  very  gentle  from  the  woods  down  to  our  line.  The  attack, 
which  was  made  about  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
1st  of  June,  was  very  spirited,  and  met  with  considerable 
success.  The  enemy  were  driven  from  the  slight  works  which 
had  been  erected  by  them,  and  the  separation  of  Hoke  and 
Anderson  gave  us  an  opportunity  which  was  quickly  improved, 
500  prisoners  being  captured  by  Wright.  Smith  met  with 
a  like  success,  capturing  the  works  and  250  prisoners,  and 
driving  the  enemy  through  the  woods  into  and  over  a  second 
clearing,  but  was  repulsed  when  he  tried  to  carry  their  sec 
ond  line,  and  was  obliged  to  fall  back  to  the  position  which 
he  had  just  captured.  He  now  tried  to  find  the  left  of  the 
5th  corps,  but  was  not  successful.  Wright  too  had  essayed 
to  carry  the  second  line  of  the  enemy,  but  without  success. 
As  our  lines  were  now  arranged,  Wright  was  on  the  extreme 
left,  then  Smith,  Warren  (there  was  quite  a  gap  between 
Smith  and  Warren),  Burn  side,  and  Hancock.  Sheridan  was 
on  the  extreme  left  with  two  divisions.  The  fighting  for  the 
possession  of  Cold  Harbor  was  severe  and  desperate,  but 
resulted  in  complete  success.  This  important  position,  so  vital 


330  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

to  us,  was  secure,  the  road  across  the  Peninsula  was  under  our 
control,  and  the  new  base  at  White  House  was  safely 
guarded. 

Lee,  in  order  to  distract  the  attention  of  Grant  from  his 
left,  savagely  pushed  out  Swell's  and  Hill's  corps  against  the 
5th,  9th,  and  2d  corps,  and  the  advance  was  quite  bold  and 
dashing,  but  very  unsuccessful.  The  enemy  were  easily  and 
quickly  repulsed.  The  most  aggressive  demonstration  was 
made  against  Griffin,  who  commanded  the  1st  division  of  the 
5th  corps,  who  was  on  the  Mechanicsville  Pike,  and  for  a  little 
time  it  promised  success ;  but  the  troops  resisted  with  great 
firmness  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  and  finally  drove 
them  back.  Our  losses  on  this  day  were  quite  2000  men, 
principally  in  the  6th  and  18th  corps.  As  severe  as  it  was,  it 
was  well  worth  the  cost.  Further  to  strengthen  and  extend 
the  left,  Hancock  was  ordered  on  the  night  of  June  1  to  move 
to  the  left  and  occupy  the  ground  between  the  6th  corps  and 
the  Chickahominy.  After  an  exhaustive  march  of  all  night, 
in  which  one  of  his  divisions  went  astray,  he  reached  Old 
Cold  Harbor  about  6.30  A.  M.,  having  made  the  twelve  miles 
in  about  ten  hours.  He  had  been  ordered  with  Wright  and 
Smith  to  attack  at  daybreak,  a  feat  that  was  wholly  impossi 
ble.  Any  one  familiar  with  the  thoroughly  demoralizing  effects 
of  a  night  march  is  quite  well  aware  of  the  absolute  neces 
sity  to  the  troops  of  rest  in  the  morning.  It  is  far  better  to 
feed  the  men,  allow  them  to  have  a  good  meal,  than  to  hurry 
them  into  an  engagement.  The  attack  was  wisely  abandoned 
until  the  afternoon.  Sheridan,  meanwhile,  extended  his  posi 
tion  towards  Bottom's  Bridge. 

The  attack  by  Hancock,  deferred  from  daylight,  was  or 
dered  at  4  p.  M.  But  Hancock  was  so  earnest  in  opposition  to 
it,  urging  the  weary  condition  of  the  men  as  an  argument 
against  its  success,  and  furthermore  that  he  was  barely  in 
position,  that  Meade  countermanded  the  order. 

On  the  afternoon  of  this  day,  June  2,  it  was  determined 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  331 

that  the  5th  corps  should  extend  its  line  to  the  left  and  con 
nect  with  the  18th.  At  the  same  time  Burnside  was  to  be 
withdrawn  from  the  right,  and  to  occupy  the  line  of  the 
Mechanicsville  Turnpike,  facing  north  and  east,  thus  refusing 
our  right  flank  along  the  road  somewhat  in  advance  of  the 
Bethesda  Church.  The  movement  was  well  begun  and  in 
course  of  successful  execution,  when  the  Confederates  rushed 
on  the  9th  corps  and  swept  away  the  extreme  right  flank  of 
the  5th.  Our  lines  were  so  close  that  no  movements  by  any 
body  of  troops  could  be  made  on  either  side  without  being 
quickly  discovered  ;  and  when  Burnside  withdrew  from  Hill's 
front,  that  active  soldier  at  once  advanced  in  force  to  hold 
him  or  make  him  fight.  The  result  was  quite  a  severe  battle 
in  which  the  9th  corps  was  rather  roughly  handled ;  and  so 
impetuous  was  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  that  at  one  time  it 
looked  as  though  they  would  be  able  to  sweep  right  into  our 
rear  and  cause  an  immense  amount  of  confusion  and  disorder. 
The  enemy  were  bravely  and  at  last  successfully  met.  Their 
advance  was  stayed,  and  Burnside  was  able  to  occupy  the  posi 
tion  to  which  he  had  been  ordered.  They  captured  consider 
able  of  the  telegraph  wire  and  killed  some  of  the  telegraph 
men. 

The  losses  in  the  5th  corps  were  due  to  the  fact  that  under 
the  pressure  from  the  enemy  the  division  of  the  9th  corps, 
which  was  to  have  pivoted  upon  the  right  flank  of  the 
5th,  was  in  the  confusion  driven  back,  and  therefore  the  flank 
was  entirely  in  the  air.  This  was  not  known  to  our  men,  and 
one  can  well  imagine  the  suddenness  and  alarm  with  which 
Ay  res' s  brigade  learned  from  a  staff  officer  that  the  troops 
must  be  rapidly  gathered  together,  faced  to  the  rear,  and 
marched  obliquely  to  the  right.  The  movement  was  hurried 
in  a  great  degree  by  the  sudden  appearance  of  the  enemy, 
and  the  confusion  incident  upon  such  appearance  did  not 
mend  matters  at  all.  Many  quite  forgot  the  direction  to  be 
taken,  and  marched  directly  into  the  enemy's  lines.  Quite  500 


332  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

prisoners  fell  into  their  hands.  The  extension  by  the  left  was 
stopped,  and  the  troops  (part  of  Cutler's  division)  which  were 
making  the  movement  were  hastily  pushed  in  to  relieve  the 
right  flank.  Order  was  soon  restored,  and  quiet  reigned  along 
our  lines. 

General  Grant  was  quite  provoked  over  the  results  of  this 
attack,  and  told  Meade  that,  while  he  was  not  generally  in 
favor  of  night  attacks,  the  enemy  had  put  himself  in  such 
a  position  as  to  render  one  quite  justifiable.  It  was,  how 
ever,  not  made. 

Wilson,  who  had  been  off  destroying  the  railways,  had  now 
returned,  and  was  put  on  the  right  of  Burnside.  Our  line 
as  now  made  up  was  as  follows :  Hancock  held  the  left, 
Barlow's  division  being  on  the  extreme  left  resting  on  what 
is  known  as  Elder  Swamp,  in  advance  of  the  Lisby  house ; 
Gibbon  was  next  in  line  to  the  right,  extending  from  near 
McGee's  house  to  near  Old  Cold  Harbor,  Birney  being  in 
reserve ;  then  came  Wright  extending  from  Old  Cold  Harbor 
to  the  front  of  the  Kelly  and  Stewart  houses;  Smith  came 
next,  extending  from  near  Stewart's  house  to  that  of  G.  Wil 
liams,  covering  the  Woody  house.  There  still  remained  quite 
a  gap  between  the  18th  and  5th  corps,  pickets  only  connect 
ing  the  troops.  However,  this  interval  was  over  a  most  deso 
late  piece  of  country,  woody,  rocky,  and  quite  hilly.  Warren 
was  on  the  right  of  Smith,  his  line  reaching  from  near  the 
front  of  J.  White's  house  to  the  Mechanicsville  Turnpike. 
Burnside  came  next,  occupying  a  refused  flank  along  the  turn 
pike,  in  advance  of  the  church  and  the  Curry  and  Armstrong 
houses.  Wilson  was  on  the  extreme  right,  Sheridan  with  two 
divisions  on  the  extreme  left  near  Bottom's  Bridge.  Our  line 
was  almost,  if  not  quite,  nine  miles  long. 

General  Lee  quickly  discovered  the  strengthening  of  our 
left,  and  made  the  following  disposition  of  his  forces :  Breck- 
inridge,  with  two  divisions  of  Hill,  was  on  the  right ;  Hoke 
and  Anderson  (Longstreet)  were  in  the  centre;  Early 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  333 

(Ewell)  with  Heth's  division  of  Hill's  corps  on  the  left. 
The  line  extended  from  the  Adams  house  past  Watt's  Hill 
in  advance  of  New  Cold  Harbor,  and  thence  to  Totopotomoy 
Creek.  Lee  was  well  and  strongly  intrenched  over  his  whole 
line.  The  men  had  ample  time  to  complete  the  intrench- 
ments,  and  while  there  was  not  any  attempt  at  abatis,  there 
were  some  slashings.  It  was  quite  evident  that  the  time  for 
the  final  struggle  had  come.  Grant  must  now  withdraw 
from  Lee's  front,  refrain  from  attempting  to  break  his  lines, 
and  transfer  his  troops  to  the  James,  or  once  more  mass  his 
troops,  assail  the  well-intrenched  lines  in  his  front,  and  by 
sheer  force  break  through  the  barrier  interposed  between  him 
and  Richmond. 

General  Meade  issued  his  orders  to  the  various  corps  com 
manders  to  make  an  attack  along  the  whole  line  at  4.30  A.  M., 
June  3,  and  the  commanders  of  the  different  corps  were 
charged  with  the  execution  of  the  order.  There  is  no  doubt 
but  that  the  order  was  issued  in  direct  conformity  to  instruc 
tions  from  General  Grant.  The  tactical  movement  was  very 
simple.  Each  corps  commander  was  to  form  his  corps  as  he 
might  determine,  a  grand  rush  was  to  be  made,  and  great' 
were  the  hopes  that  success  would  crown  our  arms. 

The  ground  at  Old  and  New  Cold  Harbor  was  quite  famil 
iar  to  many  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  here  that 
Lee  had  assumed  the  offensive  against  the  isolated  right 
wing  of  McClellan  under  Fitz-John  Porter.  The  conditions, 
however,  were  quite  reversed.  At  that  time  Lee  delivered 
the  assault,  and  with  great  success.  This  time  Lee  received 
the  assault,  and  was  fully  as  successful  in  maintaining  his 
lines  as  he  had  been  in  carrying  ours  in  1882.  Let  us  look  at 
the  position  of  Lee  and  the  ground  over  which  we  were  to 
assault.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  principal  attack  to  be 
delivered  was  on  the  Confederate  right,  and  here  were  massed 
in  force  40,000  men,  who  were  to  break  through  the  lines  if 
.possible.  This  intrenched  line  of  the  enemy  was  on  a  low 


334  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

hill  that  was  quite  long,  ending  on  the  right,  or  south,  on 
the  Chickahominy  swamps,  making  it  quite  impossible  to 
turn  the  position  without  crossing  the  river.  On  the  north 
the  hill  or  ridge  was  broken  by  ravines.  On  the  east,  to 
wards  Cold  Harbor,  it  was  quite  a  gradual  slope.  Along 
the  crest  of  this  hill  was  a  sunken  road  which  ran  along  the 
front  of  their  breastworks,  and  this  made  a  natural  defense 
which  was  utilized  by  the  enemy.  The  ground  on  the  left, 
towards  the  centre,  was  more  level,  and  though  broken  up 
by  streams  and  swamps,  was  not  as  capable  of  defense.  Up 
the  slopes  of  Watt's  Hill,  over  the  ravines  and  sides  on  the 
north  and  east,  were  to  move  the  assaulting  forces. 

The  assault  was  ordered  at  4.30  A.  M.  It  is  agreed  with 
great  unanimity  that  the  troops  moved  at  the  appointed  time, 
and  that  between  4.30  and  4.45  the  attack  was  made.  Bar 
low  formed  his  men  in  two  lines;  both  deployed.  Gibbon 
formed  two  lines ;  the  first  deployed  in  line,  and  the  second 
line  in  close  column  of  regiments.  Birney's  division  was 
used  as  a  supporting  column.  At  the  appointed  time  the  men 
sprang  to  arms,  and  advancing  with  great  rapidity,  the  lines 
of  Barlow  and  Gibbon  swept  up  to  the  intrenched  lines  of 
the  enemy.  Barlow  met  with  success.  His  first  line  swept 
over  the  skirmishers  and  outposts,  carried  the  sunken  road, 
and  swept  into  the  enemy's  lines,  capturing  prisoners  and 
three  pieces  of  artillery.  The  enemy  met  this  assault  with 
vigor  and  courage.  They  opened  at  once  a  severe  fire  upon 
the  advancing  line,  but  with  no  avail,  and  in  a  short  time 
they  were  obliged  to  leave  the  position  they  had  so  gallantly 
defended.  The  report  was  immediately  sent  back  that  the 
lines  of  the  enemy  were  pierced.  But  rallying  the  disorgan 
ized  troops  behind  their  second  line,  the  enemy  advanced  at 
once  upon  the  victorious  Barlow,  and  from  lack  of  support 
he  was  forced  back  out  of  the  works  and  out  of  the  sunken 
road.  Barlow  was  obstinate,  and  fell  back  only  about  seventy 
yards,  where  his  men  quickly  covered  themselves  and  never 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  335 

gave  up  their  position.  The  failure  of  Barlow  to  hold  the 
captured  line  after  it  was  once  in  his  possession  is  ascribed  to 
the  fact  that  his  second  line  did  not  advance  with  the  steadi 
ness  and  brilliancy  of  the  first. 

Gibbon  advanced  with  as  great  celerity  as  Barlow,  but 
though  the  dash  and  enthusiasm  were  the  same,  his  lines 
never  penetrated  the  enemy's  works.  Gibbon's  advance  lost 
a  good  deal  of  its  coherence,  because  in  his  front  he  had  to 
cross  a  swamp,  which  necessarily  created  confusion  in  his 
advancing  columns  ;  and  although  after  this  obstacle  had  been 
passed  his  men  pushed  on  with  gallantry,  still  the  impetus  of 
an  unbroken  advance  was  lacking,  and,  as  before  stated,  he 
never  penetrated  the  lines,  though  some  of  his  gallant  officers 
leaped  on  the  works  and  fell  on  the  enemy's  side  of  them. 
Owing  to  the  swamp  before  mentioned,  the  confusion  existed 
in  the  second  as  well  as  the  first  line.  Owen's  brigade  of 
the  supporting  line  had  been  ordered  to  deploy  from  column 
of  regiments  into  line  of  battle  as  soon  as  the  works  should 
be  reached  by  the  first  line,  but  by  some  misunderstanding  he 
effected  his  deployment  before  the  line  was  fairly  engaged 
and  thus  added  to  the  confusion ;  and  although  the  obstacle 
that  caused  confusion  in  Gibbon's  line  had  been  overcome 
and  he  maintained  his  position  near  the  works,  his  failure 
was  apparent.  The  losses  in  Hancock's  corps  were  quite 
3000  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

The  6th  corps  at  the  appointed  time  instantly  moved  to  the 
front.  This  corps  was  formed  in  two  lines  of  battle,  in 
the  same  order  as  on  June  1, — :Ricketts  on  the  right,  Russell 
in  the  centre,  and  Neill  in  support.  These  troops  advanced 
with  great  intrepidity.  All  that  courage  and  soldierly  bear 
ing  could  accomplish  these  gallant  men  did.  At  6  A.  M.  news 
was  received  that  Ricketts  had  carried  the  line  in  his  front, 
but  Russell  was  repulsed.  It  was  up  the  gentle  slope  from 
the  east  face  of  Watt's  Hill  and  ridge  to  the  northward  that 
Wright  had  to  take  his  men.  The  gallant  soldiers  of  the 


336  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  were  too  well  intrenched  to  have 
any  trouble  in  resisting  these  assaults.  The  ground  over 
which  our  men  advanced  was  strewn  with  dead,  dying,  and 
wounded,  and  in  less  than  half  an  hour  Wright  was  repulsed 
at  all  points. 

Smith,  too,  was  to  move  at  4.30,  and  with  commendable 
promptness  was  under  way  not  far  from  that  time.  His  as 
sault  was  over  a  plain,  broken  in  the  centre  by  a  ravine,  and 
in  this  accident  of  the  ground  Smith  made  his  attack.  Devens 
was  on  the  right  of  the  ravine,  and  Martindale  was  to  move 
down  the  ravine,  with  Brooks  on  the  left.  Devens  was  charged 
with  looking  after  the  5th  corps  connection,  and  Brooks  was 
to  keep  in  communication  with  the  6th  corps.  In  the  first 
advance  the  outposts  and  skirmishers  were  quickly  overrun, 
and  our  men  reached  the  breastworks,  but  it  was  of  no  avail. 
In  vain  did  Martindale  move  gallantly  to  the  front,  only  to  be 
repulsed  and  driven  back  with  loss.  In  the  confusion  of  the 
repulse  of  Martindale,  Brooks  was  severely  handled  by  an 
enfilading  fire  from  the  Confederate  batteries;  and  though 
repeated  orders  were  given  to  both  these  officers  to  renew  the 
assault,  yet  it  was  not  done,  and  our  old  lines  were  again 
occupied  and  held.  Warren,  who  occupied  a  front  of  nearly 
four  miles,  was  altogether  too  much  extended  to  allow  of  his 
having  any  available  force  to  assault  with,  and  he  was  content 
with  carrying  the  enemy's  skirmish  line  on  his  front. 

The  9th  corps  had  been  massed  in  rear  of  Griffin,  and  had 
moved  out  to  attack  the  enemy,  which  they  did  with  some  suc 
cess,  driving  them  from  their  front  and  pushing  their  lines 
well  to  the  right  of  the  enemy's  left. 

Thus  we  see  that,  with  this  exception  just  mentioned  of 
the  9th  corps,  all  had  failed.  Hancock's  temporary  success 
had  been  lost,  and  although  all  along  the  line  we  were 
nearer  the  enemy  than  at  the  commencement  of  the  attack, 
we  were  absolutely  unable  to  show  any  real  substantial  gain 
for  our  loss  of  between  8000  and  9000  men,  the  flower  of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  337 

our  command.  Many  a  gallant  soldier  had  heard  his  last 
reveille,  and  at  nightfall  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in 
a  disheartened  condition.  Failure  all  along  the  line  !  At  what 
a  sacrifice  was  this  order  to  assault  at  4.30  A.  M.  carried  out ! 

I  can  hardly  agree  with  some  of  the  statements  that  the 
battle  was  over  in  ten  minutes.  There  is  little  or  no  truth  in 
them.  The  fact  is  the  rush  was  made,  and  it  was  repulsed. 
Our  advanced  positions  taken  were  held ;  and  while  no  results, 
none  whatever,  were  attained,  the  fighting  was  resolutely 
maintained  for  about  two  to  three  hours.  The  enemy,  alive 
to  the  fact  that  Barlow  and  Gibbon  and  Wright  and  Smith 
were  uncomfortably  close  to  their  lines,  advanced  in  some 
force.  Whatever  might  have  been  their  object,  they  were 
easily  and  quickly  driven  back.  In  front  of  Gibbon  this 
partook  of  the  nature  of  an  attack,  but  with  no  success  to 
their  arms.  With  this  statement  the  battle  at  Cold  Harbor 
is  over.  It  is  but  fair,  however,  to  look  back  upon  these 
movements  of  the  last  few  days,  and  see  if  it  is  not  true  that 
up  to  the  final  assault  upon  Lee's  lines  the  movements  were 
well  made,  and  were  ably  conducted  and  productive  of  im 
portant  results.  > 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  turning  movement  of  the  army 
from  the  North  Anna  to  the  Pamunkey  at  Hanover  Town 
and  Totopotomoy  Creek  was  well  made,  that  the  troops 
marched  well  and  were  in  good  spirits  and  condition,  that 
the  reconnoissances  in  force  from  the  Pamunkey  to  the  Toto 
potomoy  and  the  gradual  extensions  of  the  line  by  the  left 
were  well  done.  It  is  true  that  General  Crawford  got  a  little 
disturbed  on  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road,  but  the  move 
ments  were  on  the  whole  well  connected  and  the  enemy  failed 
to  find  the  weak  spots,  if  there  were  any.  As  to  the  movement 
that  brought  Cold  Harbor  into  our  lines,  it  is  free  from  criti 
cism,  with  the  exception  of  the  stupid  blunder  of  the  staff 
officer  in  directing  Smith  upon  Newcastle,  which  lost  us  sev 
eral  very  valuable  hours.  This  point  so  vital  to  our  position 


338  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

was  taken  and  held,  and  I  firmly  believe  that  the  preliminary 
fighting  was  necessary  and  well  done,  although  at  heavy  loss. 

I  think  that  Burnside  and  Warren  were  quite  careless  in 
the  contraction  of  their  lines  on  the  2d  of  June.  The  enemy 
were  very  vigilant  and  active,  always  pushing  out  for  know 
ledge,  and  always  ready  to  put  into  action,  here  and  there, 
sufficient  bodies  of  men  to  compel  respectful  attention. 

General  Warren,  in  a  note  to  me  in  regard  to  this  matter, 
says  that  it  was  supposed  that  Burnside  would  look  after  all 
that  movement,  and  maintain  close  communication  with  him, 
which,  if  it  had  been  done,  would  have  saved  all  the  trouble. 

The  putting  of  Hancock  on  the  left  was  skillfully  and  well 
done.  To  take  ten  hours  to  march  ten  miles  does  seem  a  good 
while  ;  but  like  all  movements  made  over  blind  and  little 
known  roads  in  the  night,  double  the  time  estimated  was  con 
sumed.  It  is  rarely  that  the  troops  get  to  the  points  desig 
nated  anywhere  near  on  time. 

Direct  assaults  on  well-intrenched  lines  rarely  proved  suc 
cessful  in  our  late  war,  such  was  the  character  of  the  defense 
on  both  sides,  stubborn,  brave,  cool,  calm.  There  are,  how 
ever,  notable  instances  of  their  success  in  this  very  campaign. 
Upton,  with  part  of  the  6th  corps,  carried  a  face  of  the  Salient 
at  Spottsylvania  on  May  10,  and  later  Hancock  swept  victo 
riously  over  the  works  and  gained  great  success.  But  here 
also  the  stubborn  defense  came  in.  Although  beaten  at  the 
centre,  the  formation  of  another  line  was  quickly  made,  and 
while  the  advantages  gained  were  great,  the  results  did_not 
equal  the  expectation. 

Von  Moltke,  in  the  late  Franco-Prussian  war,  made  direct 
assaults  at  Gravelotte,  which  compelled  Bazaine  to  be  shut  up 
in  Metz.  Direct  assaults  have  always  been  made,  and  there 
may  be  times  when  it  is  positively  necessary  to  make  them. 
In  order  to  make  these  assaults  successful,  the  lines  to  be 
carried  must  be  very  carefully  and  thoroughly  reconnoitred, 
the  weak  places  discovered,  if  possible,  and  the  vital  place  — 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  339 

the  point  where  success  can  secure  the  desired  result,  that 
is,  the  smashing  of  the  opposing  lines  —  must  be  carefully 
designated.  It  nowhere  appears  that  either  General  Grant  or 
General  Meade  made  any  such  survey  as  is  here  suggested. 
The  only  thing  done  was  to  issue  an  order  to  attack  along 
the  whole  line.  Neither  were  Generals  Hancock,  Wright,  or 
Smith  asked  as  to  the  best  places  to  put  in  their  men.  I 
realize  that  this  position  is  open  to  very  severe  criticism,  in 
this,  that  it  must  be  a  poor  commander  of  a  corps  who  cannot 
be  relied  upon  to  make  the  best  selection  of  points  deemed 
weak  upon  which  to  make  an  assault.  Let  me  ask  why  was 
Barlow's  second  line  so  backward  on  this  eventful  day.  It 
nowhere  appears  that  Birney,  who  was  to  support  both  Bar 
low  and  Gibbon,  was  ordered  to  their  support,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  he  was  only  ordered  to  hold  the  lines  vacated  by 
them,  and  he  never  moved  to  help  them.  Surely  to  those  who 
know  Birney  it  is  quite  certain  that  had  he  received  orders  to 
advance,  he  would  have  done  so.  Why  was  that  swamp  first 
found  in  front  of  Gibbon  when  he  moved  to  the  assault?  The 
critical  point  was  Watt's  Hill.  Barlow  was  fairly  on  it  at  one 
time.  Why  was  not  this  place  held  ?  As  a  matter  of  history, 
its  great  importance  was  not  discovered  until  after  the  battle 
was  over. 

The  occasion  was  a  momentous  one  to  Grant.  Lee  was 
directly  in  his  path ;  and  he  determined  once  more  to  try  to 
break  his  lines  by  direct  assault.  Granting  that  the  necessity 
existed  and  was  justified  in  Grant's  mind,  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  following  criticism  is  just :  Would  it  not  have  been  well 
for  him,  before  hurling  40,000  men  on  these  lines,  to  have 
looked  the  ground  over  very  carefully  ?  I  am  not  prepared  to 
say  that,  however  carefully  the  lines  had  been  examined  and 
the  men  put  in,  the  assault  would  have  succeeded.  The  failure 
might  have  been  more  conspicuous  by  reason  of  this  care. 
Hence  it  may  be  said  with  truth  that  the  attack  ought  never 
to  have  been  made. 


340  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Badeau  gives  as  an  excuse  for  the  failure  to  know  the  lines, 
that  the  wooded  nature  of  the  ground  prevented  them  from 
being  observed.  Would  it  not  have  been  well  to  have  aban 
doned  the  whole  movement  if  the  assault  was  to  be  a  move 
in  the  dark  upon  the  valiant  and  brave  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  carefully  intrenched  in  a  most  defensible  position  ? 

In  one  of  the  many  conversations  with  J.  Russell  Young 
during  his  tour  around  the  world,  General  Grant  says  that 
there  were  two  battles  fought  in  our  war  which  ought  not  to 
have  been  ordered.  One  of  them  was  the  assault  by  McPherson 
on  the  defenses  of  Vicksburg,  made  in  response  to  McCler- 
nand's  reports  of  great  success  in  his  front,  and  the  other  was 
Cold  Harbor. 

It  is  greatly  to  be  regretted  that  this  opinion  was  formed 
ten  years  after  the  close  of  the  war,  and  not  on  the  3d  of 
June,  1864,  when  many,  very  many,  valuable  lives  might 
have  been  saved.  The  total  losses  in  the  operations  around 
Bethesda  Church  and  Cold  Harbor  are  put  by  the  different 
reports  as  follows  :  — 

Adjutant-General's  report 10,058 

General  Meade's  report 13,153 

McParlin's  report 13,229 

The  losses  on  the  1st  and  2d  of  June  are  included  in  the 
above,  and  cannot  be  separately  estimated. 

We  know  that  over  500  prisoners  were  lost  by  Warren ; 
Burnside's  fight  on  the  2d  was  hotly  contested  ;  Wright  and 
Smith  lost  over  2000  on  the  1st,  and  Sheridan  lost  in  his  three 
divisions  at  least  500.  My  estimates,  made  up  in  a  great 
measure  on  these  facts,  make  our  casualties  foot  up  to  5000 
for  the  1st  and  2d  of  June,  leaving  a  loss  of  about  8300  in 
the  assault  of  June  3 :  too  many,  far,  far  too  many,  to  be 
sacrificed  where  the  results  obtained  were  of  no  value,  and  the 
army  was  left  disheartened. 


XIV 

THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HAKBOR 

BY 

JOHN  C.   ROPES,  ESQ. 


Read  before  the  Society  February  12, 1883 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR 

THE  withdrawal  of  the  army  from  its  position  on  the  North 
Anna  was  imperative,  unless  General  Grant  was  prepared  to 
risk  a  very  serious  loss  with  a  very  small  prospect  of  success. 
Without  indorsing  his  extreme  statement  to  Halleck  that 
"  even  success  would  not  justify  "  such  a  slaughter  as  would  be 
caused  by  a  direct  attack,  we  may  well  concur  in  his  decision 
that  an  attack  was  wholly  unwise.  He l  "  determined,  there 
fore,"  as  he  wrote  to  Halleck  on  the  26th  of  May,  "  to  turn 
the  enemy's  right  by  crossing  at  or  near  Hanover  Town." 

It  does  not  appear  that  at  this  time  he  had  any  other  plan 
in  his  mind  but  that  of  changing  the  situation  of  the  two 
armies,  in  the  hope  that  he  would  find  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  in  a  position  which  could  be  assaulted  with  some 
chance  of  success.  Already  he  had  pretty  much  made  up  his 
mind  that  he  should  have  to  attack  that  army  in  their  works, 
if  he  intended  to  attack  it  at  all.2  "  A  battle  with  them  out 
side  of  intrenchments,"  he  writes  to  Halleck,  "cannot  be 
had."  One  would  have  supposed  that,  considering  that  the 
experience  of  the  past  three  weeks  had  shown  the  extreme 
difficulty  of  effecting  anything  of  consequence  against  Lee's 
army  when  behind  intrenchments,  General  Grant  would  have 
felt  that  his  task  was  now,  in  some  respects  at  least,  by  no 
means  an  easy  one.  But  with  characteristic  confidence  he 
believes,  or  affects  to  believe,  that  the  real  reason  why  the 
Confederate  army  will  not  fight  outside  of  their  intrench 
ments  is  (to  use  his  own  language)  because  it  is  "  really 
whipped."  Still,  even  if  he  did  suspect  that  the  morale 
of  Lee's  army  was  affected  unfavorably  by  his  fierce  and 

1  Badeau,  vol.  ii,  p.  262.  2  Ibid. 


344  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

repeated  assaults,  it  is  none  the  less  remarkable  that  he  should 
not  have  tried  to  shift  the  burden  of  attack  from  his  own 
army  to  that  of  his  antagonist.  Difficult  as  this  may  have 
been,  it  was  not,  as  will  soon  appear,  by  any  means  impos 
sible,  and  it  would  certainly  have  been  an  object  well  worth 
making  a  strenuous  effort  to  obtain.  If  he  could  by  a  rapid 
and  well-concealed  march  have  seized  New  Bridge  on  the 
Chickahominy,  it  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  Lee  would  have 
attacked  him.  In  such  an  event,  Lee  must  either  have  at 
tacked  or  confessed  himself  forced  back  to  the  lines  of  Rich 
mond.  And  it  seems  to  me  that  if  General  Grant,  when  he 
broke  camp  on  the  North  Anna,  had  set  this  object  clearly 
before  his  eyes  and  before  the  eyes  of  his  generals,  the  thing 
might  have  been  done. 

Let  us  therefore  trace  with  care  the  movements  of  both 
armies  in  this  change  of  the  theatre  of  operations  from  the 
North  Anna  to  the  Chickahominy. 

On  the  27th  of  May  the  cavalry,  consisting  of  Torbert's 
and  Gregg's  divisions  under  Sheridan,  supported  by  Rus 
sell's  division  of  the  6th  corps,  crossed  the  Pamunkey  and 
occupied  Hanover  Town. 

On  the  28th  the  5th  corps  crossed  at  Hanover  Town,  the 
2d  corps  four  miles  higher  up,  and  the  rest  of  the  6th  corps 
at  or  near  the  same  place.  The  2d  and  6th  corps  connected, 
and  communication  was  established  with  the  5th  corps. 

The  same  day  General  Sheridan  attacked  Fitz-Hugh  Lee's 
division  of  cavalry,  supported  by  Butler's  South  Carolina 
brigade,  at  Hawes's  Shop,  and  made  himself  master  of  that 
very  important  position.  The  loss  was  heavy  on  both  sides 
for  the  number  engaged. 

The  next  morning,  the  29th,  the  9th  corps  crossed  the  river, 
and  took  position  on  the  left  of  Hancock  and  between  him 
and  Warren. 

The  whole  army  was  now  across  the  river.  Had  it  been 
Grant's  intention  to  move  rapidly  to  the  Chickahominy,  now 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  345 

was  the  time  to  do  it.  The  distance  from  Hawes's  Shop  to 
Cold  Harbor,  a  place  of  importance  as  a  meeting  of  various 
roads,  is  only  six  miles. 

But  the  29th  was  spent  in  reconnoitring  to  the  north  and 
west.1  Russell's  division  of  the  6th  corps  was  sent  north  to 
Hanover  Court  House,  and,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
arrived  there  without  meeting  any  opposition.  Later  in  the 
same  day  Getty's  division  of  the  same  corps  was  sent  to  the 
same  place. 

Barlow's  division  of  the  2d  corps 'was  sent  out  in  a  westerly 
or  southwesterly  direction,  and  met  the  enemy  intrenched  near 
Swift  Creek,  a  tributary  of  the  Totopotomoy,  and  running  in 
a  southeasterly  direction  into  it  a  short  distance  west  of  the 
Sheldon  house.  Finding  himself  unable  to  make  further 
progress,  he  sent  for  reinforcements.  Birney  came  up  that 
afternoon,  and  Gibbon  the  next  morning. 

Warren  sent  Griffin's  division  towards  Bethesda  Church, 
and  that  officer  crossed  the  Totopotomoy  with  a  portion  of  his 
command. 

The  9th  corps  was  held  in  reserve. 

All  these  movements  were  tentative  merely.  The  troops 
were  sent  out  merely  to  feel  the  enemy  and  ascertain  his 
whereabouts.  General  Grant  in  his  report  simply  says, 
"  On  the  29th  and  30th  we  advanced,  with  heavy  skirmish 
ing,  to  the  Hanover  Court  House  and  Cold  Harbor  Road, 
and  developed  the  enemy's  position  north  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy." 

Badeau  says  that 2  "  on  the  29th  Grant  ordered  a  recon- 
noissance  in  force."  Swinton  says,3  "Where  Lee  had  taken 
up  his  real  vantage-ground  was  uncertain,  and  with  the  view 
of  developing  his  position  strong  reconnoissances  by  all  the 
corps  were  thrown  forward." 

1  69  W.  R.  307. 

2  Badeau,  vol.  ii,  p.  270. 

3  Swinton,  p.  479.    Why  was  it  so  certain  to  be  a  "vantage-ground "  ? 


346  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Meantime,  General  Lee,  who  had  discovered  our  withdrawal 
from  the  North  Anna  early  on  the  27th,  retired  on  that  day 
to  Ashland,  on  the  Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  Railroad, 
and  on  the  28th  retreated  to  Atlee's,  on  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad,  reaching  there  about  six  in  the  evening.1 

His  3d  corps  under  Hill  was  on  the  left  of  his  line,  and  was 
not  far  from  Atlee's  Station.  His  1st  corps  under  Anderson 
was  in  the  centre,  and  the  2d  corps  under  Early2  on  the  right, 
at  Hundley's  Corner,3  and  covering  the  northerly  road  via 
Pole  Green  Church 4  and  the  easterly  road  via  Old  Church.5 

Whether  the  march  of  our  army  might  not  have  been  pro 
longed  on  the  night  of  the  28th  is  a  question  worth  consider 
ing.  If  the  march  could  have  been  made  directly  from  Hawes's 
Shop  to  Bethesda  Church  or  Cold  Harbor,  it  would  have  been 
a  great  gain  to  us.  To  have  been  at  either  Bethesda  Church 
or  Cold  Harbor  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  would  have  car 
ried  with  it  a  very  considerable  strategical  advantage.  Early's 
corps  was  the  only  body  of  troops  that  could  have  impeded 
the  movement,  and  such  a  march  would  of  course  have  been 
covered  by  a  strong  detachment  of  cavalry  and  infantry  on 
the  right  of  the  column. 

Similar  remarks  are  applicable  to  a  movement  to  Cold  Har 
bor  on  the  29th,  as  General  Lee's  army  was  so  placed  that 
it  could  hardly  have  opposed  it  successfully.  At  least  half  of 
his  army  was  in  intrenchments  covering  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad,  which,  as  it  was  his  source  of  supply,  he  was  of 
course  obliged  to  protect  until  our  movements  had  made  it 
certain  that  we  were  not  aiming  that  way.  In  truth,  Lee's 

1  Badeau,  vol.  ii,  p.  270.  2  Early's  Last  Year  of  the  War,  p.  30. 

3  Not  to  be  confounded  with  "  Polly  Hundley's  Corner."    Hundley's  Corner 
is  not  shown  on  the  Cold  Harbor  map,  but  should  be  near  the  top  of  the  map, 
near  the  middle,  close  to  the  Tulley  house. 

4  Pole  Green  Church  should  be  on  the  Totopotomoy  map  near  the  bottom, 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  south  of  the  Wright  house. 

5  This  road  is  north  of  the  Bethesda  Church  Road,  and  runs  from  Hundley's 
Corner  by  the  Butler,  Bowles,  and  Armstrong  houses  in  a  northeast  direction. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  347 

army  was  resting  that  day ;  we  had  to  hunt  them  up ;  every 
encounter  of  that  day  was  brought  about  by  us.  Lee,  in  fact, 
with  his  usual  insight  into  his  adversary's  plans,  or  his  usual 
good  fortune,  remained  behind  his  works,  taking  the  risk  of 
Grant's  attempting  to  outflank  him.  But  in  point  of  fact  the 
Pamunkey  movement  had  placed  it  within  Grant's  power  to 
turn  completely  the  right  of  Lee's  army.  He  had  his  choice 
of  two  modes  of  operation.  He  could  either  have  marched  to 
the  Chickahominy  directly,  as  has  been  suggested,  or  he  could 
have  concentrated  his  whole  army  upon  Early's  corps,  which 
was  exposed  on  its  right  flank.  Our  position,  based  as  we  now 
were  on  White  House,  enabled  us  to  form  line  of  battle  with 
perfect  safety  running  north  and  south.  Had  we,  promptly 
upon  our  arrival  on  the  south  side  of  the  Pamunkey,  on  the 
night  of  the  28th  or  morning  of  the  29th,  pushed  our  troops 
well  beyond  Bethesda  Church,  which  Early  did  not  occupy 
until  the  30th,1  we  should  have  turned  the  enemy's  right  com 
pletely,  and  by  occupying  the  Mechanicsville  (or  Bethesda 
Church)  Road  should  have  covered  two  of  the  principal 
avenues  to  Richmond.  In  this  position  we  could  either  have 
delivered  a  telling  blow  upon  Early,  or,  if  that  seemed  un 
promising,  could  have  placed  ourselves  in  a  position  in  which 
Lee  would  have  been  well-nigh  compelled  to  attack  us. 

But  if  the  occupation  of  the  Mechanicsville  Pike  had  proved 
impossible,  owing  to  the  activity  of  General  Early,  he  cer 
tainly  could  not  have  prevented  our  army  from  marching  to 
Cold  Harbor  and  thence  to  New  Bridge.  His  attention  could 
have  been  occupied  by  one  corps,  and  the  other  three  could 
have  been  sent  to  their  destination. 

The  fact  is,  that  Grant  lost  the  initiative  from  the  moment 
of  his  crossing  the  Pamunkey.  Important  as  the  initiative 
always  is  in  war,  it  would  seem  to  be  much  more  important 
when,  instead  of  pitched  battles,  there  is  nothing  but  a  series 
of  assaults,  in  which  the  assailant  is  sure  to  lose  a  great  many 

1  Early's  Last  Year  of  the  War,  etc.,  p.  30. 


348  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

men  and  pretty  sure  not  to  win  any  very  notable  success. 
This  advantage,  whatever  it  may  have  amounted  to,  General 
Grant  threw  away.  He  knew,  he  says,  that  Lee's  army  would 
not  come  out  of  their  intrenchments  and  fight  him,  and  so, 
instead  of  going  at  once  for  their  communications,  he  spends 
a  whole  day  in  finding  out  exactly  where  their  intrenchments 
are. 

The  next  day,  the  30th,  our  army,  having  found  out  that 
these  intrenchments  extended  from  the  Virginia  Central 
Railroad  on  their  left  to  Pole  Green  Church  on  their  right, 
attacked  them  with  considerable  loss  and  with  varying  suc 
cess,  a  few  hundred  prisoners  being  captured  by  Hancock. 
The  6th  corps  was  recalled  from  Hanover  Court  House  and 
formed  on  Hancock's  right. 

On  the  same  day  General  Lee,  finding  that  the  Federal 
troops  confronted  the  extreme  left  of  his  line  near  Atlee's 
Station,  divined  that  our  left  was  exposed,  and  at  once  ordered 
Early  to  outflank  us  by  moving  on  Bethesda  Church.  That 
officer  attacked  with  his  customary  energy  and  some  success 
at  first,  though  ultimately  repulsed  with  loss. 

The  armies  now  facing  each  other  and  in  close  proximity  to 
each  other,  it  became  extremely  difficult  for  either  to  gain 
any  advantage  by  manoeuvring.  Moreover  nothing  in  the 
movements  of  the  past  three  days  indicated  any  particular 
position,  to  gain  which  the  Federal  army  was  manoeuvring. 
Still  the  enemy  had  extended  their  right,  and  we  had  extended 
our  left,  and  the  tendency  was  for  both  armies  to  approach  the 
Chickahominy ;  hugging  each  other,  as  they  were,  with  the 
close  embrace  of  mortal  foes  in  a  desperate  struggle,  wherever 
one  went  the  other  had  to  follow.  In  this  way,  doubtless, 
Cold  Harbor  would  ultimately  have  Been  the  scene  of  a 
struggle.  But  the  conflict  was  precipitated  by  the  cavalry. 

There  is  some  discrepancy  in  the  accounts  in  respect  to  the 
seizure  of  Cold  Harbor.  Meade 1  says,  "  Sheridan  with  two 

1  Meade's  Report  (67  W.  R.  194). 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  349 

divisions  was  sent  to  occupy  Cold  Harbor,  driving  the  enemy 
out  of  the  place."  Sheridan1  puts  it  somewhat  differently: 
"  On  the  morning  of  the  31st  I  visited  Torbert  and  Custer 
at  Ouster's  headquarters,  —  Torbert's  division  having  the 
advance,  —  and  found  that  they  had  already  talked  over 
a  plan  to  attack  and  capture  Cold  Harbor  which  I  indorsed ; 
and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  31st  the  attack  was  made,  and 
after  a  hard-fought  battle,  the  town  taken." 

As  the  enemy,  realizing  the  importance  to  our  army  of  this 
position,  covering,  as  it  did,  the  most  direct  route  to  our  base 
of  supplies  at  White  House,  had  not  only  occupied  it  in  some 
force  before  Sheridan's  attack,  but  were  now  preparing  ener 
getically  to  retake  it,  Sheridan  sent  for  reinforcements,  and 
the  6th  and  18th  corps  were  promptly  sent  to  his  support. 

The  31st  showed,  therefore,  a  decided  gain  for  us  on  the 
extreme  left  of  our  line.  On  our  right,  Birney  of  Hancock's 
corps  crossed  Swift  Creek  and  captured  the  enemy's  advanced 
line.  The  5th,  6th,  and  9th  corps  did  no  fighting  this  day, 
but  in  the  evening  the  6th  was  sent,  as  has  been  said,  to  Cold 
Harbor,  where  it  arrived  about  10  A.  M.  of  June  1. 

Smith,  also,  with  the  18th  corps,  16,000  strong,  arrived  at 
3  P.  M.  of  June  1,  having  gone  from  White  House,  where  he 
had  landed,  to  Newcastle,  owing  to  the  mistake  of  a  staff  officer. 

That  afternoon  at  five  o'clock  Wright  and  Smith  attacked 
the  enemy,  and  gained  some  ground  and  a  few  hundred  prison 
ers.  On  the  rest  of  our  line,  in  the  other  corps,  there  was 
heavy  skirmishing,  but  no  advantage  was  gained  by  either  side. 

On  the  afternoon  of  June  1  General  Meade  ordered  Han 
cock  "  to  move  promptly  "  from  his  position  on  the  extreme 
right  of  our  line,  "  and  to  reach  Cold  Harbor  as  soon  as  pos 
sible,"  and  take  position  on  Wright's  left.  The  order  urged 
Hancock  to  make  every  exertion,  and  Hancock  and  his  gal 
lant  officers  and  men  did  all  that  was  possible.  But  the  troops 

1  Report  of  Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  supp.  part  2.  Sheridan's 
Report  (67  W.  R.  794). 


350  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

unfortunately  missed  their  way,  owing  to  the  misinformation 
of  a  staff  officer,  and  arrived  not  before  daybreak,  as  they 
had  hoped  and  expected  to  do,  but  only  at  half -past  six 
o'clock,  and  in  an  exhausted  condition. 

It  was  undoubtedly  General  Grant's  and  General  Meade's 
intention  that  the  reconnoissance  by  Smith  and  Wright  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  1st  should  be  followed  by  a  serious 
attack  by  them  at  daybreak  of  the  2d,  in  which  Hancock 
would  participate ;  and  it  would  seem  that,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  misadventure  that  befell  the  2d  corps,  that  attack  would 
have  then  been  made.  While  it  is  not  probable  that  Smith 
and  Wright  would  have  found  their  task  made  any  easier 
than  they  had  found  it  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st,  there  is 
some  reason  to  believe  that  Hancock,  who  was  placed  on  the 
left  of  the  line,  would  have  encountered  fewer  opponents 
and  less  formidable  works  than  he  was  obliged  to  encounter 
the  next  morning,  when  he  took  his  part  in  the  great  assault. 
General  Miles,  who  commanded  the  left  brigade  of  Barlow's 
division,  which  was  on  the  left  of  the  2d  corps,  and  Colonel 
Hapgood,  who  commanded  the  5th  New  Hampshire  in  that 
brigade,  concur  in  stating  that,  so  far  as  they  could  judge, 
the  enemy  were  not  in  force  opposite  to  this  line  on  the  after 
noon  of  the  2d.  Still  we  find  from  Confederate  authorities 
(Gregg,  157)  that,  on  the  night  of  the  1st,  Breckinridge 
left  his  position  (about  the  centre  of  their  line)  and  moved 
towards  the  right,  and  that  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  Hill's 
corps  marched  to  the  right,  halted  for  a  while  on  the  field 
of  Gaines's  Mill,  and  then,  pursuing  its  march,  occupied  the 
extreme  right  of  the  line,  Gregg's  (or  McGowan's)  South 
Carolina  brigade  "  holding  the  last  shoulder  of  the  ridge  that 
rises  from  the  swamp  of  the  Chickahominy."  General  K.  H. 
Anderson,  commanding  the  1st  corps,  A.  N.  V.,  states  that 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d  Breckinridge  was  posted  on  the 
heights  to  the  right  of  Hoke,  and  that  A.  P.  Hill,  with  two 
divisions,  moved  to  that  point  by  way  of  Gaines's  Mill. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  351 

On  the  whole,  it  is  probable  that  the  movement  of  Breck- 
inriclge  and  Hill  had  not  been  completed  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  2d  and  it  is  quite  certain  that  Gaines's  Mill  was  not 
strongly  held  that  morning,  and  that,  had  we  been  a  little 
quicker,  we  could  have  seized  New  Cold  Harbor,  Gaines's 
Mill,  and  the  road  to  New  Bridge.  It  may  well  be  that 
nothing  but  the  accident  which  befell  the  2d  corps  prevented 
this  from  being  done.  It  should,  however,  be  remembered  that 
on  the  morning  of  the  2d  there  was  quite  an  interval  between 
the  18th  and  5th  corps.  The  army  was  not  concentrated. 

It  was  now,  however,  clearly  understood,  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  2d  of  June,  at  headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  that  the  enemy  were  in  position  and  behind  intrench- 
ments  covering  all  the  roads  to  the  Chickahominy,  and  that, 
if  we  proposed  to  fight  at  all  on  the  north  side  of  that  river, 
we  must  assault  the  enemy  in  their  works.  Accordingly,  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  the  5th  corps  was  extended  so  as  to 
connect  with  the  right  of  the  18th,  and  the  9th  corps  was  drawn 
back  on  the  right  of  the  5th,  facing  north  along  the  pike. 
Both  corps  suffered  considerably  in  this  movement. 

The  propriety  of  making  this  assault  has  been  discussed 
already  very  fully  in  two,  at  least,  of  our  papers,  and  perhaps 
I  ought  not  to  add  anything  of  my  own  to  what  has  been 
so  well  said  by  those  far  more  competent  than  I  am  to  give 
an  opinion. 

Yet  I  will  make  a  few  suggestions. 

First.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  morale  of  the  army  had 
been  seriously  impaired  by  its  experiences  up  to  the  3d  of 
June.  It  had  had  a  fair  measure  of  success.  It  had  taken 
no  step  backward.  Every  officer  and  every  man  felt  that 
there  was  no  hesitation,  no  timidity,  no  want  of  enterprise, 
at  headquarters.  True,  the  losses  had  been  severe,  but  so 
had  been  those  of  the  enemy.  Upton  had  captured  a  thousand 
men  on  the  10th  of  May  ;  Hancock,  four  thousand  on  the  12th. 
The  captures  in  the  little  affairs  on  the  North  Anna  and 


352  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Totopotomoy  must  have  comprised  at  least  a  thousand  or 
more.  The  army  had  manoeuvred  skillfully,  had  fought  hard, 
and,  on  the  whole,  not  unsuccessfully. 

Yet,  in  the  second  place,  it  must  be  confessed  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  experience  of  the  army  in  this  campaign 
to  fit  it  for  a  great,  a  decisive  battle.  Every  attack  had  been 
either  a  failure  from  a  total  want  of  proper  cooperation  and 
support,  or  had  been  only  partially  successful  for  the  same 
reason.  Often  and  often  the  capture  of  a  mere  line  of  skir 
mishers  in  their  rifle-pits  had  been  the  task,  and  the  bloody 
task,  too,  of  a  fine  brigade  or  division.  Hence  the  army  had 
its  opinions  on  the  possibility  of  carrying  out  these  orders 
for  the  capture  of  these  positions.  Their  capture  having  been, 
from  the  time  of  our  arrival  at  Spottsylvania,  the  apparent 
object  of  all  the  operations,  and  it  being  too  plain  for  con 
troversy  that  the  practicability  of  success  in  these  operations 
was  not  an  element  that  was  considered  with  any  great  care 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  it  came  to  be  held  that  it 
was  for  those  who  were  to  engage  personally  in  the  operations 
to  consider  it.  And  consider  it  they  did,  feeling,  very  justly, 
that  otherwise  they  would  be  throwing  themselves  away. 
Accordingly  the  orders  of  the  3d  of  June  were  no  doubt 
viewed  by  those  who  had  to  perform  them  very  much  as  the 
orders  which,  almost  from  day  to  day  previously,  had  been 
given  to  attack  the  lines  at  Spottsylvania,  at  the  North  Anna, 
or  at  Totopotomoy  Creek.  They  do  not  seem  to  have  been 
specially  emphasized,  as  they  should  have  been.  Pains  enough 
were  not  taken  to  imbue  the  army,  and  especially  the  corps, 
division,  and  brigade  commanders,  with  the  idea  that  this  was 
to  be  not  a  reconnoissance  but  a  battle. 

Thirdly.  If  it  be  true,  as  has  been  stated  in  one  of  our 
papers,  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  make  in  such 
a  country  as  that  part  of  Virginia  is,  a  reconnoissance  which 
shall  develop  and  ascertain  the  strength  and  weakness  of  an 
enemy's  position  without  fighting  a  battle,  or,  what  comes  to 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  353 

the  same  thing,  losing  as  many  men  as  in  fighting  a  battle, 
then  it  is  clear  that  in  such  a  country  the  true  policy  is  to 
manoeuvre  for  a  position,  even  if  you  have  to  manoeuvre  from 
the  North  Anna  to  the  James.  At  some  point  will  certainly 
be  found  either  open  country  or  the  enemy's  lines  of  com 
munication. 

Fourthly.  I  cannot  help  saying  that  in  my  judgment  there 
was  a  great  deal  lost  by  the  policy  constantly  pursued  of 
keeping  the  army  in  almost  constant  contact  with  the  enemy, 
and  by  the  frequent  and  sanguinary  attacks  upon  really 
unimportant  positions.  Had  the  army  been  kept,  as  a  rule,  at 
a  reasonable  distance  from  its  adversary,  had  the  troops  never 
been  ordered  to  attack  intrenchments  except  to  gain  an 
important  and  definite  object,  they  would  have  gone  into  any 
serious  conflict  in  greater  numbers  and  with  much  higher 
morale. 

Fifthly.  If  an  assault  like  that  delivered  at  Cold  Harbor 
is  to  be  made  at  all,  it  should  be  made  at  one  place  and  only 
at  one  place.  Whatever  may  be  the  difficulties  attending 
the  selection  of  this  place,  some  place  should  be  selected. 
And  not  only  this  —  the  troops  should  be  selected.  The  suc 
cessful  charge  of  Upton  was  made  by  twelve  picked  regiments, 
and  though  made  at  six  o'clock  in  a  May  afternoon,  was  a 
brilliant  and  complete  success.  The  operation  as  a  whole  no 
doubt  failed,  for  Mott  did  not  support  the  charge  as  he  was 
to  have  done.  But  the  charge  succeeded.  And  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  similar  precautions  would  not  gener 
ally  have  resulted  in  similar  successes. 

These  general  observations  made,  a  few  words  will  conclude 
all  I  need  say  about  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  the  details 
of  which  have  already  been  so  fully  given  to  the  Society  in 
other  papers. 

The  assault  was  punctually  made  at  half-past  four  in  the 
morning.  Barlow's  division  was  on  the  left  of  the  2d  corps  ; 
Gibbon's  division  was  on  the  right ;  Birney  was  in  reserve 


354  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

and  was  to  be  put  in  as  soon  as  the  first  works  were  entered. 
On  the  right  of  the  2d  corps  was  the  6th,  on  its  right  the 
18th. 

Barlow's  first  line,  consisting  of  the  brigades  of  Miles  and 
Brooke,  met  with  fair  success,  a  portion  of  the  troops  carry 
ing  the  enemy's  works  in  their  immediate  front.  Some  regi 
ments,  at  any  rate,  in  the  first  line  of  Miles's  brigade,  con 
spicuous  among  which  was  the  5th  New  Hampshire  under 
Colonel  Hapgood,  entered  the  intrenchments,  as  did  also 
Brooke's  first  line,  which  consisted  of  a  strong  new  regiment, 
the  7th  New  York  heavy  artillery,  under  Colonel  Morris,  and 
some  companies  of  the  148th  Pennsylvania,  under  Major 
Forster.  Three  guns,  one  color,  and  two  or  three  hundred 
prisoners  were  taken.  But  Brooke,  unfortunately  for  us,  was 
severely  wounded  while  bringing  up  his  second  line ;  and  for 
some  reason  or  other,  perhaps  the  broken  character  of  the 
ground,  the  second  line  of  both  brigades  came  up  slowly. 
Moreover  the  brigades  of  Byrnes  and  McDougall,  which  con 
stituted  the  second  line  of  the  division,  were  both  behind 
time ;  and  in  spite  of  all  efforts,  the  troops  which  had  carried 
the  intrenchments,  being  unsupported,  were  driven  out,  leav 
ing  the  captured  guns  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

Gibbon's  division  was  checked  by  a  swamp,  the  existence 
of  which  had  somehow  unaccountably  escaped  observation, 
and,  notwithstanding  great  and  heroic  exertions  and  great  loss 
of  life,  accomplished  nothing. 

Birney's  division  was  not  ordered  in  at  all,  perhaps  because 
the  leading  division  not  having  secured  a  lodgment,  there 
was  no  object  in  putting  in  the  reserve  division. 

On  the  right  of  the  2d  corps  there  were  also  determined 
charges  by  the  troops  of  the  6th  and  18th  corps,  but  nowhere 
was  any  success  worth  mentioning  achieved. 

The  5th  and  9th  corps  were  not  to  attack  unless  special 
opportunity  offered,  and  they  of  course  made  no  movement  of 
importance. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  355 

It  is  probable  that  the  best  point  for  the  attack  was  where 
Barlow's  division  attacked ;  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  if  all 
possible  pains  had  been  taken,  both  to  organize  properly  the 
assaulting  column  and  to  support  it  when  it  should  have  got 
in  by  an  overwhelming  force,  the  lines  could  not  only  have 
been  carried,  but  the  enemy's  whole  position  turned.  But 
to  effect  this  would  have  required,  that  every  detail  of  the 
whole  movement  should  have  been  fully  and  particularly 
arranged  beforehand,  so  far  as  was  possible.  There  was 
plenty  of  time  for  this,  but  it  was  not  done.  The  attack  was 
made  exactly  as  the  attacks  along  Swift  Creek  or  the  Toto- 
potomoy  three  or  four  days  before.  It  was  bravely  made,  but 
it  was  not  made  as  part  of  a  well-understood  movement  in 
which  success  was  expected,  and  in  which  success  was  to  be 
productive  of  decisive  results.  Nothing  less  than  selecting 
some  one  place  —  perhaps  on  an  imperfect  reconnoissance,  but 
still  making  the  best  choice  possible  under  the  circumstances, 
then  selecting  the  troops  and  detailing  them  to  this  special 
work  of  honor  and  danger,  the  brilliant  and  successful  per 
formance  of  which  the  whole  army  is  expecting  from  the 
chosen  column  of  attack,  then  perfecting  arrangements  for 
pouring  into  the  gap  in  the  enemy's  lines,  as  soon  as  it  shall 
have  been  made,  an  overwhelming  force,  moving  them  in 
good  order,  too,  and  giving  them  as  explicit  directions  as 
possible  as  to  what  they  are  to  do  when  they  get  in  — 
would  have  sufficed  to  justify  an  assault  on  June  3  at  Cold 
Harbor.  All  these  pains  ought  to  have  been  taken.  Had 
they  been  taken,  I  think  the  assault  ought  to  have  been 
made,  and  I  think  it  would  have  been  successful. 

It  does  not  appear  that  at  Cold  Harbor  there  were  any 
artificial  obstructions,  such  as  abatis  or  "  slashings,"  to  detain 
an  assaulting  column  in  front  of  the  enemy's  line.  None  such 
are  recollected  by  those  officers  in  the  2d  and  6th  corps, 
who  were  in  the  battle,  with  whom  I  have  conferred.  The 
advancing  line  of  Gibbon's  division  was,  it  is  true,  checked 


356  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

by  a  swamp,  but  there  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any  other 
similar  obstacle  in  the  way  of  any  other  portion  of  our  troops. 
The  fact  is,  the  men  were  checked  by  the  tremendous  fire  of 
the  enemy,  whose  works  protected  them  until  our  lines  had 
arrived  within  a  few  paces.  It  was  a  repetition  of  the  battle 
of  New  Orleans.  Still,  had  the  army  been  fresh  and  in  good 
condition  and  spirits,  and  had  the  men  known  that  the  work 
which  they  were  ordered  to  do  had  been  carefully  considered 
by  their  chiefs,  that  it  would  not  have  been  assigned  to  them 
had  it  not  been  of  vital  importance  to  the  success  of  the 
cause,  and  had  it  not  been  expected  that  their  efforts  would 
have  been  crowned  with  success,  the  selected  point  would 
have  been  carried.  In  fact,  Miles's  brigade  did  actually,  as 
we  have  seen,  carry  a  portion  of  the  line  in  their  front ;  and 
had  the  support  of  the  rest  of  the  division  been  as  prompt  as 
it  ought  to  have  been,  a  considerable  success  would  doubtless 
have  resulted.  But  still  there  was  no  reserve  to  the  2d  corps. 
Had  Barlow's  dispositions  been  so  perfect  that  Miles's  suc 
cess  had  been  followed  up,  had  Hancock,  seeing  this,  ordered 
Birney's  division  in,  still  there  is  every  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  divisions  of  Barlow  and  Birney  would  have  had  their 
hands  full  in  a  short  time,  and  would  have  had  as  much  as 
they  could  do  to  hold  what  ground  they  might  have  gained. 
There  would  have  been  no  support  at  hand.  Gibbon,  Wright, 
and  Smith,  on  the  right,  heavily  engaged,  could  have  rendered 
no  aid.  Warren  and  Burnside  were  too  far  off,  of  course. 
The  truth  is,  that,  disposed  as  our  army  was,  with  every 
corps  in  line  and  no  general  reserve  whatever,  no  crushing 
success  was  possible  for  us  against  such  an  adversary  as  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  And  it  does  seem  to  me  that, 
if  General  Grant  or  General  Meade  considered  the  attack  on 
the  morning  of  June  3  as  a  battle,  in  the  proper  sense  of 
that  term,  they  made  very  inadequate  dispositions  to  insure 
success.  If,  as  I  say,  things  had  gone  smoothly  in  the  2d 
corps,  we  might  have  captured  a  thousand  or  two  prisoners 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR       357 

and  perhaps  twenty  guns ;  but  I  fail  to  see  any  probability 
that  the  2d  corps,  unassisted,  could  hope  to  do  more  than  this. 
There  would  have  been,  of  course,  an  immediate  reinforce 
ment  of  the  enemy's  right ;  and  disordered  and  decimated  as 
Hancock's  troops  would  necessarily  have  been  by  their  suc 
cessful  assault,  they  could  not  have  accomplished  more  than 
to  have  held  what  prisoners,  guns,  and  ground  they  had 
acquired  in  the  first  half  or  three  quarters  of  an  hour. 

It  may  be  said  that  advantage  would  have  been  taken  by 
our  other  corps  commanders  of  any  such  reinforcements  sent 
by  Lee  to  his  extreme  right.  But  when,  I  ask,  did  any 
expectation  of  this  kind  ever  get  realized  ?  Not  at  Spottsyl- 
vania,  certainly,  on  the  12th  of  May ;  not  at  Petersburg, 
certainly,  on  the  30th  of  July. 

To  illustrate,  or  rather  to  show,  the  nature  of  the  expecta 
tions  which  prevailed  at  headquarters  about  this  assault  at 
Cold  Harbor,  let  us  hear  what  Grant  and  Meade  say  in  their 
reports  : 

"  The  2d  "  (says  Grant1)  "  was  spent  in  getting  the  troops 
into  position  for  an  attack  on  the  3d.  On  the  3d  of  June  we 
again  assaulted  the  enemy's  works  in  the  hope  of  driving 
him  from  his  position.  In  this  attempt  our  loss  was  heavy, 
while  that  of  the  enemy,  I  have  reason  to  believe,  was  com 
paratively  light.  It  was  the  only  general  attack  made  from 
the  Rapidan  to  the  James  which  did  not  inflict  upon  the 
enemy  losses  to  compensate  for  our  own  losses." 

Here  there  is  no  trace  of  any  other  intention  than  that  of 
making  a  general  attack,  similar  to  those  which  had  been 
previously  made.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  the  expression  of  a 
vague  hope  of  driving  the  enemy  from  his  position,  but  the 
only  regret  is  that  the  losses  were  not  more  evenly  balanced. 

General  Meade  is  quite  as  far  from  giving  any  indication 
that  in  attacking  the  enemy  at  Cold  Harbor  he  felt  that 
he  was  fighting  a  great  battle.  In  fact,  his  report  is  so 
i  67  W.  R.  21,  22. 


358  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

exceedingly  terse  and  dry,  not  to  say  meagre,  that  I  venture 
to  say  that  nine  persons  out  of  ten,  reading  it  without  having 
had  the  honor  of  a  personal  acquaintance  with  that  distin 
guished  officer,  would  rise  from  its  perusal  with  the  feeling 
that  his  principal  function  in  the  army  was  to  chronicle  in 
a  neat  and  succinct  way  the  doings  of  his  corps  and  division 
commanders,  than  which,  as  we  shall  all  agree,  a  more  errone 
ous  opinion  could  hardly  be  entertained.  Meade  says  : 1 

"  At  four  A.  M.,  June  3,  a  vigorous  assault  was  made  by  the 
2d,  6th,  and  18th  corps.  Barlow's  division,  2d  corps,  carried 
a  part  of  the  enemy's  line  on  our  extreme  left,  but,  before 
Barlow  could  be  reinforced,  the  enemy,  rallying,  compelled  him 
to  withdraw.  The  assault  of  the  6th  and  18th  corps  being 
unsuccessful,  about  11  A.  M.  offensive  operations  closed." 

Now  let  us  see  how  this  tone  which  prevailed  at  head 
quarters  is  to  be  recognized  in  the  army.  The  late  David 
A.  Russell,  one  of  the  most  gallant  and  efficient  officers  in  the 
army,  after  describing  in  his  (unpublished)  report  the  attack 
of  his  division  of  the  6th  corps  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d  of 
June,  says : 

"  Works  were  constructed  during  the  night,  behind  which 
the  troops  lay  posted  till  the  morning  of  the  3d,  when  another 
advance  was  ordered  and  attempted  along  the  whole  line; 
but  little  ground  was  gained,  however,  and  other  works  were 
immediately  thrown  up  under  sharp  and  deadly  musketry 
fire." 

Here  the  total  absence  of  any  idea  that  the  3d  of  June  was 
any  special  occasion  is  manifest. 

The  battle,  so  called,  of  Cold  Harbor  was,  in  fact,  nothing 
but  an  assault  against  an  enemy  of  known  steadiness  and 
courage,  well  intrenched.  It  was  an  assault  along  the  whole 
line,  with  no  adequate  dispositions  to  improve  any  success, 
had  any  of  the  troops  engaged  penetrated  the  enemy's  works. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  enemy  were  so  strong  in  front  of 
i  67  W.  R.  194. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  359 

Warren  and  Burn  side  that  no  concentration  of  an  adequate 
force  on  our  left  could  safely  be  made,  I  reply  that  in  that 
case  no  such  assault  ought  to  have  been  made.  When  the 
chances  are  not  in  favor  of  an  assault,  no  general  ought  to 
attack  unless  he  is  in  some  desperate  strait ;  and  none  such 
existed  in  our  case  at  the  time.  And  in  this  connection  we 
cannot  fail  to  observe  and  to  praise  the  great  skill  and  daring 
displayed  by  General  Lee,  who,  with  an  inferior  force,  and 
in  presence  of  an  enemy  who  was,  he  well  knew,  intending  to 
attack  him  heavily,  maintained  a  most  extended  and  thin  line, 
and  even  gave  an  offensive  character  to  the  operations  which 
he  ordered  on  his  extreme  left. 

His  object  in  this  was  of  course  to  prevent  a  concentration 
at  any  point  in  our  lines  of  an  adequate  force  to  make  a  suc 
cessful  assault,  and  his  object  was,  as  we  have  seen,  attained. 
Whether,  however,  there  was  any  need  of  our  holding  the 
Bethesda  Church  Road,  which  necessitated  such  an  extension 
of  our  lines,  may  perhaps  be  a  question.  One  thing  is  certain, 
-  if  we  could  not  afford  to  loose  our  hold  upon  it,  we  ought  to 
have  weakened  our  line  elsewhere.  Half  the  troops  in  the 
6th  and  18th  corps  would  have  sufficed  to  hold  our  own  lines, 
and  the  remainder  should  have  been  sent  to  the  left,  where 
the  only  real  and  desperate  assault  should  have  been  made 
by  the  2d  corps. 

But  if  General  Grant  had,  after  consideration,  concluded 
that  it  would  not  be  safe  to  weaken  his  right  or  centre  in 
order  to  concentrate  on  his  left,  then  he  should  have  concluded 
to  abandon  his  attack.  No  result  that  he  could  have  hoped 
for  could,  humanly  speaking,  have  justified  an  attack  made 
without  any  dispositions  to  pour  into  a  breach  in  the  enemy's 
lines,  when  made,  a  large  body  of  troops.  If  he  had  not  the 
troops  to  use  in  this  way,  then  such  a  battle  as  this  was 
a  mere  waste  of  men. 

Nor  will  the  reconnoissance  theory  bear  examination.  I 
refer  to  General  Meade's  remark,  made  two  days  after  this 


360  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

very  battle,  "  In  this  country  I  must  fight  a  battle  to  re 
connoitre  a  position."  The  answer  to  this  is,  that  it  is  not 
worth  while  to  fight  a  battle  merely  to  reconnoitre  a  position, 
or  for  any  purpose  than  to  win  a  battle.  If  the  country  is  so 
difficult,  then  go  elsewhere.  If  you  have  not  a  sufficiently 
superior  force,  as  Sherman  had  in  his  Atlanta  campaign,  to 
flank  the  enemy  constantly  out  of  their  strong  positions,  then 
send  for  reinforcements.  Anyway,  nothing  is  gained  by  losing 
nine  or  ten  thousand  men  in  a  mere  reconnoissance.  If  it  be 
asked,  How  could  General  Meade  tell  that  his  attack  would 
not  be  successful,  I  reply,  that  he  had  nowhere  '  made  the 
dispositions  requisite  to  obtain  under  any  circumstances  more 
than  a  very  moderate  amount  of  success ;  he  had  no  corps 
in  reserve,  ready  to  be  put  in  when  and  where  the  assaulting 
force  should  have  broken  the  enemy's  lines.  If  he  could  not 
dispose  his  army  so  as  to  have  had  such  a  reserve,  he  should 
have  told  General  Grant  that  it  was  not  worth  while  to  incur 
the  necessarily  severe  losses  of  a  general  assault  on  the  enemy's 
positions,  and  that  they  had  better  cross  the  James  at  once. 
This  paper  would  be  incomplete,  did  it  not  mention  as  it 
deserves  the  horrible  neglect  of  our  wounded  men  by  General 
Grant.  Having  lost  the  battle,  he  should  at  once  have  sent  in 
a  flag  of  truce  and  asked  to  remove  his  wounded  and  bury 
his  dead.  It  would,  of  course,  have  been  a  confession  of  fail 
ure,  but  he  would  only  have  confessed  a  patent  fact.  Instead 
of  this,  he  sent  out  no  flag  till  the  evening  of  the  5th,  and 
then  asked  for  a  truce  as  a  mutual  accommodation,  and  not  as 
a  favor  to  himself.  This  caused  additional  delay,  and  it  was 
not,  says  General  C.  H.  Morgan,  chief  of  staff  of  the  2d 
corps,  till  nearly  five  full  days  after  the  assault,  when  nearly 
all  the  wounded  had  perished  from  hunger,  thirst,  and  pain, 
that  cessation  of  hostilities  took  place.  In  these  five  days 
the  sufferings  of  the  wounded  were  simply  indescribable.  The 
heat  and  consequent  thirst,  not  to  speak  of  an  entire  want  of 
food,  added  untold  agonies  to  their  tortures.  "  Better,"  says 


THE  BATTLE  OF  COLD  HARBOR  361 

Morgan  in  his  narrative,  "  better  the  consuming  fires  of  the 
Wilderness  and  the  Po  than  the  lingering,  agonizing  death 
of  these  poor  men,  whose  vain  calls  for  relief  smote  upon  the 
ears  of  their  comrades  at  every  lull  in  the  firing.  One  man 
was  brought  into  our  lines  who  had  survived  the  dreadful 
ordeal,  and  his  account  of  his  sufferings,  how  he  had  quenched 
his  thirst  by  sucking  the  dew  from  such  grass  as  he  could 
pull  at  his  side,  and  had  allayed  the  pangs  of  hunger  in  the 
same  way,  was  not  well  calculated  to  encourage  his  comrades 
to  run  any  risk  of  being  placed  in  the  same  position.  Only 
some  great  and  controlling  military  necessity,  involving  the 
lives  of  many  others,  could  justify  this  abandonment  of  the 
wounded  soldiers  to  their  wretched  fate."  With  this  opinion 
we  shall  all  doubtless  agree.  And  I  may  remark  that  nothing 
showed  the  great  courage,  patriotism,  and  discipline  of  our 
soldiers  more  than  the  fact  that  after  such  shocking  and 
inhuman  neglect,  they  were  found  in  a  few  days  assailing 
the  works  at  Petersburg  with  their  customary  bravery. 

General  Morgan,  by  the  way,  says  that  the  statement,  in 
Swinton's  Army  of  the  Potomac,  that  an  order  was  given  for 
a  new  assault  which  was  disregarded  by  the  soldiers,  is  an 
absurdity  and  an  impossibility,  when  ascribed  to  the  2d  corps. 
In  fact,  there  is  no  truth  in  the  story. 

The  reports  of  this  part  of  the  campaign  are  meagre.  "  We 
have  nothing,"  writes  Colonel  Scott,  the  custodian  of  the 
War  Records,  "from  Breckinridge,  Hill,  or  Heth,  Barlow, 
Gibbon,  or  Wright,  in  reference  to  Cold  Harbor."  Hancock's 
report  is  excellent ;  Morgan's  narrative  is  also  admirable  and 
naturally  fuller  and  more  outspoken  than  the  official  report 
of  his  chief.  He  says  of  the  2d  corps  that  it  here  "  received 
a  mortal  blow,  and  never  again  was  the  same  body  of  men." 
Between  the  Rapidan  and  the  James  the  loss  in  this  corps 
alone  was  about  400  daily.  He  closes  his  description  with  this 
remark :  "  The  sacrifice  at  Cold  Harbor,  where  we  lost  about 
3000  men  and  the  enemy  as  many  hundred,  ought  to  have  been 


362  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  last  of  that  nature,  but  we  shall  see  the  life-blood  of  the 
corps  was  to  be  drained  still  more  before  there  came  an  end  to 
indiscriminate  and  useless  assaults  upon  the  enemy's  chosen 
positions." 

Of  Grant's  and  Meade's  reports  we  have  already  spoken. 

Badeau,  who  is  an  indiscriminate  eulogist  of  Grant,  dwells 
upon  the  fact  that,  at  the  very  time  that  Lee  was  writing 
home  about  his  victory,  "  the  national  army  was  intrenching 
half  a  mile  nearer  the  rebel  line  than  in  the  morning."  With 
such  notions  of  what  constitutes  success  in  battle,  it  is  need 
less  to  say  that  Badeau  will  hardly  help  the  military  reader 
much.  He  calls  Cold  Harbor  "  one  of  a  series  of  terrible 
blows  which  Grant  was  dealing  the  rebel  army,"  •  —  a  curious 
inversion  of  the  fact,  or  rather  a  misstatement  of  it.  Doubtless 
the  blow  was  terrible,  but  only  to  us ;  it  was  utterly  unsuccess 
ful,  considered  as  a  blow;  its  only  effect  was  to  weaken 
and  dispirit  our  army,  and,  according  to  Swinton,  almost  to 
demoralize  the  President  and  Cabinet. 

In  summing  up  the  whole  narrative,  I  repeat  that  it  seems 
to  me  that  Grant  lost  the  initiative  by  his  useless  delays  on 
the  Pamunkey  and  Totopotomoy ;  that  he  might  by  alacrity 
and  dash  either  have  overwhelmed  Early,  or  seized  the  New 
Bridge  and  Mechanicsville  roads,  or  one  of  them,  and  forced 
Lee  to  attack  him ;  that  he  did,  however,  lose  something 
by  bad  luck  in  the  delays  which  happened  to  the  18th  and 
2d  corps  in  concentrating  at  Cold  Harbor ;  but  after  all,  that 
his  plan  of  the  battle  and  his  preparations  for  success  in  it 
were  extremely  defective,  and  that  nothing  but  failure  could 
have  been  expected. 


XV 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864 

BY 

JOHN  C.   ROPES,  ESQ. 


Read  before  the  Society  May  19,  1884 


GEANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864 

THE  campaign  of  1864  in  Virginia  has  a  character  altogether 
its  own.  It  stands  out  among  the  other  campaigns  of  the  war 
with  a  sort  of  terrible  impressiveness.  Its  resoluteness,  its 
unconquerable  obstinacy,  its  persistent  hopefulness,  its  heroic 
quality,  command  our  admiration.  But  its  terribly  bloody 
battles,  its  encounters  of  every  day,  aimless,  desperate,  and 
sanguinary,  the  noble  trees  cut  down  by  musket  bullets,  the 
horrible  thickets  where  the  veterans  of  North  and  South 
struggled  in  blind  and  deadly  combat,  the  thousands  upon 
thousands  of  brave  men  slain  and  maimed,  and,  above  all,  the 
indecisive  results,  amaze,  terrify,  repel,  dishearten  us. 

Let  us  endeavor  to  do  it  justice  this  evening. 

Besides  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  operations  of 
this  campaign  of  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  particu 
larly  later  on,  I  may  remark  on  the  striking  contrast  which 
this  campaign  affords  to  those  of  Generals  Burnside  and 
Hooker,  each  of  which  ingloriously  terminated  in  a  single  and 
disastrous  battle,  fought  within  a  few  miles  of  the  Wilderness, 
where  General  Grant  had  the  first  of  his  desperate  encounters 
with  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  The  military  student  is 
also  naturally  led  to  compare  this  campaign  with  that  of  Gen 
eral  McClellan  in  1862,  the  only  other  serious  and  formidable 
invasion  of  Virginia  undertaken  in  the  war,  and  he  finds 
everything  in  the  one  utterly  different  from  everything  in  the 
other,  from  the  plan  of  the  operations  to  the  characteristics 
of  the  commanding  general. 

Few  campaigns  in  history  have  been  the  subjects  of  such 
diverse  and  even  opposite  judgments  as  this  which  we  are 
to  study  this  evening.  General  Grant  tells  us  in  his  Report 
that  he  had,  before  he  commenced  operations,  "  determined 


366  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

to  hammer  continuously  against  the  armed  force  of  the  enemy 
and  his  resources,  until  by  mere  attrition,  if  in  no  other  way, 
there  should  be  nothing  left  to  him  but  submission."  This 
determination  he  certainly  carried  into  effect  in  his  campaign 
from  the  Rapidan  to  Petersburg,  as  the  bloody  assaults  at  the 
Wilderness,  Spottsylvania,  Cold  Harbor,  and  Petersburg  bear 
witness.  As  to  the  results  of  this  policy,  opinions  differ. 
Swinton  considers  it  a  failure,  that  it  gravely  impaired  the 
efficiency  of  our  own  army,  and  inflicted  no  injury  of  conse 
quence  on  that  of  General  Lee.  Badeau  and  his  school,  how 
ever,  contend  that,  by  this  continuous  assaulting,  the  spirit 
of  Lee's  army  was  broken  and  its  strength  seriously  reduced  ; 
that,  to  use  Badeau's  own  words,  "  the  fighting  between  the 
Rapidan  and  the  James  in  1864  did  more  than  any  circum 
stance  or  event  or  series  of  events  of  the  war  to  accomplish 
that  for  which  the  war  was  waged ; "  that  "  the  losses  were 
the  price  at  which  only  the  country  could  be  saved." 

But  let  us  now  look  at  the  matter  for  ourselves. 

After  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  in  which  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  had  won  a  great  victory  over  its  antagonist,  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  it  would  seem  that  it  should 
have  been  the  policy  of  the  North  to  prosecute  the  campaign 
in  Virginia  with  vigor,  and  to  reinforce  the  army  under  Gen 
eral  Meade,  so  that  that  gallant  and  energetic  officer  could 
have  accomplished  some  striking  success  in  the  autumn  of 
1863.  Various  causes,  however,  interfered  with  this  policy 
being  carried  out.  The  critical  condition  of  the  army  of  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans  after  the  defeat  at  Chickamauga  in  the  latter 
part  of  September  caused  the  government  to  send  to  its  relief 
the  llth  and  12th  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Some 
fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  men,  moreover,  were  sent  to  New 
York  and  other  places  to  put  down  the  draft  riots,  which  had, 
in  New  York  at  any  rate,  assumed  alarming  proportions. 
General  Meade  thus  found  himself  with  an  army  hardly  supe 
rior  in  numbers  to  that  of  General  Lee,  who  in  October 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      367 

undertook  to  force  him  to  a  battle  on  disadvantageous  terms. 
General  Meade,  finding  his  right  flank  turned,  was  obliged 
to  fall  back  from  Ctilpeper  to  and  across  Bull  Run,  suffering, 
however,  no  loss,  and  inflicting  a  smart  check  on  his  adversary 
at  Bristoe  Station,  which  was  followed  in  a  few  weeks  by  the 
brilliant  feat  of  arms  performed  by  a  division  of  the  6th  corps 
(Russell's)  in  the  capture  of  the . enemy's  works  at  Rappa- 
hannock  Station,  with  about  fifteen  hundred  prisoners,  four 
guns,  and  eight  standards. 

In  November  the  armies  took  up  their  positions  for  the 
winter  on  the  Rapidan,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  though 
small  in  numbers,  being  in  unusual  spirits  and  excellent  con 
dition.  The  promising  plan  conceived  by  General  Meade  of 
forcing  an  engagement  near  Mine  Run  with  half  of  Lee's 
army,  while  the  remainder  were  stationed  in  their  distant 
cantonments,  failed,  owing  to  the  blundering  of  some  of  his 
corps  commanders,  and  the  armies  went  again  into  winter 
quarters.  Meantime  General  Grant,  who  had  superseded 
General  Rosecrans  in  the  West,  had  won  the  decisive  victory 
of  Missionary  Ridge  or  Chattanooga,  and  had  been  created 
a  lieutenant-general.  During  the  winter  Congress  took  the 
unusually  wise  step  of  intrusting  to  this  distinguished  officer 
the  control  of  all  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States.  In 
assuming  this  command,  General  Grant  did  not  propose  to 
take  the  personal  charge  of  either  of  the  two  great  armies  that 
were  to  operate  in  the  East  and  in  the  West :  the  one  was 
still  to  be  commanded  by  General  Meade  ;  General  Sherman 
was  naturally  placed  in  charge  of  the  other.  Nevertheless 
General  Grant  himself  determined  to  accompany  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  in  its  campaign  in  Virginia. 

Let  us  now  take  a  glance  at  the  situation  of  the  two  armies 
shortly  before  the  opening  of  the  campaign.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  encamped  near  Culpeper,  its  pickets  watch 
ing  the  banks  of  the  Rapidan.  On  the  other  side  of  that 
river  and  west  of  Mine  Run,  behind  strong  intrenchments 


368  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

running  nearly  north  and  south,  lay  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia. 

At  Annapolis,  the  9th  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  being  refreshed  after  its  arduous  campaign  in  the  West, 
and  was  receiving  additions  to  its  numerical  strength  in  the 
form  of  a  raw  white  division  and  another  raw  black  division. 

At  and  near  Washington  the  government  retained  between 
forty  and  fifty  thousand  good  troops ;  many  of  them,  it  is 
true,  without  actual  experience  in  warfare,  but  almost  all 
having  arrived  at  a  very  creditable  state  of  discipline. 

At  the  mouth  of  the  James  a  large  force  was  concentrating, 
consisting  of  the  10th  and  18th  corps,  commanded  by  Generals 
Gillmore  and  Smith  (Baldy),  the  whole  under  the  control  of 
the  famous  General  Benjamin  F.  Butler. 

Unconscious  of  this  formidable  concentration,  the  Richmond 
authorities  were  using  the  garrisons  of  Richmond  and  Peters 
burg  for  the  recapture  of  some  unimportant  posts  in  North 
Carolina. 

Under  these  circumstances  General  Grant  determines  upon 
two  lines  of  operation  in  the  coming  campaign.  While  he, 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  General  Meade  and  the 
9th  corps  under  General  Burnside,  operates  against  Lee  and 
his  army  on  the  Rapidan,  Butler,  with  the  two  corps  under 
him,  numbering  35,000  to  40,000  men,  is  to  land  at  Bermuda 
Hundred  and  take  Richmond. 

Tempting  as  this  project  certainly  was  at  first  blush,  it 
was  a  great  and  perhaps  an  inexcusable  mistake  for  Grant 
ever  to  have  entertained  it.  A  force  of  10,000  men  could  have 
threatened  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  with  the  aid  of  the 
fleet,  quite  as  well  as  a  force  of  40,000  men.  Bermuda  Hun 
dred,  though  admirably  adapted  as  a  base  of  operations 
against  Petersburg,  is  by  no  means  well  situated  as  a  base  for 
a  force  operating  against  Richmond.  Such  a  force  would  be 
obliged  to  have  a  large  detachment  in  the  lines  at  Bermuda 
Hundred,  to  guard  against  an  attack  from  the  south,  while  it 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      369 

was  marching  and  fighting  its  way  for  sixteen  miles  up  to 
the  defenses  of  Richmond.  In  fact,  as  General  Humphreys 
intimates,  Grant  should  have  instructed  Butler  to  take  Peters 
burg  instead  of  Richmond.  This  Butler  could  no  doubt  have 
done. 

Lastly,  to  put  such  an  important  operation  as  this  under 
the  charge  of  a  civilian  who  had  jiever  made  any  military 
reputation  was  really  an  unwarrantable  piece  of  folly.  If,  as 
Badeau  says,  Mr.  Lincoln  insisted  upon  it  on  political  grounds, 
it  would  have  done  Mr.  Lincoln  no  harm  for  General  Grant 
to  have  reminded  him,  in  distinct  and  not  to  be  misunderstood 
speech,  that  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  had  placed 
him,  Grant,  in  charge  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  for 
the  very  purpose  of  seeing  to  it  that  this  sort  of  thing  should 
not  occur  in  the  future,  as  it  had  so  often  in  the  past.  Had 
Grant  stood  his  ground,  Lincoln  would  unquestionably  have 
given  way. 

The  first  mistake  of  the  campaign,  then,  was  dividing  the 
operations  between  two  armies.  Incidental  to  this  was  the 
appointment  to  the  command  of  the  cooperating  army  of 
a  wholly  unfit  man,  and  also  giving  him  erroneous  instructions 
regarding  his  objective,  which  should  have  been  Petersburg  or 
Richmond.  If  we  add  to  these  mistakes  another,  —  that  in  this 
disposition  of  his  total  available  force  Grant  did  not  reserve 
enough  for  the  main  army,  that  he  was  from  time  to  time 
crippled  by  not  having  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  the  troops, 
or  some  part  of  them,  which  he  had  so  lavishly  bestowed  upon 
Butler,  or  allowed  to  be  retained  at  Washington,  —  we  have 
a  serious  set  of  mistakes  to  begin  with. 

With  his  main  force,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  General 
Grant  intended  taking  the  overland  route  to  Richmond.  For 
this  he  has  been  severely  and,  it  seems  to  me,  unjustly  criti 
cised.  That  in  course  of  time  Grant  and  his  army  made  their 
appearance  on  the  old  Peninsula,  that  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor  was  fought  close  to  the  very  ground  of  that  of  Gaines's 


370  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Mill  two  years  before,  seem  in  the  minds  of  many  people  to 
show  convincingly  that  Grant  should  have  transported  his 
army  by  water  to  the  Peninsula,  even  as  McClellan  had  done 
before  him. 

But  this  criticism  loses  sight  of  several  of  the  important 
factors  in  the  problem.  It  could  hardly  be  possible  for  Gen 
eral  Grant  in  the  spring  of  1864  to  transport  his  army  to  the 
Peninsula  much  more  quickly  than  General  McClellan  trans 
ported  his  army  in  the  spring  of  1862,  and  that  was  a  matter 
of  three  or  four  weeks.  Nor  was  it  to  be  expected  that  General 
Lee  would  remain  on  the  Rapidan  while  his  adversary  was 
sending  his  troops  to  Fort  Monroe  or  Bermuda  Hundred ;  it 
may  be  taken  as  certain  that  he  would  either  have  followed  the 
example  of  Joe  Johnston  and  fallen  back  to  the  neighborhood 
of  Richmond,  which  he  could  have  done  in  infinitely  less  time 
than  it  would  have  taken  General  Grant  to  get  there  by  water 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  or  else  that  he  would  have 
crossed  the  Rapidan  and  marched  boldly  upon  Washington. 
Had  he  adopted  the  first  course,  I  see  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  first  battle  of  the  campaign,  though  fought  on  the 
banks  of  the  Chickahominy,  would  have  been  any  less  mur 
derous  or  indecisive  than  the  sanguinary  struggles  in  the 
Wilderness,  at  Spottsylvania,  or  at  Cold  Harbor  itself.  Had 
he  adopted  the  second  course,  it  is  morally  certain  that  a  part 
at  least,  and  very  likely  a  large  part,  of  Grant's  army  would 
have  been  retained  in  the  neighborhood  of  Washington  to 
meet  the  threatened  invasion. 

Then  another  thing  must  be  taken  into  account.  The  real 
object  of  the  campaign  was  to  effect,  if  possible,  the  destruc 
tion  of  General  Lee's  army,  and  the  farther  from  his  base  of 
operations  General  Lee  could  be  induced  to  fight,  the  more 
chances  there  were  of  this  object  being  attained.  It  is  true 
that  the  country  over  which  the  army  must  pass  was  a  country 
abounding  in  good  positions  for  an  army  standing  on  the 
defensive ;  it  is  true  that  no  army  ever  stood  on  the  defensive 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      371 

with  more  tenacity  than  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia ;  but 
it  must  be  remembered  that  it  showed  the  same  tenacity  at 
Cold  Harbor  and  at  Petersburg  that  it  did  at  Spottsylvania 
and  on  the  North  Anna. 

There  was  but  one  way  which  was  certain  to  give  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  the  advantage  of  choosing  its  battle-ground, 
and  that  was  the  way  adopted  by  General  Sherman  in  his 
Atlanta  campaign,  which  was  conducted  contemporaneously 
with  this  campaign  of  Grant's  in  Virginia.  That  way  was  to 
flank  the  enemy  out  of  position  after  position,  until  by  some 
fortunate  combination  of  circumstances  he  could  be  brought 
to  bay  in  a  place  where  our  great  superiority  of  numbers  would 
tell ;  and  had  General  Grant,  before  he  crossed  the  Kapidan, 
reinforced  his  army  with  the  garrison  of  Washington  and, 
I  may  add,  with  one  of  Butler's  corps  also,  no  one,  in  my  judg 
ment,  would  ever  have  had  reason  to  complain  of  his  choice 
of  the  overland  route  to  Richmond.  With  such  a  force  at 
his  command  he  could  have  received  General  Lee's  attack 
at  the  Wilderness  with  his  main  body  and  also  have  seized 
Spottsylvania  with  30,000  or  40,000  men.  As  it  was,  fight 
ing  that  battle  as  he  did,  with  an  army  that  had  never  acted 
together  until  the  fight  began  (for  the  9th  corps  as  reorgan 
ized  had  not  even  wintered  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac), 
he  was  afraid  to  put  in  all  the  troops  that  he  had,  and  the 
largest  division  in  Hancock's  corps  remained  inactive  at  the 
crisis  of  the  fight.  How  different  this  from  those  elaborate 
and  admirable  turning  movements  conducted  by  Sherman's 
army  in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  in  the  course  of  which  it 
was  constantly  found  perfectly  possible  to  hold  Johnston  in 
position  with  the  bulk  of  the  army,  while  a  large  force,  fully 
able  to  act  for  the  time  being  alone,  was  planted  upon  his 
communications.  But  I  am  anticipating. 

General  Grant  proposed,  as  we  have  seen,  to  operate  against 
Lee  and  his  army ;  he  hoped  to  destroy  or  at  least  substan 
tially  to  cripple  it  in  battle. 


372  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

That  army  numbered,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  including  con 
scripts  and  men  on  leave  recently  returned,  about  56,000 
infantry,  all  good  troops  in  old  organizations,  and  about 
14,000  artillery  and  cavalry,  in  all  about  70,000  men.  It  was 
organized  in  three  corps ;  the  1st  under  Longstreet,  the  2d 
under  Ewell,  and  the  3d  under  A.  P,  Hill.  It  was  an  admir 
able  body  of  troops ;  as  an  army  it  was  superior  to  any  of 
our  armies.  It  had  certain  great  advantages  over  any  and 
all  of  our  armies :  it  was  homogeneous  in  origin  (the  officers 
and  men  were  all  Americans)  ;  it  was  a  veteran  army  (every 
regiment  in  it  had  been  in  it  in  1861,  or  at  least  in  the  early 
days  of  1862)  ;  it  was  organized  on  sound  military  principles 
(every  corps  commander  and  nearly  every  division  com 
mander  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  —  there  were  no  polit 
ical  generals  in  it)  ;  it  had  remained  under  the  same  officers 
from  the  beginning ;  no  statesmen  had  tried  experiments  with 
it ;  it  felt  and  always  had  felt  that  it  was  in  the  hands  of 
a  high-minded,  brave,  skillful  leader,  and  to  General  Lee 
every  officer  and  every  private  yielded  a  cheerful  and  unhes 
itating  devotion. 

Compare  this  ideal  state  of  things  with  that  which  existed 
in  the  camp  on  the  north  side  of  the  Rapidan,  where  during 
this  very  winter  the  commanding  general  was  obliged  to 
defend  his  action  at  Gettysburg,  before  a  committee  of  civil 
ians  in  Washington,  in  refutation  of  the  insubordinate  slan 
ders  of  his  own  officers  ;  and  where  finally  a  general  arrives 
from  the  West  to  take  hold  vigorously  of  the  much-enduring 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  ignorant,  grossly  ignorant  of  its  his 
tory,  and  thinking  that  it  only  needs  to  be  fought  thoroughly 
to  destroy  its  formidable  antagonist. 

For  General  Grant  entirely  underestimated  the  difficulty 
of  the  task  before  him.  The  army  in  front  of  him  was,  as  he 
ought  to  have  known,  an  admirable  army  and  admirably 
commanded.  The  country  which  that  army  proposed  to  de 
fend  was  eminently  suited  for  defense.  The  only  advantage 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864       373 

Grant  could  get  would  be  in  superiority  of  numbers.  But 
what  steps  did  he  take  to  secure  this  ? 

The  three  corps  of  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  now 
consisted,  the  2d,  5th,  and  6th,  commanded  respectively  by 
Generals  Hancock,  Warren,  and  Sedgwick  (for  the  1st  and 
3d  had  been  absorbed  into  the  2d  and  5th  during  the  winter, 
a  proceeding  of  very  questionable  utility),  comprised  73,390 
men,  which  enumeration  includes  all  those  worthless  recruits 
who  were  enlisted  under  that  wretched  system  of  heavy 
bounties  which  so  unwisely  prevailed  at  this  time  in  most  of 
the  Northern  States.  There  were  also  included  in  the  above 
estimate  not  a  few  brand-new  regiments  ;  for  the  North, 
alone  of  all  civilized  communities,  adopted  the  wasteful  and 
suicidal  plan  of  allowing  her  veteran  regiments  to  die  out 
from  sheer  depletion  and  keeping  up  the  apparent  numerical 
force  of  the  army  by  perfectly  raw  troops  in  perfectly  new 
organizations,  simply  to  be  food  for  powder,  —  pigeons,  as 
an  old  officer  said  to  me  the  other  day,  for  Lee's  veterans  to 
shoot  at. 

But  it  is  well  that  it  should  be  known  that  at  this  time  in 
the  war  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  get  men  to  go  where 
they  were  most  needed ;  that  is,  under  the  colors  of  some  old 
regiments,  where  they  would  most  speedily  learn  their  trade 
and  soonest  be  able  to  share  the  dangers  and  labors  of  actual 
warfare.  The  volunteers  of  this  period  preferred  new  organ 
izations,  many  of  which  were  raised  as  heavy  artillery  regi 
ments,  not  for  service  in  the  field,  but  only  for  the  arduous 
and  dangerous  duty  of  defending  the  forts  on  the  seacoast 
against  the  enemy's  cruisers.  Massachusetts  alone  raised 
in  the  autumn  of  1863  and  winter  of  1863  and  1864  about 
20,000  men  in  new  organizations. 

To  return  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  There  were,  no 
doubt,  exclusive  of  worthless  bounty-jumpers  and  such  trash, 
some  65,000  veteran  infantry  in  the  three  corps.  But  this  was 
only  about  10,000  more  than  the  infantry  of  the  Army  of 


374  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Northern  Virginia.  To  be  sure  the  cavalry  and  artillery  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  numbered  some  22,000  men  ;  but 
neither  of  these  arms  could  be  relied  on  to  take  the  place  of 
infantry.  In  fact,  Grant  does  not  seem  in  this  campaign  to 
have  understood  how  to  use  cavalry  to  the  best  advantage. 
However  this  may  be,  more  infantry  and  that  of  the  best 
quality  was  imperatively  needed,  or  the  attempt  to  force  Lee 
to  a  battle  on  equal  terms  might  as  well  be  abandoned. 

Here,  then,  was  a  question  to  be  settled,  a  matter  to  be 
arranged,  of  vital  importance.  It  was  also  a  question  capable 
of  being  settled  in  a  satisfactory  manner.  General  Grant 
could  choose  whether  he  would  take  with  him  the  troops 
which  formed  the  garrisons  of  Washington  and  its  depend 
encies,  or  one  or  even  both  of  the  corps  of  Butler,  or  the 
9th  corps.  It  is  true  that  whatever  selection  he  might  make, 
the  result  would  be,  not  to  increase  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
but  to  add  a  new  corps  to  that  army ;  he  could  not  fill  up  the 
ranks  of  the  old  regiments,  and  thereby  add  to  the  strength 
of  the  old  army  ;  the  best  he  could  do  would  be  to  add  a  new 
body  of  troops  to  the  old  army.  Hence  he  should  have  been 
doubly  careful.  The  troops  at  and  near  Washington,  for 
which  he  was  obliged  to  send  after  the  frightful  losses  at 
the  Wilderness  and  Spottsylvania  and  the  expiration  of  the 
term  of  service  of  so  many  regiments,  might  just  as  well  have 
crossed  the  Rapidan  with  him  on  the  3d  of  May.  But  this 
course  was  apparently  not  even  thought  of.  Nor  did  he  care 
to  deprive  Butler  of  any  portion  of  the  force  from  which  he 
was  expecting  such  a  feat  as  the  capture  of  Richmond.  He 
had  recourse  to  the  9th  corps,  the  very  poorest  choice  of  the 
three.  This  corps  consisted  of  about  20,000  infantry,  of  whom 
only  about  6000  were  veterans  and  good  troops ;  but  these 
had  been  marched l  from  New  Berne,  N.  C.,  to  Vicksburg  in 
Mississippi,  and  Knoxville  in  Tennessee,  and  were  by  no 
means  in  the  excellent  condition  in  which  the  mass  of  the  2d, 

1  They  were  mainly  transported  by  rail  and  boat.  —  ED. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      375 

5th,  and  6th  corps  unquestionably  were  in  the  winter  of  1863 
and  1864.  Then  there  were  some  14,000  men  that  had  never 
been  organized  until  this  winter,  and  had  never  of  course  seen 
the  face  of  the  enemy.  A  large  portion  of  these  were  in  so- 
called  veteran  regiments,  so  called  because  officered  by  officers 
drawn  from  various  regiments  in  service,  but  who  had  never 
acted  together  in  any  organization ;  the  remainder  consisted 
of  a  division  of  black  troops,  recently  enlisted.  Not  a  single 
regiment  of  either  of  these  classes  had  ever  been  in  the  field. 
Grant  says  in  his  Eeport  that  probably  two  thirds  of  Burn- 
side's  command  were  composed  of  new  troops. 

Such  was  the  force  selected  by  General  Grant  to  augment 
the  infantry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  their  hand-to- 
hand  struggle  with  the  veterans  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  If  anything  could  add  to  the  manifest  inadequacy 
of  Grant's  arrangements,  it  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  9th 
corps  was  not  to  be  incorporated  with  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  but  was  to  be  a  sort  of  independent  little  army  by  itself. 
This  was  to  save  General  Burnside's  feelings,  as  he  ranked 
General  Meade.  Even  if  it  had  hurt  Burnside's  feelings,  such 
an  arrangement  as  this,  interfering  so  directly  as  it  did  with 
the  utility  and  efficiency  of  the  organization  of  the  army, 
should  never  have  been  thought  of  for  a  moment.  But  it  was 
wholly  unnecessary.  There  have  been  many  greater  soldiers 
than  General  Burnside.  But  there  never  was  any  one  who 
would  more  cheerfully  sacrifice  a  technical  point  of  this  kind 
to  the  needs  of  the  public  service.  When  on  the  24th  of 
May  the  9th  corps  was  incorporated  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  Burnside  never  murmured. 

From  the  above  sketch  it  is  apparent  that  General  Grant 
could  count,  in  the  arduous  campaign  on  which  he  proposed  to 
enter,  upon  only  a  little  over  70,000  veteran  infantry ;  and 
as  infantry  must  be  the  main  reliance  of  a  general  warring  in 
a  difficult  country  like  Virginia,  it  seems  to  me  that  he  may 
fairly  be  charged  with  not  having  made  a  sufficient  prepara- 


376  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

tion  for  his  task.  For  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  70,000 
infantry  could,  except  by  some  fortunate  combination  of  cir 
cumstances,  obtain  any  very  material  success  over  a  well-organ 
ized  and  well-commanded  force  of  56,000  infantry  in  a  country 
like  Virginia.  Grant  was  not  going  to  be  strong  enough  to 
force  Lee  out  of  his  positions  by  detaching  portions  of  his 
army  to  operate  on  his  communications,  as  Sherman  was  going 
to  do  in  his  Atlanta  campaign.  And  every  attempt  of  Grant 
to  drive  Lee  by  main  force  out  of  his  intrenchments  was  going 
to  cost  us  at  least  two  for  one,  so  that  the  margin  now  exist 
ing  in  our  favor  would  speedily  become  reduced  to  a  nullity, 
and  reinforcements,  which  should  have  originally  formed  part 
of  the  army^  would  be  imperatively  needed  to  keep  up  a  com 
paratively  useless  numerical  superiority.  I  say  "  a  compara 
tively  useless  numerical  superiority"  advisedly;  for  where 
the  strength  of  a  numerically  weaker  adversary  is  doubled  or 
quadrupled  by  reason  of  the  nature  of  the  country  or  by 
intrenchments,  a  numerical  superiority,  to  be  good  for  any 
thing,  should  be  large  enough  to  enable  the  stronger  army, 
by  mano3uvring  upon  the  communications  of  the  weaker  one, 
to  force  it  from  point  to  point,  until  it  can  either  be  attacked 
with  a  good  chance  of  success,  or  else  compelled  to  take  the 
burden  of  attack  upon  itself  to  preserve  its  communications. 
Anything  less  than  this  is  comparatively  useless ;  in  fact,  it 
tempts  the  general  commanding  the  large  force  to  fritter 
away  his  superior  numbers  in  assaults  upon  an  enemy  in  posi 
tion  and  intrenched,  from  which  he  can  expect  little,  and  in 
which  he  is  sure  to  lose  heavily. 

General  Grant,  it  will  be  remembered,  reserved  to  himself 
the  general  direction  of  the  campaign.  It  was  for  him  to  say 
where  the  army  should  go,  when  the  army  should  fight,  and, 
practically,  how  the  army  should  fight;  that  is,  with  what 
portions  of  the  army  any  particular  attacks  should  be  made. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  proposed  that  General  Meade  should 
make  all  the  arrangements  necessary  for  the  carrying  out  of 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA   IN  1864      377 

his  wishes  and  should  charge  himself  personally  with  the 
direction  of  the  troops  on  the  march  and  in  action.  I  think 
I  am  warranted  in  saying  that  this  arrangement  worked 
badly.  Neither  General  Grant  nor  General  Meade  had  his 
full  share  of  responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  the  operations  ; 
neither  officer  carried  the  full  amount  of  the  legitimate  respon 
sibility  of  a  general  commanding  an  army.  It  was  impos 
sible  for  Grant  to  give  such  intelligent  and  careful  orders  in 
regard  to  the  direction  and  management  of  the  army  as  if  he 
had  been  the  only  general  in  charge  of  it.  It  was  impossible 
for  Meade  to  feel  a  deep  sense  of  personal  responsibility  for 
the  success  of  operations  which  he  himself  had  not  planned. 
The  two  officers  acted  indeed  in  entire  harmony  throughout 
the  campaign ;  but  as  it  was  for  one  of  them  to  order  what 
the  other  was  to  do,  and  as  the  other  did  only  what  the  first 
had  ordered,  many  things  were  ordered  which  could  not  be 
done,  and  many  things  were  done  which  ought  not  to  have 
been  ordered. 

With  this  inadequate  force  of  veterans,  this  large  infusion 
of  raw  troops  in  fresh  organizations,  this  new  and  untried 
arrangement  of  a  general  commanding  all  the  armies  of  the 
country  accompanying  two  distinct  armies, —  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  the  9th  corps,  each  under  its  own  independent 
commander, —  in  a  campaign  planned  by  himself  and  to  be 
executed  by  them  with  a  very  imperfect  knowledge  of  the 
previous  campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  a  very 
inadequate  notion  of  the  strength  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  General  Grant  entered  upon  his  new  campaign. 
His  policy,  as  we  have  seen,  was  to  hammer  continually ; 
but  even  if  his  policy  had  been  theoretically  sound,  the  army 
of  Lee  was  not  the  army  on  which  to  put  such  a  policy  into 
operation,  at  least  with  the  force  which  Grant  commanded. 

The  first  operation  of  the  campaign  was  of  course  to  cross 
the  Rapidan.  There  seems  to  have  been  some  little  doubt  as 
to  the  relative  merits  of  crossing  above  or  below  Lee's  army  ; 


378  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

but  it  was  finally  and  wisely  decided  to  cross  below.  Accord 
ingly  at  midnight  of  the  3d  of  May  the  2d  corps,  preceded  by 
Gregg's  cavalry  division,  crossed  at  Ely's  Ford  and  moved  to 
Chancellorsville  ;  while  the  5th  corps,  preceded  by  Wilson's 
cavalry  division,  crossed  at  Germanna  Ford  and  moved  to  the 
Old  Wilderness  Tavern  at  the  intersection  of  the  Germanna 
Plank  Road  with  the  Orange  and  Fredericksburg  Pike.  The 
6th  corps  followed  the  5th  corps,  and,  having  crossed  the 
river,  halted.  One  division  of  cavalry  was  retained  to  guard 
the  trains  which  crossed  at  Ely's  and  adjacent  fords  ;  and  as  it 
was  not  practicable  for  all  the  wagons  to  cross  on  the  4th,  the 
three  great  corps  remained  where  they  were,  protecting  them 
against  possible  attack,  until  the  morning  of  the  5th.  Mean 
time  Burnside,  whose  corps  had  been  for  some  days  guarding 
the  railroad  between  Culpeper  and  Washington,  was  ordered 
to  join  the  main  body  by  a  forced  march. 

The  region  into  which  our  army  had  now  entered  was 
known  as  the  Wilderness.  It  was  not  an  ordinary  wooded 
country.  It  was  covered  with  a  tangled  and  almost  impen 
etrable  undergrowth,  in  which  it  was  well-nigh  impossible  to 
handle  large  bodies  of  troops.  It  consisted  of  a  succession 
of  thickets  with  a  very  few  open  spaces.  Running  through  it 
from  west  to  east  was  the  Orange  Pike,  and,  a  mile  or  two 
south  of  that,  the  Orange  Plank  Road.  These  roads  starting 
from  Orange  Court  House,  running  in  a  direction  generally 
parallel,  come  together  a  short  distance  west  of  Chancellors 
ville.  In  the  Wilderness  they  are  about  a  couple  of  miles 
apart.  The  road  from  Germanna  Ford  which  the  5th  corps 
had  taken  intersected  the  Pike  close  to  the  Tavern.  Pursuing 
the  Germanna  Road  further  to  the  south,  we  strike  the  Orange 
Plank ;  and  very  near  this,  the  Brock  Road,  which  is  almost 
a  continuation  of  the  Germanna  Plank,  leads  to  Todd's  Tavern 
and  Spottsylvania  Court  House. 

It  was  of  the  first  importance  that  Grant  should  get  his 
army  out  of  the  Wilderness  at  once.  It  was  no  place  for  him 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      379 

to  fight  in.  None  but  veterans  could  stand  any  chance  in 
those  bewildering  thickets.  Further  to  the  south,  at  Spott- 
sylvania,  and  further  to  the  west,  beyond  Parker's  Store,  the 
country  was  more  open. 

But  Grant,  as  we  have  seen,  was  delayed  by  the  trains 
consisting  of  some  4000  wagons,  and  no  progress  was  made 
on  the  4th  of  May. 

On  the  5th  the  march  was  resumed.  The  2d  corps,  pre 
ceded  by  the  cavalry,  was  to  take  a  circuitous  route  through 
Todd's  Tavern  out  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  —  a  road  south 
erly  of  the  Orange  Plank,  and  of  the  same  general  direction, 
—  towards  Shady  Grove  Church.  The  5th  corps  was  to 
move  out  on  the  Pike  and  Plank,  and  occupy  Parker's  Store, 
opening  communications  with  Hancock  on  the  south.  The 
6th  corps  was  to  proceed  to  the  Wilderness  Tavern.  The  9th 
corps  was  to  join  the  army  as  soon  as  possible. 

Meantime  General  Lee,  who  had  observed  the  movement 
of  the  army,  determined  to  attack  it  while  it  was  yet  in  the 
Wilderness,  hoping  no  doubt  to  repeat  the  experience  of  the 
year  before,  when  his  audacity  and  enterprise  at  Chancellors- 
ville  had  proved  too  much  for  General  Hooker.  Unfortu 
nately  for  him,  Longstreet  was  some  distance  away,  but  Ewell 
and  Hill  were  available  for  immediate  action.  Ewell  con 
sequently  pushed  his  way  along  the  Pike,  and  Hill  along 
the  Plank  Road  ;  nevertheless  Lee  did  not  desire  to  bring  on 
a  battle  before  Longstreet  could  come  up.  He  wished  merely 
to  detain  our  army  in  the  Wilderness  until  the  next  day,  when 
he  expected  to  have  his  troops  all  in  hand. 

No  sooner,  however,  did  Warren's  pickets  report  the  enemy 
on  the  Pike  than  Grant  and  Meade  ordered  that  officer  to 
attack  with  his  whole  corps.  It  is  no  secret  that  the  best 
officers  of  the  5th  corps  urged  that  the  attack  should  be 
deferred  at  least  until  the  6th  corps  had  got  up  on  the  right. 
But  nothing  would  do  but  to  attack  where  they  were,  supports 
or  no  supports,  connections  or  no  connections.  And  gallantly 


380  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  5th  corps  went  in.  They  broke  some  of  the  enemy's  brigades, 
but  finally  all  their  divisions  were  either  flanked  or  turned, 
and  the  corps  as  a  whole  was  repulsed  with  very  serious  loss 
in  men,  besides  two  guns. 

Contemporaneously  with  this  movement,  Getty's  division  of 
the  6th  corps  had  been  hurried  down  the  Germanna  Plank 
Road,  to  its  intersection  with  the  Orange  Plank  Road,  our 
cavalry  having  reported  that  Hill  was  marching  up  that  road 
from  Parker's  Store.  Hancock  was  sent  for  in  haste  from  the 
neighborhood  of  Todd's  Tavern,  to  take  position  at  the  inter 
section  of  the  Brock  Road  with  the  Orange  Plank.  Before 
he  could  get  up,  however,  Getty,  in  accordance  with  the  spirit 
which  prevailed  that  day  at  headquarters,  was  ordered  in 
alone,  as  if  with  one  division  he  would  be  doing  wisely  to 
take  the  offensive  against  Hill's  whole  corps.  Fortunately, 
however,  for  him,  Hancock  came  up  soon,  and  the  fight  went 
on  during  the  afternoon  rather  to  our  advantage,  though  our 
losses  were  heavy. 

During  the  afternoon,  the  6th  corps  came  up,  formed  on 
the  right  of  the  5th,  and  was  ordered  to  attack  the  enemy. 
After  severe  losses  we  were  repulsed.  The  enemy  had  in 
trenched  themselves.  In  fact,  both  sides  threw  up  works 
whenever  there  was  an  opportunity  to  do  so.  This  closed  the 
fighting  on  the  5th  of  May. 

In  spite  of  the  bloody  repulse  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps 
during  this  day's  fight,  it  was  thought  that  there  was  a  fair 
chance  for  success  on  our  extreme  left,  where  General  Hancock 
was  in  charge  of  the  operations.  There  was  good  reason  for 
this  opinion ;  for  not  only  had  Hill's  troops  been  evidently 
much  shaken  by  the  fighting  on  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  but 
the  fact  that  the  5th  corps  was  at  the  close  of  the  day  quite  a 
distance  farther  out  than  the  2d  seemed  to  open  the  possibility 
of  throwing  a  force  from  the  left  of  the  5th  corps  upon  the 
Plank  Road  to  take  Hill  in  flank  and  rear.  Accordingly  Burn- 
side  was  directed  to  start  at  two  in  the  morning  and  to  take 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      381 

position  between  Warren  and  Hancock,  with  the  object  of 
gaining  Chewning's,  where  was  an  open  space  of  ground,  just 
to  the  north  of  the  Plank  Road.  But  the  operation  prescribed 
to  Burnside  was  a  difficult  one  for  any  officer  or  any  troops  to 
execute  ;  and  the  mistake  of  relying  on  such  assistance  as  the 
newly  organized  9th  corps  could  render  in  such  a  mortal  com 
bat  as  this  must  have  been  apparent  before  the  day  was  over. 
Yet  it  was  all  important  that  Hancock  should  be  adequately 
sustained,  for  not  only  was  there,  so  far  as  could  be  seen,  open 
to  him  the  possibility  of  overthrowing  Hill's  exhausted  troops, 
but  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  hold  the  junction  of  the 
Brock  Road  and  the  Orange  Plank  against  Longstreet,  who 
was  known  to  be  approaching.  This  was  the  principal  tactical 
manoeuvre  of  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness ;  Hancock,  with 
the  2d  corps,  assisted  by  Getty's  division  of  the  6th  and 
Wadsworth's  of  the  5th,  was  to  overwhelm  Hill  before  Long- 
street  could  arrive,  and  also  to  hold  the  left  of  the  position  of 
the  army  against  the  formidable  attack  which  might  reason 
ably  be  looked  for  so  soon  as  Longstreet  should  have  reported 
to  General  Lee. 

Hancock,  Getty,  and  Wadsworth,  without  waiting  for  Burn- 
side,  attacked  promptly  at  five  in  the  morning,  and  after  a 
fierce  resistance  drove  Hill  in  confusion  towards  Parker's  Store 
for  a  mile  or  more.  Then  it  became  necessary  to  re-form  the 
lines.  While  this  was  being  done,  Longstreet's  presence  was 
discovered.  Hancock  sent  back  to  the  Brock  Road  for  the 
balance  of  his  command  ;  but  so  disquieting  were  the  reports 
there  of  the  approach  of  Longstreet  up  that  road,  which  would 
have  been  a  repetition  of  the  celebrated  manoeuvre  of  Stone 
wall  Jackson  the  year  before,  that  General  Barlow's  division, 
one  of  the  best  in  the  army,  was  retained  at  the  corner  of  the 
Brock  Road.  Deprived  of  this  reliance,  Hancock  sends  for 
Burnside,  but  that  officer  has  not  yet  been  able  to  put  his 
troops  through  the  tangled  woods.  Then  Longstreet,  skillfully 
throwing  a  force  south  of  the  Plank  Road,  takes  our  troops 


382  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

there  in  the  flank,  and,  despite  the  brave  and  persistent  efforts 
of  Hancock,  Wadsworth,  Webb,  and  other  gallant  officers, 
the  troops  are  forced  back  by  noon  to  where  they  started  from 
at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning.  In  this  fight  Wadsworth  was 
mortally,  and  Longstreet  severely,  wounded. 

On  our  centre  and  right,  Sedgwick  and  Warren,  in  obe 
dience  to  positive  orders,  had  at  five  o'clock  attacked  the 
enemy's  works  in  their  front,  and,  as  might  have  been  ex 
pected,  were  repulsed  with  severe  loss.  Yet  on  hearing  of 
Hancock's  need  of  reinforcements,  they  were  again  ordered 
to  repeat  their  assaults ;  and  it  was  not  till  Hancock  had 
been  forced  back  and  he  had  lost  all  the  ground  and  the 
prestige  that  he  had  won  in  the  early  morning,  that  Warren 
and  Sedgwick  were  instructed  to  strengthen  their  own 
works  so  as  to  have  troops  to  spare  for  assistance  to  Han 
cock, —  an  order  that  should  have  been  given  them  at  day 
break.  There  does  not  seem  to  have  been  any  excess  of  good 
judgment  in  the  handling  of  the  army  in  this  Battle  of  the 
Wilderness. 

At  2  P.  M.  Burnside  made  his  appearance,  and  pushed  his 
troops  in  between  the  2d  and  5th  corps.  He  was  ordered  to 
attack  at  six  in  the  afternoon,  and  similar  orders  were  sent  to 
Hancock.  But  soon  after  four,  the  enemy,  having  re-formed, 
made  a  vigorous  and  determined  assault  upon  Hancock's  posi 
tion,  now  fortunately  intrenched,  at  the  Brock  Road.  Part  of 
Mott's  division,  however,  broke,  and  the  enemy's  colors  were 
planted  on  our  breastworks.  But  the  2d  corps  could  not  be 
beaten  out  of  a  good  position,  and  Carroll's  brigade  speedily 
recovered  the  ground. 

While  this  was  going  on,  Burnside  attacked  the  enemy  in 
his  front,  but,  after  meeting  a  fair  amount  of  success,  was 
forced  back  to  his  original  position. 

Finally,  at  dusk,  the  enemy  turned  the  right  flank  of  the 
6th  corps,  and  captured  a  number  of  prisoners,  among  whom 
were  Generals  Seymour  and  Shaler.  But  their  advantage 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      383 

was  but  temporary ;  they  were  soon  obliged  to  retire  in  con 
fusion. 

During  both  days  our  cavalry  were  actively  engaged  in 
protecting  our  flanks  and  skirmishing  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry. 

The  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  was  unquestionably  one  of 
the  fiercest  struggles  of  this  or  of  _any  war.  Almost  all  the 
troops  in  both  armies  were  engaged.  Our  loss  amounted  to 
2265  killed,  10,220  wounded,  and  2902  missing  —  total 
15, 387. 1  I  do  not  see  how  the  enemy's  loss  can  have  been  less 
than  10,000  men.  Ours  was  much  the  larger,  because  we  were 
generally  the  attacking  party.  Whether  it  would  have  been 
wiser  to  have  awaited  Lee's  assaults  behind  our  intrench- 
ments  is  an  important  question.  It  seems  pretty  certain  that 
we  gained  nothing,  and  lost  a  great  deal,  by  our  attacks 
on  the  right  with  the  5th  and  6th  corps.  It  seems  equally 
clear  that  Hancock's  attack  on  the  left  had  a  fair  chance  of 
success.  What  was  needed  to  make  it  successful  was  more 
troops.  I  have  already  pointed  out  Grant's  insufficient  supply 
of  infantry. 

One  thing  is  clear,  however,  that  it  was  plainly  Lee's  true 
policy  to  attack,  because  he  had,  for  all  he  knew,  a  chance 
of  defeating  the  campaign  in  the  outset.  It  is  true  he  had 
no  right  to  calculate  on  another  Hooker.  But  it  was  worth 
trying.  On  the  other  hand,  we  had  no  such  possibility  in  view 
as  this. 

Could  Grant  have  avoided  a  battle  in  the  Wilderness, 
he  doubtless  would  have  done  so,  as  the  nature  of  the  country 
rendered  it  impossible  for  him  to  use  his  artillery,  and  the  tan 
gled  underbrush  was  the  worst  possible  field  for  the  special 
military  traits  of  the  Northern  soldiers.  Accordingly  it  seems 
to  follow  that,  unless  by  assuming  the  offensive,  he  thought 
he  could  break  the  force  of  an  attack  which  was  sure  to  be 

1  The  returns,  67  W.  R.  133,  published  in  1891,  give  3383  killed,  12,037 
wounded,  3835  missing,  a  total  of  17,666.  —  ED. 


384  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

made,  it  was  clearly  his  policy  not  to  take  the  tactical  offensive 
in  the  Wilderness.  If  this  be  so,  then  he  had  no  sufficient 
reason  for  the  isolated  attack  prescribed  to  Warren  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th,  nor  for  the  repeated  assaults  on  the 
enemy's  intrenchments  which  Warren  and  Sedgwick  were 
ordered  to  make  on  the  6th.  But  when  he  knew  that  Long- 
street  was  purposing,  as  soon  as  he  could  arrive,  a  vigorous 
onslaught  on  our  left,  it  may  have  been  judicious  to  order 
Hancock  to  begin  by  attacking  and  breaking  up  Hill,  espe 
cially  as  the  latter  was  not  intrenched.  One  thing  should  be 
remarked,  —  neither  army  captured  and  held  any  works  on 
either  day. 

Both  armies  were  pretty  well  exhausted,  but  to  General 
Grant  belongs  the  credit  of  accepting  the  role  of  an  invader 
and  taking  the  initiative.  I  have  not  time  to  detail  how  our 
base  of  operations  was  skillfully  shifted  from  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad  to  Fredericksburg  and  Acquia  Creek, 
nor  how  we  just  managed  to  lose,  without  the  fault  of  any 
one,  being  the  first  at  Spottsylvania  Court  House.  Suffice 
it  to  say  that  twenty-four  hours  had  just  elapsed  after  the 
battle  when  the  army  began  its  march,  on  the  evening  of  the 
7th ;  that  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  it  was  found  that 
the  enemy  had  preceded  us ;  that  heavy  skirmishing  took 
place  the  8th  and  9th,  in  which  we  lost  one  of  our  best 
officers  in  General  Sedgwick,  commanding  the  6th  corps; 
General  Wright,  the  present  chief  of  engineers,  succeeding 
him. 

It  was  found  that  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  occupied 
a  line  everywhere  strongly  intrenched,  "having  artillery 
throughout,  with  flank  fire  wherever  practicable,"  and  the 
approaches  to  which  were  generally  obstructed  by  slashings 
or  by  regular  abatis.  "  With  such  intrenchments  as  these," 
says  General  Humphreys,  "  the  strength  of  an  army  sustain 
ing  an  attack  was  more  than  quadrupled,  provided  they  had 
force  enough  to  man  the  intrenchments  well.  In  fact  there 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      385 

is  scarcely  any  measure  by  which  to  gauge  the  increased 
strength  thereby  gained." 1 

Then  commenced  a  series  of  assaults  just  such  as  we  have 
seen  prescribed  to  "Warren  and  Sedgwick  at  the  Wilderness, 
assaults  of  such  a  character  that  no  troops  in  the  world  can 
be  expected  to  succeed  in  them  unless  they  are  wrought  up 
to  a  high  pitch  of  enthusiasm,  unless  they  are  exceptionally 
well  officered,  unless  they  are  picked  out  for  this  task  of  honor 
and  danger,  unless  they  are  sure  of  being  supported  as  soon 
as  their  valor  shall  have  planted  the  flag  of  their  country  on 
the  hostile  parapet. 

Listen  to  this  description  of  an  assault  on  the  10th  of  May, 
from  the  accurate,  dispassionate  pen  of  General  Humphreys : 
"  General  Warren,  wearing  his  full  uniform,  proceeded  to 
assault  the  enemy's  position  at  once  with  Crawford's  and 
Cutler's  divisions,  and  Webb's  and  Carroll's  brigades  of 
Gibbon's  division  under  Gibbon's  orders.  Opposite  the 
right  of  this  attacking  force  the  wood  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
intrenchments  was  dense  and  filled  with  a  low  growth  of 
dead  cedar-trees,  whose  hard,  sharp-pointed  branches,  inter 
laced  and  pointed  in  all  directions,  made  it  very  difficult  for 
the  troops  to  advance  under  the  heavy  artillery  and  musketry 
fire  they  met  at  the  outset.  They  emerged  into  the  open 
ground  near  the  intrenchments  with  disordered  ranks  and 
under  a  heavy  artillery  and  musketry  fire,  part  direct,  part 
flanking,  that  swept  the  whole  ground,  but  went  forward  some 
to  the  abatis,  others  to  the  crest  of  the  parapet,  but  were  all 
driven  back  with  heavy  loss."  2 

Such  work  as  this  is  no  part  of  the  ordinary  duty  of  a 
soldier.  It  is  exceptional  in  its  character,  and  any  attempt 
to  make  it  part  of  the  daily  task  is  sure  to  result  in  failure. 

General  Humphreys  proceeds  in  his  narrative :  "  General 
Hancock  was  ordered  to  renew  the  assault  at  half-past  6  P.  M., 
but  under  orders  deferred  it  till  7  P.  M.,  when  he  attacked 
1  Va.  Camp.  75.  2  Ibid.  81. 


386  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

with  Birney's  and  Gibbon's  divisions,  part  of  the  5th  corps 
uniting  with  him,  but  with  no  more  success  than  the  pre 
ceding  attempt."  1 

It  hardly  seems  possible  that  those  who  ordered  the  first 
attack  should  have  expected  it  to  succeed.  And  that  they 
should  have  expected  the  second  one  to  succeed  is  simply 
incredible.  Observe,  it  was  made  largely  with  the  identical 
troops  that  made  the  first  assault.  Under  such  circumstances 
men  must  feel  that  they  count  for  but  very  little  at  head 
quarters. 

But  it  is  not  only  this  which  is  to  be  noticed,  though  this, 
as  affecting  the  morale  of  the  troops,  is  important  enough. 
It  is  what  may  be  called  the  military  extravagance  of  such 
performances  which  especially  challenges  our  attention.  It 
is  the  wastefulness  of  such  operations.  Here,  you  observe,  is 
not  a  battle  going  on  all  along  the  line,  which  the  capture  of 
this  particular  position  may  decide,  like  the  capture  of  the 
Great  Redoubt  at  Borodino,  nor  is  it  the  breach  in  the  walls 
of  a  fortified  town,  which,  if  crowned,  opens  the  way  inevit 
ably  to  the  capture  of  the  place.  Nothing  of  the  sort.  Here 
is  simply  a  portion,  say  half  or  three  fourths  of  a  mile  long, 
in  a  long  extent  of  intrenchments  seven  or  eight  miles  in 
extent.  There  is  no  pretense  that  its  capture  is  going  to  be 
followed  by  any  very  considerable  advantage.  There  are  no 
thousands  or  tens  of  thousands  of  troops,  ready  and  waiting, 
to  be  poured  in  the  moment  when  Warren  or  Hancock  and 
their  brave  men  shall  have  struggled  through  the  cedar-trees, 
escaped  the  cross-fire  of  artillery  and  musketry,  and  planted 
the  stars  and  stripes  on  the  enemy's  parapet.  Nothing  of  the 
sort.  The  most  that  was  hoped  for  was  the  isolated  success 
of  capturing  a  few  rods  of  works,  a  few  guns,  and  a  few 
hundred  prisoners.  To  me,  this  seems  wasteful  in  the  highest 
degree.  When  there  really  comes  an  opportunity  to  accom 
plish  something  of  vital  importance,  where  are  the  men  to  do 
*  Va.  Camp.  82. 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      387 

it,  if  men's  lives  are  so  wantonly  expended  in  these  minor 
operations  ? 

Two,  however,  of  the  assaults  at  Spottsylvania  were  bril 
liantly  successful. 

On  this  same  day  in  which  we  have  seen  the  repulse  of  War 
ren  and  Hancock,  an  attack  was  ordered  on  the  front  of  the 
6th  corps,  which  was  intrusted  to  Colonel  Upton,  one  of  the 
most  gallant  and  capable  of  the  younger  officers  in  the  army. 
He  commanded  a  brigade  in  Russell's  division,  and  was  the 
same  officer  who  had  in  the  preceding  November  captured  the 
tete-de-pont  at  Rappahannock  Station,  taking  almost  an  entire 
brigade  prisoners.  The  force  at  his  disposal  consisted  of  twelve 
regiments,  all  good  troops,  conspicuous  among  which  were  the 
5th,  6th,  and  7th  Maine  regiments.  The  ground  was  examined 
as  carefully  as  circumstances  permitted,  not  only  by  Upton 
himself,  and  by  his  able  division  commander,  Russell,  but  by 
the  twelve  colonels  whom  Upton,  with  a  care  commendable 
but  very  unusual,  took  pains  should  understand,  as  far  as 
possible,  exactly  what  the  task  before  them  was.  Precise  in 
structions  were  given  as  to  the  disposition  of  the  troops  after 
the  works  should  be  entered.  Every  possible  precaution  was 
taken  to  insure  success.  Fortunately,  the  storming  column  — 
for  such  it  not  only  really  was,  but  by  the  exceptional  wisdom 
of  its  commanders,  it  was  treated  as  such  —  could  be  massed 
in  the  woods,  out  of  sight,  only  200  yards  from  the  enemy. 
At  the  given  signal  the  troops  rushed  forward  with  a  cheer, 
under  a  very  heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  and  with 
out  firing  a  shot  crowned  the  parapet.  But  the  resolute  men 
behind  the  works  refused  to  budge.  They  "  sat  upright  in 
their  pits  with  bayonets  ready  to  impale  the  first  who  should 
leap  over  the  works.  A  hand-to-hand  fight  ensued.  Our  men 
held  their  pieces  at  arm's  length  and  fired  downward,  or  hurled 
their  pieces  upon  the  enemy,  pinning  them  to  the  ground. 
.  .  .  The  struggle  lasted  but  a  few  seconds,  and  our  men 
swept  over  the  works,  expanding  to  the  right  and  left,  overran 


388  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  battery  and  the  second  line  of  works,  and  made  an  open 
ing  in  the  enemy's  line  of  half  a  mile  in  width,  ready  for  the 
supporting  force  which  ought  to  have  come  up  on  the  left,  but 
which  did  not  arrive."  l  This  supporting  force  was  Mott's 
division  of  the  2d  corps,  which  had  been  placed  under  the 
orders  of  General  Wright.  Its  failure  to  come  up  has  never 
been  satisfactorily  accounted  for.  Why  this  division  was 
selected  for  this  important  task  is  not  obvious,  to  say  the 
least.  It  had  given  way  under  the  attack  on  our  lines  on  the 
Brock  Road  on  the  6th.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  such 
an  assault  as  this  requires  at  least  as  much  judgment  and 
pains  in  the  selection  and  disposition  of  the  supporting  force 
as  in  the  selection  and  disposition  of  the  column  of  attack. 
Mott  was  a  mile  or  so  on  Upton's  left  and  rear,  near  the 
Brown  house,  and  ought  to  have  come  up  in  time.  But  for 
want  probably  of  definite  and  positive  instructions,  or  perhaps 
from  a  lack  of  energy  and  promptitude,  Mott  failed  to  come 
up,  and  Upton,  who  had  captured  1200  prisoners  and  several 
flags,  and  had  successfully  maintained  his  position  till  dark, 
was  reluctantly  compelled  to  retire  from  the  works  he  had  so 
gallantly  won. 

The  next  day,  the  llth,  was  spent  in  making  preparations 
for  the  other  assault  to  which  we  have  adverted. 

This  was  to  be  made  upon  the  northerly  faces  of  the  great 
Salient  in  the  enemy's  works,  on  the  west  face  of  which  the 
previous  attack  had  been  made.  The  bulk  of  the  2d  corps, 
under  the  gallant  and  energetic  Hancock,  was  ordered  up  from 
the  right  of  the  line  to  take  position  on  the  left  of  the  6th 
corps.  The  first  division,  one  of  the  best  in  the  army,  led  by 
Barlow,  a  man  of  recognized  courage  and  capacity,  was  selected 
to  make  the  attack.  It  was  to  be  supported  by  the  other  divi 
sions  of  the  corps,  those  of  Gibbon,  Birney,  and  Mott.  The 
march  on  the  night  of  the  llth  was  a  dismal  one :  it  rained 
steadily  ;  the  road  was  bad  ;  it  led  through  woods  and  marshes ; 

1  Ante,  p.  225. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      389 

at  times  the  staff  officers  who  were  directing  the  leading 
division  seemed  at  a  loss  to  find  the  true  road  or  rather  cart 
path  conducting  to  the  position  indicated.  At  last,  weary  and 
bewildered,  the  troops  bivouacked  on  the  wet  ground.  The 
orders  were  to  attack  at  four  in  the  morning,  and  Barlow  was 
to  lead  the  way.  No  one  seemed  to  know  the  lay  of  the  land, 
or  how  far  distant  the  enemy's  line  was.  But  Barlow  was  not 
the  man  to  trust  to  luck  when  there  was  information  to  be  had. 
Leaving  his  sleeping  division,  he  went  himself  to  the  picket 
line  of  Mott's  division,  which  had  been,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
this  vicinity  for  the  past  two  days.  Here  he  stumbled  upon 
a  gallant  and  intelligent  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Waldo 
Merriam  of  the  16th  Massachusetts,  who  fell  bravely  fighting 
the  next  day,  and  obtained  from  him  the  facts  required  before 
he  lay  down  to  take  rest. 

The  next  morning  his  division,  heavily  massed,  pursued  its 
path  through  the  woods,  straight  for  the  apex  of  the  Salient. 
Some  of  Gibbon's  men  cheered.  But  the  enemy  had  been 
on  the  alert,  and  received  us  with  a  steady  fire  of  musketry. 
Fortunately  for  us,  their  batteries,  at  the  moment  when  we 
charged,  were  only  just  returning  from  their  left,  where  Gen 
eral  Lee  had  ordered  them  on  the  mistaken  apprehension  that 
his  left  was  about  to  be  turned.  Hence  but  two  guns  opened 
upon  us.  The  troops  of  Barlow  and  Birney,  supported  by  those 
of  Gibbon  and  Mott,  swept  over  the  breastworks,  capturing 
all  the  troops  lying  before  them  on  the  front  and  on  both  sides 
of  the  apex  of  the  Salient,  comprising  the  whole  of  Edward 
Johnson's  division,  some  4000  men,  together  with  some 
twenty  guns  and  thirty  standards.  It  was  a  great  sweep  and 
a  brilliant  success. 

Pursuing  their  way  in  a  southerly  direction  through  the 
middle  of  the  Salient,  the  troops  struck  another  line  of  works 
running  east  and  west,  by  which  they  were  checked. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  unavoid 
able  disorder  in  the  attacking  forces.  The  ease  with  which  the 


390  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

works  were  overrun  showed  that  the  heavy  massing  of  Barlow's 
division  was  a  mistake,  and,  in  fact,  too  many  troops  joined 
in  the  assault.  It  would  have  been  better  to  have  had  one 
or  perhaps  two  divisions  in  reserve,  bringing  them  up  quietly 
in  good  order,  and  relieving  the  troops  who  were  in  the  dis 
order  and  excitement  inseparable  from  a  successful  attack. 
As  it  was,  however,  the  whole  2d  corps  was  in  or  close  to  the 
Salient,  and  a  large  part  of  it  was  in  a  greater  or  less  state 
of  confusion,  notwithstanding  the  energetic  efforts  of  their 
officers  to  re-form  the  lines. 

It  did  not  take  the  veterans  of  Lee's  army  long  to  rouse 
themselves  to  a  perception  of  the  danger  that  threatened  them. 
Had  we  been  able  to  pursue  our  attack,  the  army  of  Lee  would 
have  been  cut  in  two.  Had  Hancock  been  able  to  restore  com 
plete  order,  to  sweep  down  the  east  and  west  faces  of  the 
Salient  and  connect  with  the  6th  corps  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  9th  corps  on  the  other,  the  result  of  this  day  would  have 
been  possibly  a  decisive  defeat  for  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia.  But  apart  from  the  confusion  which  prevailed  on 
our  side,  there  were  other  causes  which  stood  in  the  way  of 
our  making  this  a  crushing  defeat  for  our  adversaries.  They 
were,  after  all,  behind  the  interior  line  of  works  facing  north  ; 
moreover,  their  works  on  the  right  and  left  of  this  were 
strongly  held  ;  no  further  surprise  was  possible.  In  fact,  so 
far  were  the  Confederates  from  being  demoralized  that  they 
at  once  rushed  furiously  to  attack  the  invaders  and  attempted 
to  recover  all  the  lost  ground.  The  disordered  troops  of  Han 
cock  found  it  impossible  to  maintain  themselves  in  the  open 
ground  around  the  McCool  house ;  they  fell  back  to  the  very 
works  they  had  just  captured,  crossing  them  and  holding  them 
against  the  repeated  and  persistent  assaults  of  their  former 
owners.  On  the  westerly  face  of  the  Angle,  for  about  the  space 
of  a  third  of  a  mile,  these  assaults  were  the  most  terrible  and 
the  most  sanguinary.  Our  batteries  from  the  open  ground  to 
the  north  played  over  the  heads  of  our  own  men  upon  the 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      391 

enemy's  lines.  The  trees,  large,  fine  shade-trees,  of  which 
there  was  quite  a  grove  on  this  part  of  the  enemy's  line,  were 
killed  by  the  terrible  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry.  In  one 
place  a  large  tree  was  actually  cut  down  by  musket  bullets,  at 
a  height  of  about  four  feet  above  the  ground,  where  its  trunk 
was  almost  at  its  thickest. 

The  enemy  poured  into  this  bloody  inclosure  all  the  troops 
that  they  could  spare  without  weakening  their  left,  which  it 
was  absolutely  indispensable  for  them  to  hold.  The  men 
fought  with  wonderful  audacity  and  persistency.  Often  the 
combatants  would  be  separated  only  by  the  captured  works, 
and  bayonet  wounds  were  given  and  received,  and  men  were 
actually  pulled  over  and  taken  prisoners.  It  was  a  fearful  and 
horrible  fight.  Well  might  the  west  angle  in  these  lines  be 
termed  the  " Bloody  Angle" 

Meantime,  assaults  were  made  on  both  sides  of  the  Salient ; 
on  the  eastern  side  by  Burnside,  on  the  western  by  Warren 
and  Wright.  Colonel  Upton's  decimated  brigade  again  took 
an  active  part  in  the  fight  of  this  day,  and  the  only  one  out  of 
seven  captains  in  the  5th  Maine  who  had  escaped  the  dangers 
of  the  successful  assault  on  the  10th  was  killed  on  the  12th. 
But  nothing  was  accomplished  by  these  side  attacks,  and  the 
end  of  the  day  found  us  in  possession  of  that  part  only  of 
the  line  which  we  had  carried  at  four  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
But  our  trophies  were  numerous  and  unmistakable, —  4000 
men,  twenty  pieces  of  cannon,  thirty  battle-flags. 

In  the  morning  it  was  found  that  the  enemy  had  retired  to 
a  new  line  of  works,  which  crossed  the  base  of  the  Salient 
south  of  the  Harrison  house. 

The  losses  this  day  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  are 
stated  at  6820  on  our  side ;  the  enemy  must  have  lost  in  the 
Salient,  though  not  elsewhere,  nearly  as  many  in  killed  and 
wounded ;  and  including  their  great  loss  in  prisoners,  their 
effective  force  must  have  been  decreased  by  about  9000  or 
10,000  men.  The  advantage  of  the  day  was  clearly  with  us ; 


392  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

and  though  Generals  Grant  and  Meade  doubtless  expected 
a  more  decisive  result,  they  had  good  cause  to  feel  proud  of 
the  achievements  of  the  army. 

For  some  six  or  seven  days  more  the  army  remained  at 
Spottsylvania,  endeavoring  to  find  some  similar  weak  place 
in  the  enemy's  lines.  During  this  time  several  costly  assaults 
were  made,  into  the  particulars  of  which  it  is  not  worth  our 
while  to  go  this  evening,  but  without  any  result  except  in  loss 
to  the  Federal  side. 

The  total  casualties  at  Spottsylvania,  in  killed,  wounded, 
and  missing,  amounted  to  17,72s.1  This  number  is  exclusive 
of  the  sick,  and  of  those  regiments  whose  time  for  service 
had  expired. 

Finding  it  impossible  to  accomplish  anything  of  consequence 
at  Spottsylvania,  General  Grant  determined  to  move  around 
Lee's  right,  in  the  direction  of  the  North  Anna.  It  was  prob 
ably  the  intention  to  seize  the  crossings  of  the  river  before 
Lee  arrived ;  but  although  the  army  was  skillfully  handled, 
this  was  found  impossible.  In  fact,  although  the  army  crossed 
both  above  and  below  that  portion  of  the  south  bank  of  the 
river  which  was  held  by  Lee's  army,  it  was  impossible  to  effect 
anything  by  any  movement  that  seemed  within  the  bounds  of 
possibility.  Lee's  left  wing  rested  on  Little  River  on  its  left 
and  on  the  North  Anna  on  its  right.  His  centre  was  on  the 
North  Anna  River.  Both  wings  were  strongly  intrenched,  and 
neither  could  be  turned.  Hence  there  was  nothing  to  do  but 
to  undertake  another  turning  move,  which  was  done  without 
having  expended  any  lives  in  useless  assaults.  The  only  en 
counters  at  or  near  the  North  Anna  had  resulted  in  our  favor. 
Two  brigades,  those  of  Pierce  and  Egan,  of  the  2d  corps,  had 
carried  the  enemy's  works  on  the  north  side  of  the  river.  War 
ren  had  successfully  repelled  a  serious  attack  made  upon  him 
after  he  had  crossed.  The  army  was,  in  fact,  in  good  spirits 
when  it  left  the  North  Anna  en  route  for  the  Pamunkey. 
i  18,399,  67  W.  R.  149.  —  ED. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      393 

On  the  24th  of  May  the  cavalry  corps,  under  General 
Sheridan,  rejoined  the  army,  after  a  raid  in  which  he  had 
destroyed  several  miles  of  railroad  track  and  some  cars  and 
engines,  and  had  got  very  near  Richmond.  But  although  he 
had  fought  a  severe  action,  in  which  J.  E.  B.  Stuart  was  de 
feated  and  killed,  he  had  accomplished  nothing  of  any  great 
moment.  Doubtless  these  raids,  of  which  some  of  our  generals 
were  so  fond,  caused  some  inconvenience  to  the  enemy ;  but 
the  policy  of  sending  off  troops  when  fighting  is  in  prospect 
cannot  be  defended.  General  Grant  needed  in  his  struggle 
every  man  and  every  gun  he  could  muster.  It  is  true  that, 
as  cavalry,  Sheridan's  force  could  be  of  but  little  use  in 
a  wooded  country,  but  as  mounted  infantry  they  might  be 
of  very  considerable  use  in  any  kind  of  a  country.  Twelve 
thousand  good  troops,  under  such  an  officer  as  Sheridan, 
possessed  of  the  power  of  reaching  their  destination  more 
speedily  than  the  rest  of  the  army,  constitute  a  force  not  to 
be  lightly  despised.  We  shall  soon  see  how  useful  they  were 
in  the  operations  which  took  place  on  the  Totopotomoy  and 
near  Cold  Harbor. 

On  the  26th  General  Grant  determined  to  withdraw  from 
the  North  Anna  and  to  cross  the  Pamunkey,  thus  approaching 
Richmond.  He  does  not  seem  to  have  had  a  very  definite  idea 
of  accomplishing  anything  by  this  move  besides  finding  a  new 
set  of  intrenchments  to  attack.  However,  the  march  was,  as 
usual,  skillfully  made ;  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry  preceded  the 
columns  and  crossed  the  Pamunkey  on  the  27th,  the  remain 
der  guarded  the  trains,  assisted  by  Ferrero's  black  division 
of  the  9th  corps.  The  Pamunkey  was  successfully  crossed  at 
and  above  Hanover  Town  on  the  28th  of  May  by  the  four  corps, 
and  on  the  same  day  Sheridan,  after  a  spirited  fight,  secured 
the  important  position  of  Hawes's  Shop,  from  which  the 
principal  roads  to  Richmond  either  take  their  departure  or 
are  easily  accessible. 

These  principal  roads  are  three  in  number.    The  northerly 


394  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

one  runs  entirely  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Totopotomoy,  by 
Enon  Church  and  Polly  Hundley's  Corner,  crosses  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  Railroad,  and  the  Chickahominy  at  Meadow 
Bridge,  and  enters  Richmond  on  the  north.  This  is  known  as 
the  Meadow  Bridge  Road.  To  reach  the  second,  or  Bethesda 
Church  Road,  one  must  go  from  Hawes's  Shop  towards  Old 
Church,  and,  shortly  after  crossing  the  Totopotomoy,  turn  to 
the  right,  passing  by  Bethesda  Church  and  through  Mechan- 
icsville,  and  crossing  the  Chickahominy  at  Mechanicsville 
Bridge.  The  third,  or  Cold  Harbor  Road,  starts  from  Old 
Church,  and,  passing  through  Old  Cold  Harbor,  New  Cold 
Harbor,  and  Gaines's  Mill,  crosses  the  Chickahominy  at  New 
Bridge. 

Midway  between  these  last  two  roads  is  a  road  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Totopotomoy,  which  runs  in  a  southwesterly  direc 
tion  by  Pole  Green  Church  from  a  point  on  the  Bethesda 
Church  Road  about  a  couple  of  miles  northeast  of  Bethesda 
Church,  to  Shady  Grove  Church,  where  it  joins  a  road  from 
Atlee's  Station  to  Mechanicsville.  We  will  call  this  the 
Old  Church  Road,  as  it  connected  Atlee's  Station  with  Old 
Church. 

A  road  also  runs  south  from  Polly  Hundley's  Corner 
through  Hundley's  Corner  to  the  Bethesda  Church  Road, 
crossing  this  last-mentioned  road  near  Pole  Green  Church. 
This  we  will  call  the  Pole  Green  Church  Road. 

One  would  have  supposed  that  it  would  have  been  General 
Grant's  plan,  on  crossing  the  Pamunkey,  to  aim  at  something 
more  than  merely  discovering  new  lines  of  intrenchments  at 
which  he  might  hurl  his  army ;  in  fact  to  gain  some  position 
threatening  Lee's  communications,  or  even  Richmond  itself. 
One  would  have  supposed  that  General  Grant  had  by  this  time 
had  enough  of  attacks,  and  that  he  would  have  seen  how 
extremely  desirable  it  would  be  for  him  to  put  himself  in  such 
a  position  that  Lee  would  be  obliged  to  attack  him.  But  in 
fact  nothing  of  the  sort  seems  to  have  entered  Grant's  head. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      395 

His  only  idea  seems  to  have  been,  on  having  crossed  the 
Pamunkey,  to  find  out  as  soon  as  he  could  where  Lee's 
intrenchments  were,  and  then  to  assault  them. 

But  in  reality  there  was  a  far  better  role  than  this  for 
Grant  to  play.  Lee  was  almost  as  much  afraid  of  Grant's 
new  movement  being  directed  against  the  railroad,  by  which  he 
obtained  most  of  his  supplies,  as  against  Richmond ;  he  there 
fore  held  on  to  the  railroad  with  his  left,  which  he  brought 
down  to  Atlee's  Station,  in  the  neighborhood  of  which  he 
placed  Hill's  corps,  while  he  threw  out  Longstreet's  corps, 
under  Anderson,  in  the  vicinity  of  Shady  Grove  Church,  and, 
on  his  right,  Swell's  corps  under  Early.  The  latter  officer 
tells  us  that  he  placed  his  troops  in  position,  covering  the 
Pole  Green  Church  Road  coming  down  from  the  north,  and 
the  Old  Church  Road  coming  in  from  the  east,  with  his  right 
resting  on  Beaver  Darn  Creek.  Lee's  line  thus  faced  north 
and  northeast,  from  Atlee's  Station  to  Hundley's  Corner.  It 
will  be  observed  that  the  enemy's  right  did  not  reach  the 
Bethesda  Church  Road,  and  that,  had  General  Grant  con 
centrated  a  force  upon  Early,  manoeuvring  by  the  Bethesda 
Church  Road,  he  could  probably  have  doubled  up  his  right 
long  before  either  Anderson  or  Hill  could  have  come  to  his 
assistance  ;  or  Grant  could  have  observed  Early  with  a  strong 
force,  and,  passing  by  him,  have  carried  his  army  down  to  Cold 
Harbor  and  New  Bridge,  in  which  position  Lee  would  prob 
ably  have  felt  obliged  to  be  the  attacking  party.  The  situa 
tion  and  movements  of  the  two  armies  were  in  fact  in  some 
respects  curiously  like,  and  in  other  respects  unlike  the  situ 
ation  and  movements  in  the  Wilderness  at  the  beginning  of 
the  month.  There,  as  here,  it  was  an  object  for  Grant  to  pass 
by  Lee ;  but  there  he  could  not  do  it,  for  Lee  was  marching 
toward  him  in  a  direction  at  right  angles  with  the  roads  on 
which  he  must  go.  And  he  could  not  greatly  hurry,  for  he 
had  to  protect  his  trains.  Here,  on  the  other  hand,  Lee  was 
perfectly  quiescent,  and  facing  north,  while  it  was  Grant's 


396  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

policy  to  inarch  south.  Moreover  the  trains  were  all  safe  behind 
the  Pamunkey,  and  well  guarded. 

All  depended  on  keeping  the  initiative.  But  this  advan 
tage  Grant  willfully  lost,  making  here  the  first  and  almost 
the  only  important  strategical  mistake  of  this  campaign.  He 
actually  occupied  the  29th  and  30th  in  finding  out  where  Lee's 
army  was,  and  in  attacking  him  in  position.  He  even  sent 
two  divisions  of  the  6th  corps  to  Hanover  Court  House,  to  see 
if  he  was  not  there.  Then  there  was  a  wearisome  repetition 
on  the  Totopotomoy  of  the  aimless  assaults  at  the  Wilder 
ness  and  Spottsylvania.  Hancock,  Warren,  Wright,  Burn- 
side,  essayed  in  vain  to  break  Lee's  formidable  lines.  Some 
times  a  few  hundred  men  would  be  swept  in  from  the  skirmish 
line  or  the  nearest  rifle-pits,  but  no  impression  was  made  on 
the  main  position. 

Moreover  the  armies  by  this  method  of  proceeding  got  so 
interlocked  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  further  man 
oeuvring  for  position.  All  that  could  be  done  was,  time  after 
time,  to  remove  the  corps  on  the  extreme  right  and  place  it 
on  the  extreme  left  of  the  line,  a  proceeding  always  observed 
and  sometimes  anticipated  by  the  enemy.  But  this  continu 
ous  wrestling  was  sure  to  culminate  in  a  great  battle. 

Meantime  Baldy  Smith's  corps,  the  18th,  was  sent  for  from 
Bermuda  Hundred ;  and  Sheridan's  cavalry  having  captured 
Old  Cold  Harbor,  which  was  some  short  distance  to  the  left 
of  our  line,  an  attempt  was  made  to  concentrate  the  6th  and 
18th  corps  there,  to  effect  a  lodgment  on  the  enemy's  extreme 
right.  Owing  to  delays  for  which  neither  of  the  officers  com 
manding  these  corps  was  responsible,  this  concentration  was 
not  effected  until  the  enemy  had  intrenched  in  front  of  our 
troops.  A  determined  assault  was  made  June  1,  but  was 
repulsed,  after  some  temporary  success,  with  great  slaughter. 
Then  the  2d  corps  was  sent  for  from  the  extreme  right,  and 
took  up  position  on  the  2d  of  June  on  the  extreme  left.  It 
was  intended  that  the  three  corps  should  assault  on  the  2d, 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      397 

but  owing  to  various  causes  this  could  not  be  done.  All  this 
while  the  enemy  were  concentrating  and  perfecting  their 
intrenchments.  It  was  impossible  to  manoeuvre  further,  as 
we  were  so  near  the  Chickahominy,  and  it  was  impossible 
now  to  take  the  enemy  unawares.  Still  Grant  was  unwilling 
to  leave  the  neighborhood  of  the  Chickahominy  without 
making  a  serious  and  determined  effort  to  break  the  ene 
my's  lines.  The  army  was  now  facing  west ;  the  2d  corps 
on  the  left,  the  6th  corps  on  its  right,  at  Cold  Harbor,  the 
18th  corps  next,  then  the  5th  corps,  and  lastly  the  9th  corps, 
the  right  of  which  was  on  the  Bethesda  Church  Road  and 
was  refused. 

On  the  other  side,  Early  held  the  left,  then  Longstreet, 
then  Hoke's  division,  which  had  come  up  from  Petersburg, 
then  Breckin ridge,  who  had  been  sent  for,  from  the  Shenan- 
doah  Valley,  and  then  A.  P.  Hill. 

The  attack  was  ordered  for  the  morning  of  the  3d  of  June ; 
but  there  seems  to  have  been  nothing  special,  either  in  the 
instructions  given  to  the  officers  or  troops,  or  in  the  prepara 
tions,  or  in  the  expectations  entertained  of  its  result  either 
by  the  generals  or  the  army,  to  distinguish  it  from  so  many 
previous  attacks.  It  was  an  attack  along  the  whole  line. 
Warren,  it  is  true,  could  not  probably  join  in  it,  as  his  front 
was  covered  by  a  swamp ;  and  it  was  not  expected  probably 
that  Burnside  should  take  a  very  active  part  in  it.  But 
the  2d,  6th,  and  18th  corps  were  to  attack  simultaneously 
at  half-past  four  in  the  morning.  There  was  no  corps  in 
reserve. 

The  attack  was  promptly  and  gallantly  made,  but  as  all  the 
world  knows,  it  was  an  utter  failure.  The  division  of  Barlow 
indeed  entered  the  enemy's  works  and  captured  two  or  three 
guns  and  two  or  three  hundred  prisoners,  but  was  speedily 
driven  out.  Partial  attacks,  however,  continued  to  be  made 
from  point  to  point  for  a  few  hours,  but  the  main  assault 
had  taken  place  and  had  failed  in  half  an  hour.  Our  loss 


398  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

in  this  battle,  if  it  may  be  called  a  battle,  had  been  upwards 
of  7300  men.  But  our  previous  loss  from  the  time  we  crossed 
the  Pamunkey  had  exceeded  5600  men,  most  of  whom  were 
thrown  away  in  comparatively  useless  assaults.  The  total 
loss  was  thus  nearly  13,000  men. 

It  is  difficult  to  find  any  justification  for  the  battle  of  Cold 
Harbor.  Here  was  an  enemy  able  to  hold  as  long  a  line  as  our 
own ;  in  fact  Early  on  their  extreme  left  actually  felt  strong 
enough  to  attack  Burnside ;  everywhere  in  front  of  the  three 
corps  which  were  to  make  the  principal  assault,  the  enemy 
were  known  to  be  in  force  and  strongly  intrenched.  Where, 
then,  was  there  any  rational  expectation,  or  hope  even,  of  driv 
ing  him  from  his  position  ?  Suppose  even  that  a  single  corps 
had  acquired  possession  of  the  works  in  their  front ;  could  it 
be  supposed,  that,  decimated  and  disordered  as  they  would 
inevitably  be  by  such  an  assault,  they  could  do  more  than 
simply  hold  what  they  might  have  gained?  The  battle  of 
Cold  Harbor  is  in  truth  the  most  terrible  instance  which  this 
terrible  campaign  affords  of  the  folly  of  fighting  with  no 
reasonable  chance  of  success  and  with  a  dead  certainty  of 
a  heavy  loss.  Now  a  heavy  loss  means  this,  —  that  when  you 
next  get  an  opportunity  you  may  not  be  strong  enough  to 
improve  it. 

The  losses  of  the  army  down  to  the  crossing  of  the  James 
were  as  follows : 

At  the  Wilderness 15,387 

At  Spottsylvania 17,723 

At  North  Anna 1,973 

On  the  Totopotomoy 3,022 

At  Cold  Harbor  June  1 2,625 

At  Cold  Harbor  June  3 7,323 

At  Cold  Harbor  to  June  12 1,159 

Sick,  sent  home,  about            ......  10,000 

Total 59,212! 

1  52,789  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  67  W.  R.  188.  —ED. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      399 

The  army  was  further  diminished,  by  the  expiration  of  the 
term  of  service  of  many  regiments,  to  the  extent  of  about 
6000  men,  making  a  total  loss  of  about  65,000  men. 

To  balance  this,  the  army  had  received  reinforcements, 
exclusive  of  the  18th  corps,  to  the  amount  of  about  40,000 
men.  The  net  loss  was  therefore  about  25,000  men. 

General  Lee's  losses  during  the  campaign  could  hardly 
have  been  less  than  25,000  men.  He  had  received,  however, 
so  far  as  I  can  discover,  only  about  10,000  reinforcements. 
His  net  loss  was  therefore  about  15,000  men. 

The  repulse  at  Cold  Harbor  had  a  most  disheartening  effect 
both  on  the  army  and  on  the  public.  It  seemed  to  many  as  if 
General  Grant  was  at  the  end  of  his  resources.  But  General 
Grant  was  in  no  way  disheartened  nor  was  he  in  the  least 
affected  by  the  tremendous  experiences  of  this  campaign.  He 
at  once  went  to  work,  with  as  cool  a  head  as  he  ever  applied 
to  any  military  problem  in  his  life,  to  effect  the  crossing  of  the 
James  and  to  capture  Petersburg. 

The  movement  began  on  the  12th  of  June.  One  by  one  the 
corps  were  withdrawn  from  their  positions  at  Cold  Harbor. 
Smith's  corps  was  sent  to  Bermuda  Hundred  by  water, 
Hancock  crossed  the  James  at  Windmill  Point  on  a  pontoon 
bridge.  These  two  corps  were  to  take  Petersburg.  Smith 
came  up  at  noon  of  the  15th  in  front  of  the  outer  defenses. 
Hancock,  who  had  received  no  definite  instructions,  an  omis 
sion  it  is  not  easy  to  explain,  halted  for  rations,  and  finally 
joined  Smith  at  six  in  the  evening.  By  this  time  Smith  had 
carried  by  assault  the  works  on  the  outer  line,  strong  in 
construction,  but  inadequately  manned.  There  was  nothing 
between  these  works  and  Petersburg  at  that  moment.  But  the 
evening  wore  on,  and  the  night,  and  the  orders  Hancock  gave 
for  the  recommencement  of  the  attack  at  dawn  were  for  some 
unaccountable  reason  not  carried  out.  However,  the  next  day 
more  troops  arrived,  the  9th  corps,  and  part  of  the  6th.  On 
the  morning  of  that  day,  the  16th,  the  2d  corps  attacked  the 


400  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

enemy's  works,  and  carried  a  portion  of  the  lines,  suffering, 
however,  considerable  loss. 

On  the  next  morning  the  5th  corps  arrived.  The  whole 
array  was  now  up. 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  Confederates  that  the  officer  in 
command  at  Petersburg  was  a  man  of  unusual  capacity  for 
conducting  a  defense.  Beauregard,  an  engineer  of  unquestion 
able  talent,  had  in  the  early  days  of  this  campaign  inflicted 
a  severe  defeat  on  Butler's  army,  and  had  caused  that  general 
to  retire  ingloriously  to  Bermuda  Hundred,  from  which  he 
never  afterwards  emerged.  Beauregard  suspected  from  the 
first  days  of  June  that  our  object  was  Petersburg,  and  he 
urged  this  upon  Lee  with  his  customary  persistency.  But  he 
had  a  way  of  presenting  his  views,  even  when  sound,  in  a  form 
repellent  to  the  minds  of  most  of  his  coadjutors.  Endowed 
with  an  active  imagination,  he  was  continually  making  projects, 
urging  their  adoption,  and  predicting  all  sorts  of  good  results 
if  his  advice  should  be  taken.  Even  when  the  steps  which  he 
counseled  were  wise,  his  imagination  ran  away  with  him,  and 
he  always  alarmed  his  hearers  when  he  came  to  prophesying 
the  results  of  his  policy.  His  diagnosis  was  almost  always 
sound,  but  his  prognosis,  in  case  his  advice  should  be  taken, 
was  almost  always  too  favorable.  Hence  his  recommendations 
did  not  have  the  weight  that  should  have  been  accorded  to 
them. 

On  this  occasion  he  reiterated  to  General  Lee  that  Grant's 
object  was  Petersburg.  He  had  with  him  on  the  16th  only 
the  divisions  of  Hoke  and  Bushrod  Johnson,  with  a  few  cavalry, 
a  force  of  some  13.000  to  14,000  men.  He  begged  Lee  to  send 
him  large  reinforcements,  or,  better  still,  to  come  to  Petersburg 
himself.  But  Lee  had  been  completely  deceived  by  the  very 
skillful  manoeuvres  which  Grant  had  made  on  the  north  side 
of  the  James  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charles  City  Cross  Roads, 
and  could  not  feel  certain  that  Grant  did  not  intend  to  move 
directly  upon  Richmond.  Hence  he  refused  to  move,  and  sent 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      401 

Beauregard  only  one  brigade,  Grade's,  which  raised  his  force 
to  about  15,000  men. 

With  Hoke's  and  Johnson's  divisions  Beauregard  had  stoutly 
held  the  line  in  front  of  Hancock  on  the  evening  of  the  16th, 
and  had  during  the  night  again  and  again,  with  a  view  of 
deceiving  us  in  regard  to  his  force,  endeavored  to  recapture 
the  position  he  had  lost.  On  the  early  morning  of  the  17th, 
however,  Potter's  division  of  the  9th  corps  captured  an  exposed 
redoubt  near  the  Shand  house,  on  the  extreme  right  of  their 
line,  which  had  incautiously  been  held  too  long,  with  guns 
and  prisoners ;  and  the  2d  corps  had  carried  the  hill  on  which 
the  Hare  house  stood.  Still  these  movements  were  isolated. 
No  one  in  the  Federal  army  recognized  the  enormous  disparity 
of  numbers.  The  ground  was  wooded  in  great  part,  and  was 
unfamiliar  to  our  people.  But  Grant  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  equal  to  the  occasion.  It  was  eminently  a  time  for  trying 
every  expedient,  and  making  a  daring  move,  if  any  such 
occurred  to  him.  It  was  his  great  chance  for  a  great  strike. 
With  portions  of  the  6th  and  18th  corps,  and  the  whole  of  the 
2d,  5th,  and  9th,  he  must  have  had  70,000  men  at  least. 
There  was  every  reason  to  essay  a  turning  movement  by  the 
left  with  the  5th  corps,  which  was  at  that  extremity  of  our 
line,  and  which  had  not  been  severely  engaged  at  Cold  Harbor ; 
Warren  might  have  been  sent  round  by  the  Jerusalem  Plank 
Road  ;  and  if  he  had  been,  he  would  have  undoubtedly  entered 
Petersburg  without  opposition.  But  nothing  of  the  sort  was 
attempted.  Sheridan,  who  had  in  the  series  of  operations  just 
terminated  seized  Cold  Harbor  for  us,  was  off  on  one  of  these 
useless  raids.  Nothing  was  done  but  to  order  another  assault 
for  one  division  of  the  9th  corps  towards  dark.  This  was 
perfectly  successful.  But  there  was  no  cooperation ;  it  was  a 
repetition  of  so  many  other  similar  affairs  since  we  had  crossed 
the  Rapidan.  We  were  at  length  obliged,  by  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements  to  the  enemy,  to  retire  from  the  captured 
works. 


402  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Nevertheless  Beauregard's  little  force  could  not  hold 
such  an  advanced  line.  During  the  night  of  the  17th  and 
18th  he  fell  back  to  the  heights  of  Petersburg,  properly  so 
called,  which  the  Confederate  army  held  to  the  close  of  the 
war. 

General  Meade  had  ordered  an  assault  for  the  next  morn 
ing,  the  18th,  at  daybreak.  On  moving  towards  the  enemy  it 
was  found  that  they  had  fallen  back,  and  our  troops  followed 
their  skirmish  line  through  the  woods  until  it  was  seen  where 
they  had  taken  position.  Even  then  a  prompt  and  vigorous 
attack  would  have  resulted  in  our  favor.  But  it  was  not 
made.  It  was  thought  necessary  to  make  further  examination 
of  their  lines,  and  while  we  were  getting  ready  for  our  after 
noon  assault,  General  Lee  arrived  with  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia.  The  assault  was  delivered  and  gallantly  deliv 
ered  at  three  in  the  afternoon,  —  but,  as  might  have  been 
expected,  it  was  an  utter  failure. 

In  these  assaults  on  Petersburg  we  had  lost  9964  men, 
making  our  total  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  during 
the  campaign  59,176,  to  which  if  we  add  about  10,000  sick, 
we  get  a  total  of  nearly  70,000  men. 

Our  army  then  sat  down  before  the  works  of  Petersburg, 
which  were  to  detain  us  nearly  ten  months.  Neither  of  the 
great  objects  of  the  campaign  had  been  attained.  Lee's  army 
had  not  been  shattered,  nor  had  Kichmond  been  taken.  Our 
cavalry  raids  had  not  destroyed  the  Confederate  lines  of 
supply.  The  Virginia  Central  Railroad  still  ran  undisturbed 
by  the  South  Anna  through  Hanover  Junction  to  Richmond. 
The  Weldon,  Danville,  and  South  Side  roads  were  as  yet 
not  even  menaced. 

The  army  was  terribly  shattered.  It  had  lost  considerably 
more  than  half  of  the  troops  that  crossed  the  Rapidan  on 
the  3d  of  May.  It  had  accomplished  nothing,  save  that  it 
had  killed,  wounded,  and  captured  some  30,000  men  of  Lee's 
army.  It  had  carried  out  its  policy  of  attrition,  and  that 


GRANTS   CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      403 

was  all.  It  had  simply  depleted  Lee's  army.  It  had  neither 
disintegrated  nor  demoralized  it. 

In  fact,  after  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  Lee  felt  himself 
able  to  spare  the  2d  corps  under  Early,  and  sent  it  to  make 
a  demonstration  on  Washington,  of  so  serious  a  character 
that  Grant  had  to  dispatch  the  6th  and  19th  corps  to  defend 
the  capital.  This  was  the  result  and  consequence  of  the 
campaign  of  1864  in  Virginia. 

The  campaign  must  be  pronounced  a  failure.  Of  this  there 
can  be  no  real  question.  The  capture  of  Richmond,  the  sur 
render  of  Lee,  were  the  result  of  quite  different  causes.  The 
result  of  this  campaign  was  to  reduce  our  army  in  numbers 
and  morale  out  of  all  proportion  with  its  adversary. 

The  difficulty  with  General  Grant  seems  to  have  been  that 
he  adopted  at  the  outset,  and  adhered  pertinaciously,  to  a 
vicious  principle ;  that  he  relied  on  mere  fighting,  even  when 
the  fighting  meant  assaulting  works  without  any  reasonable 
ground  of  success,  —  or  at  least  any  reasonable  ground  of 
achieving  such  a  success  as  was  worth  the  loss  sure  to  be 
incurred.  Then  he  was  in  other  ways  wasteful  of  his  army. 
"  The  marching,"  says  General  Humphreys,  "  was  done 
chiefly  at  night,  and  the  contact  was  so  close  as  to  require 
constant  vigilance  day  and  night,  and  allow  but  little  time 
for  sleep.  The  firing  was  incessant.  The  fatigue,  the  loss  of 
sleep,  the  watchfulness,  taxed  severely  the  powers  of  endurance 
of  both  officers  and  men.  Usually  in  military  operations,  the 
opposing  armies  come  together,  fight  a  battle,  and  separate 
again,  the  strain  lasting  only  a  few  days.  In  a  siege  it  is  only 
a  small  part  of  the  opposing  troops  that  are  close  together. 
But  with  these  two  armies  it  was  different.  From  the  5th  of 
May,  1864,  to  the  9th  of  April,  1865,  they  were  in  constant 
close  contact,  with  rare  intervals  of  brief  comparative  repose." 

By  this  course  the  strength  of  the  army  was  constantly 
kept  down.  In  none  of  the  battles  in  this  campaign  did 
Grant  have  as  many  men  as  he  needed. 


404  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

One  thing  is  certain.  With  any  resources  less  than  those 
of  the  United  States,  the  campaign,  as  Grant  conducted  it, 
must  have  come  to  a  dead  halt.  It  was  so  wasteful,  so  thought 
less  of  men's  lives,  that  it  required  large  reinforcements,  an 
adversary  numerically  much  weaker,  and  very  patient  and 
much-enduring  soldiers.  It  is  impossible,  no  doubt,  to  com 
mend  an  officer  who  is  nervous  at  taking  risks,  who  hesitates 
and  falters  when  the  day  of  battle  approaches,  who  makes 
the  unreasonable  demand  that  everything  be  made  absolutely 
certain  before  he  will  give  the  order  to  attack.  But  it  is 
equally  impossible  to  approve  of  an  officer  who  attacks  sys 
tematically,  running  his  chance  of  being  successful  or  the 
reverse,  who  does  not  realize  the  necessity  of  economy  in  the 
use  of  his  resources,  that  he  may  have  them  all  at  his 
command  on  the  day  of  a  real  battle.  To  expect  a  crushing 
victory  from  such  a  policy  as  Grant  pursued  with  his  army 
would  be  as  futile  as  to  expect  from  a  turbulent,  noisy  river 
the  terrible  devastation  of  a  freshet  or  a  broken  dam.  Better 
far  would  it  have  been  for  Grant  to  have  kept  his  army  out 
of  this  close  contact  with  the  enemy,  which  took  the  spirit 
and  vigor  to  such  a  marked  degree  out  of  his  men  ;  to  have 
ordered  fewer  attacks,  and  taken  more  pains  about  those  he 
did  order ;  to  have  taken  such  pains,  in  fact,  and  made  so  few 
attacks,  that  when  he  did  order  an  attack  the  troops  would 
have  known  that  all  possible  preparation  had  been  made, 
and  that  their  chief  expected  them  to  succeed.  If  the  sol 
diers  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ever  entertained  such 
notions  as  this,  they  were  speedily  disenchanted.  It  was  soon 
seen  that  attacks  were  the  daily  task,  and  that  as  often  as 
not  no  thought  whatever  had  been  given  to  them,  or  any 
expectations  whatsoever  entertained  in  regard  to  their  issue. 

Strategically,  the  campaign  was  undoubtedly  well  con 
ducted.  The  army  was  never  placed  in  a  false  position ;  its 
marches  were  skillfully  planned  and  admirably  executed ;  as 
a  rule  its  wants  were  liberally  provided  for  and  its  wounded 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1864      405 

well  cared  for.  The  march  to  Petersburg  was  a  brilliant  feat ; 
and  had  it  been  followed  by  a  little  more  enterprise  in  the 
operations  after  arriving  before  the  town,  we  should  have 
secured  a  great  prize. 

Tactically,  however,  the  campaign  yields  but  few  lessons, 
unless  by  way  of  avoidance.  Everywhere  we  see  the  same 
burning,  persistent  desire  to  fight,  to  attack,  in  season  and 
out  of  season,  against  intrenchments,  natural  obstacles,  what 
not.  This  is  not  the  temper  of  the  great  soldier.  There  is  not 
a  trace  of  it  in  Marlborough  or  Wellington.  In  fact  neither 
of  those  generals  could  have  conducted  his  campaigns  a 
month  on  such  a  theory.  They  had  not  the  requisite  resources. 
There  is  nothing  of  the  sort  in  the  principles  or  practice  of 
Napoleon.  With  him  a  battle  was  always  a  serious  matter  for 
which  troops  were  to  be  husbanded,  as  for  a  supreme  effort ; 
and  though  he  spared  no  sacrifice  while  the  occasion  was  in 
progress,  he  knew  well  the  value  of  previous  and  subsequent 
rest  and  recuperation.  The  experience  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  this  campaign  was  in  fact  a  new  experience  for 
soldiers.  Sacrifices  were  demanded  every  day  of  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  army  which  had  hitherto  been  required  only 
occasionally,  and  then  only  from  those  selected  for  some 
special  post  of  honor  and  danger.  To  lie  in  a  new-dug  rifle- 
pit  a  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy  for  several  days  under 
constant  fire  is  much  like  the  experience  of  the  engineer 
troops  in  a  siege.  To  rush  from  this  rifle-pit  upon  the  enemy's 
works  is  the  act  of  a  forlorn  hope,  whose  gallant  performance 
is  the  admiration  of  a  storming  column,  itself  selected  for 
a  special  and  dangerous  service.  But  it  is  not  every  day  that 
the  sap  is  pushed  forward  or  the  breach  assaulted.  Yet  the 
soldiers  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  to  make  these 
exceptional  feats  their  daily  duties.  All  honor  to  the  brave 
men  who  with  unwavering  and  steady  patriotism  stood  up  to 
their  work  and  met  their  fate. 


XVI 

GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN    AGAINST 


BY 


COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE 


Read  before  the  Society  November  1^  1887 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE 

WHEN  General  Grant  came  to  the  East,  at  the  end  of  the 
third  year  of  the  war,  to  conduct  operations  against  Lee  in 
person,  he  took  upon  himself  the  enterprise  of  destroying  an 
army  composed  of  the  best  men  and  most  seasoned  veterans 
of  the  South  and  led  by  the  foremost  commander  of  the  Con 
federacy. 

Lee  had  twice  led  his  army  across  the  Potomac  to  invade 
the  North,  and  had  been  defeated  each  time ;  but  he  had  seen 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  retreat  from  his  front  four  times,  — 
once  from  the  Peninsula,  once  across  the  Rappahannock  in 
1862,  and  once  again  across  the  Rappahannock,  and  once 
across  the  Rapidan  in  1863,  —  while  at  Mine  Run  in  Decem 
ber,  1863,  he  showed  that  he  remained  as  willing  as  ever  to 
come  out  of  his  intrenchments  to  engage  his  adversary  if  the 
latter  would  not  attack  him. 

Could  the  Confederates  maintain  the  war  but  a  year  or  two 
longer  on  the  same  terms,  they  might  hope  to  wear  out  the 
patience  of  the  North,  whose  public  debt  was  growing  at  the 
rate  of  three  or  four  million  dollars  a  day.  The  party  which 
opposed  the  war,  harping  upon  our  financial  burdens  and 
exaggerating  the  losses  in  battle,  which  were  bringing  mourn 
ing  and  distress  to  every  hamlet  in  the  North,  was  growing 
stronger  every  day ;  volunteering  had  lagged  ;  the  draft  had 
been  met  by  riots,  and  mercenaries  (many  of  them  of  the 
worst  type)  were  being  sent  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  army ; 
and,  in  short,  every  day's  delay  augmented  the  perils  which 
beset  the  cause  of  the  Union.  Procrastination  was  the  only 
salvation  for  the  Confederacy.  Unceasing  action  was  forced 
upon  Grant. 


410  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

It  took  only  two  days  of  fighting  against  Grant  to  commit 
Lee  to  the  Fabian  policy,  and  he  never  afterwards  turned 
aside  from  it. 

Grant  saw  that  it  would  not  do  to  make  a  campaign  of  mere 
manoeuvres  for  position,  or  to  draw  back  from  the  front  of  the 
enemy  if  he  failed  to  engage  them  outside  of  their  intrench- 
ments,  or  even  if  our  arms  met  with  reverses.  To  make  Lee 
retreat,  or  even  to  make  him  abandon  Richmond,  could  not  end 
the  war.  The  rebel  armies  had  to  be  destroyed.  Nothing  but 
the  utter  exhaustion  of  the  men  and  resources  of  the  South 
could  persuade  the  Southerners  that  the  Unionists  of  the 
North  were  mighty  enough  to  maintain  the  Union.  These 
were  not  the  only  reasons  for  taking  and  keeping  the  aggress 
ive.  Grant's  comprehensive  plan  of  fighting  all  the  rebel 
armies  at  once  required  that  hostilities  should  be  so  unremit 
ting  against  each  army  that  neither  could  reinforce  the  other. 
No  one  of  these  facts  can  be  lost  sight  of  in  estimating 
Grant's  conduct  in  the  campaign  which  began  on  the  Rapidan 
in  May,  1864,  and  ended  at  Appomattox  Court  House  in 
April,  1865. 

His  critics  have  treated  the  operations  between  the  Rapidan 
and  the  Chickahominy  as  if  they  constituted  a  campaign  by 
themselves  ;  but  if  one  has  ever  been  led  to  take  this  view,  he 
has  only  to  read  the  noble  Memoirs  of  General  Grant  to  cor 
rect  it.  This  great  narrative,  breathing  the  sincerity  of  one 
who  submits  his  acts  to  the  judgment  of  his  fellow  men  as  he 
goes  to  present  himself  before  the  Infinite  Judge,  and  bearing 
the  mark  of  a  hand  which  hastens  to  record  the  truth  while 
yet  there  is  day,  impresses  us  with  the  fact  that  there  was  one 
unremitting  campaign  from  the  first  gun  in  the  Wilderness  to 
the  last  gun  at  Appomattox  Court  House,  a  campaign  which 
was  not  divided  into  weeks  or  months,  and  which  had  but  two 
geographical  limits,  —  the  first  where  Lee's  army  was  struck, 
and  the  last  where  it  was  captured,  —  and  that  when  losses  are 
counted,  they  are  to  be  aggregated.  The  lives  lost  in  the 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  411 

Wilderness  contributed  directly  to  the  surrender  at  Appo- 
mattox. 

Through  the  smoke  of  the  many  battles  of  May  and  June, 

1864,  the  calm  eye  of  our  great  commander  rested  on  the 
inevitable  day  when  Lee's  army,  depleted,  famished,  worn  out 
and  discouraged,  should  yield  to  his  blows  and  give  up  its 
existence.    His  unimpassioned  genius  forecast   the   ultimate 
destruction  of  his  adversary  as  confidently  as  the  scientist 
predicts  the  final  extinction  of  the  life  of  the  world,  and  his 
sphinx-like  face  betrayed  no  sign  of  discouragement  at  repulse 
or  dismay  at  the  long  roll  of  his  losses.    If  we  would  estimate 
the  value  of  his  methods,  we  must  now,  as  he  did  then,  carry 
forward  the  losses  of  1864  to  the  day  of  final  reckoning  in 

1865,  and  then  compare  them,  and  we  shall  find  that  Grant 
lost  but  a  few  more  and  perhaps  less  men  than  Lee  lost. 

Mr.  Ropes,  in  his  papers  upon  the  Wilderness  campaign, 
delivered  before  us  and  in  the  Lowell  Institute  course,  has 
taken  a  view  of  General  Grant's  conduct  of  this  campaign 
which  is  so  much  at  variance  with  that  which  I  have  been  led 
to  take  that  I  have  ventured  to  examine  the  grounds  upon 
which  his  criticisms  are  based,  and  with  great  deference  to 
make  this  record  of  the  results  of  my  labor.  In  the  same  con 
nection  I  have  also  touched  upon  the  premises  of  some  criti 
cisms  made  by  General  Walker  in  his  brilliant  "  History  of 
the  Second  Army  Corps."  The  censures  expressed  by  these 
gentlemen  command  attention,  not  only  from  the  authority  of 
the  writers,  but  also  because  they  embody  the  result  of  an 
investigation  of  all  the  facts  contained  in  recent  publications 
upon  the  campaign,  excepting  perhaps  the  Personal  Memoirs 
of  General  Grant,  which  may  have  been  published  at  a  later 
date. 

The  most  valuable  compilation  of  the  facts  of  this  campaign 
which  we  have  is  the  elaborate  work  of  General  Humphreys 
entitled  "  The  Virginia  Campaign  of  '64  and  '65,"  which  is  a 
monument  of  faithful  and  accurate  research,  joined  to  the  most 


412  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

intimate  personal  knowledge  of  the  events  of  the  campaign. 
If  it  lacks  the  picturesque  view  of  the  historian  skilled  in 
the  art  of  popular  narrative,  it  is  in  the  highest  degree  satis 
factory  to  one  searching  for  exact  and  complete  information. 
I  have  followed  this  work  in  statements  of  fact  in  this  paper, 
excepting  where  I  have  otherwise  noted. 

The  criticisms  to  which  I  have  referred  credit  Grant  with 
taking  the  proper  route  and  with  the  greatest  skill  in  moving 
his  columns,  changing  his  bases,  and  protecting  his  trains,  and 
I  shall  not  dwell  upon  these  features  of  the  campaign.  It  is 
sufficient  to  direct  attention  to  the  fact  that  from  the  camps 
north  of  the  Rapidan  to  the  James  the  army  was  moved  over 
a  hundred  miles,  crossing  three  rivers  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
and  making  nine  flank  movements,  without  a  miscarriage  or  sur 
prise  ;  that  the  pontoon  bridges  across  the  Eapidan  were  taken 
up  on  orders  issued  while  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness  was  yet 
in  progress,  that  the  base  of  supplies  was  changed  first  to 
Fredericksburg,  next  to  Port  Royal,  next  to  White  House, 
and  last  to  the  James  River ;  that  the  sick  and  the  wounded, 
excepting  a  few  who  perished  between  the  hostile  lines,  were 
taken  up  and  transported  to  the  rear  with  the  most  perfect 
method  and  humanity ;  that  the  army  was  well  fed,  well 
clothed,  and  well  sheltered ;  that  the  daily  percentage  of  sick 
in  May  was  less  than,  and  in  June  was  almost  the  same  as,  it 
was  in  camp  in  April,1  and  that  a  supply  train  of  4000 
wagons  and  a  long  train  of  reserve  artillery  were  so  well  pro 
tected  in  their  movements  that  not  a  gun,  wagon,  or  animal 
was  taken  by  the  enemy,  and  not  a  dollar's  worth  of  material 
was  abandoned  or  destroyed  to  save  it  from  the  enemy. 

But  the  master  mind  that  successfully  planned  and  directed 
these  immense  operations  is  accused  of  underestimating  the 
difficulty  of  the  task  before  him,  of  uselessly  sending  Butler's 
army  up  the  James  and  misdirecting  its  efforts,  of  neglecting 
other  reinforcements  which  were  at  his  command  and  crossing 
1  M.  &  S.  pt.  1,  p.  329. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  413 

the  Rapidan  with  an  insufficient  force,  of  moving  his  army 
from  one  position  to  another  with  the  single  idea  of  finding 
new  lines  of  intrenchments  to  attack,  of  making  a  series  of 
hopeless  assaults  and  attacking  in  season  and  out  of  season, 
instead  of  flanking  the  enemy  by  repeated  movements  until 
they  should  be  caught  in  a  place  where  they  could  be  attacked 
with  the  certainty  of  victory,  of  inadequately  supporting  his 
attacking  columns  and  recklessly  wasting  the  lives  of  his  sol 
diers,  and  of  sometimes  neglecting  strategic  opportunities. 
This  is  a  formidable  indictment.  No  general  should  be  for 
given  for  this  aggregation  of  errors.  They  seem  utterly  in 
consistent  with  the  military  skill  which  previously  had  directed 
our  armies  in  the  West  at  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry,  Vicks- 
burg  and  Chattanooga,  and  which,  a  little  later,  impelled  the 
armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James  in  the  capture  of  Peters 
burg  and  the  brilliant  pursuit  and  capture  of  Lee's  army ;  and 
the  specific  acts  on  which  these  errors  are  charged  deserve 
a  very  careful  examination. 

Grant  had  once  suggested  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
might  abandon  all  the  routes  to  Richmond  and  move  from 
Suffolk,  Virginia,  against  the  Weldon  Railroad  and  Raleigh, 
threatening  the  Danville  Railroad,  and  so  compelling  the 
enemy  to  quit  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee ; l  and  Swinton 
says  2  that  this  plan  was  recommended  by  the  soundest  mili 
tary  reasoning,  but  intimates  that  external  influences  induced 
Grant  to  relinquish  it  for  the  plan  which  he  adopted.  Badeau 
says  (vol.  ii,  p.  43)  that  the  former  plan  was  devised  by 
General  W.  F.  Smith,  and  that  Grant  did  not  incline  to  it 
after  he  came  East ;  but  be  this  as  it  may,  it  seems  improbable 
that  President  Lincoln  urged  the  route  by  way  of  the  Rapidan, 
in  view  of  the  fact  related  by  General  Grant  in  his  Memoirs 
(vol.  ii,  p.  123)  that  the  President  suggested  that  he  might 
go  down  the  Potomac  and  advance  on  Lee  from  some  point 
on  that  river.  No  intimation  that  there  was  any  pressure  upon 
1  Badeau,  vol.  ii,  p.  558.  2  Swinton,  p.  408. 


414  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

him  to  take  the  Rapidan  route  is  conveyed  to  us  by  Grant's 
Memoirs,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  selected  it 
because  of  the  opportunity  and  extent  of  country  it  afforded  for 
fighting  Lee  near  our  base  of  supplies  before  he  could  inclose 
himself  in  the  permanent  works  around  Richmond.1  In  this 
place  I  will  quote  the  opinion  of  General  Humphreys  in  reply 
to  the  suggestion  that  Lee's  army  might  have  been  broken  up 
with  much  less  loss  of  life  by  manoeuvring  it  into  positions 
where  victory  would  have  been  assured  rather  than  fighting 
it  as  Grant  did.  He  says  :2  "  But  move  as  we  might,  long 
continued,  hard  fighting,  under  great  difficulties,  was  before 
us,  and,  whatever  might  be  the  line  of  operations  adopted,  the 
successful  execution  of  the  task  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
could  only  be  accomplished  by  the  vigorous  and  untiring 
efforts  of  all  belonging  to  that  army,  and  by  suffering  heavy 
losses  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  that  the  whole  army  well 
understood." 

This  is  the  opinion  of  one  who,  as  chief  of  General  Meade's 
staff,  had  the  most  intimate  knowledge  of  what  the  army  had 
to  do,  and  who  for  military  learning  and  skill  and  sagacity 
and  caution,  combined  with  courage  and  resolution,  had  not 
an  equal  among  all  the  corps  commanders. 

Grant  determined  to  send  Butler's  army  up  the  James 
simultaneously  with  the  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
across  the  Rapidan,  in  order  to  have  the  two  armies  converge, 
to  unite  in  front  of  Richmond,  while  at  the  same  time  But 
ler's  army  in  its  movement  should  cover  the  James,  it  being 
important  to  guard  that  avenue  to  the  sea.  Butler,  without 
uncovering  the  mouth  of  the  James,  could  have  threatened 
Richmond  and  Petersburg  with  10,000  men,  but  he  could 
not  have  safely  taken  that  number  of  men  far  up  the  river  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  he  therefore  was  given  a  force  of 
about  38,000  men.3  Grant  is  criticised  for  this  ;  but  when  we 
find  that  the  Army  of  the  James  detained  over  27,000  men 

1  Grant's  Memoirs,  141.  2  Va.  Camp.  9.  3  Ibid.  137. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  415 

from  Lee,  so  that  no  part  of  it  manifested  itself  in  Grant's 
front  until  after  the  great  battles  of  the  Wilderness  and 
Spottsylvania,1  we  see  that  the  event  justified  Grant  in  send 
ing  this  army  up  the  James,  for  the  number  detained  by 
Butler  was  proportionately  greater  than  that  opposed  by  Lee 
to  Grant  in  those  battles. 

Kegarding  the  assumption  that^Grant  is  responsible  for 
Butler's  landing  at  Bermuda  Hundred  instead  of  advancing 
on  Petersburg,  it  is  to  be  said  that  Grant  in  his  written 
orders  directed  that  he  should  occupy  City  Point,  and  that 
in  person  he  urged  upon  Butler  the  importance  of  taking 
Petersburg.2 

It  is  said  that  Grant  should  have  taken  with  him  across  the 
Kapidan  all  the  troops  then  in  the  defenses  of  Washington, 
whose  numbers  are  stated  at  40,000  to  50,000.  Whether  he 
is  chargeable  with  an  error  in  this  respect  cannot  be  deter 
mined  until  we  learn  whether  the  administration  would  have 
permitted  these  troops  to  quit  Washington  before  Grant 
made  it  certain  that  he  could  hold  Lee  in  his  front  and  prevent 
him  from  marching  on  Washington,  and  whether,  before  the 
country  was  roused  by  the  great  battles  of  May,  the  admin 
istration  could  have  ventured  to  violate  the  contract  with  men 
who  had  enlisted  to  serve  as  heavy  artillery  by  sending  them 
to  serve  as  infantry  against  the  enemy.  I  have  not  been  able 
to  find  the  authority  for  placing  the  number  of  men  left  in 
Washington  at  40,000  to  50,000.  Not  over  20,000  of  them  all 
told  seem  to  have  reached  Grant  afterwards  when  he  called 
for  all  that  could  be  sent.3 

1  Va.  Camp.  124,  141,  142,  164.  2  95  W.  R.  15,  16. 

8  Va.  Camp.  110,  note.  The  returns  published  in  the  War  Records  after 
this  paper  was  read  show  that  April  30,  1864,  there  were  39,394  "  present  for 
duty  "  in  the  Departments  of  Washington  and  the  Susquehanna,  from  which 
organizations  numbering  17,333  were  sent  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  before 
June  15,  1864.  The  remainder  included  over  9  regiments  of  the  Veteran  Re 
serve  Corps,  not  available  for  field  duty,  besides  detachments  of  recruits  and 
convalescents  (60  W.  R.  1047,  1052  ;  81  W.  R.  47,  48).  As  the  9th  corps  had 


416  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

One  other  criticism  of  this  nature  which  remains  to  be 
noticed  is  against  the  selection  of  the  9th  corps  to  reinforce 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  instead  of  a  corps  from  the  Army 
of  the  James.  The  9th  corps  was  kept  at  Annapolis  to  lead 
the  enemy  to  believe  that  it  was  intended  to  be  landed  on 
the  coast  south  of  Norfolk ;  and  it  was  probably  fear  of 
this  movement  which  detained  the  troops  in  North  Carolina 
that  Beauregard  afterwards  summoned  in  such  haste  to  the 
defense  of  Petersburg.  This  was  a  sufficient  reason  for  not 
exchanging  the  9th  corps  with  one  of  the  Army  of  the  James. 
The  objection  which  is  urged  to  the  9th  corps  is  that  two 
thirds  of  its  strength  was  in  raw  soldiers,  but  they  fought 
well,  and  in  the  two  white  divisions  at  least  fourteen  of  the 
twenty-two  regiments  were  old  organizations. 

Grant  took  across  the  Rapidan  about  115,000  officers  and 
men  "  equipped  for  duty,"  of  all  arms  (127,095  "  present 
for  duty  ").1  The  morning  reports  of  Lee's  army  a  few  days 
before  showed  the  force  to  be  61,025  effectives.2  These  are 
the  numbers  of  those  in  both  armies  who  could  be  brought 
into  line  of  battle.3  I  do  not  think  that  at  the  time  Grant 
crossed  the  Rapidan  any  military  critic  would  have  said  that 
with  an  effective  force  nearly  twice  as  great  as  Lee's  he  had 
made  inadequate  preparation  in  this  respect.  Mr.  Ropes 
estimates  Lee's  force  70,000  and  General  Grant  estimates 
it  at  80,000.*  There  were  in  it  66,351  "  present  for  duty."  8 

Lee's  advance,  consisting  of  Ewell's  and  Hill's  corps,  lay 
in  rear  of  the  intrenchments  along  the  Rapidan  from  Barnett's 
Ford  to  Morton's  Ford,  with  a  line  of  intrenchments  facing 

19,250  present  for  duty  (60  W.  R.  1055),  it  seems  that  the  statement  of  the  War 
Department  giving  the  numbers  of  reinforcements  May  4  to  June  12,  cited  by 
General  Humphreys,  was  inadequate. 

1  67  W.  R.  198,  285,  287,  915  ;  2  Grant's  Memoirs,  291. 

2  N.  &  L.  Ill ;  Va.  Camp.  14-17. 

8  2  Grant's  Memoirs,  289,  291 ;  2  Badeau,  94 ;  Va,  Camp.  14,  408  ;  69  W.  R. 
198,  285,  287,  915. 
*  2  Grant's  Memoirs,  290.  5  N.  &  L.  111. 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  417 

east  along  Mine  Run  from  Morton's  Ford  to  Antioch  Church. 
The  Wilderness  covered  the  country  east  of  Mine  Run.  Lee's 
headquarters  were  at  Orange  Court  House,  and  Longstreet 
with  two  divisions  of  his  corps  lay  in  reserve  at  Gordonsville. 
The  Orange  Turnpike,  the  Orange  Plank  Road,  and  the 
Catharpin  Road  all  ran  from  Chancellorsville  or  its  vicinity 
southwesterly  through  the  Wilderness.  Grant  directed  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  to  cross  the  Rapidan  at  Ely's  and  Ger- 
manna  fords,  and  to  push  for  the  latter  two  roads  with  a  view 
to  passing  the  column  on  the  Plank  Road  over  to  the  Cathar 
pin  Road  a  little  way  beyond  the  Wilderness  Tavern,  and  then, 
moving  up  along  the  Catharpin  and  Pamunkey  roads,  to  strike 
the  western  flank  of  Lee's  force  on  the  Rapidan  in  the  open 
country  beyond  the  Wilderness  ;  but  he  made  every  disposition 
for  fighting  the  enemy  whenever  they  should  come  out  of  their 
intrenchments  to  interrupt  the  movement.  The  whole  army 
excepting  the  9th  corps  crossed  the  Rapidan  on  the  night  of 
May  3,  and  the  different  corps  reached  the  designated  halt 
ing  places  —  the  2d  at  Chancellorsville,  the  5th  at  Wilder 
ness  Tavern,  and  the  6th  on  the  heights  west  of  Germanna 
Ford  — •  on  the  4th  of  May,  in  season  to  have  continued  their 
march  five  miles  further ;  but  they  were  halted  to  cover  the 
passage  of  the  immense  wagon  trains  across  the  Rapidan  and 
their  concentration  at  Todd's  Tavern,  which  operations  were 
not  entirely  accomplished  until  2  P.  M.  the  next  day.  This 
halt  has  been  characterized  as  a  mistake,  and  question  has 
been  made  whether  the  army  ought  not  to  have  pushed  on  to 
Robertson's  Tavern  or  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  leaving 
the  protection  of  the  trains  to  Torbert's  cavalry  and  two  divi 
sions  of  the  6th  corps  or  the  9th  corps.  General  Walker,  in 
the  "  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,"  says  that  50,000 
men  could  have  been  in  position  beyond  the  Wilderness  at 
Robertson's  Tavern  before  night,  with  only  Swell's  20,000 
near  enough  to  attack,  and  that  80,000  of  our  men  could  have 
been  there  by  next  morning,  with  the  necessary  cross-roads  all 


418  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

cut  along  their  rear  by  labor  during  the  night.  On  the  con 
trary,  General  Humphreys  says l  that  to  have  moved  on  would 
have  left  the  right  too  open,  and  that  on  this  account,  and  to 
rest  the  troops  for  the  action  of  the  morrow,  the  halt  was 
judicious.  Let  us  examine  the  situation.  If  the  army  had 
moved  on  five  miles,  there  would  have  been  five  miles  between 
its  rear  and  Ely's  Ford,  where  the  trains  were  crossing.  To 
a  point  within  that  five  miles  it  was  less  than  fifteen  miles  from 
the  enemy's  works  at  Morton's  Ford  to  the  road  from  Ely's 
Ford.  Lee  predicted  our  movement  on  the  2d,  and,  discover 
ing  it  early  on  the  4th,  sent  Hill  down  the  Plank  Road  and 
Ewell  down  the  Turnpike,  towards  our  columns.  Ewell  easily 
got  within  five  miles  of  the  Wilderness  Tavern,  and  early  on 
the  morning  of  the  5th  had  his  advance  on  the  road  leading 
from  the  Turnpike  to  Spotswood's  on  the  Germanna  Road, 
within  five  miles  of  Ely's  Ford,  where  our  trains  were  crossing. 
If  Grant  had  left  his  right  open,  the  exploit  of  Jackson  at 
Chancellorsville  a  year  before  would  have  furnished  Ewell 
an  encouraging  precedent  for  falling  on  our  trains  to  bring 
Grant  to  the  right-about.  If  the  attack  had  been  made, 
Torbert's  cavalry  and  two  divisions  of  infantry  could  not  have 
even  covered  the  ground,  much  less  could  they  have  withstood 
the  attack  of  Ewell's  corps.  The  9th  corps  was  out  of  the 
question.  Having  been  detained  to  guard  the  railroad  between 
Bull  Run  and  the  Rappahannock,  it  made  a  forced  march  for 
the  Rapidan,  but  its  leading  division  did  not  cross  the  Rapidan 
until  the  morning  of  the  5th,  and  the  other  two  did  not  cross 
until  evening. 

Let  us  now  inquire  what  would  have  happened  to  the  army 
if  it  had  marched  five  miles  farther  on  the  4th.  If  it  had 
moved  towards  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  leaving  its  trains 
to  follow  from  Ely's  Ford  via  Todd's  Tavern,  the  enemy 
would  not  have  asked  a  better  situation.  Both  Ewell  and 
Hill  (if  they  could  have  persuaded  themselves  that  Grant 
l  Va.  Camp.  20. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  419 

had  thus  deliberately  exposed  his  trains)  would  have  swooped 
down  upon  them,  and  speedily  have  ended  the  Wilderness 
campaign  by  destruction  of  Grant's  bread  and  ammunition. 

If  the  5th  corps  had  moved  out  on  the  Turnpike  to  take 
position  at  Robertson's  Tavern,  it  would  have  met  E well's 
corps  halfway  from  Wilderness  Tavern,  the  2d  corps  would 
have  had  to  come  up  from  Chancellorsville  by  the  Orange 
Plank  Road,  adding  ten  miles  to  its  previous  march  of  twenty, 
to  join  hands  with  the  5th ;  Hill's  corps,  which  marched  only 
fifteen  miles  that  day,  would  probably  have  come  up,  and  our 
troops  would  still  have  found  themselves  in  the  Wilderness 
and  probably  too  much  occupied  with  the  enemy  to  busy 
themselves  in  cutting  roads  along  the  rear  of  their  line  for 
operations  the  next  day.  But  if  Grant  had  succeeded  in  tak 
ing  up  the  supposed  line  at  Robertson's  Tavern,  the  enemy 
would  probably  have  retired  into  their  works  along  Mine  Run, 
as  they  had  done  in  the  previous  December  when  our  forces 
reached  Robertson's  Tavern,  to  await  the  arrival  of  Long- 
street,  and  to  await  another  flank  movement  on  Grant's  part, 
only  to  meet  it  as  they  met  those  which  he  afterwards  in  fact 
did  make. 

But  the  halt  of  the  4th  diminished  the  hope,  founded  on 
the  experience  of  the  Mine  Run  campaign,  that  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  would  succeed  in  passing  through  the  Wilder 
ness  and  turning  Lee's  flank.  The  order  which  issued  that 
evening  for  the  movement  on  the  5th  warned  the  corps 
commanders  that  their  troops  should  "  be  held  ready  to  meet 
the  enemy  at  any  moment  ;  "  and  Grant,  on  hearing  of  Lee's 
approach  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  ordered  Meade  to  attack 
the  enemy  wherever  they  were  found  1  "  without  giving  time 
for  dispositions." 

The  head  of  the  5th  corps,  which  had  lain  across  the 
Orange  Turnpike  in  front  of  Wilderness  Tavern  during  the 
night  of  the  4th,  was  moving  across  country  toward  Parker's 
1  Badeau,  ii,  104. 


420  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Store  on  the  Plank  Road  to  join  hands  with  the  2d  corps, 
which  was  to  move  up  the  Catharpin  Road  and  throw  its  right 
out  towards  this  point,  when  E well's  advance  was  discovered  in 
front,  coming  eastward  on  the  Pike,  and  Meade  between  seven 
and  eight  o'clock l  ordered  Warren  to  attack  this  force  at  once. 
It  is  said  that  it  was  a  mistake  to  order  an  attack  before  the 
6th  corps  came  up  on  the  right  of  the  5th,  but  the  Union 
generals  had  too  often  delayed  their  attacks  for  everybody  to 
come  into  line.  The  chance  of  inflicting  damaging  blows  be 
fore  the  enemy  had  concentrated  and  prepared  for  the  attack 
had  too  often  been  thrown  away  in  this  manner,  and  this  was 
not  the  time  to  repeat  these  tactics.  Longstreet  was  not  yet 
within  supporting  distance,  and  even  Hill's  corps  was  sep 
arated  from  Swell's  by  several  miles  of  thickets  and  forest, 
Swell's  corps  itself  was  not  yet  in  line  of  battle ;  it  was  seen 
by  our  advance  2  filing  out  of  the  road  to  form  line  of  battle, 
and  it  was  not  all  in  line  of  battle  when  our  attack,  too  long 
delayed,  actually  began.  The  5th  corps  numbered  24,000 
infantry  in  line  of  battle,3  and  Swell's  corps,  without  Hoke's 
brigade  and  21st  North  Carolina,  numbered  in  all  only  about 
17,000,  and,  with  Rauiseur's  and  Johnston's  brigades  absent, 
probably  not  over  16,000  ;  *  and  although  in  the  dense  thickets 
of  the  Wilderness,  if  the  party  attacked  was  prepared,  the 
attacking  party  was  at  a  disadvantage,  especially  if  composed 
of  troops  unfamiliar  with  the  country,  yet  military  principles 
will  not  support  the  theory  that  with  the  advantages  which 
were  in  our  favor  it  was  a  mistake  to  attack  without  waiting 
for  the  6th  corps.  If  the  attack  had  been  delayed  until  the 
6th  corps  arrived,  the  enemy  would  have  been  found  in  per 
fect  preparation  and  probably  behind  breastworks,  for  Swell's 
instructions  were  not  to  bring  on  an  engagement  before 
Longstreet's  arrival.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  attack  failed  of 

1  Va.  Camp,  23.  2  Ante,  p.  129. 

8  67  W.  R.  198. 

*  67  W.  R.  1069-1070. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  421 

complete  success,  not  because  of  the  absence  of  the  6th  corps, 
but  because  the  orders  to  attack  were  not  promptly  obeyed, 
and  because  of  the  want  of  common  tactical  precautions  in 
some  one  of  the  generals  of  the  5th  corps.  We  are  told  by 
Mr.  Ropes  "  that  it  was  no  secret  that  the  best  officers  of  the 
5th  corps  urged  that  the  attack  should  be  deferred  until 
the  6th  corps  had  got  upon  the  right,"  and  in  this  connection 
I  quote  from  the  above-cited  paper  of  Colonel  Swan,  who 
was  a  member  of  the  staff  of  General  Ayres,  then  command 
ing  a  brigade  in  Griffin's  division  of  the  5th  corps.  Stat 
ing  that  at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  pickets  of  Grif 
fin's  division,  which  had  been  somewhat  irregularly  posted 
the  night  before  at  the  open  field  on  the  Turnpike  where  our 
earthworks  were  afterwards  thrown  up  about  a  mile  and 
a  half  west  of  the  Wilderness  Tavern,  having  been  ordered  in 
for  the  march  towards  Parker's  Store,  the  enemy  was  discov 
ered  approaching  on  the  Pike ;  he  proceeds  as  follows :  *  "  I 
remember  myself  that  the  break  in  Griffin's  picket  line  was 
immediately  rectified,  that  the  division  was  formed  in  line  of 
battle  and  began  to  throw  up  a  breastwork  of  logs  and  earth, 
and  that  Generals  Griffin,  Ayres,  and  Bartlett  rode  out  to 
near  the  picket  line,  whence  the  enemy  could  be  seen  leaving 
the  road  and  entering  the  woods  to  the  right  and  left.  I  knew 
that  the  generals  and  staff  officers  all  thought  that  the  enemy 
were  in  strong  force.  I  remember  that  word  to  that  effect 
was  sent  back  to  General  Warren,  and  I  am  sure  that  not 
long  after,  I  knew  that  Griffin  had  been  ordered  to  attack. 
I  think  I  carried  the  order  from  Griffin  to  Ayres  to  attack. 
I  remember  that  Ayres  sent  me  back  to  Griffin  to  say  that  in 
his  judgment  we  ought  to  wait,  for  the  enemy  was  about  to 
attack  us,  and  we  had  a  strong  position,  and  I  remember  that 
Griffin  went  again  to  the  front  and  then  sent  me  back  to  say 
to  General  Warren  that  he  was  averse  to  making  an  attack. 
I  don't  remember  his  words,  but  it  was  a  remonstrance. 

1  Ante,  p.  129. 


422  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

I  think  I  went  twice  to  General  Warren  with  that  message. 
The  last  time  I  met  him  on  the  road,  and  I  remember  that 
he  answered  me  as  if  fear  was  at  the  bottom  of  my  errand. 
I  remember  my  indignation.  It  was  afterwards  a  common 
report  in  the  army  that  Warren  had  just  had  unpleasant 
things  said  to  him  by  General  Meade,  and  that  General 
Meade  had  just  heard  the  bravery  of  his  army  questioned. 
However,  the  attack  was  not  made  by  Griffin  until  Warren 
came  up,  although  in  the  mean  time  his  troops  had  advanced 
to  near  the  edge  of  the  open  fields  shown  on  the  map  as  half 
a  mile  or  so  in  front  of  the  Union  breastworks."  The  attack 
was  made  by  Griffin's  division  on  the  Turnpike  at  about 
noon.1 

In  reading  these  things  one  cannot  wonder  that  Grant, 
waiting  for  over  four  hours  at  the  Wilderness  Tavern  to  hear 
Warren's  musketry  announce  that  his  orders  had  been  obeyed, 
should  question  the  spirit  of  those  who  were  responsible  for 
the  delay,  every  moment  of  which  was  impairing  the  chance 
for  victory  which  he  saw  within  his  grasp.  These  generals 
who  hesitated  to  attack  were  brave  and  skillful  soldiers,  but 
some  strange  lethargy  seems  to  have  possessed  them.  When 
the  attack  was  made  the  enemy  were  driven  in  fine  style ;  but 
although  there  were  troops  enough  not  only  to  form  two  and 
three  lines  of  battle,  but  also  a  reserve  line,2  no  precaution 
was  taken  to  extend  our  line  far  enough  to  the  right  to  insure 
against  a  flanking  movement,  or  even  to  throw  back  a  column 
to  cover  the  flank,  although  a  single  brigade  would  have 
sufficed.  The  enemy  threw  forward  a  force  which  turned 
Griffin's  right  flank  in  a  counter-attack,  the  right  of  our  line 
gave  way,  and  the  whole  of  Griffin's  division  retired  to  its 
original  position.  Portions  of  the  other  three  divisions  of  the 
5th  corps  made  disjointed  attacks  on  Ewell's  corps  on  the 
south  of  the  Pike,  which  miscarried  because  the  direction  was 
lost  in  the  thickets,  and  an  attack  was  made  on  a  division  of 
1  Va.  Camp.  26.  2  Ante,  pp.  130,  131. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  423 

the  6th  corps  after  it  arrived  on  the  right  of  the  5th,  which 
was  repulsed,  and  thus  ended  the  battle  of  this  day  on  the 
Turnpike. 

Another  battle  was  fought  on  the  Orange  Plank  Road.  The 
advance  of  Hill  eastward  on  that  road  being  detected  early  in 
the  morning,  Getty's  division  of  the  6th  corps  was  sent  down 
from  Wilderness  Tavern,  and,  forming  line  of  battle  across 
the  Plank  Road  in  front  of  the  Brock  Road,  awaited  the  arrival 
of  the  2d  corps  under  Hancock,  which,  marching  back  from  a 
point  on  the  Catharpin  Road,  two  miles  west  of  Todd's  Tavern, 
came  up  the  Brock  Road  and  formed  on  the  left  of  Getty. 
Getty's  division,  advancing  westward  on  both  sides  of  the 
Orange  Plank  Road,  met  the  enemy  between  four  and  five 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  near  Tapp's  farm.  The  2d  corps 
came  to  its  aid,  and  the  combined  forces  engaged  the  enemy  in 
a  close  and  furious  battle  which  lasted  until  dark.  General 
Humphreys  says 1  that  with  an  hour  more  of  daylight  Hill 
would  have  been  driven  from  the  field,  for  his  force  was  shat 
tered  and  disjointed.  He  had  not  connected  with  Ewell,  and 
during  the  battle  on  the  Plank  Road  Wadsworth  was  sent 
with  his  division  and  Baxter's  brigade  from  the  line  of  the 
5th  corps,  in  a  southwesterly  direction,  to  take  Hill's  force 
in  flank  and  rear ;  but  nightfall  also  stopped  him  short  of  his 
mark,  or  he  would  have  rolled  up  Hill's  flank,  and  the  result 
would  have  been  disaster  for  the  latter.  This  attack  on  the 
Plank  Road  seems  to  have  been  amply  justified  by  the 
damage  inflicted  on  Hill's  corps,  and  more  than  justified 
by  the  chance  of  completely  routing  this  corps,  which  nothing 
but  the  merest  chance  averted.  Probably  the  obstruction  of 
the  march  of  the  2d  corps  by  the  artillery  in  the  Brock  Road 
delayed  its  arrival  long  enough  to  save  Hill's  corps. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  Getty  was  ordered  in  against  Hill 
before  Hancock  could  get  up,  but  General  Humphreys  says 1 
that  at  2  p.  M.  the  head  of  Hancock's  column  arrived  and 

1  Va.  Camp.  35. 


424  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

was  placed  on  Getty's  left,  and  that  at  3.15  the  latter  was 
ordered  to  attack,  and  Hancock  was  ordered  to  support  him 
with  his  whole  corps,  and  that  Getty's  attack,  supported  by 
Hancock,  was  made  at  4.15.1 

General  Walker  says2  that  the  reports  of  Lee's  move 
ments  on  the  4th  caused  some  change  of  plan,  and  that  "  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  why  Hancock  should  have  been 
sent  so  far  away  to  the  left,  unless  his  movement  was  to  be 
persisted  in,  except  only  in  some  extraordinary  emergency, 
unless,  that  is,  the  commanding  general  felt  strong  enough  to 
fight,  or  at  least  to  hold  in  check,  the  enemy  with  the  5th  and 
6th  corps  while  pushing  the  2d  into  their  rear,"  yet  that 
Hancock  was  called  back  before  the  battle  with  the  5th  and 
6th  corps  had  been  fought  out.  No  suggestion  appears  in 
Grant's  order  of  the  4th  of  an  intention  to  push  the  2d  corps 
alone  into  the  rear  of  the  enemy,  and  it  is  not  clear  how  this 
could  have  been  done  with  any  hope  of  success,  and  General 
Humphreys,  who  planned  the  movement,  makes  no  allusion  to 
such  intention  in  his  explanation  of  it.  General  Humphreys 
says3  that  the  order  for  the  movement  on  the  5th  conformed 
to  Grant's  original  plan,  which  was  to  move  by  the  Catharpin 
and  Pamunkey  roads  to  turn  Lee's  right  (western)  flank  in  the 
open  country,  and  to  this  end  Hancock  was  ordered  to  march 
westward  on  the  Catharpin  Road  to  Shady  Grove  Church 
and  extend  the  right  towards  Warren.  Warren  was  to  move 
across  country  to  Parker's  Store  and  extend  his  right  towards 
Sedgwick  at  Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  to  which  point  the  latter 
was  ordered  to  move.  The  only  modification  which  the  reports 
of  the  enemy's  movements  on  the  4th  caused  was  that  these 
three  corps  were  to  wait  when  they  reached  the  points  desig- 

1  Va.  Camp.  30,  31.     It   appears  by  the  reports  of  Generals  Hancock  and 
Getty  that  the  latter  was  ordered  to  attack  after  the  2d  corps  had  begnn  forming 
on  the  left  of  his  division,  but  before  it  was  completely  in  position  to  attack. 
67  W.  R.  319,  320,  677. 

2  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  411. 

3  Va.  Camp.  12,  13,  21. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  425 

nated,  prepared  to  move  on,  and  the  reserve  artillery  was 
closed  up  somewhat.1 

On  the  4th  a  movement  of  the  enemy  in  force  on  the  Plank 
Road  west  of  Verdiersville  had  been  seen  and  a  few  shots 
were  fired  by  them  at  Robertson's  Tavern  on  the  Pike,  but 
this  was  all.  Sedgwick's  corps  at  Wilderness  Tavern  was  in 
the  best  position  to  support  Warren  against  an  attack  on 
either  of  these  roads  by  Swell's  or  Hill's  corps,  and  Sedgwick 
and  Warren  together  were  quite  equal  to  withstanding  or 
attacking  these  two  corps  of  the  enemy.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  enemy  had  been  moving  out  to  oppose  our  turning 
movement  on  the  Catharpin  and  Pamunkey  roads,  it  would 
have  been  very  desirable  to  encourage  them  in  thus  moving 
out  of  their  works  into  the  open  country  with  a  view  to  en 
gaging  them  there,  and  with  this  view  it  was  altogether  best 
for  Hancock  to  continue  his  march  on  the  Catharpin  Road. 
He  could  come  to  the  aid  of  the  5th  and  6th  corps,  or  they 
could  come  to  his  aid  by  the  Brock  Road,  as  long  as  we  held 
ground  to  the  west  of  it.  This  road  was  the  key  to  the  position. 

Longstreet  had  not  appeared  on  the  night  of  the  5th. 
Prompt  work  must  be  had  if  his  absence  was  to  avail  our 
forces.  Burnside  had  arrived  on  the  field  with  three  divisions, 
and  he  was  ordered  to  march  at  2  A.  M.  May  6,  so  as  to 
arrive  at  five,  in  the  interval  between  Warren  and  Hancock,  be 
tween  the  Pike  and  the  Plank  Road,  and  then  to  pass  between 
Ewell  and  Hill  and  attack  the  left  and  rear  of  the  latter  from 
Chewning's,  while  the  rest  of  the  line  attacked.  Sedgwick  and 
Warren  on  the  Pike  found  the  enemy  in  breastworks,  and, 
although  they  advanced  against  them  repeatedly,  were  beaten 

1  Badeau,  ii,  102,  note  ;  67  W.  R.  371,  375.  Meade's  order  of  6  p.  M.,  May  4, 
seems  to  clearly  indicate  the  purpose  to  have  the  2d  corps  take  position  to  act 
with  the  5th  and  6th  corps.  The  reason  that  it  got  so  far  away  from  the  former 
was  that  its  march  was  unimpeded,  while  the  5th  corps  encountered  the  enemy 
early  in  the  morning-.  The  2d  corps  got  back  to  Todd's  Tavern  within  support 
ing  distance,  and  there  waited  two  hours  for  General  Meade's  order  to  move  to 
the  attack.  67  W.  R.  189,  318. 


426  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

back  each  time.  On  the  Plank  Road  Wadsworth's  division  of 
the  5th  corps  and  Hancock  with  Birney's,  Mott's,  and  Getty's 
divisions  attacked  Hill's  force  and  drove  them  out  of  their 
intrenchments  and  through  the  forest,  inflicting  great  loss.1 
Longstreet,  with  two  divisions  and  Anderson's  division  of 
Hill's  corps,  arriving  at  this  time,  made  a  counter-attack  which 
partially  checked  Hancock's  advance,  and  the  irregularity  of 
his  line  of  battle  and  the  confusion  into  which  the  command 
had  fallen  in  the  thickets  and  forest  required  Hancock  to  halt 
and  rectify  the  disorder.  He  sent  the  news  of  his  success  to 
Gibbon,  who  commanded  his  left  wing  in  front  of  the  Brock 
Road,  and  ordered  him  to  attack  the  enemy's  right  flank. 
Gibbon,  who  for  a  short  time  was  alarmed  by  the  approach  of 
some  returning  Union  convalescents  on  the  Brock  Road,  and 
who  perhaps  was  in  fear  of  an  attack  by  Longstreet  on  the 
road  leading  from  the  Catharpin  to  the  Brock  Road  at  Trigg's, 
which  he  was  guarding,  did  not  attack.2  Gibbon  contended 
that  he  never  received  what  he  supposed  was  a  positive  order 
to  attack,3  but  no  explanation  of  his  failure  to  attack  appears 
in  his  report  of  the  battle.4  Hancock  felt  that  if  this  attack 
had  been  made,  the  force  in  his  front  would  have  been  beaten. 
At  about  nine  o'clock  Hancock  attacked  again  with  five  divi 
sions,  but  was  prevented  from  exerting  himself  to  the  utmost 
by  an  attack  of  the  enemy's  dismounted  cavalry  and  artftlery 
on  Gibbon,  who  remained  guarding  the  roads  on  the  left, 
which,  with  the  rapid  firing  of  Sheridan's  cavalry,  who,  in  the 
attempt  to  come  up  the  Brock  Road  to  attack  Longstreet's 
right,  had  encountered  Stuart's  cavalry,  made  Hancock  fear 
that  Barlow  was  seriously  attacked  by  a  part  of  Longstreet's 
corps.  No  ground  was  gained,  and  at  about  eleven  the  contest 
died  away.  A  flank  attack  by  Longstreet  from  the  Fredericks- 
burg  Railroad  then  broke  several  of  Hancock's  brigades  on 
the  left  of  the  Plank  Road  and  spread  such  disorder  in  the 

1  Va.  Camp.  37 ;  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  420.         2  67  W.  R.  321. 
3  History  of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  426.  4  67  W.  R.  430. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  427 

lines  that,  it  being  impossible  to  correct  them  in  the  thickets, 
Hancock  ordered  them  back  into  his  works  along  the  Brock 
Road,  where  he  re-formed,  and  then  swept  his  front  clear  with 
a  brigade.  The  responsibility  for  this  reverse  seems  to  lie  on 
General  Birney  or  some  one  of  his  subordinates,  for  it  seems 
that  they  should  have  guarded  against  a  flank  attack. 

Burnside  with  two  divisions  made  his  attack  between  War 
ren's  and  Hancock's  commands  at  two  o'clock,  and  first  drove, 
and  then  was  driven  by,  the  enemy,  and  finally  established 
himself  on  the  line  with  these  commands  so  as  to  connect 
them.  At  4.15  P.  M.  the  enemy  made  a  great  attack  on  Han 
cock  and  were  completely  repulsed.  At  a  later  hour  Ewell 
turned  the  right  flank  of  the  right  division  of  Sedgwick's 
corps  north  of  the  Turnpike  and,  surprising  two  brigades,  threw 
them  into  confusion  and  captured  some  hundreds  of  prisoners ; 
but  the  damage  extended  no  farther,  and  indeed  Early  says  in 
his  memoirs  that,  such  was  the  disorder  into  which  the  attack 
ing  force  had  fallen,  it  was  fortunate  for  them  that  darkness  put 
an  end  to  the  conflict.1  General  Humphreys  says2  that  Wright, 
who  commanded  the  division  which  was  flanked,  had  seen 
that  the  situation  afforded  him  the  opportunity  to  flank  the 
enemy,  but  did  not  attempt  it  for  want  of  troops,  and  he  adds 
that  two  brigades  of  the  6th  corps  which  were  in  reserve 
would  have  been  furnished  if  requested.  This  would  have 
turned  the  tables.  This  was  not  the  only  error  on  the  right  flank. 
General  Humphreys  also  says2  that  the  pickets  must  have 
neglected  their  duty  to  allow  the  command  to  Be  surprised ; 
and  it  was  a  singular  mishap  to  suffer  within  three  miles  of 
the  very  spot  where,  on  this  same  turnpike,  through  the  same 
neglect,  Jackson  had  been  permitted  to  fall  on  the  flank  of  the 
llth  corps  almost  exactly  a  year  before. 

It  seems  to  me  that  neither  Grant  nor  Meade  was  respon 
sible  for  the  four  great  tactical  errors  which  I  have  pointed 
out,  viz. :  the  failure  of  the  5th  corps  to  attack  promptly  on 
i  Va.  Camp.  50,  note.  2  Ibid.  50. 


428  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  morning  of  the  5th  ;  the  failure  of  Gibbon  to  attack  Long- 
street  in  flank  on  the  6th ;  the  flanking  of  Birney  on  the  left ; 
and  the  flanking  of  Sedgwick  on  the  right.  If  either  of  the 
attacks  had  been  promptly  made,  our  victory  would  have  been 
much  greater.  If  the  enemy's  flank  attacks  had  been  properly 
met,  our  losses  would  have  been  less,  and  if  Biruey  had  repulsed 
that  made  on  him,  Hancock  might  have  given  the  finishing 
stroke  to  the  force  opposed  to  him.  One  cannot  withhold  his 
admiration  from  the  commander  who,  like  Grant,  realizing  that 
his  plans  have  miscarried  through  errors  like  these,  for  which 
he  is  not  responsible,  wastes  no  time  in  complaints,  and  makes 
no  attempt  to  throw  responsibility  for  any  degree  of  failure  on 
any  one  else,  but  resolutely  and  silently  plans  to  strike  again. 

It  has  been  said  that,  when  Longstreet's  presence  was  dis 
covered  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  Hancock  sent  to  the 
Brock  Road  for  the  balance  of  his  command,  but  that  Barlow's 
division  under  Gibbon  was  kept  there  because  of  the  dis 
quieting  reports  that  Longstreet  was  coming  up  that  road, 
and  that,  deprived  of  this  reliance,  Hancock  sent  for  Burn- 
side,  but  that  the  latter  had  not  been  able  to  get  through 
the  woods :  this  conveys  a  wrong  impression.  Hancock  sent 
word  to  Meade  at  6.30  that  Burnside  should  attack,  as  Birney 
(on  the  left)  was  just  holding  his  own  against  Longstreet.1 
At  7  A.  M.  he  directed  Gibbon  to  attack  Longstreet's  right 
flank,  and  Gibbon,  as  before  stated,  failed  to  attack,  because 
he  did  not  understand  that  he  was  ordered  to  do  so,  and  not 
from  any  fear  of  Hancock's  that  Lougstreet  would  attack 
Gibbon  where  he  was.  The  attack  prescribed  for  Gibbon  was 
an  offensive  rather  than  a  defensive  project.  At  the  same 
hour  Meade  sent  word  to  Hancock  that  Stevenson's  division 
of  the  9th  corps  was  at  Wilderness  Tavern  and  would  be  sent 
to  him  if  required,1  and  at  eight  o'clock  this  division  reported 
to  him  and  it  took  part  in  his  second  attack  at  8.50  A.  M.2 

At  this  same  hour  Hancock  was  informed  that  Burnside 
1  68  W.  R.  440.  2  Va.  Camp.  39-41. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  429 

had  pushed  nearly  to  Parker's  Store  and  would  attack  in  that 
quarter.1  There  seems  to  have  been  every  reason  for  Grant  to 
believe  this  to  be  true.  General  Humphreys  says  that  Burn- 
side  moved  out  in  the  morning  towards  Chewning's,  and,  find 
ing  the  enemy  in  force  near  that  place,  made  dispositions  for 
the  attack  (p.  46)  ;  and  I  find  it  stated  in  the  history  of  the 
6th  New  Hampshire  Volunteers,2,  a  regiment  of  Griffin's  bri 
gade  of  Potter's  division,  that  moving  at  2  A.  M.  from  bivouac 
in  the  rear  of  the  6th  corps  in  the  direction  of  Parker's  Store, 
the  brigade  formed  for  attack  at  daylight,  and  advancing  about 
a  mile  met  the  enemy  in  force,  and  that  a  desultory  fire  was 
kept  up  until  about  eleven  o'clock,  when  the  brigade  moved  to 
the  left.  Why  the  attack  by  the  whole  line  under  Burn  side 
was  not  made  at  an  early  hour  is  a  question  that  deserves 
investigation.3  General  Humphreys  says  (p.  40)  "reiterated 
orders  did  not  bring  about  his  expected  cooperation.  As  late 
as  11.45  General  Rawlins  wrote  him:  'Push  in  and  drive  the 
enemy  from  Hancock's  front  and  get  on  the  Orange  Plank 
Road.  Hancock  has  expected  you  for  the  last  three  hours, 
and  has  been  making  his  attack  and  dispositions  with  a  view 
to  your  assistance.' " 

Upon  the  whole  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that  the  verdict  of 
history  will  be  that  Grant  failed  to  win  a  more  decisive  success 
in  the  Wilderness  by  reason  of  faulty  tactics  on  his  part,  or 
that  he  was  not  justified  in  expecting  a  great  victory  from  his 
superiority  in  numbers  when  he  had  induced  the  enemy  to  come 
out  of  their  works  to  fight. 

Grant  is  criticised  for  ordering  the  5th  and  6th  corps  to 
attack  when  Hancock  did,  May  6 ;  and  it  is  said  that  they 
were  repulsed,  "  as  might  have  been  expected  ;  "  and  it  is  said 
that  these  corps  ought  to  have  been  ordered  to  intrench  at 

1  68  W.  R.  441. 

2  Adjutant-General  Rep.  N.  H.  1866,  v.  ii,  p.  595. 

3  See  67  W.  R.  460,  461 ;  68  W.  R.  906,  907,  published  after  this  paper  was 
read. 


430  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

daylight,  in  order  to  send  all  the  men  that  could  be  spared 
to  Hancock's  assistance.  This  attack  was  essential  to  insure 
against  reinforcing  Hill's  corps  by  E well's  ;  and  as  the  enemy 
had  only  hasty  breastworks  such  as  Hancock's  men  captured 
on  the  left,  and  the  lines  attacking  them  were  concealed 
by  the  thickets  almost  to  their  very  front,  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  why  it  was  to  be  expected  that  more  than 
20,000  men  under  Warren  and  Sedgwick  were  to  be  repulsed 
by  less  than  15,000  under  Ewell.  These  commanders  were 
finally  ordered  to  suspend  their  attacks  and  throw  up  works, 
in  order  that  part  of  them  might  be  available  to  reinforce 
Hancock.  This  was  at  half-past  ten,1  and  not,  as  has  been 
stated,  after  Hancock  had  been  forced  back  and  lost  all  his 
ground,  for  Longstreet's  attack  on  Hancock  did  not  begin 
until  about  eleven  o'clock.2  It  would  not  have  been  wise  to 
send  any  part  of  Warren's  and  Sedgwick's  force  to  Hancock 
before  it  became  certain  that  the  force  under  Burnside  had 
the  opportunity  to  make  itself  felt. 

On  the  7th,  finding  that  the  enemy  were  well  intrenched 
and  that  they  would  not  come  out  of  their  intrenchments, 
Grant  started  the  army  that  evening  on  another  flanking 
movement  to  the  left.  When  we  reflect  that  this  was  the 
first  time  that  our  army  had  ever,  after  a  pitched  battle  in 
the  enemy's  country,  resumed  its  march  towards  Richmond, 
we  realize  that  Grant  had  won  a  substantial  success  in  the 
Wilderness,  besides  inflicting  a  heavy  loss  on  the  enemy.  At 
this  time,  when  the  enemy  confessed  their  inability  to  further 
come  outside  of  their  intrenchments  to  resist  our  march  into 
their  territory,  it  seems  to  me,  rather  than  at  Gettysburg, 
came  the  turning-point  of  the  war  in  the  East.  After  Gettys 
burg  the  Confederacy  had  the  same  capacity  for  recruiting 
armies  and  supplying  them  as  before,3  and  the  morale  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  just  as  good.  In  the  autumn 
of  1863  Lee  crossed  the  Rapidan  to  attack  Meade,  and  in 
1  68  W.  R.  451.  2  Va.  Camp.  42,  43.  3  Pollard,  cited  in  2  Badeau,  8. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  431 

December  he  came  out  of  his  intrenchments  along  Mine  Run 
to  attack,  and  failed  to  come  to  blows  only  because  Meade 
had  retreated  across  the  Rapidan  in  the  night.  But  the 
Wilderness  marked  a  perceptible  turn  of  the  tide.  The 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  as  a  whole,  never  again  exposed 
itself  out  of  its  trenches  until  it  was  driven  out  April  2, 
1865 ;  and  from  the  time  when  the  Confederate  leader  recog 
nized  the  fact  that  Grant's  army  could  not  be  driven  back 
across  the  Rapidan  the  conclusion  must  have  been  forced  upon 
him,  if  he  permitted  himself  to  reason  upon  the  subject,  that 
the  fall  of  Richmond  must  be  the  inevitable  result,  if  the 
commander  of  the  Union  armies  had  the  power  to  forecast 
with  military  logic,  the  nerve  to  keep  his  forces  up  to 
their  work,  the  skill  to  conduct  an  offensive  campaign,  and 
the  good  fortune  to  retain  the  confidence  of  the  North.  The 
only  hope  left  to  Lee  was  that  delay  might  exhaust  the 
patience  of  our  people,  or  strengthen  the  internal  enemies  of 
the  Union,  so  much  as  to  compel  peace  with  the  Confederacy  or 
possibly  lead  to  foreign  intervention.  But  his  clear-eyed  and 
immovable  antagonist  penetrated  the  future  with  an  unerr 
ing  vision,  and  his  iron  hand  was  never  to  relax  its  grasp 
until  the  last  soldier  in  arms  against  the  Union  had  surren 
dered. 

The  loss  on  our  side  in  the  Wilderness  was  17,666,!  or  15.5 
per  cent,  of  the  effective  force  of  the  army,  and  about  17.3 
per  cent,  of  those  actually  engaged.  The  Medical  and  Surgical 
History  of  the  War  places  the  enemy's  loss  at  11,400,  which 
is  17.1  percent,  of  the  enemy's  total  and  18.1  of  their  effective 
force.2  The  sources  of  these  figures  are  not  given,  but  from 
the  reports  of  a  number  of  the  Confederate  commanders3 
which  have  been  preserved  (some  of  which  impress  one  with 
the  belief  that  they  greatly  understate  their  losses),  I  draw 

1  67  W.  R.  133. 

2  See  N.  &  L.  111. 

3  Va.  Camp.  54 ;  67  W.  R.  1062,  1064,  1069,  1070,  1072,  1073,  1091. 


432  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

the  conclusion  that  their  loss  was  at  least  as  great  as  this.1  In 
a  conflict  which  could  be  terminated  only  by  the  destruction 
of  one  army  or  the  other,  to  inflict  a  loss  of  17.1  per  cent,  with 
a  loss  of  17.3  per  cent,  in  one  battle  was  a  substantial  success 
in  itself,  considering  the  disproportion  in  the  numbers  of  the 
two  armies  and  the  numbers  behind  them  from  which  recruits 
could  be  drawn. 

Our  advance  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Spottsylvania  Court 
House  on  the  morning  of  May  8,  but  Lee  discovered  or  sur 
mised  this  movement  against  his  right  flank  early  enough  to 
send  a  portion  of  his  army  to  that  place  in  advance  of  us.  An 
attack  was  at  once  made  on  these  troops  by  Meade's  leading 
divisions  without  dislodging  them,  and  as  a  result  Lee  drew 
his  lines  around  Spottsylvania  Court  House  on  the  west,  north 
and  east,  from  the  Po  River  at  Shady  Grove  Church  Road, 
around  McCool's  house  and  east  of  Spottsylvania  Court 
House,  to  a  point  south  of  the  Fredericksburg  Road.  Only  two 
courses  were  open  to  Grant.  One  was  to  attack  Lee  where 
he  was,  the  other  was  to  again  attempt  to  flank  him.  He  is 
blamed  for  not  adopting  the  latter  course.  It  is  said  that  he 
should  have  "  flanked  the  enemy  out  of  position  after  position, 
until  by  some  fortunate  combination  of  circumstances  he  could 
be  brought  to  bay  in  a  place  where  our  great  superiority  of 
numbers  could  tell."  If  this  means  that  Grant  should  have 
waited  until  Lee's  army  could  be  caught  out  of  their  breast 
works,  a  conclusive  answer  is  that  they  never  would  allow 
themselves  to  be  so  caught.  Grant  did  move  to  flank  them  re 
peatedly,  and  although  the  movements  almost  always  followed 
very  quickly  after  blows  which  inflicted  severe  injuries  on  the 
enemy,  yet  they  were  always  able  to  detect  them  and  to  plant 
themselves  in  new  works  across  Grant's  path.  They  would 
have  done  this  no  less  if  he  had  retired  from  each  new  set  of 

1  A  very  conservative  estimate  gives  7750  killed  and  wounded.  (N.  &  L., 
p.  Ill,  note  3.)  7078  prisoners  were  lost  May  1  to  12.  (67  W.  R.  280.)  It  is 
not  possible  to  ascertain  how  many  were  lost  in  the  Wilderness. 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  433 

works  without  fighting  and  attempted  to  out-march  them  in  a 
mere  game  of  mano3uvres.  That  these  were  to  be  the  enemy's 
tactics  could  be  foreseen  when  Grant  found  them  intrenched 
at  Spottsylvania,  and  as  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  nothing 
but  hard  fighting  could  conquer  Lee's  army,  he  determined 
that  it  was  better  to  attack  that  army  in  works  hastily  con 
structed,  in  such  short  intervals  between  fighting  and  marching 
as  he  should  be  obliged  to  let  them  have,  than  to  manoeuvre 
them  into  the  formidable  fortifications  of  Richmond  and  then 
ultimately  attack  them  there  with  their  strength  unimpaired. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  these  field-works  were  not 
usually  serious  obstacles ;  our  men  passed  over  them  without 
effort  when  they  reached  them  ;  they  served  simply  as  a  shelter 
from  bullets  and  shot ;  and  whenever  they  could  be  approached 
without  too  long  exposure  to  fire,  it  was  just  as  easy  to  charge 
upon  them  as  it  was  to  charge  upon  an  unprotected  line  of 
battle  standing  up  and  delivering  its  fire.  It  is  true  that  the 
charging  line  could  not  maintain  as  good  order  in  crossing 
earthworks  as  it  could  in  an  unobstructed  field ;  yet  if  order 
could  be  restored  soon  enough  to  sweep  down  in  the  rear  of 
the  works,  or  if  the  enemy  on  either  flank  should  lose  heart 
and  retreat,  then  the  supports  could  come  forward  and  pass 
over  the  works  in  good  order  and  form  line  of  battle  inside. 
There  came  a  time  afterwards  at  Petersburg  when  all  this  was 
done.  Grant  saw  that  the  war  could  not  be  ended  except  with 
a  great  deal  of  fighting  of  this  kind.  It  is  quite  probable  that 
he  hoped  for  an  earlier  success  than  he  achieved,  and  that  at 
first  he  did  not  realize  what  a  wary  and  skillful  leader,  and 
what  a  brave,  steadfast,  and  resolute  army  he  had  to  encounter, 
for  his  experience  in  the  West  had  not  been  with  their  equals  ; 
but  he  saw  that  if  he  did  not  succeed  at  first,  the  way  to  make 
success  possible  at  last  was  by  hammering  the  enemy,  and 
that  good  fortune  might  attend  our  attacks  at  any  time,  but 
that,  whether  the  end  was  to  come  sooner  or  later,  constant 
action  to  the  very  limit  of  our  ability  was  necessary  to  termi- 


434  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

nate  the  war  before  exhausted  patience,  political  opposition,  or 
foreign  intervention  should  make  our  difficulties  too  great. 

If,  when  he  saw  the  enemy  intrenched  in  his  front  at  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House,  Grant,  adopting  the  course  which  his 
critics  now  point  out  as  the  proper  one,  had  manoeuvred  again 
and  again  by  the  left  flank  until  he  had  arrived  in  front  of 
Petersburg  (if  indeed  Lee  had  permitted  such  feeble  strategy 
to  proceed  without  interruption),  can  it  be  contended  that 
Grant  there  could  have  extended  his  lines  to  the  right  and  left, 
embracing  his  adversary  in  the  deadly  lock  which  was  broken 
only  at  Appomattox  Court  House,  or  that  he  could  have 
turned  the  flank  and  broken  through  the  lines  at  Petersburg 
and  then  wheeled  to  sweep  down  in  rear  of  them  as  if  in 
some  magnificent  field-day  manoeuvre,  as  he  did  on  the  2d  of 
April  ?  To  my  mind  there  is  but  one  answer,  and  that  is  that 
all  this  would  have  been  impossible.  The  losses  in  men  and 
material  which  Grant  inflicted  on  Lee  between  the  Rapidan 
and  the  James  were  necessary  to  make  these  things  pos 
sible,  and  in  the  final  result  is  found  the  best  answer  to  the 
undiscriminating  charges  made  against  General  Grant  of 
ordering  assaults  without  the  pretense  that  they  were  to 
be  followed  by  any  considerable  advantage,  and  wasting  his 
soldiers  in  callous  indifference  to  life  and  obstinate  ignorance 
of  the  laws  of  strategy. 

On  the  9th  of  May  the  withdrawal  of  Early' s  corps  from 
the  enemy's  left  on  the  Catharpin  Road  and  the  appearance 
of  a  portion  of  Longstreet's  corps  on  the  Fredericksburg  Road 
on  our  left,  in  front  of  the  9th  corps  as  it  came  down  that 
road  towards  Spottsylvania  Court  House  and  crossed  the  Ny 
(movements  executed  by  Lee  in  drawing  his  lines  about  Spott 
sylvania  Court  House)  led  Grant  to  suspect  Lee  of  moving  on 
the  Fredericksburg  Road  to  try  to  cut  off  our  communication 
with  that  place,  which  had  been  established  as  the  new  base 
of  supplies,  or  to  bar  our  further  advance  in  that  direction 
towards  Richmond,  and  the  2d  corps  was  sent  across  the 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  435 

Po  above  the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road  bridge  for  a  recon- 
noissance,  with  a  view  to  recrossing  at  or  below  that  bridge, 
and  to  turning  and  attacking  the  enemy's  left  flank.  The 
crossing  was  made  by  three  divisions  on  the  9th,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  10th  a  portion  of  one  division  recrossed  to  the 
enemy's  side  on  the  left  bank,  half  a  mile  below  the  bridge. 
The  discovery  of  the  enemy  in  strong  force  in  that  vicinity 
dispelled  the  suspicion  of  a  movement  on  their  part  towards 
Fredericksburg,  and  Hancock  was  ordered  to  withdraw  and 
recross  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Po  above  the  bridge,  to  join  in 
an  attack  to  be  made  by  Warren  and  Wright  on  the  enemy's 
works  on  the  west  side  of  the  Spottsylvania  lines.  The  enemy's 
attack  on  the  2d  corps  south  of  the  Po  in  executing  this  order 
was  repulsed  with  severe  loss  to  the  Confederates.  Lee  had 
sent  Mahone's  and  Heth's  divisions  from  Early's  3d  corps, 
from  the  right  to  reinforce  the  left  flank  (the  west  front), 
when  it  was  threatened  by  Hancock's  movement,1  and  Warren 
and  Wright  were  then  ordered  to  assault  on  the  west  front. 
The  former  assaulted  with  two  of  his  own  divisions  and  two 
of  Gibbon's  brigades  of  the  2d  corps,  while  Hancock's  force  was 
still  engaged  across  the  Po ;  but  although  the  lines  reached 
the  enemy's  works  and  some  of  our  men  entered  them,  the 
thickets  disordered  our  lines  too  much  to  allow  them  to  make 
a  lodgment,  and  the  attack  was  repulsed.2  Further  on  the  left 
Upton's  division  of  the  6th  corps,  advancing  from  Shelton's, 
carried  the  west  side  of  the  Salient ;  but  Mott's  division,  which 
was  to  have  attacked  on  his  left  from  Brown's,  did  not  come 
forward,  although  one  brigade  made  the  attempt  and  was 
repulsed  by  an  enfilading  artillery  fire,  and  Upton,  being  left 
without  support  in  a  dangerous  position,  was  withdrawn  after 
dark.  Hancock  assaulted  from  Warren's  front  at  7  P.  M.  with 
Birney's  and  Gibbon's  divisions  and  a  part  of  the  5th  corps, 
without  success.  These  attacks  on  the  west  front  have  been 
characterized  as  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  hopeless  assaults, 

1  Va.  Camp.  79  et  seq.  2  Va.  Camp.  81,  82. 


436  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

which  those  who  ordered  them  could  not  expect  to  succeed, 
without  supports  waiting  to  pour  in  if  the  works  should  be 
carried,  with  no  pretense  that  any  considerable  advantage  was 
to  follow  their  capture,  and  causing  a  wanton  expenditure  of 
men's  lives  in  minor  operations,  merely  with  the  hope  of  captur 
ing  a  few  miles  of  works,  a  few  guns,  and  a  few  hundreds  of 
prisoners.  An  examination  of  the  authorities  will  not  sustain 
this  indictment. 

The  first  assault  under  Warren,  although  already  determined 
upon,  was  made  only  after  Warren,  a  careful  officer,  had  made 
a  reconnoissance  in  force,  and  had  reported  that  he  thought 
the  opportunity  for  an  attack  was  favorable,1  and  Badeau  says2 
that  the  second  assault  was  made  to  divert  the  enemy's  attacks 
from  Upton,  upon  the  report  to  Grant  that  the  men  were 
unwilling  to  obey  the  order  to  give  up  the  works  they  had 
taken,  which  he  had  given  to  save  further  losses.  Warren  had 
Birney's  division  and  a  brigade  of  Gibbon's  division  of  the 
2d  corps,  and  one  of  his  own  divisions  in  reserve,  and  Hancock 
had  a  part  of  the  5th  corps  and  possibly  Barlow's  division  to 
call  on.  These  attacks  of  Warren  and  Hancock  failed  because 
the  lines  in  advance  did  not  carry  the  works,  and  not  for 
want  of  supports.  Neither  did  Upton's  assault  fail  of  greater 
success  because  ample  supports  were  not  provided.  The  other 
two  divisions  of  the  6th  corps  lay  on  his  right,  and  Mott  was 
directed  to  enter  the  enemy's  works  on  his  left.  Upton  reported 
that  he  made  an  opening  for  Mott  on  his  left,  and  General  Hum 
phreys  says:3  "The  failure  of  Mott's  division  did  more  than 
neutralize  the  success  of  Upton.  Had  Mott  joined  him,  the 
two  pressing  forward,  taking  the  enemy  on  the  right  and  left 
in  flank  and  rear  and  receiving  further  reinforcements  from 
the  6th  corps  as  they  progressed,  the  probabilities  were  that 
we  should  have  gained  possession  of  Lee's  intrenchments." 

As  to  the  sacrifice  of  life,  —  our  total  loss  on  this  day  was 

1  68  W.  R.  600,  604.  2  Vol.  ii,  p.  164. 

8  Va.  Camp.  83,  87. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  437 

a  little  more  than  4000.  Of  this  number  Upton  lost  about 
1000,  but  he  took  over  a  thousand  prisoners,  besides  inflict 
ing  a  considerable  loss  in  killed  and  wounded.1  Of  the 
remaining  3000  the  5th  corps  lost  a  little  over  900,  and,  con 
sidering  the  probable  loss  of  the  2d  corps  across  the  Po,  it  is 
not  probable  that  its  loss  in  the  assault  was  greater.  This 
gives  about  2800  as  the  loss  incident  to  the  two  assaults  on 
the  right,  which  was  not  such  a  loss  out  of  the  30,000  men 
engaged  in  them  as  would  have  accompanied  assaults  of  the 
fearful  character  attributed  to  them  as  above  stated. 

General  Humphreys  says 2  that  it  would  have  been  better 
to  continue  Hancock's  turning  movement  across  the  Po,  aid 
ing  it  with  one  division  of  the  5th  corps,  and  attacking  at  the 
critical  moment  in  Warren's  front  with  the  other  two.3  Great 
respect  is  due  to  his  opinion,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  at  the 
time  he  would  have  advised  separating  four  divisions  from 
the  rest  of  the  army  by  a  river,  in  order  to  attack  the  enemy 
on  two  sides,  when  it  would  have  required  two  passages  to 
unite  our  force  in  case  of  a  reverse,  with  the  enemy  interjected 
between  the  two  parts  of  our  army. 

The  Salient  was  too  vulnerable  a  point  to  be  left  without 
another  attempt  upon  it.  The  event  fully  justified  the  attempt. 
On  the  morning  of  May  12  it  was  taken,  with  many  prisoners, 
by  the  2d  corps,  but  the  attack  failed  of  complete  success 
because  the  supports  were  too  impetuous.  They  pressed 
forward  and  entered  the  works  with  the  front  line,  with  the 
result  that  the  men  arrived  in  such  a  confused  and  unwieldy 
mass  that  a  sufficient  force  could  not  be  sent  in  proper  order 
down  the  rear  of  the  works  to  take  the  enemy's  troops  on 
the  interior  faces  of  the  Salient  in  flank ;  and  the  enemy's 
reserves,  coming  forward  from  a  line  of  works  across  the  base 
of  the  Salient,  drove  our  men  back  until  our  main  line  held 
only  the  outer  face  of  the  enemy's  works.  The  6th  corps 

1  Va.  Camp.  85,  89  ;  67  W.  R.  229,  230.  2  Va.  Camp.  82,  83. 

8  General  Warren  apparently  held  the  same  view,  67  W.  R.  541. 


438  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

came  to  the  aid  of  the  2d,  and  the  battle  raged  at  the  Salient 
all  day,  the  enemy  pouring  in  brigade  after  brigade  to  fight 
our  men  across  the  captured  works.  The  enemy  made  a  costly 
error  in  coming  out  of  their  works  at  the  base  of  the  Salient. 
General  Humphreys  says :  "  It  has  been  said  that  the  continu 
ance  of  this  desperate  contest  at  the  apex  of  the  Salient  on 
the  part  of  General  Lee  was  an  unnecessary  sacrifice  of  troops 
he  could  ill  afford  to  spare ;  but  in  fact  he  could  not  with 
draw  them  during  daylight  without  the  risk  of  serious  disas 
ter,  and  Meade  continued  to  press  against  him  there  with  the 
hope  of  bringing  about  that  withdrawal  and  disaster."  Dur 
ing  the  day  the  5th  and  9th  corps  attacked  on  the  right  and 
left,  but  found  the  enemy  too  strong  for  them.  General  Hum 
phreys1  places  our  loss  this  day  at  6820,  and  the  enemy's 
at  from  9000  to  10,000.  He  places  our  total  loss  from  the 
8th  to  the  12th  of  May  at  14,322,  which  was  about  12.5  per 
cent,  of  our  original  effective  force.  He  does  not  give  an 
estimate  of  the  Confederate  loss  on  the  8th  or  9th,  and  in  the 
absence  of  reports  covering  the  10th  says2  that  it  may  have 
been  2000.  This  seems  a  low  estimate,  but  if  we  accept  it 
and  assume  that  against  the  Union  loss  of  about  3500  on  the 
8th,  9th,  and  llth,  there  was  a  Confederate  loss  of  1000,  we 
arrive  at  a  total  Confederate  loss  from  the  8th  to  the  12th  of 
at  least  12,000,  or  19.7  per  cent,  of  their  original  effective 
force.  This  result  would  disprove  the  charge  of  a  useless 
sacrifice  of  life  by  General  Grant  down  to  the  12th  of  May. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th  the  enemy  were  found  to  have 
withdrawn  from  the  Salient  to  a  line  near  its  base,  and  Grant 
ordered  the  fourth  flank  movement  for  that  night.  The 
5th  and  6th  corps  were  sent  to  the  left  around  the  rear  of  the 
9th  corps  to  form  on  its  left  and  attack  on  the  Fredericksburg 
and  Massaponax  Church  roads,  but  although  the  withdrawal 

1  Va.  Camp.  104,  106;  67  W.  R.  231.   7078  prisoners  were  taken  May  1 
to  12,  67  W.  R.  280. 

2  Va.  Camp.  89. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  439 

of  these  troops  was  not  discovered  by  Lee  until  the  14th, 
and  they  would  have  turned  the  enemy's  right  if  their  march 
had  been  unimpeded,  a  storm  set  in,  and  rain,  mud,  and  dark 
ness  delayed  and  fatigued  them  so  much  that  the  attack  was 
given  up.  The  2d  corps,  leaving  one  division  to  cover  the 
right  of  Burnside,  who  now  held  the  right  of  our  position,  his 
left  resting  on  the  Fredericksburg  Road,  had  moved  to  the 
road  near  the  Ny. 

On  the  night  of  the  17th,  at  the  suggestion  of  Generals 
Humphreys  and  Wright,1  the  2d  and  6th  corps  were  sent 
back  to  the  Salient  to  attack  the  enemy's  left,  in  the  expecta 
tion  that  the^  would  be  found  to  have  weakened  their  force 
there  to  meet  our  movements  on  the  13th  against  their  right, 
and  these  corps  with  the  9th  made  the  attack,  but  it  was 
unsuccessful,  as  the  enemy  were  found  in  strong  force.  Our 
loss  was  about  670.2  Considering  the  advice  under  which  this 
attack  was  made  and  the  small  loss,  it  cannot  be  considered 
as  having  been  wanton,  ill  advised,  or  wasteful  of  life.  This, 
the  fifth  flank  movement  of  the  campaign,  ended  Grant's 
offensive  operations  around  Spottsylvania  Court  House. 

On  the  19th  Ewell  moved  against  our  right  with  6000  men 
to  ascertain  if  Grant  was  again  moving  to  his  left,  and  perhaps 
with  the  hope  of  gaining  some  advantage,3  and,  attacking,  was 
driven  back  with  a  loss  acknowledged  by  Ewell  to  be  900 
men.4  Early's  corps  was  held  ready  to  cooperate,  and  a  brigade 
of  it  made  a  demonstration  on  the  5th  corps,  with  what  loss  we 
are  not  told.  Our  total  loss  on  this  day  was  about  1323.4 

On  the  night  of  May  20,  for  the  sixth  flank  movement, 
the  2d  corps  was  sent  to  the  left  via  Guinea  Station  and 
Bowling  Green  to  Milford  Station  on  the  Fredericksburg 
Railroad,  opposite  Lee's  right  flank,  in  the  hope  that  Lee, 
seeing  this  force  isolated,  would  come  out  of  his  intrenchments 
to  attack  it ;  but  although  Lee  was  informed  of  it  and  inter- 

l  Va.  Camp.  110.  2  Va.  Camp.  115. 

3  Badeau,  vol.  ii,  p.  208,  note.  *  Va.  Camp.  112,  115. 


440  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

preted  it  as  a  movement  to  open  communication  with  Port 
Royal  as  a  base  of  supplies,  he  made  no  attempt  to  attack ; 
and  when  the  remainder  of  our  army  followed,  he  pushed 
twenty-eight  miles  further  south  for  Hanover  Junction  to 
throw  himself  across  the  road  which  he  thought  Grant  in 
tended  to  take  from  the  Pamunkey  River  to  Richmond,  and 
there  to  guard  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  and  then,  learn 
ing  that  Grant  was  moving  towards  the  North  Anna  River 
against  the  Confederate  left,  he  directed  his  force  to  meet  this 
movement.  On  the  morning  of  the  23d  the  5th  corps,  having 
crossed  the  North  Anna  at  Jericho  Mills,  repulsed  an  attack 
made  by  Hill's  corps  from  a  position  in  front  on  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad.  The  5th  corps  carried  the  bridge  head 
works  at  the  telegraph  road  crossing  on  the  same  day,  and  on 
the  next  crossed  to  the  south  side.  The  enemy  had  a  well- 
intrenched  line  from  Little  River  to  Ox  Ford  and  thence 
along  the  North  Anna,  so  as  widely  to  separate  the  two  parts 
of  our  army.  Nothing  but  the  severe  handling  which  Lee  had 
received  could  have  prevented  him  from  attacking  one  or  the 
other  portion  here.1  That  he  did  not  is  the  best  evidence  that 
his  own  estimate  of  the  comparative  prowess  of  the  two  armies 
had  greatly  changed  since  the  time  when  he  attacked  in  the 
Wilderness.1 

Sheridan,  who  on  the  8th  of  May  had  been  sent  from 
Spottsylvania,  with  all  the  cavalry  but  Torbert's  division, 
with  instructions  to  make  his  way  to  the  James  and  get  sup* 
plies  from  Butler,  and  who  had  drawn  the  main  part  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  away,  had  gone  within  five  miles  of  Rich 
mond,  recaptured  375  of  our  men,  destroyed  much  material, 
and  reached  Butler's  army,  returned  to  Grant  on  the  24th. 
The  latter  has  been  criticised  for  sending  his  cavalry  away 
rather  than  using  them  on  foot,  if  necessary,  in  the  woods, 
where  they  could  not  be  used  on  horseback,  and  it  is  intimated 
that  the  raids  which  were  made  by  the  cavalry  served  only  to 

1  Unless  his  inaction  here  resulted  from  his  illness,  as  has  been  suggested. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  441 

cause  the  enemy  some  inconvenience.  There  are  good  reasons 
for  differing  from  these  views.  The  enemy's  cavalry  were  also 
capable  on  foot,  and  to  draw  them  away  where  they  could  be 
fought  by  our  troopers  in  the  saddle  was  a  good  service.  In 
narrow  forest  roads  the  led  horses  of  the  dismounted  men 
might  have  been  a  great  obstacle  to  the  movements  of  the 
infantry  ;  our  trains  could  not  carry  forage  for  so  great  a  body 
of  horse  for  a  long  time,  and  it  was  wise  to  let  the  most  of 
the  cavalry  find  forage  for  themselves  while  the  army  was 
making  its  first  change  of  base.  A  sufficient  number  for  the 
needs  of  the  army  were  retained  with  it. 

Due  importance  has  not  been  credited  to  the  destruction  of 
property  by  the  cavalry  on  their  raids.  The  South  was  able 
to  supply  food  enough  to  sustain  all  the  soldiers  it  could 
recruit,  but  there  was  no  great  surplus  to  replace  the  immense 
quantities  destroyed  by  our  cavalry,  and  every  locomotive, 
every  car,  and  every  rail  destroyed  was  a  loss  which  it  was 
always  difficult  and  at  last  impossible  to  replace.  We  shall 
see  wagon  trains  at  Petersburg  eight  months  later  in  1865 
hauling  rations  along  by  railroad  tracks  dilapidated  beyond 
repair,  and  Lee's  army  in  the  critical  hour  crippled  by  want 
of  transportation  and  weakened  by  hunger  in  part,  if  not 
wholly,  as  the  result  of  these  cavalry  raids.  A  list  of  the 
stores,  materials,  and  railway  equipment  destroyed  by  Sheri 
dan's  cavalry  in  1864  and  1865  would  afford  one  explanation 
why  Lee's  army  was  so  much  more  easy  to  beat  in  April,  1865, 
than  in  May,  1864.  Grant  made  war  on  Lee's  materials  as 
well  as  his  men. 

Returning  now  to  the  position  of  affairs  on  the  North 
Anna,  we  find  that  Wilson's  cavalry  division,  demonstrating 
against  the  enemy's  left,  and  destroying  portions  of  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  Railroad  there,  gave  Lee  the  impression  which 
Grant  wished  to  give  him,  that  our  army  was  next  about  to 
move  against  that  flank ;  for  Grant,  being  persuaded  that  he 
could  not  attack  with  success  on  the  North  Anna,  now  pro- 


442  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

jected  his  seventh  flank  movement  in  the  opposite  direction ; 
and  starting  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  the  army  moved  down 
the  North  Anna  and  Pamtmkey  rivers,  crossed  the  latter  at 
Hundley's  and  Hanover  Town,  and  by  midday  of  the  28th  was 
in  position  facing  south,  with  its  right  across  the  Hanover 
Court  House  Road  at  Crump's  Creek  and  its  left  near  the 
Totopotomoy  Creek  at  the  crossing  of  the  road  which  runs 
from  Hawes's  Shop  to  Old  Church  ;  and  the  cavalry,  pressing 
forward  on  the  road  from  Hanover  to  Richmond,  drove  the 
enemy's  cavalry  from  breastworks  across  the  road  a  mile  south 
of  Hawes's  Shop,  late  in  the  evening,  after  a  hard  fight.  Mr. 
Ropes  has  said  that  General  Grant  "  does  not  seem  to  have 
had  a  very  definite  idea  of  accomplishing  anything  by  this 
move  beyond  finding  a  new  set  of  intrenchments  to  attack ; " 
but  I  cannot  escape  the  belief  that  his  motive  was  to  move 
around  the  flank  of  the  enemy  to  strike  them  where  there 
were  no  breastworks,  for  Lee  did  not  get  his  infantry  in  front 
of  Grant  until  the  afternoon  of  the  28th,  and  they  then  began 
to  throw  up  the  field-works  which  sheltered  them  on  the  next 
day.1  A  crossing  higher  up  on  the  Pamunkey  than  Hundley's 
would  not  only  have  exposed  Grant's  intention  to  the  enemy 
at  once,  but  would  also  have  exposed  his  army  to  attack  while 
crossing  the  river. 

It  has  also  been  said  that  Lee  placed  his  left  at  Atlee's 
Station  and  his  right  on  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  and  that,  as  his 
right  did  not  reach  the  Bethesda  Church  Road,  Grant  could 
probably  have  moved  down  that  road  and  doubled  up  Early's 
corps  on  the  Confederate  right  flank,  or  reached  Cold  Harbor 
and  New  Bridge,  or  perhaps  crossed  .the  Chickahominy  to 
attack  Richmond,  but  that  Grant  willfully  lost  this  advantage, 
"making  the  first  and  perhaps  the  only  important  strate 
gical  mistake  of  the  campaign  ; "  and  that,  instead  of  taking 
his  advantage,  he  "  occupied  the  29th  and  30th  in  finding  out 
where  Lee's  army  was  and  in  attacking  him  in  position." 
i  Va.  Camp.  165, 166. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  443 

The  diary  of  Longstreet's  corps1  states  that  that  corps 
occupied  the  ground  between  Hundley's  Corner  and  Walnut 
Grove  Church  on  the  28th,  and  that  on  the  30th  it  moved 
thence  to  take  the  place  of  Early's  corps,  when  the  latter 
moved  to  the  right  from  Hundley's  Corner  to  cover  the  Be- 
thesda  Church  Road.  The  War  Department  maps  indicate 
that  Longstreet's  corps  was  not  intrenched  between  Hund 
ley's  Corner  and  Walnut  Grove  Church,  and  the  records  now 
at  hand  do  not  state  whether  it  was  formed  in  line  of  battle 
or  not,  but  it  seems  certain  that,  with  the  corps  lying  on  this 
ground,  it  substantially  covered  the  Bethesda  Church  Road,2 
and  that  Grant  could  not  have  doubled  up  Early's  right 
flank  by  moving  down  that  road,  and  could  not  have  reached 
Cold  Harbor  or  New  Bridge,  or  crossed  the  Chickahominy 
by  the  Bethesda  Church  Road.3 

The  operations  here  were  as  follows  :  On  the  29th  Wright's 
corps  reconnoitred  as  far  as  Hanover  Court  House,  meeting 
no  force  but  cavalry.  The  2d  corps  found  the  enemy  in 
trenched  on  the  south  side  of  the  Totopotomoy  at  the  cross 
ing  of  the  road  from  Hawes's  Shop  to  Richmond,  and  formed 
line  facing  them  on  both  sides  of  this  road ;  and  two  divi 
sions  of  the  5th  corps,  crossing  the  Totopotomoy,  moved  along 
the  Shady  Grove  Church  Road  and  found  the  enemy  in  force 
at  Hundley's  Corner.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th  Wright's 
corps  was  sent  to  turn  the  enemy's  left  flank,  but  it  was  so 
delayed  by  swamps  and  thickets  that  it  arrived  in  position 
too  late  to  attack  that  day.  Hancock's  skirmishers  in  the 
mean  time  captured  the  most  of  the  intrenched  skirmish  line 
in  their  front,  while  on  his  left  Burnside  with  sharp  skirmish 
ing  crossed  the  Totopotomoy,  bringing  his  left  near  the  Shady 
Grove  Church  Road.  Warren,  while  moving  down  this  road, 
sent  a  brigade  over  to  the  Bethesda  Church  Road  to  look 
after  a  force  supposed  to  be  cavalry  that  his  skirmishers  had 

i  67  W.  R.  1058.  *  See  W.  R.  Atlas,  pi.  ucra,  8. 

8  Va.  Camp.  106,  169. 


444  THE  WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

encountered  there,  but  it  was  Early's  corps  which  had  been 
extended  to  that  road,  as  before  stated :  Early's  men  attacked 
this  brigade  of  Warren's,  drove  it  over  on  Warren's  left 
flank  and  followed  with  a  resolute  attack  on  two  divisions  of 
Warren's  corps,  but  were  driven  back  by  these  divisions. 
During  this  conflict  a  brigade  of  Barlow's  division  of  Han 
cock's  corps  attacked  on  its  front  to  relieve  Warren,  and  car 
ried  the  enemy's  advanced  line  of  rifle-pits.  This  attack  was 
stopped,  by  General  Meade's  order,  in  less  than  forty  minutes 
from  its  beginning.  It  was  the  only  attack  on  the  enemy  in 
position  on  the  29th  or  30th,  excepting  the  attacks  of  skir 
mish  lines. 

Smith's  corps  from  the  Army  of  the  James  began  arriving 
at  White  House  on  the  30th,  and  Grant  apprehended  that 
the  enemy  might  try  to  pass  around  our  left  flank  to  fall  on 
him  on  his  march  up  the  south  bank  of  the  Pamunkey ;  and 
so,  although  it  was  determined  that  the  enemy  were  in  too 
strong  position  to  assault  on  the  31st,  our  lines  were  pressed 
close  against  them  and  an  attack  threatened,  and  Sheridan 
on  the  same  day,  under  instructions  to  watch  towards  Cold 
Harbor,  finding  Fitz-Hugh  Lee's  cavalry  division  at  Old  Cold 
Harbor  in  a  threatening  attitude,  attacked  him  and  took  the 
place.  The  enemy  sent  Hoke's  division  there  late  in  the  day. 
As  important  roads  met  there  and  the  position  was  in  the  line 
of  a  further  extension  to  the  left  and  was  important  to  our 
army,  Sheridan  was  ordered  to  hold  it  at  all  hazards,  and 
Wright's  corps  was  dispatched  there,  it  being  the  plan  to 
attack  the  enemy  there  before  they  could  intrench,  with  this 
corps  and  Smith's.1  The  enemy  had  also  formed  the  plan  of 
moving  in  force  on  Cold  Harbor,  and  Kershaw's  division, 
which  had  joined  Hoke's  there  June  1,  made  two  attacks  on 
Sheridan  and  was  repulsed.  The  6th  corps  got  into  position 
by  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  June  1,  and  Smith's  corps 
by  six  in  the  evening.  The  enemy  in  the  mean  time  had  moved 

1  Va.  Camp.  172. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  445 

two  divisions  to  the  right  to  connect  with  Kershaw,  and  the 
latter  had  connected  on  the  right  with  Hoke  and  was  in 
trenched  in  a  line  across  and  at  right  angles  with  the  road 
leading  from  Old  Cold  Harbor  through  New  Cold  Harbor  to 
Richmond.  Smith's  corps  formed  on  the  right  of  this  road 
and  Wright's  corps  formed  on  the  left  of  it  about  fourteen 
hundred  yards  in  front  of  the  enemy,  and  advanced  on  them  at 
six  o'clock.  The  6th  corps  carried  a  part  of  the  enemy's 
main  line,  capturing  500  prisoners,  and  Smith's  corps  carried 
the  intrenched  picket  line,  Devens's  division  capturing  250 
prisoners.  Our  total  loss  was  about  2200.1  The  enemy's  loss 
is  unknown  beyond  the  750  prisoners.  That  night  Hancock's 
corps  was  sent  from  the  right  to  the  left  to  reinforce  Wright, 
and  they  were  to  attack  early  in  the  morning  of  June  2,  but 
the  fatigue  of  the  troops  and  the  want  of  preparation  led  to 
postponing  the  attack  to  the  morning  of  the  3d.  In  the  mean 
time,  on  the  morning  of  the  2d,  Lee,  perceiving  the  with 
drawal  of  Hancock  from  our  right,  sent  other  troops  to 
extend  his  own  right,  and  sent  Early  to  turn  our  right  flank. 
He  struck  Burnside  while  the  latter  was  withdrawing  to  cover 
Warren's  right,  which  was  near  Bethesda  Church,  and  took 
a  large  number  of  prisoners  from  the  skirmish  line  of  this  and 
the  5th  corps,  but  was  stopped  by  the  line  of  battle. 

Hancock's  corps  having  formed  on  the  left  of  Wright,  ex 
tending  as  far  as  Barker's  Mill,  a  general  assault  was  made 
by  these  two  corps  and  Smith's,  June  3,  and  it  failed.  The 
5th  and  6th  corps  had  some  success  in  attacking  Early's 
corps.  Our  loss  June  3  was  between  6000  and  7000  men.2 
The  enemy's  is  not  known,  but  it  must  have  been  very  much 
less.  The  battle  of  this  day  was  at  New  Cold  Harbor.  It  is 
a  common  error  to  state  the  whole  loss  at  both  Cold  Harbors, 
May  30  to  June  3  as  if  they  all  occurred  in  this  charge  of 
June  3,  and  in  this  way  the  magnitude  of  the  reverse  has  been 
much  exaggerated. 

1  Va.  Camp.  176.          2  Va.  Camp.  191 ;  see  also  N.  &  L.  115,  note  3. 


446  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

General  Grant  has  been  unsparingly  censured  for  this 
attack,  and  he  himself  has  said  in  his  Memoirs  that  he  always 
regretted  it,  and  that  not  only  was  there  no  advantage 
whatever  gained  by  it  to  compensate  for  the  heavy  loss  we 
sustained,  but  that  it  temporarily  revived  the  hopes  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  had  the  opposite  effect  on 
his  own  army. 

General  Humphreys  says  that  when  this  assault  was  or 
dered,  there  seemed  to  be  no  chance  for  further  turning  move 
ments  ;  that,  as  both  of  Lee's  flanks  were  protected,  the  front 
was  the  only  part  to  assault,  and  that,  if  success  had  crowned 
the  attack,  severe  loss  might  have  been  inflicted  on  Lee's 
army  in  the  disorder  incident  to  falling  back  on  the  Chicka- 
horniny. 

Badeau  says  that  a  withdrawal  to  the  south  side  of  the 
James  would  have  weakened  Grant's  hold  on  the  nation,  and 
that  the  examples  of  Donelson  and  Chattanooga,  and  Old 
Cold  Harbor  two  days  before,  and  the  belief  that  the  enemy 
were  enfeebled  and  depressed,  influenced  Grant  to  order  this 
assault.  It  may  also  be  said  that  afterwards  in  the  assault  on 
Petersburg,  April  2,  1865,  works  of  far  greater  strength  were 
carried  and  the  enemy  were  routed  behind  them.  The  differ 
ence  in  the  situations  was  that  in  the  latter  one  the  enemy 
were  more  enfeebled  and  dispirited  than  in  the  former.  Grant 
miscalculated  the  time  rather  than  the  possibilities. 

In  a  former  paper  ("  The  Northern  Volunteer  ")  I  quoted 
Swinton's  statement  that  some  hours  after  the  failure  of  the 
first  assault  the  men  refused  to  obey  an  order  from  General 
Meade  to  renew  the  attack,1  and  I  take  this  opportunity  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  this  statement  seems  to  have 
been  made  without  foundation,  as  General  Grant  denied  it  in 
the  newspapers  in  March,  1884,  and  no  mention  of  it  is  to  be 
found  in  General  Humphreys's  work,  or  the  reports  of  the 
Union  commanders. 

1  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  487. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  447 

The  army  remained  in  position  at  Cold  Harbor  until 
June  12,  pressed  close  up  to  the  enemy  and  making  regular 
approaches,  with  a  view  to  preventing  the  withdrawal  of  any 
portion  of  them  to  be  sent  against  Hunter,  who  was  moving  on 
Lynchburg.  Sheridan  started  on  the  7th  with  two  divisions 
of  cavalry  to  meet  Hunter  at  Charlottesville,  and  with  him 
to  destroy  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  from  that  point  to 
Hanover  Junction  and  then  to  rejoin  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Hunter  defeated  three  brigades  under  Jones  at  Piedmont, 
June  5,  and,  meeting  Crook  and  Averill  from  West  Virginia 
at  Staunton  on  the  8th,  moved  on  Lynchburg  by  way  of  Lex 
ington.  Lynchburg  was  too  important  to  the  Confederacy 
to  be  risked,  and  as  soon  as  Lee  heard  of  Jones's  defeat,  he 
sent  Breckinridge's  force,  which  had  joined  him  May  20,  back 
to  the  Valley,  and  on  the  13th  Early's  corps  was  dispatched 
to  Charlottesville  to  strike  Hunter's  force  in  the  rear  and 
then  move  up  the  Valley  and  cross  the  Potomac  to  threaten 
Washington.  It  has  been  said  that  Lee  sent  Early  away 
because  he  felt  able  to  spare  his  force  to  threaten  Washing 
ton.  It  seems  that  he  was  sent  to  save  Lynchburg  as  a  par 
amount  necessity.  General  Humphreys  says  : l  "  The  object 
in  threatening  Washington  appears  to  have  been  the  protec 
tion  of  Lynchburg  and  the  upper  part  of  the  Valley  of  Vir 
ginia.  It  could  hardly  have  been  made  with  the  expectation 
of  drawing  off  from  around  Richmond  any  very  large  part  of 
our  forces  operating  against  it." 

A  few  days  after  the  battle  of  Cold  Harbor  General 
Halleck  proposed  to  Grant  that  he  should  invest  Richmond 
north  of  the  James,  but  Grant  adhered  to  what  General 
Humphreys  calls  "  the  original  plan  of  campaign," l  and  on 
the  9th  of  June  preparations  were  directed  for  crossing  the 
James.  This,  although  an  abandonment  of  the  attempt  to 
capture  Richmond,  or  draw  the  enemy  out  by  menacing  it,  was 
directly  in  accordance  with  the  intention  which  Grant  had 
l  Va.  Camp.  194,  195. 


448  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

announced  to  the  commanders  of  the  two  armies  before  start, 
ing  for  the  Wilderness,  "  to  put  both  their  armies  south  of 
the  James  River  in  case  of  failure  to  destroy  Lee  without  it."  1 

Let  us  now,  before  following  the  army  across  the  James, 
summarize  the  events  of  the  campaign  from  May  5  to 
June  12,  to  see  whether  the  criticisms  on  the  campaign  are 
sustained. 

To  begin,  with,  our  losses  have  been  greatly  magnified. 
The  figures  for  the  different  engagements  in  Phisterer's  Sta 
tistical  Record  (p.  216)  aggregate  81,837.  Swinton  places 
the  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  at  upwards  of  60,000.2 
General  Meade,  in  his  report  made  November  1,  1864,  reck 
oned  the  loss  at  54,000,  but  said  that  his  report  was  made 
mainly  from  memory  and  personal  notes  and  documents,  as 
he  had  no  subordinate  reports.  Badeau  cites  the  regimental 
records  on  file  in  the  War  Department  for  figures  that  make 
the  number  43,349,8  and  the  Surgeon-General's  Report  makes 
it  45,945.3  While  the  regimental  rolls  are  to  be  relied  on  as 
stating  the  full  number  of  killed  and  missing,  they  may  not 
always  report  men  as  wounded  who  are  absent  in  hospital  or 
who  have  returned  to  duty  or  have  been  discharged  between 
two  musters,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Surgeon-General's 
report  probably  cannot  be  relied  on  for  a  complete  report  of 
killed  and  missing.  General  Humphreys  carefully  selected 
statistics  from  both  these  sources,  which  give  about  50,000, 
omitting  perhaps  the  few  hundred  casualties  between  Cold 
Harbor  and  the  James.4 

The  origin  of  Phisterer's  enormous  errors  may  be  found  in 
the  method  which  was  apparently  adopted  by  him  to  ascertain 
our  loss  at  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness.  He  places  it  at 

1  See  67  W.  R.  15,  16;  60  W.  R.  828,  885,  904. 

2  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  481.       3  Badeau,  iii,  713,  ii,  331. 
4  Va.  Camp.  53,  117,  224,  241,  242,  424.     The  returns  published  since  this 

paper  was  read  give  45,682  killed  and  wounded  and  8822  missing  —  a  total  of 
54,504  for  the  period  May  4  to  June  12,  including  those  in  "  minor  skirmishes, 
etc.,  en  route  June  7  to  24,"  in  the  cavalry.  67  W.  R.  185,  187,  188. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  449 

37,737.  General  Humphreys  has  pointed  out  1  that  the  Con 
federate  General  Willcox,  in  a  published  account  of  the  Battle 
of  the  Wilderness,  arrived  at  the  same  number  by  adding 
together  the  alternative  estimates  of  the  Surgeon-General's 
report  and  accepted  the  result  without  question. 

In  the  total  of  Grant's  losses  between  the  Rapidan  and 
James  some  writers  include  the  10,900  sick  sent  back  during 
the  movement.  This  leads  us  to  compare  the  amount  of 
sickness  in  Grant's  army  with  that  in  McClellan's  on  the 
Peninsula,  as  shown  by  the  "  Medical  and  Surgical  History 
of  the  Rebellion." 

The  comparison  is  as  follows : 

No.  sick  in  Per  cent,  of 

Date.  Hospital.  mesne  strength. 

May  1862                    16,535  22.8 

May   1864  13,078  11.3 

June  1862  18,369  23.3 

June  1864  13,994  14.1 

July   1862  40,158  37.8 

July   1864  19,509  26.1 

It  is  a  curious  fact,  worthy  of  notice  in  connection  with  the 
statement  sometimes  made  that  Grant  subjected  his  armies  to 
unheard  of  mental  strain,  that  nervous  maladies  were  more 
numerous  in  June  and  July,  1862,  than  in  the  same  months  in 
1864.2 

The  Medical  Director  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  reported 
that  over  20,000  sick  were  sent  away  from  the  Peninsula  April 
15  to  August  20,  1862.3  This  number  added  to  23,000  lost  in 
battle  gives  43,000  or  more  to  compare  with  the  like  loss  of 
64,426  in  Grant's  army  May  5  to  June  15,  1864. 

In  a  former  paper  ("  The  Failure  to  take  Petersburg  June 
15,  1864  "),  in  the  absence  of  published  returns,  I  accepted 
Swinton's  exaggerated  estimate  of  Grant's  loss  in  action  May 
5  to  June  15,  1864,  at  60,000,  and  I  estimated  McClellan's 

i  Va.  Camp.  424.  2  M.  &  S. 

8  12  W.  R.  182, 184, 185, 186,  187, 188,  211,  213,  216. 


450  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

loss  to  have  been  as  great  as  Grant's  by  comparison  of  the 
former's  statement  July  15  l  that  he  then  had  present  for 
duty  and  sick  105,224,  with  the  certificate  of  Assistant  Adju 
tant-General  Townsend1  that  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
April  1,  1862,  there  were  145,292  present,  of  whom  136,444 
were  "for  duty,"  and  that  prior  to  June  15  it  was  reinforced 
by  35,375,  of. whom  32,360  were  "for  duty."  Subsequent 
study  of  the  return  of  March  31  2  shows  an  apparent  dis 
crepancy  between  its  figures  and  those  of  the  Adjutant- 
General,  which  requires  explanation  before  the  latter  can  be 
accepted.  This  return  gives  only  110,826  "  present "  and 
104,250,  "present  for  duty,"  without  McDowell's,  Banks's, 
and  Wadsworth's  commands.  Adopting  the  latter  number,  and 
estimating  that  for  the  5th  New  York  and  2d  Delaware3  1600 
is  to  be  added  to  the  32,360  reinforcements  of  the  certificate, 
138,210  is  reached  as  McClellan's  total  force.  His  loss,  if 
placed  at  43,000  as  above,  was  about  31  per  cent.  The  Con 
federate  loss  in  action  in  the  Peninsular  Campaign  was  upwards 
of  28,450  out  of  a  force  of  about  70,000,4  or  upwards  of  40  per 
cent,  without  counting  the  loss  from  sickness.  Grant  received 
46,934 5  reinforcements  including  Smith's  command  of  10,000  6 
from  the  18th  corps,  making  his  total  force  about  162,000. 
His  loss  of  64,504  in  battle  and  from  sickness7  was  about 
40  per  cent.  Lee  started  with  62,000  and  received  about  12,000 
reinforcements.8 

The  Confederate  losses  between  the  Rapidan  and  the  James 
in  1864  will  probably  never  be  known,  because  not  only  did 

1  1  C.  W.  pp.  343-345.  2  14  W.  R.  53. 

8  14  W.  R.  260.  4  N.  &  L.  80,  81,  86. 

5  Badeau's  estimate  of  40,000  (ii,  p.  328  et  seq.)  is  shown  to  be  inadequate 
by  returns  published  in  1891  in  which  Abercrombie  reported  34,645  as  sent 
forward,  to  which  should  be  added  4889  for  the  29th  Mass.,  5th  N.  H.,  3d  and 
4th  Del.,  1st  Md.,  157th  Pa.  Cav.  and  29th  colored,  and  from  which  2600  should 
be  deducted  for  187th  Pa.  and  2d  Pa.  Heavy  Art.,  which  arrived  after  Cold 
Harbor.  69  W.  R.  364,  414,  738,  14,  261,  304,  443,  453,  724,  739 ;  81  W.  R. 
47,  48 ;  69  W.  R.  602. 

6  67  W.  R.  999.      7  Ante,  p.  448,  note  3,  p.  449.       8  Va.  Camp.  124,  125,  164. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  451 

the  rapidity  of  the  campaign  and  the  constant  loss  of  com 
manding  officers  probably  interfere  with  making  reports,  but 
most  of  those  which  were  made  were  probably  lost  or  destroyed 
in  the  flight  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg ;  at  any  rate  they 
have  not  come  to  light  up  to  the  present  time.1 

But  very  careful  and  conservative  estimates  of  their  losses 
in  action  have  been  made  by  General  Humphreys  as  follows : 2 

Loss  in  the  Wilderness 11,400 

Spottsylvania  May  10  and  12 12,000 

May  19 900 

May  27  to  June  1 4,000 


28,300 

To  this  we  should  add  as  the  balance  of  10,000  prisoners  re 
ported  by  the  Commissary  General  of  prisoners  (Badeau,  ii, 
332),  after  deducting  say  6500  prisoners  included  in  the  above  3,500 


31,800 

This  was  about  43  per  cent,  of  Lee's  force  of  74,000  without 
the  loss  from  sickness.  This  leaves  out  of  account  the  killed 
and  wounded  in  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  and  the  opera 
tions  of  May  8  and  9,  and  the  operations  on  the  North  Anna, 
including  Hill's. 

The  criticism  that  General  Grant  erred  in  not  following 
Sherman's  plan  of  flanking  the  enemy  out  of  position  after 
position  until  they  could  be  brought  to  bay  where  our  supe 
rior  numbers  could  tell,  is  not  a  happy  one,  because,  without 

1  Ewell  reported  that  out  of  his  15,500  effectives  he  had  8000  left  May  11,  and 
5100  May  19,  and  that  he  lost  over  half  his  force  May  4  to  27.    The  Confederate 
Medical  Director  reported  Ewell's  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  at  4453.   In  view 
of  these  figures  it  is  safe  to  say  he  lost  at  least  7750.    Losses  are  also  reported 
in  4  brigades  of  Longstreet's  corps  to  June  15,  of  1805,  in  Bryan  and  Mahone's 
brigades  in  the  Wilderness,  and  McGowan's  May  12,  at  737,  and  in  the  artillery 
to  December  4,  at  1663,  of  which  1200  may  safely  be  attributed  to  the  period 
up  to  June  12,  giving  a  total  of  11,492  for  19  out  of  34  brigades  of  infantry  and 
the  artillery.   67  W.  R.  1053,  1060,  1064,  1075,  1090,  1094. 

2  Va.  Camp.  pp.  54,  89,  105,  112,  193. 


452  THE  WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

disparagement  to  him  or  his  army,  it  is  to  be  recalled  that 
Sherman  never  mano3uvred  the  enemy  into  such  a  position, 
and  that  Grant  flanked  Lee  out  of  position  oftener  than  Sher 
man  did.  Johnston  was  pushed  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta,  a 
distance  of  about  a  hundred  miles,  in  a  little  over  two  months. 
Lee  was  pushed  from  the  Rapidan  to  Petersburg,  about  the 
same  distance,  in  forty  days  (when  Johnston  was  relieved  of 
command,  he  reminded  Jefferson  Davis  that  Lee's  retreat  had 
been  quite  as  rapid  as  his).  Grant  executed  nine  flank  move 
ments.  Sherman  executed  four.  Grant  assaulted  field-works 
on  seven  days  and  Sherman  on  seven  days,  the  object  being 
the  same,  but  Grant's  assaults  being  more  persistent  and  on 
a  larger  scale.  Grant's  army  was  in  contact  with  the  enemy 
almost  every  day  for  forty  days  and  so  was  Sherman's.  Of 
the  month  of  May  General  Cox  writes : 1  "  Every  day  had 
brought  its  combat,  and  in  the  latter  part  of  it  the  army  had 
lived  day  and  night  under  fire." 

It  is  true  that  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta  Sherman  lost  only 
about  17,000  men  in  battle,2  but  he  knew  that,  although  the 
leader  opposed  to  him  persisted  in  his  Fabian  policy,  the  day 
could  only  be  postponed  when  a  great  sacrifice  of  life  must 
be  made,  and  it  was  only  the  inconsiderate  and  hot-headed 
nature  of  Hood  which  relieved  Sherman's  army  from  a  tre 
mendous  struggle  around  Atlanta. 

General  Sherman  believed  that  he  would  have  to  do  a  great 
deal  more  fighting  at  some  time,  and,  when  he  ordered  the 
general  assault  at  Kenesaw,  he  felt  that  it  was  better  to 
chance  a  victory  by  assaulting  earthworks  than  to  flank 
Johnston  out  of  his  reach  again. 

To  return  now  to  the  situation  at  Cold  Harbor.  On  the 
night  of  June  12  Smith's  corps  marched  for  White  House 
Landing,  to  take  shipping  around  to  Bermuda  Hundred  on 
the  James.  On  that  same  night  the  5th  corps  marched  for 
Long  Bridge,  and  crossing  the  Chickahominy  there  marched 

1  Atlanta,  p.  87.  2  Atlanta,  pp.  88,  135. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  453 

out  towards  Richmond,  and,  facing  that  city,  held  the  White 
Oak  Swamp  Bridge  and  the  Charles  City  and  Central  roads. 
The  rest  of  the  army,  crossing  the  Chickahominy  at  Long 
Bridge  and  lower  down,  under  cover  of  this  movement,  pushed 
for  Wilcox's  Landing,  on  the  James  River.  Lee.  awakened  to 
this  movement,  nervously  moved  his  army  to  Malvern  Hill 
and  Riddle's  Shop  to  protect  Richmond ;  but  although  our 
advance  under  Smith  had  attacked  the  works  around  Peters 
burg  and  half  our  army  had  crossed  the  James  on  the  15th, 
Lee,  as  late  as  10.30  A.  M.  on  the  16th,  telegraphed  Beaure- 
gard,  who  was  crying  for  reinforcements,  that  he  did  not  know 
the  position  of  Grant's  army,  and  could  not  strip  the  north 
bank  of  the  James,  and  at  3  P.  M.  he  had  not  heard  that  Grant 
had  crossed  the  James.1  In  the  paper  above  mentioned  ("  The 
Failure  to  take  Petersburg,  June  15,  1864  "  )  I  have  traced 
the  history  of  the  15th  of  June,  and  therefore  will  not  dwell 
on  it  here,  but  will  repeat  my  conviction  that  Petersburg 
could  have  been  taken  on  that  day.  It  was  due  to  Grant  as 
the  consummation  of  a  piece  of  most  brilliant  strategy,  and 
if  it  had  been  accomplished,  Lee  would  have  been  obliged  to 
leave  Richmond  for  the  interior. 

The  2d  corps  crossed  the  James  on  the  night  of  the  14th, 
with  orders  to  march  to  a  point  about  halfway  between  City 
Point  and  Petersburg.  As  the  orders  did  not  seem  to  require 
extraordinary  haste,  Hancock  delayed  for  rations  until  10.30 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th.2  The  destination  named  for  him 
carried  him  somewhat  out  of  the  direct  road  to  Petersburg, 
and  it  was  not  until  late  in  the  day  that  he  was  intercepted 
by  orders  to  go  to  Smith's  aid  in  front  of  Petersburg.  He 
arrived  at  dusk,  and  then  put  his  corps  at  Smith's  disposal, 
but  the  latter  would  not  advance  that  night  beyond  the  works 
which  he  had  taken.  Without  doubt,  if  Hancock  had  arrived 

1  Va.  Camp.  214. 

2  The  delay  was  pursuant  to  General  Meade's  order.   Hancock  had  one  day's 
rations  in  hand  and  did  not  need  to  delay  for  more.  80  W.  R.  303,  304. 


454  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

two  hours  earlier,  as  he  would  have  done  if  his  orders  had 
contemplated  it,  Petersburg  would  have  fallen  that  night,  and 
General  Grant  is  therefore  criticised  for  not  letting  Hancock 
know  early  in  the  day  that  the  capture  of  Petersburg  was  to 
be  attempted,  and  for  sending  him  so  far  out  of  the  road 
to  Petersburg ;  but  there  was  ample  force  in  front  of  Peters 
burg,1  and  all  that  was  wanted  was  a  general  who  would  take 
the  responsibility  of  assaulting.  Grant  supposed  that  Smith 
was  such  a  general.  If  he  had  effected  the  capture  of  the 
place,  the  world  would  have  applauded  Grant's  prudence  in 
not  disclosing  the  plan  to  any  one  in  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  Secrecy  was  essential  to  success,  and  so  great  was 
Grant's  secrecy  that  he  took  the  order  for  Smith's  move 
ment  to  Butler  in  person  on  the  14th  and  disclosed  it  to 
no  other  commander  unless  to  General  Meade.2  It  seems 
to  me  that  Grant  thought  that  the  2d  corps  would  be  needed 
only  to  reinforce  Smith  in  Petersburg  or  guard  his  rear 
from  an  attack  from  Bermuda  Hundred,  that  it  was  ordered 
to  the  City  Point  Railroad  to  oppose  any  force  that  might 
break  through  Butler's  lines  and  cross  the  Appomattox  in 
Smith's  rear,  and  that  it  was  either  Smith's  delays  or  the 
erroneous  impression  that  he  had  taken  the  outer  line  of 
works  early  in  the  day  that  induced  Grant  to  order  the  2d 
corps  to  him. 

I  have  before  called  attention  to  the  question  whether,  if 
Grant  had  placed  his  army  on  the  south  side  of  the  James 
without  having  fought  a  battle,  he  could  have  succeeded  in 
demolishing  Lee's  army  as  he  finally  did ;  and  the  inquiry  now 
suggests  itself  whether,  if  Grant  had  manoeuvred  down  from 
the  Rapidan  to  Cold  Harbor  without  fighting,  he  could  there 

1  Badeau,  362. 

2  The  writer  does  not  assume  to  judge  whether  he  disclosed  it  to  General 
Meade  on  returning-  from  General  Butler  on  the  night  of  the  14th.    General 
Grant  says  that  he  did  and  General  Meade  asserts  to  the  contrary.    Grant's 
Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  p.  294;  80  W.  R.  315. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  455 

have  so  excited  Lee's  apprehensions  by  the  demonstration  of 
one  corps  as  to  conceal  the  movement  across  the  James,  and 
whether  he  could  have  crossed  it  without  a  great  battle,  and, 
if  he  had  crossed,  whether  Lee  would  have  followed  him  rather 
than  strike  for  Washington  as  he  did  in  1862,  when  McClellan 
lay  at  Harrison's  Landing  with  nearly  90,000  men. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  verdict  of  history  will  be  that  the 
campaign  from  the  Rapidan  to  Cold  Harbor  did  much  to 
change  the  relative  prowess  of  the  armies  and  courage  of  the 
commanders ;  and  as  I  have  said  before,  the  final  result  of 
the  campaigns  which  began  on  the  Rapidan  and  ended  at 
Appomattox  Court  House  was  that  the  enemy  lost  nearly  as 
many  men,  if  not  more  than  the  Union  army  lost.  It  is  in 
vain  to  search  the  records  which  are  in  print  for  a  statement 
of  the  Confederate  losses,  but  I  have  above  shown  that 

The  losses  between  the  Rapidan  and  James  were  at  least  .     .       31,800 
Prisoners  captured,  and  estimates  of  killed  and  wounded  in  a 
few  cases,  from  June  14,  1864,  to  March  24,  1865,  to  be 

found  in  General  Humphreys's  work,  give 10,000 

Loss  reported  in  front  of  Bermuda  Hundred l 3,226 

The  army  which  was  destroyed  between  March  24  and  April  9 

numbered  at  least 67,537 

The  total  is 112,563 

I  believe  that  this  would  be  swelled  by  over  20,000  if  full 
reports  of  the  Confederate  commanders  were  at  hand.  The 
number  of  Lee's  army  March  24,  18G5,  is  arrived  at  as 
follows : 2 

Force  returned  in  the  morning  report  of  the  Army  of  Northern 

Virginia,  infantry  and  cavalry,  February  28,  1865  ....  56,895 

Artillery,  February  20 6,113 

Swell's  force,  Department  of  Richmond,  March  20 4,529 

67,537 

1  68  W.  R.  205,  218,  245,  253,  265. 

2  95  W.  R.  388,  390  ;  96  W.  R.  1274;  see  also  Va.  Camp.  434. 


456  THE   WILDERNESS  CAMPAIGN 

Apparently  this  total  does  not  include  Rosser's  cavalry, 
the  heavy  artillery,  or  the  naval  and  local  force,  amounting 
perhaps  to  2000  in  all.1 

The  loss  in  action  of  the  Armies  of  the  Potomac  and  James, 
May  4, 1864,  to  April  9,  1865,  was  124,166,2  of  which  63,626 
occurred  prior  to  June  14.3 


NOTE 

May,  1904.  The  recent  statement  to  the  writer  by  Colonel  Dodge, 
that  his  view  of  General  Grant  in  "  Some  Federal  and  Confederate 
Commanders"  (vol.  x,  Papers  Mil.  Hist.  Soc.  of  Mass.)  has  been 
modified  by  later  studies,  and  that  he  should  not  care  to  have  his 
comments  on  the  Wilderness  (pp.  34  et  seq.)  taken  as  a  critical  dis 
cussion  of  that  campaign,  renders  it  unnecessary  here  carefully  to 
weigh  them,  as  the  authority  of  Colonel  Dodge  would  otherwise 
require.  It  may  not,  however,  be  out  of  place  to  note  the  following 
suggestions  with  reference  to  those  comments  : 

1.  Grant's  march  of  May  4  was  primarily  an  attempt  to  turn 
Lee's  flank,  and  the  route  taken  was  better  than  that  via  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court  House  would  have  been,  because  it  led  more  directly  to 
the  enemy's  flank  and  rear  and  left  more  ground  for  further  rnan- 
osuvres  towards  Richmond,  and  because  by  pursuing  it  the  Union 
army  left  the  Spottsylvania  route  free  for  the  trains.    If  the  army 
had  marched  on  the  latter  route  the  trains  would  necessarily  have 
followed  it  on  the  same  route  without  effectual  cover.    While  Ewell 
had  a  shorter  march,  Longstreet  had  a  longer  one,  to  reach  the 
Union  army,  than  would  have  been  necessary  to  strike  it  on  the 
Spottsylvania  route. 

2.  The  Salient  at  Spottsylvania  was  a  vulnerable  part  such  as 
military  theory  designates  for  attack,  and  it  was  the  weakest  point 
in  the  Confederate  lines ;  a  reconnoissance  of  it  was  attempted,  and 

1  Va.  Camp.  434 ;  95  W.  R.  1276. 

2  07  W.  R.  195;  87  W.  R.  161,  162;  95  W.  R.  601;  68  W.  R.  18,  19;  80 
W.  R.  238,  268;  87  W.  R.  132,  144,  161. 

a  67  W.  R.  188 ;  68  W.  R.  18, 19, 187,  797-99. 


GRANTS  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  457 

it  does  not  appear  that  its  failure  to  disclose  the  lay  of  the  enemy's 
lines  diminished  the  success  of  the  assault.  The  manoeuvres  of 
May  11  induced  Lee  to  withdraw  Ewell's  artillery  from  Johnston's 
front,  and  the  assault  of  the  12th  was  made  in  its  absence.  Appro 
priate  orders  were  given  for  massing  the  Union  troops  opposite  the 
points  to  be  attacked. 

3.  After  May  12  Grant  resorted  to  "an  assault  all  along  the 
line  "  only  at  Cold  Harbor.1    It  would  have  been  fortunate  if  he  had 
there  taken  the  precautions  which  Colonel  Dodge  suggests,  because 
the  result  might  have  been  the  abandonment  of  the  plan  to  assault, 
but  they  would  not  have  disclosed  salient  or  dominant  part,  or  other 
key  to  the  enemy's  position,  the  carrying  of  which,  with  any  possi 
ble  disposition  of  the  Union  army,  could  have  resulted  in  driving 
Lee  from  his  position. 

4.  No  scheme  of  manceuvres  is  apparent  which  could  have  induced 
Lee,  after  the  Battle  of  the  Wilderness,  to  afford  Grant  the  chance, 
between  that  field  and  the  James,  of  attacking  the  Confederate  army 
outside  of  intrenchments. 


THE   TRUCE   FOR  COLLECTING   THE   WOUNDED   AT 
COLD   HARBOR 

The  censure  passed  by  Mr.  Ropes  on  General  Grant  for  the 
delay  of  five  days  before  arranging  a  truce  for  the'  recovery  of  the 
wounded  left  between  the  lines  after  the  assault  of  June  3  (ante, 
p.  360)  is  perhaps  based  upon  General  Morgan's  narrative.  The 
correspondence,2  since  published  in  the  War  Records,  shows  that 
General  Morgan  could  not  have  intended  to  attribute  the  responsi 
bility  for  the  delay  up  to  June  6  to  General  Grant.  It  was  Han 
cock's  statement,  in  his  dispatch  of  1  P.  M.,  June  5,  that  he  was 
informed  that  wounded  were  still  lying  between  the  lines,  which 
led  Grant  to  take  measures  for  sending  out  the  flag  of  truce,  which 
he  did  immediately.  The  commander  of  the  armies  would  not 
have  been  justified,  without  such  information  from  his  subordinates, 
to  have  asked  for  a  truce  upon  the  assumption  that  there  were 

1  For  attacks  of  May  17  and  30,  see  ante,  pp.  439,  444. 

2  69  W.  R.  599,  603,  604. 


458  THE   WILDERNESS   CAMPAIGN 

wounded  remaining  between  the  lines.  Morgan's  narrative l  states 
that  the  flag  of  truce  went  through  the  lines  at  about  5  P.  M.,  but 
that  the  absence  of  Lee  from  his  headquarters  delayed  his  reply 
until  nearly  10  o'clock.  The  narrative  also  says,  with  reference 
to  the  delay  which  followed,  "  It  was  understood  at  the  time  that 
the  delay  was  caused  by  something  akin  to  points  of  etiquette,"  and 
it  implies  that  it  was  Grant  who  was  responsible  for  them.  It  also 
recites  certain  particulars  supposed  to  be  in  the  correspondence 
between  him  and  Lee,  the  absence  of  which  might  have  changed 
General  Morgan's  conclusions,  if  he  had  known  the  fact.  This  cor 
respondence  has  since  been  published.  Grant's  note,'2  which  was 
sent  under  the  flag  of  truce  above  mentioned,  proposed  a  general 
arrangement  for  both  parties  for  thereafter  collecting  their  wounded 
between  the  lines.  Lee  in  reply  2  expressed  his  fear  that  the  method 
proposed  would  lead  to  "  misunderstanding  and  difficulty,"  pro 
posed  instead  the  customary  flag  of  truce  from  either  party  desiring 
to  remove  its  dead  or  wounded,  and  said,  "  It  will  always  afford 
me  pleasure  to  comply  with  such  a  request  as  far  as  circumstances 
will  permit."  Grant  assumed  that  this  was  an  assent  to  his  pro 
posal  for  the  case  then  present,  and  replied  on  the  morning  of  June 
6 8  proposing  12  to  3  P.  M.  that  day  as  the  time  when  he  should 
send  out  parties  under  white  flags  to  collect  the  dead  and  wounded. 
Lee  replied  8  on  the  same  day  that  he  had  not  intended  to  assent, 
but  to  say  that  permission  should  be  "  asked  for  by  flag  of  truce  in 
the  usual  way,"  and  that  he  had  directed  the  proposed  parties  under 
white  flags  "to  be  turned  back."  Then  Grant,  on  the  same  day,8 
formally  asked  permission  to  collect  his  dead  and  wounded  at  a 
time  to  be  fixed  by  Lee,  who  in  reply,  by  dispatch  4  dated  7  P.  M., 
fixed  8  to  10  that  evening.  Grant  received  this  dispatch  between 
11  and  12  p.  M.,  and  therefore,  on  the  morning  of  June  7,  asked 
for  further  time,5  which,  by  dispatch  dated  2  p.  M.,  Lee  fixed  at  6 
to  8  P.  M.  that  day,6  at  which  time  the  parties  were  sent  out.7  This 
correspondence  between  Grant  and  Lee  was  set  out  by  Badeau  in 
1881  (vol.  ii,  p.  309,  note)  and  by  Grant  in  his  Memoirs  (vol.  ii, 
p.  272)  in  1886. 

1  MS.  copy  in  files  of  M.  H.  S.  2  69  W.  R.  600.  3  Ibid.  638. 

*  Ibid.  639.  5  Ibid.  666.  6  Ibid.  667.  7  Ibid.  667,  669. 


GRANT'S  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  LEE  459 

If,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  it  can  be  said  that  Grant  was 
censurable  for  proposing  a  general  arrangement  for  both  parties 
instead  of  forthwith  asking  permission  to  recover  his  wounded,  or 
for  allowing  his  assumption  that  Lee  had  in  any  degree  assented  to 
his  first  proposal,  to  delay  his  request  for  such  permission,  he  recti 
fied  the  error  early  enough  to  have  collected  the  wounded  June  6, 
if  Lee's  reply  had  not  been  delayed.  I  cannot  see  how  from  any 
point  of  view  Grant  could  be  held  responsible  for  the  delays  on 
June  7. 

It  seems  clear  that  Lee's  refusal  of  June  6  was  to  compel  Grant's 
request,  as  an  acknowledgment  of  the  Confederate  victory. 

It  is  not  to  be  thought  for  a  moment  that  either  commander 
purposely  delayed  his  replies  to  the  other.  These  delays  must  be  laid 
to  the  inevitable  difficulties  incident  to  the  passage  of  hostile  lines, 
the  long  distances,  the  movements  of  the  commanders,  and  the 
barrier  which  darkness  raises. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Army  corps  are  indexed  by  their  numbers^;  divisions,  brigades,  and  batteries, 
by  the  names  of  their  commanders.  Reference  is  made  to  an  army  alone,  where 
all  its  infantry  corps  are  mentioned  on  a  page,  without  reference  to  the  corps  singly. 
State  troops  are  indexed  by  the  names  of  the  states. 


ABBOTT,  Major  Henry  L.,  150, 151. 

Abercrombie,  General  John  J.,  450. 

Acquia  Creek,  208,  384. 

Adams,  Captain  Charles  F.,  Jr.,  302. 

Adams  house,  333. 

Alabama  troops,  169. 

Alsop's  House,  214, 222,  235,  238. 

Ambulances,  17,  207,  212,  294. 

Ammunition,  17. 

Anderson,  General  George  T.,  51,  154, 197. 

Anderson,  General  Richard  H.,  29,  39,  52, 
54,  56,  57,  58,  60,  68,  71,  72,  73,  153,  197, 
198,  213,  215,  223,  227,  232,  233,  234,  294, 
299,  303,  304,  328,  350,  426. 

Anderson  farm,  296. 

Andrew's  Tavern,  21. 

Animals,  207. 

Anna  Bridge,  68. 

Anna  River,  69. 

Annapolis,  368. 

Antietam,  29,  30. 

Antioch  Church,  417. 

Appomattox,  171,  410,  433. 

Appomattox  River,  67, 454. 

Arms,  Confederate,  94. 

Armstrong  house,  332. 

Army  of  the  James,  400,  414-416,  440,  454, 
456. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  7,  13,  27,  32, 
33/34,40,  68,69,  70,  74,  75,  83,119,121,  184, 
207,  208,  304,  327,  332,  333,  345,  346,  356, 
366-369,  371,  372,  373,379,  384,  392,  395, 397, 
402,  409,  416,  425,  430,  431,  455. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  6,  7,  12,  13,  24,  27, 
31,  67,  70,  73,  74,  75,  119,  120,  121,  129,  171, 
172,  183,  184,  207,  213,  289,  304,  305,  307, 
310,  311,  322,  323,  325,  327,  329,  332,  337, 
344,  351,  352,  366,  368,  369,  373-375,  379, 
397,  405,  409,  415-417,  430,  431,  440,  442, 
449,  450,  456. 

Arnold,  Captain  William  A.,  306. 

Artillery,  captured,  45,  61,  64,  67,  131,  133, 
180,  189,  193,  212,  222.  226,  252,  259,  260, 
209,  294,  354,  380,  389,  391,  412. 

Artillerv,  Confederate,  37,  39,  59,  63,  101, 
103,  ll2,  114,  146,  147,  172,  238,  241,  280, 
389,  426,  456,  457. 

Artillery,  heavy,  294,  298,  299. 

Artillery,  Union,  15, 17,  45,  59,  98,  101,  103, 
122,  138,  139,  172,  178,  186,  192,  193,  194, 
195,  207,  208,  220,  221,  222,  235,  294,  306, 
308,  374,  412,  415,  423. 

Ashland,  69,  323,  324,  325,  346. 

Atlanta  campaign,  360,  371,  376,  451,  452. 

Atlee's  Station,  70,  323,  327,  346,  348,  395, 
442. 


Averill,  General  William  W.,  447. 
Ayers,  General  Romeyn  B.,  124,  129,  236, 

293,  331,  421. 

Badeau,  General  Adam,  340,  345,  362,  366, 

369,  436,  446,  450,  458. 
Badges,  Confederate,  86. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  7. 
Bands,  84. 

Banks,  General  Nathaniel  P.,  450. 
Barker's  Mill,  445. 
Barlow,  General  Francis  C.,  6,  61,  122,  139, 

146,  148,  169,  192,  195,  198,  220,  222,   223, 
244,  245,  247,  249,  250,  253,  254,  256,  257, 
258,  265,  266,  267,  268,  271,  276,  277,  278, 
281,  282,  283,  284,  293,  301,  305,  308,  313, 
315,  332,  334,  335,  337,  339,  345,  350,  355, 
356,  358,  361,  381,  388-390,  397,  426,  428, 
436,  444, 

Barnard,  Captain  George  M.,  167. 

Barnet's  Ford,  5,  184,  416. 

Bartlett,  General  Joseph  J.,  124,  421. 

Bases,  412,  434,  440. 

Bates,  Colonel  James  L.,  303,  304. 

Battle,  General  Cullen  A.,  98,  99,  133. 

Baxter,  General  Henry,  132,  143,  155, 195, 

214,   239,  291,  423. 

Bayonet  fighting,  225,  261,  269,  280,  387. 
Beauregard,  General  G.  T.,  67,  70,  74,  400- 

402,  416,  453. 

Beaver  Dam  Creek,  69,  314,  395,  442. 
Belle  Isle,  4. 
Belle  Plain,  63. 

Benning,   General  Henry  L.,  51. 
Bermuda  Hundred,  74,  321,  368,  370,  399. 

400,  415,  452,  4,54. 
Bethesda  or  Bethel  Church,  303,  313,  315, 

325,  331,  345,  346,  348,  359,  445. 
Bethesda  Church  Road,  359,  394,  395,  442, 

433. 

Beverly  house,  236. 
Birney,  General  David,  122,  139,  141,  146, 

147,  150, 161, 170,  191, 193, 194, 195, 197,  198, 
210,  220,  222, 223,  245,  249,  250,  252,  253,  254, 
278,  280,  281,  283,  293,  294,  296,  297,  303, 
305,  306,  308,  313,  315,  316,  332,  334,  339, 
349,  354,  386,  388,  389,  426,  428,  435,  436. 

Blackwater  Run,  83. 
Bliss,  Colonel  Zenas  R.,  160. 
Block  House,  215,  216. 
Block  House  Road,  217,  233,  234. 
Bloody  Angle  (see  Salient),  65,  66,  237,  238, 
250,  253,  256,  267-271,  278, 280,  282,  283, 284, 

294,  296,  390,  391. 
Bloody  Lane,  256,  270. 
Bottom's  Bridge,  330,  332. 


464 


INDEX 


Bowling  Green,  300,  301.  439. 

Bragonier,  115. 

Brandy  Station,  8,  11,  178. 

Breckenridge,  General  John  C.,  67,  68,  71, 
72,  73,  305,  350,  351,  3C1,  391,  400,  447. 

Breastworks  (  see  Fortifications),  45,  47, 
50,  54,  57,  58,  59,  61,  64-68,  71,  72,  73.  99, 
100,  106,  107,  109,  110,  114,  129,  130,  138, 
139,  141,  142,  144,  147,  154,  161,  191,  200, 
201,  207,  210,  211,  215,  216,  219,  220,  221, 
223,  224,  235,  236,  238,  255,  269,  293,  295, 

302,  305,  306,  317,  321,  333,  336,  343,   347, 
348,  350,  351,  352,  355,  362,  380,  384,   396, 
421,  425,  426,  430,  433,  435,  442,  444. 

Bristoe  Station,  367. 

Brock's  Bridge,  43. 

Brock  Road,  41,  46,  47,  53,  55,  57,  58,  59,  60, 
61,  80,  123,  126,  137,  138,  139,  140,  143,  146, 
148, 149,  154,  155, 156, 158, 167, 189,  190,  194, 
198,  199,  200,  201,  209,  210,  212-218,  235,  378, 
380-382,  388,  423,  425-428. 

Brooke,  General  John  R.,  161,247, 249,258, 
259,  278,  280,  282,  354. 

Brooks,  General  W.  T.  H.,  321,  329. 

Brown,  Colonel  Hamilton  A.,  92,  98. 

Brown,  Colonel  Henry  W.,  135. 

Brown,  Colonel  Hiram  L.,  278. 

Brown,  Colonel  J.  Thompson,  103. 

Brown,  Captain  John  Badger,  108,  110. 

Brown,  Colonel  Joseph  W.,  307. 

Brown  house,  249,  257,  277,  278,  388. 

Bull  Run,  3,  11,  207,  367,  418. 

Burial,  212. 

Burnside,  General  Ambrose  E.,4,  7,  8,  9, 
11,  18,  20,  21,  23,  24,  28, 31,  49,  53,  55,  60,  63, 

65,  67,  69,  122,  144,  159,  160,  168,  169,  170, 
183,  195,  201,  209,   219,  221,  226,  236,   294, 

303,  309,  310,  322,  338,  365,  368,  375,   378, 
391,  397,  398,  425,  427. 

Burton,  Colonel  Henry  S.,  220. 

Butler,  General  Benjamin  F.,4,  8,  31,  55, 

66,  67,  70,  73,  321,  368,  369,  374,  400,  412, 
414,  415,  454. 

Butler,  General  Matthew  C.,  344. 
Byrnes,  Colonel  Richard,  354. 

Caldwell,  General  John  C.,  5. 

Camps,  83. 

Cantwell,  Captain,  113. 

Carroll,  General  S.  S.,  54,  122,  141,146,161, 

168,  194,  195,  198,  201,  291,  292,  382,  385. 
Carruth,  General  Suinner,  199. 
Catharpin  Road,  15,  21,  43,  48,  80,  126,  127, 

137,  146, 158, 187,  191,  202, 213,  219,  232, 276, 

379,  417,  420,  423-425,  434. 
Cavalry,  Confederate,  37,  43,  48,  55,  56,  57, 

120,  172, 181,  185,  209,  213,  214,  230,  237,  240, 

305,  426.  440,  441,  444. 
Cavalry  Union,  9,  14,  18,  21,  31,  41,  43,  48, 

55,  57.  73,  122,  157,  158,  172,  184,  186,  187, 

190,  202,  208, 213,  214,  217,  218,  219, 240,  305, 

322,  329,  330,  332,  344,  349,  374,  378, 383,  393, 

396,  426,  440,  441,  442,  444,  447. 
Cavalry,  vedettes,  3,  42,  70,  71,  73. 
Cedar  Creek,  battle  of,  180,  181. 
Cemetery  Ridge,  6. 
Central  Road,  453. 
Chancellorsville,  5,  16, 19,  28,  30,  38,  55,  56, 

79,  122,  126;  148,  156,  186,  209,  378,417,419. 
Chancellorsville,  battle  of,  41,  42,  126,  195, 

379,  418. 
Chandler's,  16. 
Chaplain's,  40. 

Charles  City  Cross-Roads,  400. 
Charles  City  Road,  453. 


Charlottesville,  447. 

Chattanooga,  31,  367,  446. 

Chesterfield  Bridge,  305,  307,  308,  312,  322. 

Chewning's,  22,  128,  129,  132,  137,  138  142 

144,  159,  188,  195,  381,  425,  429. 
Church,  Major,  262. 
Chickahominy  River,  69,  70,  71,  73,  74  324- 

326,  330, 334,  344,  345,  347,  348,  350, 351,  370, 

397,  442,  443,  452,  453. 
Chickamauga,  366. 

Christ,  Colonel  Benjamin  C.,  159, 160, 199. 
Christian  Commission,  the,  177. 
City  Point,  415,  453. 
City  Point  Railroad,  454. 
Clark's  Mountain,  27,  32,  39,  95. 
Clothing,  Confederate,  32, 34,  36,  40,  84,  85, 

86,  94. 

Clothing,  Union,  31,  412. 
Coffman,  Major,  100. 
Cohorn  mortars,  315. 
Cold  Harbor,  71,  72,  121,  237,  312,  315-317, 

321,  324,  326,  327, 330,  333,  345,  346,  349,  351, 
393,  395,  397,  442,  443,  447,  452. 

Cold  Harbor,  battle  of,  72,  315,  321,  328,  331, 

334-337,  340,  345,  347-349,  351,  353-355,  357, 

358,  361,  362,  366,  370,  371, 396-398, 401,444- 

447,  450,  457-459. 
Cold  Harbor  Road,  394,  445. 
Collis,  General  W.  T.  H.,  103,  105, 114. 
Colored  troops,  89,  144,  181,  182,  184,  300, 

375. 
Colors,  captured,  64,  132,  252,  259,  261,  354, 

391. 
Columns  of  attack,  229,  249,  250,  252,  256, 

276,  282. 

Convalescents,  148,  178, 426. 
Consolidation  of  Army  Corps,  177, 182, 183, 

294. 

Conscription,  184. 
Coppe'e,  Henrv,  316. 
Corbin's  Bridge.  187,  213,  218,  219,  259. 
Corse,  General  Montgomery  1).,  305. 
Cox,  General  Jacob  D.,  452. 
Craig's  Meeting  House,  21,  127, 187. 
Crawford,  General  Samuel  G.,  22,  45,  46, 

123,  127,  128, 130, 132,137,  138,  142,  159,  167, 

188, 189,  219,  298,  307,  309,  313, 314,  325, 337, 

385. 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 

372. 

Crittenden,  General  Thomas  L.,  295,  309. 
Crook,  General  George,  30,  447. 
Crump's  Creek,  323,  442. 
Culpeper  County  ,  120. 
Culpeper  Court  "House,  3,  7,  27,   28,  177, 

367,  378. 

Culpeper  Mine  Ford,  11, 15-18,  186,  202. 
Currency,  Confederate,  35. 
Curry  house,  332. 
Curtin,  Colonel,  302. 
Custer,  General  OJeorge  A.,  349. 
Cutler,  General  Lysander,  132,  239,  307, 

322,  332,  385. 

Cutts,  Colonel  Allen  S.,  63. 

Dahlgren,  Colonel  Ulric,  5,  28. 

Dalton,  Major  Henry  R.,  135,  136. 

Daniel,  General  Junius,  45,  62,  133. 

Davis,  General  Joseph  R.,  197,  232. 

Dead,  the,  212,  262,  270,  271. 

"  Death  Angle,"  see  "  Bloody  Angle." 

Delaware  troops,  278,  450. 

Deserters,  96. 

Devens,  General  Charles,  321,  329,  445. 

Dickerson's,  304. 


INDEX 


465 


Dodge,  Colonel  Theodore  A.,  456, 457. 

Dole,  General  George,  62,  111,  133. 

Donelson,  Fort,  446. 

Double  columns,  17,  260. 

Dow,  Captain  Edwin  B.,  194. 

Downer's  Bridge,  31,  303. 

Drafts,  409. 

Drill,  Confederate,  84. 

Driver,  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  R., 

273. 

Drums,  Confederate,  85. 
Drury's  Bluff,  174. 
Dunn  house,  323. 
Durrett,  Surgeon,  241. 

Early,  General  Jubal  A.,  7,  29,  45,  53,  56, 
60,  62,  63,  72,  73,  94,  101,  113,  120,  132,  136, 
144,  162,  180,  219,  233,  293,  299,  304,  314, 
395,  398,  403,  427. 

Earthworks,  see  Breastworks,  Fortifica 
tions,  Intrenchments. 

Edwards,  Colonel  Oliver,  136. 

Egan,  Colonel  Thomas  W.,  303,  306,  392. 

Eggleston,  George  Gary,  71. 

Eighteenth  Army  Corps,  70,  72,  73,  316, 
321,  326,  328-330, 336,  337, 340,  349,  350,  351, 
354,  356,  358,  359,  362,  368,  396,  397,  399, 
401,  444,  445,  450,  452,  454. 

Elder  Swamp,  332. 

Eleventh  Army  Corps,  366. 

Ely's  Ford,  5,  14,  16,  17,  18,  28,  30,  41,  119, 
122,  126,  186,  377,  417,  418. 

Engineer  Department,  Union,  79, 172,  246. 

Eustis,  General  Henry  L.,  137,  138,  156, 
167,  177,  181,  195,  197,  2(58. 

Ewell,  General  Richard  S.,  7,  20,  24,  29,  37, 
39,  42,  43,  44,  45,  48,  49,  50,  53,  55,  56,  58, 
60,  62,  63,  64,  67,  68,  92,  113,  140,  142,  158, 
195,  372,  439,  451. 

Extra  duty  men,  Union,  172. 

Extra  duty,  Confederate,  by  negroes, 
173. 

Fences,  84. 

Ferrero,  General  Edward,  161,  300,  393. 

Field,  General  Charles  W.,  29,  39,  50,  51, 
54,  74,  153,  197,  198,  216, 217,  220,  230,  232, 
233.  234,  294. 

Fifth  Army  Corps  (Warren),  3, 6, 11, 14-17, 
19,  21,  22,  31,  42-46,  49,  56,  57,  58,  61,  65, 
68,  73,  123, 124,  127,  135,  143,  155,  172,  177, 
184-190,  194,  197,  201,  202,  210,  212,  213- 
220,  222,  223,  240,  241,  292,  296,  297,  302, 
303,  307-309,  312-315,  322,  323,330,  331,336, 
349,  351,  356,  359,  378-380,  382,  384-386, 391, 
397,  400,  401,419-425,429,  435-438,440,443- 
445. 

First  Army  Corps,  Confederate  (Long- 
street,  Anderson),  29,  37,  44,  47,  49,  50, 
56-59,  61,  68,  69,  73,  94,  120,  126,  146,  149, 
152,  153,  158,  160,  172,  184,  185,  195,  208, 
228,  229,  232,  233,  240,  294,  304,  328,  329, 
372,  379,  381,  417,  419,  420,  425,  428,  430, 
434,  442,  443,  456. 

First  Army  Corps,  Union,  3,  5,  6,  11,  177, 
182,  183. 

Fitzgerald,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  92. 

Five  Forks,  219. 

Flankers,  22,  186. 

Flat  Run  or  Flat  Bush  Creek,  137, 186. 

Forage,  17,  441. 

Foraging,  84,  91,441. 

Foroigners,  121,  122. 

Forest  fires,  53,  54,  56,  61, 103, 105, 135, 161, 
201,  222,  229,  361. 


Forster,  Major  Robert  H.,  354. 

Fort  Monroe,  370. 

Fortifications  (see  Breastworks),  14,  137, 

281. 

"  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,"  171. 
Frank,  Colonel  Paul,  139,  148, 154, 169,  194, 

198. 
Fredericksburg,  14,  28,  29,  42,  56,  97,  122, 

125,  209,  310,  412,  434. 
Fredericksburg  Road,  60,  217, 221, 225,  233, 

236,  292,  293,  296,  297,  299,  432,434,  435,  438, 

439. 
Fredericksburg  &  Orange  Railroad,  139, 

153,  194,  197,  426. 
Fredericksburg  &   Richmond  Railroad, 

208,  301,305,310. 

French,  General  William  F.,  6, 11. 
Furloughs,  88,  185. 
Furnaces,  the,  126, 127, 139. 

Gaines's  Mill,  350,  351,  369,  370. 

Gate  road,  236. 

Gayle  house,  236,  293,  303. 

General  attacks,  49,  53,  143, 195,  285,  325. 

Gentry's,  313,  333. 

Georgia  troops,  149,  241,  314. 

Germ  anna  Ford,  5,  11,  14,  15,  18,  19,  22,  30, 
95,  96,  119,  123,  126,  186,  187,  195,  378,  417. 

Germanna  Plank  Road,  11, 15,  42,  54,  123, 
125,  126,  132,  133,  135,  138,  144,  154,  156, 
169,  170,  202,  378,  380,  418. 

Germanna  Road,  15, 119. 

Getty,  General  George  W.,  46,  47,  125,  134, 
137-143,  145,  150, 154,  157,  167,  168, 170, 171, 
178-182,  188-195,  197,  199,202,  210,  345,380, 
381,  423,  424,  426. 

Gettysburg,  6,  121,  366,  372,  430. 

Gibbon,  General  John,  122,  139,  141,  146, 
148,  161,  168,  170,  194,  195,  201,  220,  222, 
241,  245,  249,  250,  276,  278,  280,  292,  293, 
295,  305,  308,  309,  313,  332,  334,  335,  337, 
339,  354-356,  361,  371,  383,  386,  388,  389, 
426,  435,  436. 

Gibson's  house,  95. 

Gillmore,  General  Quincy  A.,  368. 

Glady  Run,  220. 

Good  Hope  Church,  21. 

Gordon,  General  James  B.,  37. 

Gordon,  General  John  B.,  45,  53,  54,  59, 
60,  64,  66,  102,  133,  136,  162,  220,  233,  234. 

Gordonsville,  8, 20,  37,  43,  62,  120,  126,  184, 
232,  417. 

Gracie,  General  Archibald,  401. 

Grant,  General  Lewis  A.,  137, 138, 191-195, 
198,  254,  263,  267,  269. 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  4,  7-10,  19,  20, 
23,  30,  31,  38,  39,  42,  43,  54,  55,  58,  60,  61, 
63,  65-74,  103,  105,  119,  122,  125,  143,  163, 
167,  171,  207,  208,  211,  212,  226,  235,  285, 
289,  300,  308,  325,  327,  332,  333,  339,  340, 
343,  345,  347,  348,  350,  357,  359,  360,  365- 
377,  379,  392,  394,  396,  399,  400,  401,  403, 
409-417,  419,  422,  427-131  ,433, 436, 438, 442- 
444,  446,  447,  451,  452,  454,  456-458. 

Grapevine  Bridge,  7. 

Grazing,  8. 

"  Great  Angle,"  the,  at  Spottsylvania, 
292. 

Gregg,  General  D.  McM.,  4,  9,  14,  19,  20, 
21,  41,  122,  158,  218,  322,  323,  327,  378. 

Gregg,  General,  50,  350. 

Griffin,  General  Charles,  19,  22, 45, 123. 125, 
127,  129,  133,  138,  144,  167,  188,  212,  235, 
307,  313,  322,  330,  345,  421,  422, 

Griffin,  Colonel  Simon  G.,  429. 


466 


INDEX 


Guards,  4,  17,  18,  23,  186. 


4,  17, 
Brid 


Guinea's  Bridge,  301,  302,  303. 
Guinea's  Station,  300,  301,  302,  439. 

Halleck,  General  Henry  W.,  42,  63,  66,  343, 

447. 

Hamilton's,  16. 

Hamilton's  Crossing,  8,  14,  21,  185,  187. 
Hammond,  Lieutenant-Colonel  John,  128, 

137,  157. 

Hampton,  General  Wade,  8,  37,  55,  60,  73, 

299,  300. 
Hancock,  General  Winfield  S.,  4,  6,  16,  21, 

31,  47,  56,  65,  122,  138-141,  144,  146-149,  152, 

156,  158-161,  163,  168-171,  189,  191-193,  195, 

199,  209,  220,  222,  223,  237,  245,  246,  250,  251, 

254,  255,  257,  2S7,  275,279,  281,  283,  300,  306, 

308,  313,  315,  317,  325,   330,  339,  361,  373, 

380-382,  385,  388,  423,  424,  426-428,436,437, 

453,  457. 
Hanover  Court  House,  313,  324,  345,  348, 

396,  442,  443. 

Hanover  Junction,  67,  304,  440,  447. 
Hanover  Town,  312,  322,  323,  343,  344,  393, 

442. 

Hapgood,  Colonel  Charles  E.,  50. 
Hardin,  Colonel  Martin  D.,  314. 
Hare  house,  401. 
Harris,  General  Nathaniel  H.,  64,  65,  228, 

229. 

Harris  house,  296,  313. 
Harrison's  house,  59,  237,  391. 
Harrison's  Landing,  455. 
Hart  farm,  238. 

Hartranft,  General  John  R.,  159,  160. 
Hawes's  Shop  or  Store,  312,  313,  323,  324, 

344-346,  393,  442,  443. 
Hawes's  Store,  battle,  324,  344,  442. 
Hayes,  General  Alexander,  5,  122,  142,  168, 

211,  294. 

Hayes,  General  Harry  T.,  136. 
Health,  Confederate,  84,  86,  87. 
Henkel,  Surgeon,  85. 
Heth,  General  Henry,  29,  45,  46,  47,  48,  56, 

61,  72,  142,  147,  153,  190,  192,  194,  197,  220, 

222,  232,  234,  322,  361,  435. 
Hill,  General  Ambrose  P.,  7,  20,  22,  24,  37, 

39,  43,  44,  46,  49,  50,  53,  68,  71,  72,  73,  140, 

148,  195,  231,  233,  350,  351,  361,  372,  451. 
Historians,  Confederate,  171. 
Hoke,  General  Robert  F.,  71,  73,  74,  305, 

327.  329,  397,  400,  401,  420,  444,  445. 
Hood,  General  John  R.,  452. 
Hooker,  General  Joseph,  28,  29,  42,  43,  365, 

379. 

Hospitals,  10. 
Howard,  Lieutenant  McHenry,  81,  93,  277, 

278,  280,  281,  282,  284. 
Huguenots'  descendants,  34. 
Humphreys,  General  Andrew  A.,  11,  23, 

138,  156,'  172,  173,  184,   185,  194,  202,  213, 
369,  384,  385,  411,  414,  418,  423,  424,  427,  429, 
436-439,  446-450. 

Humphreys,  General  Benjamin  G.,  230, 

231. 

Hundley's  Corner,  314,  346,  395,  442,  443. 
Hundley's  (Nelson's)  Ford,  312,  442. 
Hundred  days  men,  181. 
Hunt,  Lieutenant  Peter,  306. 
Hunter,  General  David,  73,  447. 
Hunter,  Major  R.  W.,  113. 
Hunting  Creek,  16. 
Hutton.  Captain,  169. 

Indiana  troops,  132. 


Intrenching  tools,  17. 

Intrenchments,  (see  Breastworks,  Forti 
fications),  367,  376,  384,  395.  416,  418,  429- 
431,  440,  457. 

Jackson,  General  Thomas  J.  (Stonewall), 

29,  38,  40,  68,  126,  302,  381,  418,  427. 
Jacobs  Mill  Ford,  11,  312. 
James  River,  8,  9,  13,  27,  31,  55,  56,  67,  73, 

74,  184,  399,  412,  414,  415,  440,  447,  448,  455. 
Jenkins,  General  Micah,  53,  156,  200,  213. 
Jericho  Ford,  307,  440. 
Jerusalem  Plank  Road,  401. 
Jet  house.  See  Gayle  house. 
Johnson,  Surgeon,  91. 
Johnson,  General  Bushrod,  400,  401. 
Johnson,  General  Edward,  29,  44,  45,  59, 

60,  62-64,  83,  88,  93,  94,  96,  97,  99,  102,  105, 

106, 108, 111-113,  133,  136, 162,  220,  224,  233, 

234,  252,  280,  282,  457. 
Johnston,  General  Joseph  E.,  4,  5,  30,  31, 

171,  370,  371,  452. 
Jones,  General  John  M.,  44,  45,  93,  96,  99, 

110,  114,  132,  136,  213. 
Jones,  General  William  E.,  447. 
Jones  farm,  323. 

Kelly  house,  332. 

Kemper,  General  James  L.,  302,  305. 

Kenesaw  battle,  452. 

Kent,  Lieutenant-Colonel   Jacob  Ford, 

170. 
Kershaw,  General  Joseph  B.,  29,  39,  50,  51, 

53,  57,  152,  153,  155,  197,  198,  215,  220,  230- 

234,  444,  445. 

Kilpatrick,  General  Judson,  4,  5,  28. 
King,  General  Rufus,  301. 
Kitching,  Colonel  J.  Howard,  298, 313, 314. 
Knoxville,  7,  37,  374. 
Kyle,  Major,  91. 

Lacy  house,  127,  130-132,  143,  154,  159. 

Landron  house,  238,  255,  256,  269,  296. 

Lane,  General  James  H.,  64. 

Laurel  Hill,  222,  223,  227,  228. 

Law,  General  E.  Mclver,  51. 

Leasure,  Colonel  Daniel,  156,  201. 

"  Lee  to  the  rear,"  51,  62,  64,  153. 

Lee,  General  Fitz-Hugh,  37,  38,  53,  57,  70, 
71,  181,  216,  230,  233,  327,  344,  444. 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  4,  5,  6,  7,  8,  9, 19, 
20,  23,  27,  28, 30,  31,  32,  35,  36,  38,  39, 40,  43, 
46,  49,  50,  51,  53,  55,  56,  58,  59,  61,  62,  64, 
65,  66,  67,  68,  69,  70,  71,  73,  74,  110,  113, 
119,  120,  125,  126,  139,  142,  143,  148,  149, 
152,  200,  211,  212,  223,  227,  233,  291,  310, 
311,  322,  323,  325,  347,  a59,  362,  368,  370- 
372,  379,  395,  400,  402,  410,  415,  417,  418, 
430-434,  438-440,  442,  445,  447,  452,  453- 
457,  458. 

Lee,  General  William  H.  F.,  38. 

Leonard,  Colonel  Samuel  H.,  235. 

Libby  Prison,  4. 

Liberty  Mills,  120. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  369,  413. 

Lisby  house,  332. 

Little  River,  309,  310,  392,  440. 

Littlepage's  Ford,  322. 

Livermore,  Colonel  Thomas  L.,  120,  407. 

Local  force,  Confederate,  456. 

Lockwood,  General  Henry  H.,  303. 

Locust  Grove,  19,  43. 

Lomax,  General  Lunsford  L.,  38. 

Long,  General  Armisted  L.,  63. 

Long  Bridge,  452,  453. 


INDEX 


467 


Long  Creek,  305,  306. 

Longstreet,  General  James,  7,  8, 10,  20,  29, 
37,  39,  40,  43,  44,  45,  46,  47,  48,  50,  53,  142, 
149,  152,  153,  155,  156,  158,  160,  169,  180, 
184,  195, 197,  200,  213,  229,  233,  381,  382,  417. 


Losses,  Confederate,  55,  66,  67,  100,  109, 
111,  163,  209,  213,  256,  314,  361,  383,  391, 
399,  402,  403,  426,  431,  432,  438,  439,  450, 
451,  455. 

Losses,  Union,  5,  55,  66,  67,  71,  72,  74,  100, 
103,  154,  155,  160,  163,  209,  225-227,  251, 
298,  299,  308,  330,  335,  336,  340,  361,  383, 
391,  392,  398,  402,  403,  431,  437-439,  445, 
448-450,  452,  456. 

Lyle,  Colonel  Peter,  214,  215,  217,  231. 

Lvman,  Colonel  Theodore,  76,  105,  109, 
165,  189,  192,  212,  217,  234,  294,  302. 

Lynchburg,  73,  447. 

Lyon,  Lieutenant,  108. 

MacDougall,  Colonel  Clinton  D.,  354. 

Macy,  Colonel  George  N.,  150. 

Maddens,  16, 

Mahone,  General  William,  52,  154-156, 
197,  220,  228,  293,  435. 

Maine  troops,  155, 189,  194, 233, 234, 298,  313, 
387,  391. 

Malvern  Hill,  73,  453. 

Mangohick  Church,  312,  323. 

Maps,  17,  79,  140. 

Marches,  18-20,  22-24,  39,  67-69,  95,  186,210, 
211,  213,  222,  233,  247,  259,  277,  292,  301, 
315,  322,  328,  330,  338,  349,  350,  388,  403, 
404,  412,  419,  439,  456. 

Marshall,  Colonel  Charles,  113. 

Martin,  Captain  Augustus  P.,  235. 

Martindale,  General  John  H.,  321,  329. 

Marye's  Heights,  28. 

Maryland  troops,  19,  214,  215,  239,  313,  450. 

Massachusetts  troops,  65, 105, 131,  142,  150, 
151,  215,  223,  235,  237,  249,  292,  298,  302, 
373,  389. 

Massaponax  Church  Road,  438. 

Mat  River,  303. 

Mattapony  River,  300,  301,  304. 

McAllister,  Colonel  Robert,  140,  198. 

McCall,  General  George  A.,  127. 

McCandless,  Colonel  William,  122, 143. 

McClellan,  General  George  B.,  30, 333,  365, 
370,  449,  450,  455. 

McCool's  house,  59,  390,  432. 

McDowell,  General  Irwin,  301,  450. 

McDowell's  Mills,  323. 

McGee's  house,  332. 

McGowan,  General  Samuel,  64,  65,  350. 

McLaws,  General  Lafayette,  29,  30,  328. 

McMahon,  Colonel  James  P.,  237. 

McMahon,  Colonel  Martin  T.,  72. 

Meade,  General  George  G.,  4-6,  11,  18,  19, 
22,  23,  28,  30,  55,  74,  75,  83,  103,  105,  121, 
127,129,  136-138,  140,  143,  157,  167-171, 
189,  192,  199,  207-209,  218,  219,  235,  236, 
240,  291,  293,  296,  302,  308,  310,  315,  325- 
327,  330,  333,  348-350,  357-360,  366-368, 
372,  375-377,  379,  402,  419,  420,  422,  425, 
427,  428,  431,  438,  444,  446,  448,  453,  454. 

Meadow  Bridge  Road,  324,  394. 

Mechanics,  Confederate,  85. 

Mechanicsville  Road,  314. 

Mechanicsville  Turnpike  (Old  Church 
Road),  324,  330-332,  347,  351,  362. 

Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the 
Rebellion,  449. 

Mendell,  Colonel  George  H.,  246,  248. 

Merriam,  Colonel  Waldo,  249,  257,  389. 


Merritt,  General  Wesley,  4,  5, 10,  57,  218. 
Michigan  troops,  306. 
Michler,  Major  Nathaniel,  140. 
Miles.  General  Nelson  A.,  122,  219,  222, 
247,    249,    251-253,    259-261,  276,  278,  280, 

350,  354,  356. 

Milford  Station,  300,  301,  304,  311,  439. 
Mine  Run,  10,  20,  27,  28,  43,  88,  93, 120, 123, 

125,  126,  134,  207,  208,  211,  409,  417,  419. 
Mine  Run  campaign  and  battle,  3,  7,  11, 

23,  177,  208,  209,  367,  419,  431. 
Mine,  battle  of  the,  184. 
Missionary  Ridge,  battle  of,  367. 
Mississippi  troops,  231. 
Mitchell,  Colonel  William  G.,  168. 
Mitchell's  Ford,  88,  89,  96. 
Mitchell's  Station,  3. 
Montpelier,  83. 
Morale,  Confederate  (see  Spirits),  41,  208, 

343,  372,  403,  430,  446. 
Morale,  Union  (see  Spirits),  184,  223,  322, 

351,  403,  446. 

Morgan,  Colonel  Charles  H.,  246-248,  256, 
285,  360,  361,  457,  458. 

Morris,  Colonel  Orlando  H.,  354. 

Morris,  General  William  H.,  291. 

Morrison,  Colonel  David,  199. 

Morton's  Ford,  184,  416-418. 

Motley's,  302. 

Mott,  General  Gershom,  48,  52,  122,  139, 
141,  142,  143,  146,  148,  154,  161,  168,  169, 
193,  194,  195,  198,  220,  225,  226,  245,  248- 
251,  276,  278,  280,  281,  294,  353,  382,  388, 
389,  426,  436. 

Mountain  Run,  16,  88,  92,  95. 

Mud  Tavern,  304. 

"  Mule  Shoe,"  the,  60,  63,  64,  65. 

Mundee,  Major  Charles,  168. 

Murray,  Captain  Harry,  182. 

Myers  farm,  the  (Gayle  house),  236,  293. 

Nansemond  River,  180. 

Naval  forces,  Confederate,  456. 

Neill,  General  Thomas  H.,  136, 137, 188, 189, 
192,  202,  293,  329. 

Nelson's  (Hundley's)  Ford,  312. 

Nervous  maladies,  449. 

Newcastle,  312,  328,  349. 

Newmarket,  W.  Va.,  67. 

Newton,  General  John,  6 

New  Bridge,  324,  344,  347,  351,  362,  395, 442, 
443. 

New  Hampshire  troops,  350,  354,  429,  450. 

New  Hope  Church,  15. 

New  Jersey  troops,  182. 

New  Orleans,  battle  of,  &56. 

New  York  troops,  142,  182,  199,  237,  294, 
295,  298,  302,  354,  450. 

Nineteenth  Army  Corps,  403. 

Ninth  Army  Corps  (Burnside),  4,  7,  12,  13, 
31,  42,  103,  122.  144,  161,  169,  172,  182,  184, 
187,  195,  199,  201,  210,  225,  226,  292,  294, 
295,  296,  302,  303,  304,  307-312, 315,  322,  330, 
331,  336,  340,  345,  349, 351, 354,  356,  359, 368, 
371,  374,  375, 379-382,  391,  399,  401,  415-418, 
425,  427-429,  434,  438,  439,  443,  445. 

North  Anna  battle,  306,  307,  308,  310,  311, 
321,  322,  337,  351,  371,  451. 

North  Anna  River,  67,  68,  69,  209,  305,  310, 
317,  322,  .343,  344,  346,  392,  393,  440-142. 

North  Carolina,  4,  9,  29,  301,  368,  416. 

North  Carolina  troops,  84,  89, 92,  93,  94, 102, 
108,  110,  113,  114,  420. 

Northern  Virginia,  Army  of.  See  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia. 


468 


INDEX 


Numbers,  Confederate,  13,  31,  37,  39,  74, 
92,  93,  94,  120,  121,  171,  172,  173,  184,  185, 
192,  208,  283,  372,  400,  401,  416,  420,  439, 
455,  456. 

Numbers,  Union,  12,  31,  37,  41,  67,  119, 
120-123,  172,  173,  178,  184,  192,  203,  207, 
321,  333,  349,  368,  373-375,  401,  414-416, 
420,  430,  437,  455. 

Ny  River,  58,  59,  60,  63,  220,  221,  226,  236, 
292,  293,  294,  296,  298,  434,  439. 

O'Connell,  Pat,  225. 

Officers  killed  and  wounded  (see  Names), 

99,  100,  101, 102,  103,  142,  291,  314-317. 
Officers,  regimental,  appointment  of,  92. 
Official  reports,  146. 
Old  Church,  314,  346. 
Old  church  roads,  325,  394,  395,  442. 
Opel,  John  N.,  132. 
Opequan,  battle  of,  178. 
Orange  County,  120. 
Orange  Court  House,  7,  39,  83,  94, 125,  228, 

232,  233,  417. 

Orange  Plank  Road,  15,  19,  21,  22,  39,  40, 
42,  43,  79,  80,  96,  123,  124,  126, 128,  130,  134, 
137,  138,  139,  140,  141,  143,  144,  146,  148, 
149,  153-156, 161,  167-170,  187,  189,  190, 191, 
193-198,  200,  203,  208,  210,  228,  229,  232, 

233,  378-381,  417-420,  423,  425,  426,  429. 
Orange  Springs,  21. 

Orange  Turnpike,  5,  19,  21,  39,  42,  44,83, 
96,  126,  128,  129,  130-133,  137,  138,  142,  158, 
186-189,  208,  232-234,  378,  417-423,  425,427. 

Orange  &  Alexandria  R.  R..  20,  27,  28,  384. 

Orders,  disobedience  of,  72,  73,  361,  421, 
426,  446. 

Orders,  general,  Confederate,  39,  291. 

Orders,  general,  Union,  8,  9,  14-18,  21,  291, 
419. 

Orders,  mistake  in,  328,  426. 

Ormon's,  15. 

Otis,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Elwell  S.,  293. 

Owen,  General  Joshua  T.,  141,  146,  194, 
195,  198,  292,  335. 

Ox  Ford,  68,  307-310,  312,  440. 

Paine,  Captain  William  H.,  246. 

Palmyra  Ford,  39. 

Pamunkey  River,  9,   14,  69,  70,  181,  312, 

322,   323,  326,  328,  344,   347,  362,  392-396, 

440,  442,  444. 

Pamunkey  Road,  14,  21,  417,  424,  425. 
Parke,  General  John  G.,  310. 
Parker's  Store,  15,  19,   21,  22,  43,  44,   123, 

128,  138,  139,  152,  153,   158,  159,    188,    189, 

191, 197,  202,  220,  379-381,  419,  420,  424,  429. 
Parsly,  Lieutenant-Colonel  O.  M.,  92. 
Payne's  Farm,  93. 
Peake's  Turnout,  313. 
Pegram,  General  John,  101,  136,  144,  162, 

213,  214. 
Peirson,  General  Charles  L.,  105,  169.  205, 

212,  215,  216,  235,  239,  240,  241. 
Peninsula,  the,  369,  370,  449,  450. 
Pennsylvania  troops,  105, 127,  128,  302,  309, 

314,  354,  450. 

Penrose,  Colonel  William  H.,  189. 
Perrin,  General  Abner,  64,  228. 
Perry,  General  Edward  A.,  228,  229. 
Perry's  house,  240. 
Perry,  J.,  house,  241. 
Petersburg,  73,  74,  181,  327,  357,  368-370, 

339,  402,  405,   414,  433,  434,  441,  446,  453, 

Peyton,  Major  Greene,  234. 


Phillip's  Mill,  313. 

Phisterer's  Statistical  Record,  446. 

Pickets  (see  Skirmishers),  3,  17,  18,  22  43 
88,  89,  90,  91,  92,  94,  100,  102,  103,  124,  127, 
250,  260,  278,  379,  421,  427. 

Pickett,  General  George  E.,  29,  68,  74, 184, 
302-305. 

Piedmont,  27. 

Pierce,  Colonel  Byron  R.,  306,  392. 

Piney  Branch  Church,  14,  55,  80,  126,  213. 

Pioneers,  16. 

Pisgah  Church,  83,  94. 

Plans  of  battle  and  campaign,  Confeder 
ate,  20,  23,  39,  43,  44,  45,  49,  56,  70,  74,  97, 
99,  126,  143,  156,  209,  211,  212,  325,  368,  379, 
383,  420. 

Plans  of  battle  and  campaign,  Union,  4, 
7,  8,  9,  10,  14,  20,  21,  215,  31,  32,  46,  49,  55, 
63,  187,  208,  212,  219,  220,  226,  250,  333, 
357,  362,  365-371,  374, 377,  383,  384,  410,  411, 
413-415,  417,  419,  424,  447,  448,  456. 

Po  River,  58,  61,  63,  139,  140,  143,  144,  219- 
221,  222,  276,  302,  361,  432,  434,  437. 

Poague,  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  T., 
44,  47,  50,  51, 63. 

Pole  Green  Church,  348. 

Pole  Green  Church  Road,  346,  394,  395. 

Polecat  Run  or  Station,  303. 

Polly  Hundley's  Corner,  346. 

Pontoons,  14,  15,  16, 17, 18, 122,  123,  399,  412. 

Po  Ny  River,  301,  302. 

Pony  Mountain,  18,  20. 

Poplar  Run,  83, 

Port  Royal,  310,  323,  440. 

Porter,  Captain  Charles  H.,  2.  319. 

Porter,  General  Fitz-John,  333. 

Potomac,  Army  of.  See  Army  of  Poto 
mac. 

Potomac  River,  73,  409,  413,  447. 

Potter,  General  Robert  B.,  159,  160,  195, 
296,  302,  303,  308,  401,  415,  429. 

"Present  equipped,"  Union,  12. 

Prices  in  Confederacy,  35. 

Priest,  Captain,  101. 

Prisoners,  Confederate,  71,  72,  99,  109, 136, 
180,  190,  195-197,  225-227,  259,  260,  298, 
299,  306-308,  314,  329,  348,  349,  351,  352, 
354,  367,  388,  389,  391,  396,  437,  445,  451. 

Prisoners,  Union,  4,  54,  67,  98,  101,  141, 
142,  143,  162,  331,  332,  340,  427,  440,  445. 

Public  debt  of  United  States,  409. 

Provost  marshal's  department,  172,  210. 

Quarles  Ford,  309,  312. 
Quarters,  84, 
Quesenbury  house,  296. 

Raccoon  Ford,  5. 

Raids,  cavalry,  60,  332,  393,  401,  440,  441, 

447. 

Rain,  226,  290,  309,  439. 
Raleigh,  4. 
Ramseur,  General  Stephen  D.,  64,  65,  133, 

420. 
Rapidan  River,  3,  4,  7,  8,  14-18,  23,  24,  27, 

28,  30,  31,  38,  39,  41,  42,  67,  79,  83,  88,  101, 

119, 120,  126, 137, 184,  180,  207,  228,  232,  367, 

370,  377,  409,  412-417,  430,  431. 
Rappahannock  River,  3,  8,  28,  38,  185,  209, 

409. 

Rappahannock  Station,  367,  387,  418. 
Rations,  Confederate,  8,  32,  35,  38,  49,  66, 

71,  86,  87,  107,  110,  115,  116. 
Rations,  Union,  4,  17,  31,  66,  210,  290,  315, 

412. 


INDEX 


469 


Rawlins,  General  John  A.,  167, 429. 
Kecomioissaiices,  need  and  practicability 

of,  246-248,  276,  277,  338-340,  352,  355,  300, 

402,  457. 

Recruits,  178,  185,  186,  372. 
Recruiting,  4,  183,  373,  374,  430,  432. 
Regiments  discharged,  314,  399. 
Regiments,  strength  of,  178,  298. 
Regimental  rolls,  448. 
Reinforcements,  63,  06,  68,  70,  71,  74,  294, 

298,  302,  305,  321,  328,  349,  371,  375,  376, 

399,  450. 

Religion  among  Confederates,  40. 
Reports,  Confederate,  451. 
Reserve  artillery,  15,  16, 17,  21, 22. 
Reynolds,  General  John  F.,  127. 
Rhode  Island  troops,  306. 
Rice,  General  James  C.,  222,  240,  241. 
Richards's  shop,  48. 
Richardsville,  14-17. 
Richmond,  4,  5,  9,  27,  28,  31,  60,  67,  70,  73, 

74,  212,  216,  311,  325,  344,  368-370,  374,  393- 

395,  400,  403,  410,  414,  431,  434,  440,  442, 

443,  447,  452,  453. 
Richmond  and  Fredericksburg  R.  R-.  69, 

324,  346. 
Ricketts,  General  James  W.,  23,  125, 178, 

329,  335. 
Ricketts,  Captain  R.  Bruce,  48,  141,  192, 

193,  194. 

Riddle's  Shop,  453. 
Roads,  16,  55,  127,  191. 
Robertson's,  15. 
Robertson's  River,  120. 
Robertson's  Tavern,  15,  43,  123,  202,  417, 

418,  425. 
Robinson,  General  John  C.,  22,  128,  130, 

143,   144,   188,  210,  212,  214,  215,  217,  221, 

235,  239,  240,  241. 
Robinson,  Leigh,  145,  147,  149. 
Rodes,  General  Robert  E.,  29,  45,  59,  94, 

98,  106,  107,  110,  111,  133,  220,  224,  233,  234, 

314,  325. 
Ropes,  John  C.,  105,  341,  363,  411,  416,  421, 

442,  457. 

Rosecrans,  General  William  S.,  366,  367. 
Ross's  Mill,  16. 
Rosser,  General   Thomas  S.,   7,  48,  158, 

456. 
Russell.  General  David  A.,  135,  178,  267, 

298,  303,  312,  323,  329,  336,  344,  345,  358, 

367,  387. 

Salem  Church,  312. 

Salient,  the  Spottsylvania,  59,  60,  63,  G4- 
68,  107,  109,  111-114,  116,  220,  223,  237,  245, 
265,  275,  283,  284,  388-391,  437-439,  456. 

Sanford,  217,  240. 

Sanitary  Commission,  177. 

Scott,  Colonel  Robert  N.,  361. 

Second  Army  Corps,  Confederate  (Ewell), 
3,  4,  6,  11,  14,  16,  17, 19,  21,  22, 31,  41, 46,  50, 
60,  61,  63,  64, 67-69,  72,  73, 120, 126, 132, 143, 
149,  167,  172,  184,  188,  193,198,202,203,208, 

219,  220,  233,  299,  304,  314,  330,  346-348,  362, 
872,  416-120,  422,  423,  425, 427,  430, 434,  439, 
456. 

Second  Army  Corps,  Union  (Hancock), 
17,  21,  47-50,  52, 55,  60,  61,  63, 67,  71-73, 127, 
137,  138,  143, 152, 154, 168, 170, 172,  177, 186, 
187,  189,  191,  192,  194, 195,  202,  201, 210, 219, 

220,  221,  223,  225,  226,  232, 245,  246, 265,  276, 
280,  283,  284, 285,  290,  292-296,  300-308,  811- 
313, 315,  322,  323,  325,  330, 334, 335,  345,  348- 
351, 353,  358,  361,  362,  371,  378,  380-382, 388- 


390,  396,  399,  401, 419,  420,  423-127, 429,  430, 

434,  435,  437-439,  443,  445,  453,  454. 
Sedgwick,  General  John,  4,  5,  6, 15,  21,  31, 

45,  50,  53,  54,  55,  58,  59,  62,  125,  144,  170, 

178,  179,  221,  235,  373,  384,  430. 
Seymour,   General  Truman,  54,  102,  137, 

162,  189,  202,  210,  382. 
Shady  Grove  Church,  21,  127,  158,  187, 202, 

216,  379,  424. 
Shady  Grove  Church  Road,  325,  337,  395, 

432,  434,  443. 
Shaler,  General  Alexander,  54,  102,  135, 

162,  170,  202,  210,  382. 
Shand  house,  401. 
Shafpsburg,  30. 
Sharpshooters,  237,  308. 
Sheldon  house,  345. 
Shelton,  Lieutenant,  133. 
Shenandoah  Valley,  7,  31,  73,  120,  447. 
Shenandoah  Valley  Turnpike,  181,  397. 
Sheridan,  General  Philip  H.,  9,  14,  18,  21, 

31,  53,  60,  67,  73,  156, 157,  181, 184,  187,  202, 

213,  214,  218,  219,  226,  240,  322,   325,  327, 

344,  348,  349,  393,  401,  426,  440,  444,  447. 
Sherman,  General  William  T.,  8,  30,  360, 

867,  371,  376,  451,  452. 
Shreve,  Major  William  P.,  287. 
Sick,  per  cent,  of,  412,  447. 
Sigel,  General  Franz,  30,  67. 
Sixth  Army  Corps,  3,  5,  6,  11,  15-17,  19,  21, 

22,  31,  42,  45,  46,  48,  49,  54,  58,  65-68,  72, 

74,  123,  125,  134,  135,  137, 143,  144,  150,  154, 
161,  170-172,  177,  178,  182, 185-189, 196,  202, 
210,  220,  224,  226,  236,  265,   268,  291,  292, 
295,   296,   303,   309,  311,  313,  315,  322-324, 
327-330,  335-337,  340,  348-350,  354,  356,  358, 
359,  378,   380,  382,  384,  391,  396,  399,  401, 
403,  417,  420,  421,423-425,  427-429,  435-439, 
443-445. 

Skirmishers  (see  Pickets),  140, 150,  266. 

Sleeper,  Ca.ptain  J.  Henry,  292. 

Smith,   General  William  F.,  70,  72,  312, 

316,  321,  328,  339,  413,  453,  454. 
Smyth,  General  Thomas  A.,  249,  278,  309. 
Snell's  Bridge  (Stannard's  Mill),  218,  302, 

304. 

Somerville  Ford,  92. 
South  Carolina  troops,  307,  344,  3T>0. 
Spirits  of  Confederates,  32,  33,  34,  40,  41, 

75,  88,  366. 

Spirits  of  Union  troops,  211,  316-318,  322, 

337,  306,  399. 
Spotswood's,  418. 
Spottsylvania  Court  House,  14,  28,  55-58, 

61,  63,  68,  79,  80,  99,  104,  106,  121,  126,  208, 

212,  213,  216-219,  221,  229,  231,  233-239,245, 

275,  290,  303,  351,  353,  357, 366, 370,  371,  378, 

379,  384-392,  415, 417,  418,  432,  434-439, 440, 

451. 

Spottsylvania  Ridge,  59,  60. 
Stafford,  General  Le  Roy  A.,  93,  213. 
Staffs,  79,  246. 
Stannard's  Mill  or  Snell's  Bridge,  218, 

302,  304. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of  War ,[221. 
Staunton,  447. 
Steuart,  General  George  H.,  62,  64,  83,  85, 

87,  91,  93,  94,   106,  108,  112,  113,  114,  116, 

252,281,282,283. 

Steuart,  Lieutenant  William,  108, 109,  111. 
Stevens,  General  Hazard,  175, 196, 199. 
Stevens  house,  235. 
Stevensburg,  15,  16. 
Stevensburg  and  Germanna  Ford  Road, 

15,  119,  123. 


470 


INDEX 


Stevenson,  General  Thomas  G.,  144, 149, 

150,  160,  195,  199,  226,  428. 
Stewart  house,  332. 
Stone,  Colonel,  232. 
Stonewall  brigade,  33,  93,  111,  252,  261. 
Stony  Mountain,  18,  20. 
Strategy,  202,  203,  321,   322,  337,  338,  344, 

346,  347,  353,  359, 362,  371,  376,  395, 396,  400, 

404,  405,  417-419,  425, 431-434,  439,  441,  442, 

451-457. 
Stuart,  General  J.  E.  B.,  185,  214,  216,  231, 

233,  234,  393,  426. 
Suffolk,  siege  of,  180. 
Supplies,  Confederate,  7,  8,  412,  430,  441. 
Supplies,  Union,  2iX),  404,  419. 
Surgeon-General's  Report,  448,  449. 
Susquehanna,  Department  of,  415. 
Swan,  Colonel  AVilliam  W.,  117,  167,  169, 

171,  421,  422. 

Sweitzer,  Colonel  Jacob  B.,  124. 
Swift  Creek  (or  Run),  313,  315,  345,  349, 

355. 
Swinton,  William,  125,  143,  171,  209,  285, 

316,  345,  361,  362,  366,  446,  448,  449. 
Sykes,  General  John,  6. 

Tabernacle  Church,  80. 

Tactics,  134,  141,  192,  193,  202,  203,  253,  254, 
255,  266,  333,  338,  352,  353,  360,  362,381, 
386,  390,  403,  404,  420-424,  427,  428,  433- 
435,  437,  438,  446,  457. 

Talley,  Colonel  William  C.,  128. 

Tannatt,  Colonel  Thomas  R.,  298. 

Tanner,  Major,  93. 

Tapp's  farm,  or  house,  128,  143,  147-150, 
153,  159,  169,  423. 

Taylor,  Colonel  Walter  H.,  94,  171,  172, 
185. 

Taylor's  Ford,  322. 

Telegraph  Road,  68,  304. 

Tennessee,  East,  7. 

Tenth  Army  Corps,  368. 

Terrill,  Colonel  James  B.,  315. 

Texas  troops,  50,  51,  62,  149,  153,  169,  172. 

Third  Army  Corps,  Confederate  (Hill), 
29,  37,  48,  49,  52,  53,  56,  58,  59,  60,  68,  73, 
93,  94,  111,  120,  126,  128,  138,  139,  147,  149, 
152,  160,  167,  168,  172,  184,  190,  193,  194, 
196, 197,  202,  208,  219,  220,  228.  232,  233,  299, 
305,  330,  331,  350,  372,  380,  381,  416,  418, 
419,  423,  425,  426,  430,  440,  442-445,  447, 
451. 

Third  Army  Corps,  Union,  3,  6,  11,  138, 
177,  182,  183,  294,  313. 

"  Third  Army  Corps,  Union,"  the,  313. 

Tidewater  section  of  Virginia,  27. 

Tinsley  farm,  325. 

Todd's  Tavern,  14,  22,  46,  56,  58,  60, 80, 123, 
126,  127, 137, 149,  187, 189,  212, 213,  214,  217, 
219,  220,  230,  235,  238,  240,  292,  378-380, 
417,  418,  423,  425. 

Torbert,  General  Alfred  T.  A.,  9,  10, 19, 
21,  23,  300,  322,  323,  327,  349,  417,  418,  440. 

Totopotomoy  battle,  314,  315,  325,  337,  352, 
a53. 

Totopotomoy  Creek,  69,  313,  315,  324,  333, 
344,  362,  393,  396,  442,  443. 

Townsend,  E.  D.,  Assistant  Adjutant- 
General,  450. 

Trains.    See  Wagon  trains. 

Transportation,  Confederate,  7. 

"  Traveller,"  62. 

Trevilian's  Station,  73. 

Trigg  house,  426. 

Trimble,  General  Isaac  R.,  93. 


Tripler,  Charles  S.,  Medical  Director,  449. 

Truax,  Colonel  William  S.,  269. 

Tulley  house,  346. 

Turkey  Hill,  71. 

Twelfth  Army  Corps,  366. 

Twyman's  Store,  21. 

Tyler,  General  Robert  O.,  294,  296,  305, 

308,  313. 

Ulster  men,  descendants  of,  33. 

Upton,  General  Emory,  62,  109,   134,  135 

170,  178,   202,   212,  224,  225,  235-238,  268, 

269,  293,  353,  387,  388,  435-437. 

Vaccination,  87. 

Venable,  Colonel  Charles  H.,  153,  216,217 

220,  232,  310. 

Verdiersville,  43,  228,  425. 
Vermont  troops,  138,  182,  192-198,  254,  265. 
Veteran  Reserve  Corps,  415. 
Vicksburg,  31,  340,  374. 
"  Virginia  Campaign,  of  1864  and  1865, 

The,"  411,  412. 
Virginia  Central  Railroad,  31,  69,  307, 309, 

324,  346,  348,  395,  402,  440,  441,  447. 
Virginia  troops,  85,  91,  92,  93,  99,  101,  115, 

132,  136,  145. 

"Wadsworth,  General  James  H.,  24,  45,  47, 
49,  52,  53,  123,  127,  130,  132,  143,  144,  146, 
149-151,  154,  155,  180,  188,  195,  196,  198, 
210,  381,  382,  423,  426,  450. 

Wagon  trains,  10,  13,  17,  18,  19,  32,  56,  156, 
157,  186,  187,  202,  210,  213,  220,  290,  291, 
302,  323,  378,  379,  393,  395,  396,  412,  417- 
419,  441,  456. 

Wainwright,  Colonel  Charles  S.,  133. 

Walker,  General  Francis  A.,  53,  198,  202, 
411,  417,  424. 

Walker,  General  James  A.,  93,  111. 

Walnut  Grove  Church,  443. 

Walton,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  93. 

War  Department,  Confederate,  70. 

Ward,  General  J.  H.  Hobart,  223. 

Warren,  Colonel  E.  T.  H.,  92,  100. 

Warren,  General  Gouverneur  K.,  5,  6,  15, 
19,  21,  22,  31,  50,  55,  57,  61,  68,  123,  124, 
128,  133,  144,  167,  211,  214,  218,  235,  236, 

309,  338,  373,  374,  385,  420-422,  430,  435, 
436! 

Warrenton  Junction,  4. 

Washington,  73,  187,  210,  368-370,  374,  378, 

403,  415,  447,  455. 
Watkins,  Colonel  (52d  Va.),  315. 
Watt's  Hill,  333,  334,  335,  339. 
Webb,  General  Alexander  S.,  5,  53,  141, 

146,  148,  150,  151,  155,  180,   198,  280,  291, 

382,  385. 

Welford  house,  3. 
West  Point  graduates,  208,  372. 
West  Virginia,  178. 
Western  Confederate  armies,  171,  433. 
Wheaton,  General  Frank,  137,  138, 154, 177, 

178,  179,  190,  191,  193,  195,  197,   199,  267, 

269. 

White,  Dr.  Henry  Alexander,  25. 
White  House,  9,  70,  181,  321,  323,  330,  347, 

349,  412,  444,  452. 
White,  J.,  house,  332. 
White  Oak  Swamp,  73,  453. 
Wickham,  General  William  C.,  38. 
Wilcox,  General  Cadmus,  29,  47,  48,  49,68, 

142,  147,  148,  152,  153,   159,  190,  192,  194, 

208,  220,  232,  234,  303,  322,  449. 
Wilcox's  Landing,  453. 


INDEX 


471 


Wilderness,  the,  10,  22,  23,29,  38,  39,42,  46, 

94-97,  128,  131,  145,  149,  150,  187,  188,  191, 

208,  209,  234,  378,  379.  417,  419,  420,  448. 
Wilderness,  battle  of,  6,  47,  98,  119,  138, 

144,  149,  150,  163,  171,   201,  20!),  210,  211, 

361,  366,  370,  379-384,   415,   429-431,   440, 

448,  449,  451,  456. 
Wilderness  Run,  96,  127,  130. 
Wilderness  Tavern,  15,  19,  21,  41,  96,  123, 

124,  12G,  132,  133,   137,  144,  167,  186,  189, 

378,  379,  417-419,  422-425,  428. 
Willcox,  General  Orlando  B.,  159, 195,  199, 

221,  303,  307-309,  312. 
Williams,  General  Seth,  18,  22,  105. 
Williams,  Colonel  Titus  V.,  92, 101. 
Williamson,  Captain  George,  91,  92,  93, 

108,  109,  112,  114. 
Willis,  Colonel  Edward,  314. 
Wilmington,  4. 
Wilson,  General  James  H.,  9,  19,  21,  22, 

74,  123,  127,  158,  187,   216,  217,    218,   240, 

322,  323,  332,  378,  441. 


Windmill  Point,  399. 

Winslow,  Captain  George  B.,  133. 

Winter  quarters,  Confederate,  32,  36,  83, 

120,  367. 

Winter  quarters,  Union,  3,  4,  120, 177,  367. 
Wofford,  General  William  T.,  153-156, 197. 
Woody  house,  332. 
Wounded,  the,  101,  102,  103,  105,  135,  201, 

209,   212,  213,  219,  222,  294,  360,  361,  404, 

412,  451,  458,  459. 

Wright,  General  Ambrose  R.,  228,  229. 
Wright,  General  Horatio  G.,  125,  131,  137, 

167,  178,  188,  226,  339,  361,  384,  388,  427, 

439. 

Yell,  the  Confederate,  34,  44,  45,  75. 
Yellow  Tavern,  226. 
York  River,  8,  27,  58,  185. 
Young,  General  Pierce  M.  B.,  37. 
Young,  J.  Russell,  340. 


(Cbe 

Electrotype*  and  printed  by  H.  O.  Houghton  &  Co. 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.S.  A. 


HOME  USE 


. 


LIUHAHy 


26 


LD 


61 


University  01  v-d. 
Berkeley 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 


CODb7D73SS 


-,.  . 


